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Abstract 
 
This thesis probes a neglected area lying at the interface between medical 
and labour history and is concerned with issues of occupational health 
and safety in the British chemical industry between the First World War 
and the passage of the Health and Safety at Work Act of 1974. The 
research is presented thematically and draws on a wide variety of primary 
and secondary source material to reveal the causes of ill health, the 
politics of reform and the role of the key players, such as the government, 
medical profession, employers and trade unions. As such, it engages 
critically with hypotheses in this contested field of historical research. 
The results of open-ended interviews also provides new testimony to 
show how occupational health issues impacted directly on the workers 
themselves as well as on the lives of their families.  
 
It is argued that the outputs of the chemical industry had social, 
economic, and political benefits but that the human cost in producing 
these was often hidden by poor data collection, a lack of investigation 
and by the fact that the effects of exposure only became evident after 
latency periods of many years. Some of the obvious and insidious 
hazards to heath were addressed over time but only so long as the costs 
of these measures did not adversely impact on the profit making 
capabilities of the firms involved. Therefore, working within a system 
that prioritised profit over health many chemical workers continued to be 
exposed to hazardous and lethal processes. The main response to this by 
both the employers and the state was to pay compensation. This was the 
cheaper alternative to prevention and also had the effect of hiding the 
destitution that arose when a chemical worker no longer had the ability to 
sell his labour power. 
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Introduction 
 
Dad worked at ICI in the caustic plant. At the time we were living out 
at Rushton, which is about ten mile…twelve mile away from 
Winnington and he used to cycle there and back. I remember him 
coming home, well being brought home in the ambulance when he’d 
had nasty burns through the caustic.1 
 
 
Between 1914 and 1974 thousands of ‘dads’ risked their lives each day in 
British chemical works in an effort to earn a living. With the passing of each decade 
the demand for the goods they produced increased and in 1943 the Chemical 
Workers Union (CWU) claimed that, ‘without the toil of the chemical process 
worker, life as it is lived today would be impossible.’2 For example, and by way of 
attempting to define the industry, in the mid 1970s the Department of Trade and 
Industry utilised the following Standard Industrial Classification Order for the 
Annual Census of Production providing an indication of the range of products 
produced. The classification included sixteen divisions which were as follows; 1) 
General Chemicals, 2) Inorganic, 3) Organic, 4) Miscellaneous, 5) Pharmaceuticals, 
6) Toilet Preparations, 7) Paint, 8) Soap and Detergents, 9) Synthetic Resins, 
Plastics, and Synthetic Rubber, 10) Dyestuffs and Pigments, 11) Fertilisers, 12) 
Polishes, 13) Adhesives and Gelatines, 14) Explosives, Fireworks, Matches, 15) 
Pesticides, Disinfectants and 16) Printing Ink.3 The problems in attempting to define 
the industry will be identified below but what can be deduced from the list above is 
that the chemical industry differs from most others in that its product range and 
methods of manufacture are very wide-ranging, indeed it has been described as ‘a 
constellation of different industries.’4 Various aspects of everyday life have 
undoubtedly benefited from the many chemical products listed above but this study 
will examine the actual costs to humankind as experienced by those who toiled to 
produce the multitude of chemical substances that are often found in the products of 
other industries. 
                                                 
1 Interview D. Walker with Gladys Rogerson, 21 March, 2005, p.5 
2 B. Edwards, War on the People, Independent Labour Party, (London 1943), p.4 
3 C.Gill, R. Morris and J. Eaton, Industrial Relations in the Chemical Industry, Saxon House, (Hants. 
1978), p.xvi 
4 C.Gill, R. Morris and J. Eaton, Industrial Relations in the Chemical Industry, Saxon House, (Hants. 
1978), p.xvi 
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In their 1978 study, Industrial Relations in the Chemical Industry, Gill Eaton and 
Morris noted that industrial injuries were substantially under reported. More 
importantly with regard to the chemical industry many cases of industrial disease, a 
greater hazard in chemicals than industrial injury, also went unreported.5 These 
omissions immediately confront any researcher of occupational health with an 
obvious problem - and one that Sellers has identified in Hazards of the Job - as an 
epistemological dilemma whereby ‘workplace causes and their bodily effects often 
remain frustratingly obscure, remote, and difficult to establish.’6 Nonetheless, using 
a combination of documentary analysis and oral testimony this study will explore the 
main characteristics of the British chemical worker’s experience in relation to 
occupational health and safety, providing an analysis of the continuities and changes 
that occurred over the period 1914 to 1974.  
An important aspect of this research is to explore the causes of ill health, the 
politics of reform and the role of key players, such as government, medical 
profession, employers and trade unions. More than twenty years ago Weindling 
argued in The Social History of Occupational Health, that the study of occupational 
health should form part of the social history of industrialisation as, ‘only a fraction of 
the historical literature on industry, the labour movement and medicine is concerned 
with occupational health.’7 Social historians rose to this challenge and many 
important studies have since been published but the history of occupational disease 
and injury within the British chemical industry is largely absent. The outcomes of 
this research should provide a more detailed survey of the interaction between health 
and work in this important sector of British industry. The fundamental questions that 
require explanations are, to what extent, in what form, and for what reasons were 
British chemical workers exposed to dangers and hazards within the workplace 
between the outbreak of World War One and the introduction of the Health and 
Safety at Work Act (1974)? The thesis will concentrate on the industrial health issues 
that affected the workers who were directly involved in the production of chemical 
                                                 
5 C.Gill, R. Morris and J. Eaton, Industrial Relations in the Chemical Industry, Saxon House, (Hants. 
1978), pp.237-239 
6 C. C. Sellers, Hazards of the Job, University of North Carolina Press, ((London 1997), p.4 
7 P. Weindling, ‘Linking Self Help and Medical Science: The Social History of Occupational Health, 
pp.2-31 in P. Weindling (ed) The Social History of Occupational Health, Croom Helm, (London 
1985), p.2 
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compounds but not those who used chemical substances within the other industries 
such as the textile, glass, and paper industries. One of the main objectives in 
examining this area is to build upon the contemporaneous body of social historical 
research relating to the impact of work upon health. Recent work on other industries 
has provided a better understanding of how workers have contracted a range of life 
threatening illnesses such as asbestosis, mesothelioma, pneumoconiosis, bronchitis, 
emphysema, silicosis, and byssinosis.8 This study will attempt to fill the gap that 
presently exists providing a study of occupational health and safety amongst British 
chemical process workers, an especially neglected group in the literature.   
Methodology 
In researching for this thesis a combination of both qualitative and 
quantitative methods were used although qualitative methods were the more 
dominant. Quantitative methods were used to provide information on the numbers 
employed in the industry as well as to indicate the membership and densities of the 
main trade unions that recruited and organised within this sector. Official data drawn 
from Factory Inspector’s reports and the Annual Abstract of Statistics provide an 
indication of the numbers affected by fatal and non-fatal accidents as well as helping 
to quantify those who suffered from a variety of occupational diseases that resulted 
from exposure to toxic gases, fumes or dusts. For example, data has been extracted 
from Factory Inspectors reports to construct new tables that show the numbers of 
officially reported cases of chrome ulceration within the chromate-manufacturing 
sector. These tables cover two ten-year periods that sit either side of the 1939-45 
war: the former period being one during which occupational health issues received 
negligible attention whilst the latter witnessed more significant progress. This data is 
then compared with factory inspector’s reports, quantitative environmental and 
technical data, as well as with worker’s testimony and by doing so the official 
                                                 
8 For example, see: S. Bowden, and G. Tweedale, G. ‘Mondays Without Dread: The Trade Union 
Response to Byssinosis in the Lancashire Cotton Industry in the Twentieth Century’ pp.79-95 in 
Social History of Medicine, Volume 16, No.1, 2003, G. Tweedale, Magic Mineral to Killer Dust, 
Turner & Newall and the Asbestos Hazard, Oxford University Press, (Oxford 2003), R. Johnston, and 
A. McIvor, Lethal Work, A History of the Asbestos Tragedy in Scotland, Tuckwell Press, (East 
Lothian 2000), R. Johnston, and A. McIvor, Miners’ Lung, A History of Dust Disease in British Coal 
Mining, Ashgate, (Hampshire 2007), M.W. Bufton, and J. Melling, ‘Coming Up for Air: Experts, 
Employers, and Workers in Campaigns to Compensate Silicosis Sufferers in Britain, 1918-1939’ 
pp.63-86 in Social History of Medicine, Volume 18, No.1, 2005, S. Morrison ‘The Factory 
Inspectorate and the Silica Dust Problem in UK Foundries, 1939-1970, pp.31-49 in Scottish Labour 
History Journal, Volume 40, 2005  
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statistical data is subjected to a cross-method triangulation and its reliability tested.9 
New data is also presented from twelve volumes of the United Alkali Company 
Accident Books. These volumes contain reports of fatal and non-fatal accidents that 
occurred within this large chemical manufacturer over the fourteen-year period, 1914 
to 1928. They therefore provide a means to present quantifiable data to show the total 
numbers of employees affected and a monthly pattern of injury that extends from the 
beginning of the First World War through to the era of economic Depression. 
Statistical evidence has also been drawn from epidemiological reports, such as that 
found within the British Journal of Industrial Medicine, to indicate the numbers 
affected by occupational cancers within the dyestuffs, chromate, and vinyl chloride 
sectors of the industry.  
Russell notes that only a small percentage of the records held by the chemical 
industry have actually survived with fire, explosion, air raids, and programmes of 
modernisation being cited as responsible agents for much of the destruction.10 
Russell further suggests that documentary material was destroyed because some 
owners of chemical plant were anxious to rid themselves of ‘irritating reminders of 
an out-of-date image.’11 Despite this pattern of destruction qualitative methods have 
been used to analyse both primary and secondary documentary source material that 
includes various public records, media reports, private papers, company records, 
photographs and journal articles. For example, the archives of the Chester and 
Cheshire Record Office were identified as holders of documentary papers belonging 
to Brunner Mond, Fleetwood Ammonia, and Castner Kellner chemical companies as 
well as having minute books of the Federation of Trade Unions of Salt Workers, 
Alkali Workers, Mechanics and General Labourers. This source material revealed 
pertinent information, such as the Accident Books belonging to the United Alkali 
Company, although the trade union (handwritten) minute books were sparse in 
content and offered up little that was relevant to this study. More recent archival 
                                                 
9 Discussion of this methodology is found in K. Macdonald and C. Tipton, ‘Using Documents,’ 
pp.187-200 in N. Gilbert (ed) Researching Social Life, Sage, (London 1993) and P. Bellaby, 
‘Histories of Sickness: Making Use of Multiple Accounts of the Same Process,’ pp.20-42 in S. Dex 
(ed) Life and Work History Analyses: Qualitative and Quantitative Developments, Routledge, 
(London 1991)     
10 C.A. Russell, (ed) Chemistry, Society and Environment, A New History of the British Chemical 
Industry, Royal Society of Chemistry, (Cambridge 2000), p.2 
11 Ibid, p.2 
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material belonging to companies such as Imperial Chemical Industries were not 
found and therefore a wide variety of sources were used to cover the inter-war and 
post-war periods that included government publications, journal articles and oral 
testimony. A significant documentary source was found within the Mitchell Library 
Archives that related to the chromate-manufacturing firm of J & J White of 
Rutherglen, near Glasgow. This document was an original internal company memo 
dated from the 1950s that outlined the response made by the firm to the fact that 
occupational lung cancer had been officially associated with the industry for the first 
time. The text of this document is critically analysed to show how the firm selected 
particular words and phrases that sought to minimise the significance of the threat 
posed by this deadly occupational health hazard. 
New evidence is presented from the recently deposited Minutes and Reports 
of the Chemical and Allied Trades National Committee held at the Modern Records 
Office at Warwick University. From the same archive a variety of TUC papers 
relating to occupational health issues were also examined. What emerges from these 
primary sources is that both the TUC and TGWU used their limited resources over 
many years to campaign on various occupational health issues and that in doing so 
met with some success. The information contained within these archival sources is 
supplemented by information retrieved from the TUC annual reports. In contrast to 
the limited information that has been made available by most chemical companies 
the TUC annual reports dating from 1914 to 1974 detail the discussions held and the 
decisions taken by the workers’ representatives and are available online in their 
entirety at http://www.unionhistory.info/  
Oral History Project 
In order to discover the human experience of working within the chemical 
industry it was decided to design an oral history project. The desired outcome was to 
find several respondents with a range of job descriptions that had worked in different 
types of plant. The text used to advertise for respondents did not specify any specific 
occupational group but simply requested that they should have had experience of 
working within the industry or related in some way to someone who had. To help 
recruit respondents it was decided to send notices to local libraries and community 
centres and to write articles that were likely to be published in local newspapers 
 5
  
(short, concise and with a local interest). The trade union that represented most 
chemical workers was the TGWU and they were also contacted to see if a cohort of 
former shop stewards or activists could be generated. Doug May in Bristol was the 
only respondent who was generated by this method. As some early evidence 
suggested that Polish and Pakistani workers had entered the chemical industry 
contact was also made with Mr Bashir Maan, a senior representative of the Pakistani 
community in Glasgow, and with a national Polish newspaper based in England. 
Unfortunately, neither of these contacts produced respondents although Mr Maan did 
admit that some Pakistanis who came to Glasgow did work in the chemical industry 
but had since died. His offer to contact their wives to see if they would be willing to 
participate proved fruitless. Equally, contact was made and correspondence entered 
into with a Mr Christopher Storey QC, a professional lawyer who represents trade 
unions in legal cases against British Chrome and Chemicals Ltd. Due to time and 
business commitments this source also proved barren. Paul Holleran, a former 
journalist with the Rutherglen Reformer and now area secretary with the National 
Union of Journalists was contacted to ascertain if he had retained details of people he 
had interviewed in the early 1990s about the chemical plant in Rutherglen. He had 
not and therefore this path generated no respondents. 
The response to the recruiting material harvested a total of thirteen 
respondents. Four were from the Dumfries area, one from Bristol and eight were 
from Rutherglen near Glasgow. Of the respondents from Rutherglen seven were not 
interviewed as their sole interest and knowledge was concentrated on the current 
environmental damage allegedly being caused by the dumping of chromate waste 
(CRVI) in their district. These respondents had little or no direct knowledge of the 
workplace or processes. The local newspaper article in Rutherglen also led to a 
television appearance on Thistle TV (a local cable company) to discuss the project 
and to see if a further cohort could be generated. This proved fruitless. A further 
three respondents were contacted in Cheshire via information provided by an 
acquaintance. Therefore, in total, nine respondents were interviewed with one, 
Richard Fitzpatrick, being interviewed twice. This was done in the interest of Mr 
Fitzpatrick who being 87 years old at the time of the interview grew visibly tired as 
the first interview had progressed. 
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The average age of those interviewed was 71, with birth dates ranging from 
1917 to 1945, while the employment histories of the respondents ranged from the 
late 1930s to the late 1970s. Although a smaller sample was generated than had been 
desired the cohort did represent a good coverage of the industry in that the plastic, 
chromate, explosive and fertiliser sectors were all represented. With the exception of 
a former manager of a chemical plant all the respondents had worked as process 
workers or were related to family members who also worked as process workers. 
Why no former directors or technologists came forward to participate in this study 
cannot be explained by reference to the design of the recruitment material. Perhaps, 
with hindsight, specific mention could have been made to encourage these former 
workers. One reason that may explain the general problem in recruiting respondents 
was made by two former process workers from Dumfries who admitted that their 
former colleagues had seen the article published in the local press but had refused to 
make contact because they were fearful that ICI would stop their pension if they 
talked to an outsider.  
All respondents were informed beforehand of the purpose of the research 
study and two documents were sent to their homes in advance of the visit and 
interview. The first was an ‘informed consent statement’ that outlined how the 
interview would be recorded, what the aims of the research were, what the rights of 
the respondent were, and how the transcript of any interview was to be processed 
before being deposited with the Scottish Oral History Centre at the University of 
Strathclyde. The second document was a ‘copyright clearance form’ issued by the 
SOHC. The interviews were conducted on a one-to-one basis in the homes of the 
respondents although wives and other family members were also present in all cases 
with the exception of one of the anonymous respondents from Dumfries who was 
alone. The three respondents from Cheshire who were related to one another were 
interviewed as a group. All those interviewed were asked standard questions at the 
outset that were designed to gain some information but also to allow the respondent 
to become familiar with the microphone and the situation. The first questions always 
asked for the respondent’s name, date of birth, where they were born, if they had 
brothers or sisters, if they had children, at what age did they leave school and what 
was their first job? Thereafter, in a relatively unstructured manner questions were 
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asked of the respondents about the experiences they had in connection with the 
chemical industry. 
It is acknowledged that there is always the possibility that respondents 
‘private memory’ can be influenced over time by ‘public memory’, that is by 
exposure to other people’s memories fed through media reports, books, films etc and 
that this ‘hegemonic process’ can help create a false or different past for 
respondents.12 Self evidently, this is more likely to happen when the subject matter 
under discussion has received some interest and information about it has been widely 
disseminated. The wars fought between 1914-18 and 1939 -1945 provide good 
examples of such subject matter. Nonetheless, this does not detract from the fact that 
people can and do remember events quite clearly and that by recalling these they 
create a ‘voice of the past’ that helps fill the gaps within the documentary sources.13  
Moreover, the ‘private memory’ of the respondents in this study would have been 
highly unlikely to have been influenced by ‘public memory’ as so little public 
information exists about the working conditions that existed within the British 
chemical industry.  
Prior to embarking on this project it is perhaps appropriate to provide a brief 
background to this industry. Although being the nineteenth century world leader in 
heavy chemicals the British chemical industry was not as important to British 
business as their other real industrial giants such as iron, steel, coal, and textiles. One 
area of the industry that did receive some early attention was pollution, the notorious 
bête noire of chemical production. Public criticisms about pollution led to the 
introduction of limited legislation in 1864 dealing specifically with the emissions of 
hydrochloric acid. Indeed, it was around this time that the first Alkali Inspector, Dr 
Robert Angus Smith, coined the phrase ‘acid rain’ which offered one explanation as 
to how hydrochloric acid emissions were being transported causing much 
environmental damage. A limited number of minor amendments to the initial 
legislation were introduced over the next 42 years until the Liberal government 
passed the Alkali &c Works Regulation Act (1906). This legislation began to address 
                                                 
12 For example see A. Thomson, ‘Anzac Memories: Putting Popular Memory Theory into Practice in 
Australia,’ pp.239-252 in A. Green and K. Troup (eds), The Houses of History, A Critical Reader in 
Twentieth-Century History and Theory, Manchester University Press, (Manchester 1999) 
13 P. Thompson, The Voice of the Past, Oral History, Oxford University Press, (1978) 
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the problem of noxious fumes arising from a wider range of industries but as Ashby 
and Anderson have noted in The Politics of Clean Air, ‘there it (the Act) remained, 
unchanged apart from additions made to the schedules of processes, until 1975.’14 
With the exception of pollution, little attention was paid to the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century British chemical industry which was sited predominantly in 
south Lancashire, Tyneside and Glasgow with some subsidiaries in Teeside, London, 
Bristol and Birmingham. One government enquiry of 1893 reported on the 
conditions of work within alkali and chromate plants and made recommendations to 
improve these. However, it was not until the outbreak of the First World War that a 
more intense interest was taken in the industry when it was discovered just what a 
limited range of products it manufactured.15 By 1915, criticisms could be found on 
the pages of the trade industry journal, The Chemical News, that included blistering 
attacks on the ‘sloth and apathy’ shown by most British manufacturers.16 Confirming 
this view seventy-five years later, Dintenfass, in an economic and historical account 
of The Decline of Industrial Britain has referred to the chemical masters ‘excessive 
technological conservatism.’17  This trait was witnessed in the decision made by 
many chemical masters to stick with the LeBlanc system rather than the more 
efficient Solvay system as well as ignoring the synthetic dye processes, developed by 
Perkin, an 18 year old British chemist, who sold his discovery to German capitalists 
thus allowing the German industry to achieve a virtual monopoly of this market by 
1914.18 Accordingly, at the beginning of 1915, dyestuffs, medicines and fertilisers 
                                                 
14 E. Ashby and M. Anderson, The Politics of Clean Air, Oxford University Press, (Oxford 1981), 
p.80  
15 The colours for the army khaki and navy blue had been imported from Germany. The British 
chemical industry was also largely dependent on natural constituents that were shipped large distances 
and had to be protected from German attack by the British Navy. The German industry was more 
sophisticated and self-sufficient. For a more detailed discussion on the shortcomings and British 
responses see M. Sanderson, The Universities and British Industry 1850-1970, Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, (London 1972), pp.214-242    
16 The Chemical News, January 1, 1915, p.8. Allegation made by William Reginald Ormandy DSC, 
FCS 
17 M. Dintenfass, The Decline of Industrial Britain, 1870-1980, Historical Connections Series, 
Routledge, (London 1992), p.14 
18 H, Braverman, Labour and Monopoly Capital, The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century, 
(New York 1998), p.111 
The LeBlanc system was invented in France in 1791 and was used by most British alkali 
manufactures that also made some improvements to the process. Despite these improvements the 
process was labour intensive and a heavy polluter of the atmosphere and surrounding environment. In 
1861,Ernest Solvay invented a cleaner and more efficient system of manufacture and in 1873 the 
British firm of Brunner Mond began to manufacture alkali by this method. They soon began to 
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were all failing to be supplied in sufficient quantities in Britain although of primary 
concern to the government was the poor supply of munitions for the war effort. 
Following government intervention and encouragement chemical firms began to 
extend their range of products whilst the government took responsibility for the 
production of synthetic dyes and explosives.19 Looking back at the chemical industry 
in 1953 Williams notes in his account that the First World War was the pivotal point 
in the industries history and one that led to its structural reorganisation.20 
Anticipating post-war modernisation, the Ministry of Reconstruction appointed a 
standing committee in 1917, ‘fully representative of the whole of the trade,’ to 
consider a closer collaboration between the government and representatives of the 
trade.21 No trade union was consulted and the Association of British Chemical 
Manufacturers were identified as being ‘the most representative’ group.22 Thereafter, 
the post-war British government and chemical industrialists made a concerted effort 
to bring the British industry to the same level of expertise and development that had 
been demonstrated by the German manufacturers.23 By 1919, and in pursuit of this 
aim, a ‘British Mission’ was sent to the occupied zone in Germany to investigate and 
report on the methods that had been adopted for the production of explosives and 
poison gases by the German chemical industry. Having identified that the German 
dye industry had been swiftly converted to the production of munitions the British 
Mission noted that: 
 
In the future it is clear that every chemical factory must be regarded as 
a potential arsenal … for military security it is essential that each 
country should have its chemical industry firmly established … the 
rapid growth of the British chemical industry during the war proves 
                                                                                                                                          
threaten the LeBlanc industry in Britain and consequently 48 LeBlanc manufacturers joined forces in 
1890 under the name of the United Alkali Company to protect prices and share research costs. The 
UAC folded in 1926 when it became a part of ICI.    
19 G.C. Allen, British Industries and Their Organization, Longman, (London 1970), p.209 
20 T. I. Williams, The Chemical Industry, Past and Present, Penguin, (London 1953), p.87  
21 Ministry of Reconstruction, Committee on the Chemical Trade, To Advise as to the Procedure 
which should be adopted for dealing with the Chemical Trade, HMSO, PP 1917, (Cd.8882), p.3 
22 Ibid, p.3 
23 W.J. Reader, ‘The Chemical Industry’ pp.156-178 in N.K. Buxton and D.H. Aldcroft (eds) British 
Industry Between the Wars, Instability and Industrial Development, 1919-1939, Scolar Press, (London 
1979), p.156   
 10
  
that it can compete successfully with Germany provided that 
reconstruction is undertaken on a sufficiently large scale.24 
 
Thus, it was decided that a modern and complete chemical industry was essential for 
Britain and that this should be protected against imports by The Dyestuffs (Import 
Regulation) Act of 1920, legislation that was intended to last ten years but in fact 
remained unaltered until 1960. 
Showing no lack of willingness to intervene in the business of the chemical 
industry the government also helped establish the British Dyestuffs Corporation 
(BDC) in 1919. The BDC had a short lived independent existence when in 1926 it 
became part of Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI), a firm that exemplified the shift 
in Britain towards a more concentrated production structure such as was found in the 
motor vehicle and electrical goods industries.25 Bringing together the largest British 
chemical concerns at the time such as Brunner Mond, Nobel Industries and the 
United Alkali Company, the formation of ICI was the British chemical industries 
defensive response to overseas competition specifically from the German and 
American industries.26 The main German industries had amalgamated in 1925 
forming IG Farbenindustrie AG and in America, DuPont and Allied Chemical and 
Dye had emerged during World War One as well resourced and powerful 
competitors. International agreements were entered into by all of these chemical 
giants that allocated appropriate monopolistic markets to each. For ICI this meant the 
British Commonwealth, for IG Farben the Continental market, and for DuPont and 
Allied Chemical and Dye the markets of North and South America.27 Until the 
Second World War these agreements remained in place with many new processes 
being developed and the range of products being enlarged as witnessed for example 
by the new plastics, industrial gases, synthetic fibres, insecticides, drugs and 
disinfectants. Again, preparations for war drew government interest in the products 
                                                 
24 British Mission Appointed to Visit Enemy Chemical Factories in the Occupied Zone Engaged in the 
Production of Munitions of War in February 1919, HMSO, PP1921, (Cmd. 1137), pp.9-10 
25 C. More, The Industrial Age, Economy and Society in Britain, 1750-1985, Longman, (London 
1989), p.323 
26 W.J. Reader, ‘The Chemical Industry’ pp.156-178 in N.K. Buxton and D.H. Aldcroft (eds) British 
Industry Between the Wars, Instability and Industrial Development, 1919-1939, Scolar Press, (London 
1979), p.165 
27 W.J Reader, ‘The Chemical Industry’ provides a detailed historical account of this period.  
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of the industry when in 1938 £204,000 was invested in poison gas research with the 
Chemical Warfare (Defence) Department.28 Given the changes made to the industry 
highlighted above, by 1939, Britain was no longer reliant on large imported supplies 
of chemical products as had been the case in 1914.  
The Second World War further stimulated the chemical industry bringing new 
branches of the industry into being such as the petrochemical industry and from 1950 
to 1960 the percentage of chemical products produced from oil (rather than coal or 
coke) rose from 6 per cent to 50 per cent.29 Indeed, Allen has calculated that between 
1958 and 1968 output from the chemical industry grew by 85 per cent compared with 
43 per cent for the manufacturing industry as a whole.30 Nonetheless, in the 1960s 
the British chemical industry faced new competition from the Japanese along with 
that of the European and American industries. The National Economic Development 
Council (NEDC) in collaboration with the Chemical Industries Association (formerly 
the Association of British Chemical Manufacturers) formed a team that included 
three leading trade union representatives to study the American chemical industry. 
Following their visit to the USA in 1966 the NEDC published a series of 
recommendations aimed at improving the ‘efficiency and competitiveness’ of the 
British chemical industry.31 Of specific interest to this study was the finding by the 
NEDC that the American companies devoted greater attention to safety measures 
with the result that accident frequency rates within the American chemical industry 
were one-third of the corresponding British figure.32 In 1973-74, the Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) raised the price of a barrel of oil from $2.46 
to $9.76 thereby hitting the now oil reliant chemical industry hard.33 The industries 
almost immediate response was to cut their labour forces and move many processes 
overseas where cheaper labour markets were to be found.34 Thus within ICI’s 
                                                 
28 J.D. Bernal, The Social Function of Science, Routledge, (London 1944), p.50 
29 P. Pagnamenta and R. Overy, All Our Working Lives, British Broadcasting Corporation, (London 
1984), p.162  
30 G.C. Allen, British Industries and Their Organization, Longman, (London 1970), p.211 
31 National Economic Development Office, ‘Manpower in the Chemical Industry, A Comparison of 
British and American Practices’, HMSO, (London 1967) 
32 Ibid, p.43 
33 C. More, The Industrial Age, Economy and Society in Britain, 1750-1985, Longman, (London), 
p.233 
34 P. Pagnamenta and R. Overy, All Our Working Lives, British Broadcasting Corporation, (London 
1984), p.166 
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Annual Report for 1975 it was stated that they had reduced their employee numbers 
by 3,000.35  
                                                
It can be seen from the overview above that over the period in question the 
chemical industry had taken on an increasingly important role within Britain. From 
1914 the main impetus had been to meet the demands of war with explosives 
manufacture and the defence of the realm taking precedence. Public money in the 
form of government subsidies were put into the industry to shore up the gaps that had 
been allowed to exist under private ownership. Having built up the dyestuffs industry 
through direct governmental funding from 1917 the British chemical industry began 
its transformation towards self-sufficiency. Dyestuff production increased 
dramatically between 1913 and 1933 from 9,114,134 lbs. to 52,944,866 lbs. and by 
1945 exports by the chemical industry amounted to £37,414,951 making it the third 
largest exporter in Britain just behind cotton and machinery.36 The shortages of 
natural raw materials during World War Two helped to further develop the 
manufacture of alternative synthetic materials. The industry became important 
politically in helping to secure Britain’s kudos as a major independent world power 
and although the staple sectors of British industry such as coal mining, shipbuilding 
and the steel industry faltered after 1918, the inter-war years saw the growth of the 
‘new’ sectors such as the electricity supply industry, the motor vehicle as well as the 
chemical industry. Cronin notes that between 1920 and 1938 the coal, cotton, 
woollen, shipbuilding and steel industries had shed around 915,000 workers whilst 
during the same period more than 600,000 had been added to the chemical, electrical 
engineering, vehicles, electricity supply, silk and rayon as well as the hosiery 
industries.37 The Second World War further stimulated the industry and in the 
decades thereafter the chemical industry contributed increasingly to economic, 
political and social roles in the development of the nation. As stated earlier, the 
chemical industry fed into other industries and these industries were helping to meet 
the demands being made by an increasingly affluent consumerist society. The demise 
of the Empire from the late 1940s also led to the increased use of new synthetic 
 
35 Imperial Chemical Industries Limited, Annual Report, 1975, p.9 
36 B. Edwards, Chemicals, Servant or Master? Life or Death? National Labour Press, (London 1945), 
pp.15-16 
37 J. E. Cronin, Labour and Society in Britain, 1918-1979, Batsford, (London 1984), p.53 
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fibres and substances that offered cheaper and more sustainable alternatives to the 
natural products such as rubber, silk, wood and cotton.  
 Calculating the numbers employed in the industry is a process that is at best 
confusing and at worst wholly inaccurate, particularly for the earlier periods. This is 
due mostly to the changes that were made in occupational classifications. The task is 
further complicated by a lack of a clear and indisputable definition of the chemical 
industry. For example, in 1948 the President of the Board of Trade called for a 
comprehensive survey of the whole industry but the study group were immediately 
faced with the problem of defining it. Contemporary definitions that were available 
included those belonging to: The 5th Census of Production, the Trade and Navigation 
Accounts, the Wartime Essential Works Orders, the Partial Census of Production 
(1946), the Association of British Chemical Manufacturers (ABCM), the Standard 
Industrial Classification of the Government Inter-Department Committee of 
Statisticians and that of the International Labour Office.38 
Nonetheless, academic writers probing this subject area have estimated that in 
1914 there were around 30,100 employed in the ‘alkali and manufacturing chemists’ 
sectors.39 By 1921, the Ministry of Labour calculated that there were 74,477 males 
and 18,714 women employed although Buxton and Aldcroft claim that the numbers 
dipped during the recession of the early 1930s before rising again to around 57,000 
by 1937.40 As stated above, the Second World War witnessed further expansion of 
the industry and by 1948 the total numbers employed had more than doubled 
reaching 142,000 of which 102,000 were process workers.41 By way of 
demonstrating the unreliability of this data the figures for 1948 are quadrupled when 
using the method adopted by the Ministry of Labour in 1949, which estimated the 
numbers employed as 429,600.42 The reason for this difference is that the Ministry of 
Labour did not work from a specific definition but utilised the heading ‘chemical and 
allied trades’ that included some processes that were not taken into account by the 
                                                 
38 T. I. Williams, The Chemical Industry, Past and Present, Penguin, (London 1953), pp.87-88 
39 L. F. Haber, The Chemical Industry During the Nineteenth Century, A Study of the Economic Aspect 
of Applied Chemistry in Europe and North America, Oxford University Press, (Oxford 1958), p.232 
40 Eighteenth Abstract of Labour Statistics of the United Kingdom, PP1926, (Cmd. 2740), p.16 and 
N.K. Buxton and D.H. Aldcroft, British Industry Between the Wars, Instability and Industrial 
Development 1919-1939, Scolar Press, (London 1979), p.176 
41 T. I. Williams, The Chemical Industry, Past and Present, Penguin, (London 1953), p.91 
42 Ibid, p.91 
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ABCM or the Board of Trade. By 1963, the National Economic Development Office 
calculated that 410,000 people were employed in the industry and as Gill et al have 
noted this level of employment remained almost constant up to 1974 when 432,600 
workers were employed making the chemical industry the ninth largest employer in 
the United Kingdom.43 
The scale and the speed with which the industry expanded can perhaps account 
for the sparsity of information that is available: the expansion outpaced the 
administration. Added to this is the fact that the industry has been associated with 
corporate secrecy due to the high capital investment involved in the development of 
products and processes. Perhaps this explains why the industry has received less 
attention from social historians than other industries? Regardless of these potential 
barriers Chapter One will analyse the existing literature on occupational health and 
safety and will engage with relevant historical research. Although touching on many 
studies this chapter will also specifically engage with the research undertaken by 
Tweedale, and Johnston and McIvor on the asbestos industry, Markowitz and 
Rosner’s recent critique of the American chemical industry and Woolfson and 
Beck’s sociological study of the occupational dangers associated with the oil 
industry. In addition, there will be an analysis of the research undertaken by Bartrip, 
Fenn and Burman that has analysed the impact of state intervention as evidenced by 
the introduction of the Workmen’s Compensation Act in 1897 and the subsequent 
amendments made to this legislation. Navarro’s class-based critique of the dominant 
interpretations of health and medicine will also be examined. In addition, primary 
source material will be probed for evidence of the attitudes and strategies of the 
workers, trade unions, employers, the state and the medical establishment. This will 
result in a comprehensive interpretation of the available literature and provide a 
range of viewpoints. Interpretations are varied and this chapter should offer the 
reader a clear understanding of how the main theoretical frameworks inform and 
influence historical accounts of occupational health and safety issues.  
 Chapter Two is divided into two parts with the first of these addressing the 
impact made on the health and welfare of the workers by the hours and pace of work. 
                                                 
43 Manpower in the Chemical Industry, A Comparison of British and American Practices, National 
Economic Development Office, HMSO, (London 1967), p.52 and C.Gill, R. Morris and J. Eaton, 
Industrial Relations in the Chemical Industry, Saxon House, (Hants. 1978), p.xviii 
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This requires an analysis of the labour process within the chemical industry to 
establish what changes occurred in the way that the work was organised and how this 
impacted on the working environment and the body. Whilst some large firms had 
operated within the British chemical sector up to 1914 the shape of the industry 
changed quite radically in response to foreign competition from the mid 1920s. This 
resulted in a rationalisation of the industry and it became one that was dominated by 
large-scale firms whose methods of work organisation were adapted to suit an 
increasingly technological and scientific based process. In part two there will be an 
examination of the causes and impact of accidents upon the workforce. Many 
obvious dangers existed within the workplace such as that caused by fire, explosion, 
splashes from caustic, ore crushing machinery, poorly lit or badly ventilated 
workplaces and from injuries incurred in the maintenance of the large process 
equipment. In Chapter Three there will be an examination of the damage caused to 
the body of the chemical worker by the exposure to a variety of toxic fumes, gases or 
liquids. This could result in temporary or permanent damage being caused to the 
skin, lungs, teeth or eyes of the operatives. A more insidious risk existed from the 
long-term exposures to toxic and carcinogenic substances that could result in death. 
Three specific areas of the industry will be examined to measure the consequences of 
exposure to chromates, intermediate dyestuffs, and vinyl chloride monomer. Both 
Chapters Two and Three will draw on new primary source material, the accident 
books that belonged to the United Alkali Company, and will also draw on 
government reports, occupational health journals and oral testimony to probe the 
attitudes and perceptions that existed amongst those who were directly exposed to 
the dangers within the workplace.  
 The role played by the state, the factory inspectors, and medical research will 
be the main focus for Chapter Four. From 1914, both local and national government 
bodies increasingly intervened in the regulation of the workplace. Extensions to the 
franchise, the emergence of the Labour Party as a sustained political force and the 
demands of both World Wars are frequently cited as factors to explain this changed 
approach. Factory inspectors were appointed by the state to police, investigate, 
advise and ensure that rules and regulations were implemented. Their reports on the 
number of accidents, fatalities and dangerous practices in the workplace provided 
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some insight into the conditions that existed in the workplace and of the willingness 
or otherwise of employers and workers to adhere to the legislation. The role that the 
state and the factory inspectorate played in occupational health and safety will be 
examined to measure how effective they both were in implementing and policing 
workplace legislation. Whilst many accidents and much physical damage was 
immediate and visible, the effects of industrial disease could remain hidden for years. 
As the industry expanded rapidly from 1914 onwards many newly discovered 
processes and chemicals were introduced without the full understanding of their 
effects being known. The status of medical science in society meant that in most 
cases medical research became an essential tool for the verification of most industrial 
diseases. The ownership, publication and distribution of such medical research was 
therefore a vital element of the decision making process undertaken by that section of 
society entrusted to formulate preventative health and safety measures. Given the 
importance that was attributed to medical research this chapter will examine where, 
when, and how medical evidence was gathered, presented, and acted upon. 
Chapter Five examines the trade unions and their attitudes to occupational 
health. The chemical industry was capital intensive and from 1914 onwards 
technological and product change accelerated. Under such circumstances economies 
of scale were vital for the ‘efficient’ manufacture of many chemical products and this 
led to a high degree of ownership concentration with a few companies having a 
virtual monopoly on chemical production. At the beginning of the period in question 
the employers were confronted by three main developments that affected industrial 
relations. These were the growth and stabilisation of trade unionism, increasing 
foreign competition, and state intervention. This chapter will examine the 
interactions that existed between the employers, management and the trade unions 
and will analyse the attitudes and responses to occupational hazards within the 
working environment. Did the trade unions have enough power to force concessions 
from the employers? Did trade unions campaign for improved health and safety 
measures and if so did this merely remove some of the worst excesses of the 
capitalist production process and thereby humanise it? This examination will make 
use of new primary source material belonging to the Transport and General Workers 
Union (TGWU) as well as that of the Trades Union Congress (TUC) and measure the 
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trade union response to these issues. An analysis of company responses will include 
that of ICI, the largest firm in Britain, as well as from a more specialist producer, J&J 
White, chromate manufacturers of Rutherglen near Glasgow. 
 What were the strategies and attitudes that the employers took to prevent or 
promote improved working conditions? Chapter Six provides an analysis of these 
with a specific focus on occupational cancers, the most insidious of risks faced by the 
chemical worker. Despite the inherently dangerous processes associated with 
chemical manufacturing this chapter will begin by offering an explanation as to why 
it was that the employers were rarely bothered by government legislation or 
interference. This necessitates a brief analysis of the role played by the industry’s 
own organisation, the Association of British Chemical Manufacturers who helped to 
create a positive perception of the industry. This chapter will examine both large and 
small firms to see if the responses made by these employers to the evidence of 
occupational cancer differed in either style or substance.  
 
 
  
Chapter One 
Historiography 
To be sure many chemical authors have written books purporting to 
show their science as entirely benevolent, and that the chemical 
industry deserved public support and encouragement. However, many 
of these works of mild propaganda originated at a time when science, 
chemistry and the chemical industry were undergoing nothing like the 
public resentment or suspicion that marks the end of the twentieth 
century.1   
 
 
Inevitably, the historical analysis of occupational health attracts a variety of 
interpretations. At an early point there were those who took an optimistic view of 
how dangers within the workplace could be dealt with and who emphasised the 
improvements that could be made through a combination of scientific knowledge, 
improved technology, trade union campaigning, and state intervention. This view had 
a tendency to present a long and mostly uninterrupted progress curve from the poor 
and unregulated to improved and regulated working conditions where the neglect of 
the past was to be replaced with care and concern for the worker. The Webbs, who 
belonged to the scientific gradualist group of socialists, took such a view and had 
much faith in the emancipating powers offered by ‘bureaucratic expertise.’2 This 
type of analysis is seen by many as naïve and therefore more recent critical 
examinations of occupational health have questioned the validity of the long smooth 
trajectory of progress as posited by these writers.  
One area of critical analysis is that belonging to the Marxist school of social 
scientists. They have claimed that the system of capitalist production determines the 
working conditions and that it is this system that undermines the health and well 
being of those who sell their labour power.3 Undoubtedly, outside the western 
capitalist systems such as in the former Soviet Union poor working conditions also 
existed and these inevitably led to injury and death of workers. Nonetheless, as 
Braverman has correctly argued:  
                                                 
1 C.A. Russell (ed), Chemistry, Society and Environment, A New History of the British 
Chemical Industry, Royal Society of Chemistry, (Cambridge 2000), p.v 
2 S. Ingle, The British Party System, Third Edition, Pinter, (London 2000), p.179  
3 For such analyses  see T. Nichols, The Sociology of Industrial Injury, Mansell, (London 1997) and  
V. Navarro, Class Struggle, the State and Medicine, Martin Robertson, (London 1978)  
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Whatever view one takes of Soviet industrialization, one cannot 
conscientiously interpret its history, even in its earliest and most 
revolutionary period, as an attempt to organize labour processes in a 
way fundamentally different from those of capitalism.4  
 
This study will deal with the capitalist mode of production as operated within Britain 
and the effects this has had on the working population within the chemical industry. 
For the vast majority of the population, work constituted a large and important part 
of life. That their daily toil was, and continues to be, conducted under the rules of the 
capitalist system is not in question. Most economists view the capitalist system as an 
axiomatic process, constructing various economic models around it whilst 
reinforcing certain assumptions such as private property, profits, and the free 
market.5 In contrast to this view, during the second half of the nineteenth century 
Marx constructed his theory of the materialist conception of history, an essential 
element of which was his analysis of productive activity. Marx asserted that within 
the capitalist system there are those who buy and there are those who sell labour 
power with that labour power being bought and sold as if it was a commodity. As a 
commodity it sells on the market and its price is wages. For Marx, those who 
purchase labour power need to do so in order to capitalise on their ownership of the 
means of production and in Wage, Labour and Capital, he identified that the value of 
labour power was the difference between the wage paid and the amount by which the 
value of the raw materials increases in value in the process of manufacture.6 
Therefore, according to Marx’s theory there is a certain amount of labour power that 
has not been paid for by the buyer. Within Capital, Marx described this particular 
exploitation of labour power as an equation: labour – labour power = surplus value. 
Thus capitalism gets surplus value for nothing, and it is the source both of profit and 
of capital accumulation. To increase the amount of surplus value the buyer of labour 
power could increase the amount of time the seller spends working (absolute surplus 
                                                 
4 H. Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital, The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century, 
Monthly Review Press, (New York 1998), p.15 
5 D. McLellan, Marx, Second Edition, Fontana Press, (London 1975), p.51 
6 J. S. McClelland, A History of Western Political Thought, Routledge, (London 1999), p.556 
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value), work could be driven at a more intensive pace, new machinery could be 
introduced, and the organisation of work could be altered. 
Within such a system it has been acknowledged by Marxist writers that agency 
was demonstrated by a variety of active players who combined to push for health and 
safety legislation although this was never against an open door. Indeed, it took time 
for capitalists to realise that maintaining the health of their workforce could be 
beneficial to capital accumulation, something that Hyman has noted when he states 
that: 
 
The maintenance of a relatively healthy and well-nourished working 
class is the essential condition of a productive labour force; hence 
most employers have come to accept or even welcome the various 
concessions which have been made to working class pressure. 7 
 
As welfare legislation was passed it was the worker who largely financed the benefits 
and as Hyman again has argued ‘progressive taxation and state welfare provisions 
have involved redistribution of income within rather than between classes.’8 The 
labour movement rarely called into question the basis of this economic system and so 
long as it did not do so it retained a usefulness for that system. Thus for Miliband, 
drawing on the theory of hegemony posited by Gramsci, such actions made for a 
‘vigorous but safe controversy and debate, and for the advancement of solutions to 
problems which obscure and deflect attention from the greatest of all problems, 
namely that here is a social order governed by the search for private profit.’9 
Therefore the ‘functional’ role played by the trade unions did deliver some 
amelioration from the worst excesses of industrial capitalism with various steps 
being taken to reduce working hours, improve sanitary conditions, lighting, and 
ventilation, as well as pressing for limited funding for state research on matters of 
occupational health. Following a steady decline in work-related fatality rates between 
1960 and 1981, Nichols has shown that these rates, along with serious injury rates, 
                                                 
7 R. Hyman, Industrial Relations, A Marxist Introduction, MacMillan press, (London 1978), p.131 
8 Ibid, p.131 
9 R. Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society, The Analysis of the Western Power System, Quartet, 
(London 1983), p.233 
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worsened during the period 1981 to 1984 due to the ‘weakening of labour by 
economic, political and ideological means.’10 Therefore, the improvements to health 
and safety that had been implemented whilst the labour movement was acting at its 
functional best began to be loosened once it had been perceived that they posed a 
threat to the interests of capitalists. Indeed, where any threat to profit levels arose the 
measures designed to protect the workforce, as will be discussed below, could be and 
were ignored by those who controlled the means of production. For those adopting a 
Marxist approach there is little doubt that ultimately within an industrial capitalist 
system profit will always be placed above the health and safety of the workforce. For 
example, Navarro, Nichols, Woolfson and Beck have all utilised Marxist theory in 
their analyses of occupational health issues and along with the work of others writing 
from a similar perspective will be referred to.11 
This Marxist view has not gone unchallenged and for McIvor, in A History of 
Work in Britain, 1880-1950, ‘the long-run improvement in occupational mortality 
belies Marxist prognostications of deterioration, although to some extent new 
hazards and work-related illnesses replaced old ones.’12 Two points are worth noting 
here. First, and as McIvor notes elsewhere, given the fact that many work-related 
fatal illnesses were not officially included in the compilation of official statistics and 
that many deaths continued to be misdiagnosed as non-work related (some 
deliberately to avoid compensation payments) then the first part of this assertion 
must be qualified and be seen as applying only to the most obvious and irrefutable 
deaths. Second, we can only speculate as to the levels of mortality found amongst the 
‘new hazards and work-related illnesses’ as they only become ‘new’ once publicly 
identified and acknowledged. As will be discussed in detail in Chapters Two and 
                                                 
10 T. Nichols, ‘Death and Injury at Work: A Sociological Approach’, pp.86-106 in N. Daykin and L. 
Doyal (eds) Health and Work, Critical Perspectives, MacMillan, (Hampshire 1999), p.92.   
11 V. Navarro, Class Struggle, the State and Medicine, An Historical and Contemporary Analysis of 
the Medical Sector in Great Britain, Robertson, (London 1978) V. Navarro, Crisis, Health, and 
Medicine, A Social Critique, Tavistock, (London 1986), V. Navarro, Dangerous to Your Health, 
Capitalism in Health Care, Monthly Review Press, (New York 1993), M. Beck, J. Foster, H. 
Ryggvik, and C. Woolfson, Piper Alpha Ten Years After, Safety and Industrial Relations in the British 
and Norwegian Offshore Oil Industry, Centre for Regulatory Studies, University of Glasgow, 
(Glasgow 1998) C. Woolfson, Deregulation: The Politics of Health and Safety, A Report Prepared for 
the STUC in Conjunction with the International Centre for Trade Union Rights, University of 
Glasgow, (Glasgow 1994), T. Nichols, The Sociology of Industrial Injury, Mansell, (London 1997), T. 
Nichols, and P. Armstrong, Safety or Profit: Industrial Accidents and the Conventional Wisdom, 
Falling Wall Press, (Bristol 1973) 
12 A. McIvor, A History of Work in Britain, 1880-1950, Palgrave, (Hampshire 2001), p.112 
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Three both respiratory diseases along with cancers would have devastating effects on 
an untold number of chemical workers years before these cancers and diseases were 
officially recognised. Indeed, the effects of exposure to many chemicals remained 
unknown for years and in some cases have never been revealed as: 
 
Many of them were first made when manufacturers had no legal 
requirement to carry out any safety tests, and none has been tested on 
humans … virtually nothing is known about the long-term effects on 
human health of these chemicals.13 
  
Moreover, many so-called ‘new’ hazards and illnesses can actually be old. For 
example, coal miners struggled for years to have pneumoconiosis recognised and as 
will be shown chemical workers in the dye sector also struggled for years to have 
bladder cancer recognised as an occupational disease. Therefore, although such 
occupational diseases existed and would have added to the toll of work-related 
deaths their impact was only measured once it had been officially recognised and had 
become ‘known’. How is it possible to measure the unknown? As Watterson has 
argued, ‘our ability to assess and predict occupational health risks over the long term 
is in fact limited.’14 Based on the above, it is at least possible to argue that it may not 
be the case that the long-run improvement in occupational mortality in Britain belies 
Marxist prognostications of deterioration. This issue will be expanded upon 
throughout. 
Other historians of occupational health and safety have argued that Marxist 
interpretations ignore the positive effects of state intervention on working conditions. 
For example, Bartrip, Burman, and Fenn have all asserted that state intervention, in 
the form of compensation and factory legislation ultimately had an ameliorative 
effect on occupational health and safety. Their ‘revisionist’ perspective examines the 
variety of legislative measures that were enacted such as the Factory and Workshop 
Act (1878), the Employers’ Liability Act (1880), the Employers’ Liability 
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Amendment Bill (1894), the Workmen’s Compensation Act (1897), and the 
subsequent amendments as contained in the Workmen’s Compensation Act (1906). 
The Factory Inspectorate have also been analysed to measure their ratio to British 
industry as well as the enforcement resources that they had at their disposal. Both 
Bartrip and Burman have acknowledged that the Employers’ Liability Act, which 
could have penalised employers financially if their negligence was proven, was far 
from successful. Contracting out was extensively enforced by employers (avoiding 
investigation of the accident as well as compensation payment) and involved workers 
signing away their rights to the terms of the Employers’ Liability Act.15 Bartrip has 
demonstrated that much of the compensatory reform was ‘moderate’ or ‘symbolic’ 
although having some ‘practical’ significance.16 In their quantitative analysis of the 
factory inspectorate both Bartrip and Fenn discovered understaffing and respectively 
low levels of reporting whilst the low levels of fines at the inspectorates’ disposal 
failed to penalise poor employers effectively.17 Bartrip and Fenn also question the 
effectiveness of the Factory Inspector, as they found no close correlation between the 
rise in the numbers of inspectors after 1892 and reductions in fatal injury rates.18  
In Not Only the Dangerous Trades Harrison explores the relationship between 
women’s work and health between the 1880s and 1914 and persuasively argues that 
factory legislation proved to be a poor and weak strategy in preventing damage to the 
health of women exposed to dangerous substances such as lead and phosphorus. 
Crucially for Harrison, failures existed within the legislative measures in that the 
elimination of recognised dangerous substances was rejected in favour of their 
regulation. Aspects of regulation such as protective wear for workers and fines for 
employers were respectively inadequate and cheap. In any event, legislation and 
regulation addressed only a few of the problems within a low number of occupations 
leaving the largest area of women’s paid labour, domestic labour, outside its remit. 
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Consequently, the working environment for women was barely altered and many 
areas of work remained untouched by legislation.19  
Recognising certain deficiencies in compensatory legislation, such as its tendency 
in leading to ‘institutionalised conflict’ between trade unions and employers’ 
organisations, Bartrip however expresses an optimism towards the legislation in that 
many who had previously received nothing for accident and injury were now able to 
claim compensation, especially from 1906 onwards.20 The Workmen’s 
Compensation Act of 1906 extended the scope of the legislation to a wider field, the 
rights of the persons covered were enlarged, the amounts payable as compensation 
were increased for those under 21 years of age, and some provision was made to 
provide for security of payment. With a few exceptions, all industries and 
occupations were now covered by this legislation. The 1897 Act had covered around 
7 million workers but by 1906 this had more than doubled bringing approximately 15 
million workers under its umbrella.21 One of the most important changes that the 
legislation now addressed was that automatic financial compensation was paid for 
those suffering from one of six major industrial diseases. This replaced the previous, 
and often fruitless, legal route that had been trodden by many workers affected by 
lead, mercury, phosphorus, arsenic, anthrax, and ankylostomiasis. However, McIvor 
has argued that these six diseases attained their legal position simply because the 
connections between the occupation and the disease were ‘virtually irrefutable.’22 
The process of identifying dangerous substances was not however one that could be 
necessarily relied upon. In 1908, Professor Glaister published his Poisoning by 
Arseniuretted Hydrogen or Hydrogen Arsenide that identified the harmful effects of 
gas found in aniline dye and bleaching powder manufacture that assisted in 
Workmen’s Compensation claims.23 Unfortunately for chemical workers chrome 
ulceration, an injury that was repeatedly observed and reported in government 
enquiries since 1893, had to wait until 1920 for inclusion within the list of recognised 
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industrial diseases.24 Even after this inclusion many cases of chrome ulceration 
remained ‘undetected’ as will be discussed below.  
 Bartrip’s positive view of compensatory legislation rests on its symbolic and 
practical importance. Symbolically, workers had been provided with a right that had 
taken them one step closer to a social, legal and political parity with fellow citizens. 
Practically, it had established work injury victims as a separate group who were 
entitled to claim benefits that were denied to others.25 However, and by way of 
criticism, compensation did not restore lost limbs or mobility. It did not restore a 
partner who played a vital part in maintaining the life of others. Health and safety 
legislation failed to properly address the protection of the worker and concentrated 
instead on providing limited compensation thereby reinforcing the notion that what 
was important in life was money rather than health and life itself. More importantly, 
it is possible to argue that financial compensation and regulation only came into 
being because it allowed employers and the government to deal with the problem of 
their responsibility for health in a relatively cheap way rather than spending larger 
amounts on medical research and properly funded preventative measures.  
Between 1970 and 1973, Nichols and Beynon conducted a series of interviews 
with chemical process workers at a large multi-national chemical plant in the north 
east of England. In the absence of this knowledge it would be forgivable if the reader 
dated the interviews to the beginning of the twentieth century. Thus, one operative 
wearing a mask and goggles which ‘don’t keep the dust out’ and who worked in a 
large shed which held the materials due for processing reported that: 
 
You can’t see in there. I’ve been in there and had my gear in forward 
and tried to look through my windows and with the dust coming down 
and floating I’ve had the impression that I am going back and I 
couldn’t understand why. I felt all giddy. It’s definitely upsetting. It’s 
not good for you actually. If you went on continually I think you’d get 
a bad illness after a couple of years.26 
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Another worker reported that ‘sometimes when I come down my ears are tingling – 
you know buzzing … you only notice when you stop’ with another stating ‘you say 
to them (the managers) look its fucking hot in there. I could pass out or something. 
All they ever say is ‘It’s your job. It’s up to you.’27 The men employed in this plant 
worked shifts of eight hours, from 6am to 2pm, 2pm to 10pm and 10pm to 6am but 
the shifts were not fixed for a week but instead were rotated throughout the week. 
Thus, the 6am to 2pm shift would be worked on Monday and Tuesday and on 
Wednesday and Thursday it would move to a 2pm to 10pm shift before being moved 
again to a 10pm to 6am shift for Friday, Saturday and Sunday. The following 
Monday and Tuesday were days off. Shift work has always been a part of the 
chemical industry and has been referred to in government reports since 1893. 
Discussing shift patterns, Kinnersley, in The Hazards of Work noted that much 
public attention has focused on jet lag but ‘jet lag is just a short taste of what its like 
to be on shifts, but without the dreary surroundings of a factory at night and in 
circumstances when mistakes can cost only money – not life or limb. Shift lag is an 
altogether more serious condition.’28 Diet is affected as are sleeping patterns and the 
gradual wearing down of stamina must eventually have a deleterious impact on 
health. Deterioration of health can be much more subtle than loosing a limb or 
contracting a recognised disease. This study undertaken by Nichols and Beynon 
appears to be an exception in that much of the literature on the chemical industry 
fails to make any direct link between the processes and substances discussed and the 
potential dangers that these posed to the chemical workforce within the British 
industry. Tweedale, in Magic Mineral to Killer Dust, expresses a similar frustration 
when he comments that, ‘at best, workers’ deaths and injuries, if they are mentioned 
at all, are seen as the unintentional results of industrialization – regrettable perhaps, 
but not really a factor in the onward and upward march of the economy.’29  
Discussion of deaths and injuries arising out of incidents within the chemical 
industry tend to be reserved for single and dramatic events, such as explosions or 
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leakages where large numbers of workers have been involved or where the public 
have been exposed to danger. On the other hand, the toll of injury and death arising 
from the drip feed effect of exposure to dust, gases and fumes as well as to other 
dangerous working conditions often occur with little or no comment. The lack of 
response to industrial injury and death must be viewed in contrast to the amount of 
political, economic and social effort that has been expended over the years in an 
attempt to diffuse industrial disputes, which, although resulting in lost days to 
production and having cost implications, are of a much smaller scale than that lost to 
industrial accidents. For example, between 1960 and 1970 there were 46.2 million 
days lost through industrial disputes yet within the same period 241 million days 
were lost through industrial accidents.30 Industrial disputes between 1950 and 1975 
caused no loss of life amongst those involved but 16,622 workers did lose their lives 
in work related accidents in the same period.31 Just five years after the introduction 
of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (HASAWA, 1974) the Conservative 
government came to power under a slogan of ‘Labour isn’t working’ and 
continuously chose to highlight the number of days lost to industry through strikes 
but never through accidents or injuries. Adopting a policy of anti-trade unionism the 
Conservative government then presided over a rate of industrial injury that amounted 
to ten times the number of days lost through strikes.32 The resultant increase in 
claims for compensation to the Department of Social Security Industrial Injuries 
Scheme was met by Conservative cuts to benefit entitlement and by reductions to the 
levels of compensation available.33 Clearly for industrial capitalists, owning the 
means of production is important but to do so also requires having control of that 
ownership and that strategy can include hiding the truth about the numbers who 
suffer from its effects. 
Offering one sociological interpretation of how industrial deaths or injuries have 
been made invisible Dwyer posits that professional associations were formed that 
placed an emphasis on preventing spectacular accidents from coming into public 
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view through technical improvement, as occurred in the coal industry, whilst 
compensation payments were used to reduce the visible destitution caused by 
accidents.34 This path, according to Dwyer, meant that industrial death could be 
produced invisibly and any emerging conflict on the issues could be dealt with 
institutionally. These structures would leave capitalism and the science that serves it 
‘triumphant’ allowing them to celebrate their victory in such a way that it was visible 
to all. This theory is persuasive and Dwyer has gone on to argue that the process 
produced a ‘social peace’ on issues of occupational health and safety, a pattern that 
was replicated in the USA, France, Germany and Belgium. ‘Weberian bureaucracy 
replaced Marxian class conflict.’35 An example of this can be seen when the 
government updated the rules and regulations attached to chemical work in 1922 
(S.R. & O., 1922, No.731). Following this the Association of British Chemical 
Manufacturers (ABCM) published their Model Safety Rules in 1928. This effort had 
an immediate influence when in 1929 the Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of 
Factories noted the publication stating that the ABCM were doing ‘admirable 
work.’36 Republished again in 1938 and in 1952 the Chief Inspector of Factories was 
sufficiently impressed to write the foreword for the ABCM’s rules, commenting that 
this initiative was ‘greatly to be commended.’37 Alongside this shining example of 
how the industry took its responsibilities seriously some of the largest and most 
reputable chemical employers continued to pay compensation to those who died or 
were dying from exposure to highly suspected or known carcinogenic substances in 
the dyestuffs industry. The sense of duty and care that the industry was prepared to 
take had been made visible by its rules and regulations. The workers loss of ability to 
‘earn a living’ had been made invisible by the industry’s ability to pay compensation. 
However, much less visible were the institutional matters such as the accident rates 
that continued to occur and which, by the 1960s, were three times higher than those 
found within the American chemical industry (the American industry had clearly 
made a more intensive effort to maintain their productive labour force). Similarly, 
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breaches of legislation continued and even as late as 1973 an inspector found men 
working in chemical dust up to two feet in depth, something for which ICI were later 
fined just £50.38 The bureaucratic machine dealt with the practicalities of these 
infringements whilst at the same time diffusing and diverting any potential 
antagonism that may have arisen.   
But what of the science that serves capitalism? In his Marxist critique of the 
dominant interpretations of health and medicine Navarro posits that science is far 
from being objective and basically amounts to what assigned scientists in bourgeois 
institutions do, thereby leaving the knowledge found outside the scientific circles 
non-scientific.39 For example, written in 1939, B. L. Coombes autobiographical 
account These Poor Hands would be considered ‘unscientific’ evidence of the poor 
and unsafe working conditions that existed in the coal mining industry. As Navarro 
has suggested much of this type of evidence was ignored, or ignored until the 
connections between occupation and disease had become virtually irrefutable. Once 
the link had become highly visible it then had to be made invisible. Thus, once 
scientists had ‘discovered’ the link it was compensation and regulation that were 
offered more often than prevention or an outright ban. Such was the case with lead, 
phosphorous, asbestos amongst others. Even with cases that were deemed to be 
irrefutable science retained a certain usefulness to capital as their compliance could 
still be used to disguise the truth. For example, the women who toiled to fill shells 
from 1914 were exposed to the dangers posed by toxic poisoning from TNT, a 
scientific ‘fact’ that was established in 1915. However, Ineson and Thom have 
shown that many women workers continued to be sacrificed for war production as a 
result of the identity of interests formed between the medical and managerial 
establishments. Both medical officials and managers were willing to keep production 
going, along with the help of government censorship, despite clear evidence of toxic 
poisoning arising from exposure to TNT.40 In addition, the views expressed by 
Dwyer and Navarro above are confirmed by Ineson and Thom when they claim that 
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much of the early protection put in place within TNT plants was to prevent 
explosions and that the TNT workers own experience of ill-health was ignored with 
the Lancet claiming that, ‘the history given by a patient is often very misleading.’41 
Many examples of scientific knowledge being used (or abused) by the interests of 
capital to hide the effects of occupational disease, death and injury exist within the 
literature. For example, writing in 1944, Bernal argued that government funded 
medical researchers were circumscribed. By examining the workings of the Medical 
Research Council (MRC) Bernal concluded that its scope was ‘extremely limited’ in 
that it had to remain a consultative body, had no power to enforce any action in 
relation to its findings, and could not unilaterally make its findings publicly known.42 
Graebner, in ‘Hegemony Through Science’ has demonstrated that the lead industries 
of America had ‘engineered the development, dissemination, and perception of 
knowledge concerning the lead hazard’ with one laboratory ‘translating the 
industry’s needs into the language of science.’43 The consequences of this action 
were that millions of people were exposed to the toxic properties of tetraethyl lead 
for fifty years. Tweedale has shown that the medical community were sometimes 
reluctant to upset the asbestos industry given that from the 1950s it had provided 
‘jobs, research funding, access to data, and university endowments for doctors,’ 
presumably to the right kind of people.44 Johnston and McIvor’s, Lethal Work has 
revealed that research undertaken by the industry-funded Asbestosis Research 
Council did produce medical knowledge but that the industry helped to limit the 
dissemination of the knowledge by restricting it to ‘a narrow group of specialists.’45 
In 1958, in an article entitled ‘Illness and the Job’, The Times reported that, ‘while a 
manufacturer can still produce a new, perhaps noxious product, without being 
required to submit it to official analysis, lessons must continue in many cases to be 
learnt the hard way.’46 The ‘hard way’ for many uninformed workers meant 
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experiencing pain, injury and possibly death. The International Agency for Research 
on Cancer (IARC) posed the question of how accurate the information was on 
industrial carcinogens because since 1755 (the year the first occupational cancer was 
identified) only 26 chemicals or industrial processes had been positively linked to 
occupational cancer over the next 200 years.47 In some cases a particular process 
may have been used for a number of years and then withdrawn with a further 20 
years elapsing before any of the workers would show signs of cancer that the 
exposure had caused. Within the chemical industry, chrome compounds were known 
to have harmful effects on the health of the process workers since 1893 and yet 
respiratory cancer was not investigated as a possibility until the mid 1950s in Britain 
even although the German industry had identified a correlation from 1912 and later 
confirmed this in the 1930s. As referred to earlier, chrome ulceration had become a 
scheduled disease from 1920 but it would take local knowledge of this illness and not 
medical expertise to identify the true levels of illness that continued to be found 
within the industry. Thus, by 1990, the Sheffield Occupational Health Project was 
able to record more cases of chrome ulceration in one local factory than were 
officially recorded across the whole of Britain.48 Where a worker felt ill and had a 
suspicion that the conditions within his or her workplace may have been the cause of 
this, there was no guarantee that the local doctor would confirm these suspicions. 
Writing in 1987, Watkins, a community physician, noted that, ‘no doctor has ever 
been struck off the register for the false certification implicit in telling workers that a 
process is safe when knowing that it isn’t.’49 With regard to the power that capital 
can exert through the ownership of medical knowledge the Marxist perspective 
clearly has some validity. 
Perhaps some critics would argue that this is an overly deterministic view and 
fails to acknowledge that not all scientists behave according to the above 
interpretation. However, the chemical industry was notoriously secretive, something 
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Coley explains by the fact that large capital expenditures on new products and 
process had to be protected to maintain a competitive advantage over rivals.50 Given 
the existence of this industrial secrecy the toxic content of many substances remained 
unclear except amongst those who needed to know (the scientists and engineers).51 
Therefore, following on from the analysis above, the only way this knowledge could 
be dispersed to a wider audience was for scientists to take an objective and individual 
stance. Certainly within the chemical industry and in the wider scientific field some 
dissident voices were heard but they are noteworthy in that they are but a few. The 
industrial hygienist Arlidge from the 1890s and the medical expert Dr Thomas Oliver 
attempted to widen interest in occupational health. Publications by Oliver, 
Dangerous Trades (1902) and The Diseases of Occupations (1908) covered a variety 
of trades, with the former volume containing a chapter on the chemical industry 
written by Laurie, the Principal of Herriot Watt College.52 Laurie concluded that at 
the beginning of the twentieth-century the business of chemical manufacturing was 
one of the unhealthiest industries in Britain.53 Thomas Legge, a pioneer of industrial 
health and the first Medical Inspector of Factories, ploughed a sometimes-lonely 
furrow in exposing dangerous working methods. Legge would later resign his 
position in 1926 when Britain failed to ratify the Geneva White Lead Convention of 
1921 that sought to prohibit the painting of interiors using white lead paint.54 In 
1949, one medical practitioner alleged that ICI had not taken sufficient steps to 
protect the workforce against ά-naphthylamine (used in the manufacture of dyes and 
at the time suspected of causing bladder cancer) and was dismissed by ICI when he 
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persisted in his criticisms.55 Bladder cancer caused by inhalation or skin contact with 
this chemical was confirmed as an occupational cancer amongst chemical workers in 
1954. To some extent these individual examples act as a corrective to the theory 
posited by Navarro although convincing evidence is available to show that industrial 
capital has created gaps between scientific knowledge and the dissemination of that 
knowledge to a wider sphere. Johnston, McIvor, Tweedale, Graebner and others have 
all demonstrated that capitalist control of scientific knowledge ensured that many 
workers continued to toil in production processes for years after they were known to 
be harmful, sometimes fatally so. Although what a small number of dissident 
scientists had to say was useful in raising awareness of the dangers posed, the 
hegemonic control that was exerted by capital allowed it to continue exposing 
workers to risks long after lead, phosphorous, asbestos, chrome, etc, had been 
revealed as potential killers. 
As has been touched upon in the introduction to this work, there were those who 
did not physically work within a chemical factory but who actively and successfully 
sought some protection for their health and property from its pollutants. However, 
unlike the noxious and harmful chemical substances that floated in the air or on 
water between social boundaries posing some threat to all classes, Watterson has 
argued that it is mostly those at the lower end of the social scale who have 
experienced occupational exposure to toxic substances.56 This exposure resulted in 
occupational disease amongst chemical workers that included ulceration, dermatitis, 
poisoning, anaemia, cancers, cyanosis, respiratory disorders, teeth and bone rot, and 
the partial or complete destruction of the nasal septum. Reforms designed to limit 
physical damage at the lower end of the social scale, as Jones has argued, have 
mostly been bound up with reasons of national efficiency, moral outrage or to ward 
off industrial unrest and the challenges posed by the labour movement.57 Under such 
circumstances, health and safety legislation was bound to be piecemeal in nature, (as 
it was) and would follow a reactive pattern in line with the ebb and flow of the 
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reasons provided above. An example of this can be seen in the actions of the Health 
of Munitions Workers Committee. This scientific group, created by the government 
to tackle the problems of worker fatigue and increased accident rates within a limited 
number of industries during World War One, had its primary role in helping to 
increase production levels for the war. However, as Rose notes, finding the 
limitations of the worker only became a relevant factor for the government when 
unemployment had become practically non-existent. Once that war had ended 
unemployment returned and with that ‘normality’ in place government and business 
interest diminished until the demands made by the Second World War resurrected 
their interest again.58 McIvor, in A History of Work in Britain, 1880-1950, holds a 
similar view to Watterson when he argues that despite the introduction of some 
ameliorative legislation to deal with issues of occupational health and safety 
‘working-class, blue-collar and blue-blouse workers were more adversely affected 
than middle-class professionals and office workers.’59 
Work-related poisonings have not been as vigorously pursued as homicidal 
poisonings although as Crowther and White have noted in On Soul and Conscience, 
poisoning was more numerous and ‘more likely’ to be found as a result of exposure 
to toxic materials within industry.60 Those who investigate murders generally seek 
out a motivational factor to explain any malice or intent involved. Perhaps it is 
thought that there is a lack of malice or intent in industrial poisoning cases? If so, 
perhaps there is a case for industrial manslaughter? The failure of employers to fully 
implement the rules and regulations that were passed by successive governments and 
the consequences suffered by workers has been the subject of investigation for some 
time. For example, from the end of the nineteenth century Sherard, in The White 
Slaves Of England and Hardie in his ‘White Slaves’ series of pamphlets published by 
The Labour Leader exposed the disregard that employers had for their chemical 
process workers.61 Factory Inspectors Reports such as that provided by Thomas 
Legge, a pioneer of industrial health and the first Medical Inspector of Factories, 
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confirmed the ill health identified by these writers as well as providing evidence that 
many employers continued to evade the legislation.62 More recently, Tweedale’s 
Magic Mineral to Killer Dust and Johnston and McIvor’s Lethal Work have revealed 
how employers and government regulators failed to properly protect workers from 
asbestos dust even after 1931 when medical knowledge had clearly identified the 
implications of exposure to asbestos. Both of these studies also reveal that despite 
being provided with full medical knowledge and legal opinion asbestos employers 
continued to oppose regulation, misinform workers of the dangers, failed to maintain 
extraction and safety equipment, and continued to expose their workforces to this 
potential killer. Providing an explanation (or motive perhaps?) for this ‘strikingly 
irresponsible’ behaviour Tweedale, Johnston and McIvor all take the view that, 
‘profit was, quite clearly, being placed before workers’ health and well being.’63 
Within the international chemical industry perhaps the most notorious and well-
known incident is that which occurred in 1984 in Bhopal, India. Described by 
Lapierre and Moro as the worst industrial disaster in history the explosion at the 
Union Carbide fertilizer plant produced a massive toxic cloud that killed an 
estimated 16,000 to 30,000 people with more than 500,000 sustaining injuries to their 
eyes, lungs, brain, muscles, bone joints, liver, kidneys, as well as to their 
reproductive, nervous and immune systems.64 The exact death and injury tolls 
remain unknown as, in order to limit compensation claims, the authorities stopped 
counting. Union Carbide never disclosed the exact content of the chemicals involved 
thereby restricting the range of effective treatments and no court, neither Indian nor 
American, ever passed judgement on Union Carbide which took all possible steps to 
avoid responsibility.65 The main source of this ‘accident’ was the inadequate and 
poor state of the safety systems, a preventable situation except for the fact that the 
safety budget for the plant had been cut in order to save money. Having a safety 
system in place means that the firm had calculated the risks associated with the 
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process. Therefore, by diluting this safety system the risk factor for securing a safe 
environment had been increased. 
In Paying for the Piper, Woolfson, Foster, and Beck have identified the human 
cost amongst oil workers that resulted from the employers’ failure to implement 
good health and safety practices so that production would not be inhibited. Public 
investigations following the Piper Alpha and Ocean Odyssey explosions of 1988 
revealed that the employers had shown a ‘flagrant disregard for the safety and 
welfare of the offshore workforce.’66 A later study by Beck, Foster, Ryggvik and 
Woolfson concluded that despite the criticisms made of the industry the lessons of 
the Piper Alpha disaster had still not been learned.67 Perhaps the most well known 
example of placing profit before human life was that of the Ford Pinto case. In 1977, 
company documents belonging to the Ford Motor Company proved that Ford knew 
of weaknesses in the fuel tank of the Ford Pinto prior to its launch on the market. 
However, a cost-benefit analysis conducted by the firm indicated that it would be 
cheaper for Ford to pay compensation for burn deaths and injuries (identified as a 
‘benefit’) following ‘accidents’ rather than modify the fuel tank to prevent the fires 
in the first place (a ‘cost’).68 Ford’s actuaries calculated that there would be 180 burn 
deaths and 180 severe burn injuries per year. All of the above-cited cases 
demonstrate that employers may not have intended to kill or injure but they do show 
quite emphatically that they had the knowledge to prevent this happening. Amongst 
the industrial capitalists above, calculations had been made to see how much it would 
cost to prevent death or injury before deciding to choose profit over life. Of course 
defining ‘accident’ can be fraught with interpretation although the common 
interpretation would be that it is an unforeseen event, something that occurs 
unintentionally or by chance. Writing on such issues Campbell, in Philosophy of the 
Accident, has argued that if situations are controlled successfully then what happens 
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is non-accidental: the accidental appears where there is imperfect control or no 
control at all.69 
It is at least possible to argue that the economic rationalities of industrialised 
society forces people at all levels to choose between health and productivity and to 
seek an ‘acceptable’ balance between the two. One South Wales industrialist and 
Member of Parliament, H.H. Vivian, stated at the end of the nineteenth century, ‘You 
cannot have manufactures carried on without suffering: half or two thirds of your 
incomes is derived  … from manufacturing industry, and you must take the rough 
with the smooth.’70 This demonstrates quite clearly the relationship that exists 
between capital and labour. Firstly, within a capitalist system most workers derive 
their income from industry by selling their labour power to those who own the means 
of production. Secondly, by doing so, there is the potential to suffer. Thirdly, there 
appears to be little choice, as ‘you must’ take the rough with the smooth. The 
pronouncement did take the potential for ill health into account but for those who 
own industry, being ill (or taking the rough) usually means having access to, and the 
financial backing for, care, rest, medical attention, and even recuperation. A 
developed welfare system can assist those who find themselves out of work but for 
those who sell their labour power both the wage and the working conditions can 
determine the living standards, social well being, and health for themselves as well as 
for their dependants. Being physically able to sell ones labour power is crucial for 
most as it literally means being able to earn a living. Amongst the theories espoused 
by the adherents of capitalism, the contract of employment has always been 
presented as something that the sellers of labour power have entered into freely. 
Whilst the theory of being ‘free’ to enter into a contract may be true in that workers 
are not marched at gunpoint to a place of work, the theory can also be viewed as 
disingenuous as it implies that the decision is reached without restriction or 
constraint.71 Yet restrictions and constraints do exist that heavily influence the 
potential workers’ decision. Financial and state support for those with no wage 
improved as the twentieth century progressed, however, at the beginning of the 
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period under examination these provisions were negligible and consequently the 
threat and fear of unemployment haunted many. Job mobility for the working classes 
was also limited to some extent by their inability to save from low wages as well as 
by their lack of educational opportunities. When the overwhelming alternative to 
accepting long hours of risky and dangerous work on the employers’ terms is 
unemployment, debt or poverty, the meaning of being ‘free’ to enter the contract has 
clearly been redefined. Thus, even in the 1970s one chemical process worker could 
state that, ‘You’re trapped in this job. Every man in this plant now is trapped here, 
believe it or not. You’ve got to stay whether you like it or not.’72  
In his Marxist critique of the labour process and health, Navarro posits that the 
extraction of absolute surplus value is usually found where low technology, low 
specialisation of labour, and elementary organisation of labour form the major part of 
the labour process.73 On offer to the majority of workers who ‘freely’ entered into a 
contract of employment with the chemical manufacturers in 1914 were, basic 
technology, long hours of work, no proper meal breaks, relatively low wages, and a 
labour intensive and dangerous working environment. Again Navarro claims that 
such working conditions would have had negative consequences for the health of the 
workers resulting as they did in, fatigue, stress, and exposure to risks from injury and 
toxic materials.74 As touched upon elsewhere in this chapter conditions did improve 
to some extent over time, however the NEDC could still report in 1967 that within 
the British chemical industry, toilet and changing facilities varied considerably, that 
many first aid and medical facilities were under funded, safety training and auditing 
was under developed, and that strong and effective safety policies and practices 
needed to be put in place.75  
Hyman has argued that the ‘imbalance’ of the employment contract can only be 
lessened for the worker when labour markets are tight, the skills that are required by 
employers are scarce, or when workers band together such as in a trade union.76 Of 
the three factors that might lessen this ‘imbalance’ there is little evidence to suggest 
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that chemical workers would have experienced much ameliorative impact.  Firstly, 
Gill et al have argued that chemical employers had little concern with the labour 
market for chemical workers a market that usually contained ‘ample numbers.’77 
Secondly, even up to the 1970s about 50 per cent of the waged labour in the chemical 
industry had no recognised trade skill with diligence and brute force being the main 
requirements in demand.78 Thirdly, the trade unions that attempted to represent 
chemical workers from 1914 were relatively weak and poorly organised and failed to 
make more than a limited impact upon the chemical masters. The embryonic 
chemical trade unions had faced a formidable task in developing or sustaining 
collective organisation. They were confronted by organised employers in the shape 
of the United Alkali Company and also by the range of paternalist strategies in place 
at Brunner Mond. The absence of chemical trade unions during this period is evident 
for example in A History of Trade Unionism (1894) where the Webbs only make a 
passing reference to them in their publication. More than one hundred years later, 
Fraser, in A History of British Trade Unionism (1999) only refers to the skilled few 
chemical workers that had joined craft unions. Clegg, Fox and Thompson, in A 
History of British Trade Unions Since 1889, note the existence of the National 
Labour Federation who competed with the Tyneside and National Labour Union for 
members along with the Workers’ Union also attempted to gain members.79 Pelling 
offers no information on chemical trade unions within his History of British Trade 
Unionism (1992). 
Lerner, in Breakaway Unions and the Small Trade Union, provides a case study 
of the Chemical Workers’ Union (CWU) that was assisted and influenced in its 
development by the Independent Labour Party (ILP) from the late 1890s. According 
to Lerner, the CWU were unfairly accused of poaching members in 1923 and by 
1924 had been disaffiliated from the Trades Union Congress (TUC). Therefore, 
general unions, whose main interests and membership lay outside the chemical 
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industry would represent the chemical workers with those being the Transport and 
General Workers Union (T&GWU) from 1922 and the National Union of General 
and Municipal Workers (NUGMW) from 1924. By 1927, ICI had set up Works 
Councils to establish labour-management co-operation but the CWU, who 
represented a challenge from below, regarded the setting up of these councils as, ‘a 
form of company unionism established to prevent effective union organization.’80 
This assessment appears to have been correct although, to some extent, other factors 
did play a part. Between 1927 and 1950, trade union membership in ICI plummeted 
from approximately 60 per cent to around 20 per cent of the workforce despite a 
general increase in trade union membership in other firms from 1935 and into the 
war years.81 Sir Alfred Mond, in charge of all labour issues at ICI, was determined 
from the outset that the employees should be loyal to the firm and not to the trade 
unions and in echoing the sentiments of the deeply anti-trade union organisation, the 
Economic League, Mond stated that, ‘the best answer to socialism is to make every 
man a capitalist.’82 On this evidence it could be argued that the trade union 
movement within the chemical industry had been throttled at birth. The lack of 
agency within the industry unlike the coal miners or engineers has resulted in few 
historical documents being created and has led to what Haber has described as ‘a 
lack of continuity in the original source material.’83  
Some historians, although acknowledging that the trade unions did campaign for 
improved health and safety legislation, have argued that they could have done more. 
For example, Weindling and Bartrip, have forwarded such a view.84 It is certainly 
difficult to agree with this assertion for the chemical industry but in analysing this 
claim at a wider level it must mean that these writers feel that either a) the trade 
unions should have been more revolutionary or b) that trade unions had an equal 
power within the social structures and had equal access to the policy process yet 
                                                 
80 S. Lerner, Breakaway Unions and the Small Trade Union, George Allen & Unwin, (London 1961), 
p.23 
81 A. McIvor, A History of Work in Britain, 1880-1950, Palgrave, (Hampshire 2001), p.99 
82 W. J. Reader, Imperial Chemical Industries, A History, Volume II, The First Quarter-Century 1926-
1952, Oxford University Press, (London 1975), p.60   
83 L. F. Haber, The Chemical Industry During the Nineteenth Century, A Study of the Economic Aspect 
in Applied Chemistry in Europe and North America, Oxford University Press, (Oxford 1958), p.231 
84 P. Weindling, (ed) The Social History of Occupational Health, Croom Helm, (London 1985), p.10 
and P.W.J. Bartrip, The Home Office and the Dangerous Trades, Regulating Occupational Disease in 
Victorian and Edwardian Britain, Rodopi, (Amsterdam 2002), p.276 
 41
  
failed to utilise this power. In examining these points it can be stated that trade 
unions were never a revolutionary force and had accepted the capitalist mode of 
production, arguing from within, in order to lessen the worst affects of industrial 
capitalism. Laybourn has suggested exactly this when he notes that from the mid 
1920s the TUC were intent on uniting the trade union movement and with regard to 
the General Strike he notes that: 
 
It was never the revolutionary strike which some ardent Communists hoped it 
would be but it had a cathartic effect upon government and employers, and  
permitted the trade unions to protect and improve the standard of living of their  
members.’85 
 
This was only possible because the hegemonic structures allowed trade unions to 
play this functional role and therefore it can be argued that point b) can be viewed as 
adopting a fallacy of pluralism. 
Following a short post-war economic boom, rising unemployment led to a 
haemorrhaging of trade union membership during the depression that began in the 
early 1920s. Trade union membership declined from 8,348,000 in 1920 to 4,392,000 
by 1933 with union density reduced from 45.2 per cent to 22.6 per respectively.86 
This slashed income from membership dues, increased outgoings for unemployment 
benefit, reduced numerical strength and created a large reserve army of labour 
desperate for work. By 1926, following the General Strike, the trade union 
movement could have been eliminated but instead the Conservative government 
introduced the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act (1927). Historians differ over 
the severity of the measures contained within this legislation but general or national 
strikes were made unlawful and the system of political levy to the Labour Party was 
changed from contracting-out to contracting-in amongst other restrictive measures. 
According to Hain, in Political Strikes, this Act ‘boosted moderate trade unionism by 
attacking workers’ rights to engage in strikes and political action and drove unions 
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towards an accommodation with government’ which lay the foundations for joint 
government, industry and union cooperation ‘within a system of corporate bias.’87 
The Mond-Turner talks of 1928 and 1929 were a symbolic example of the new 
industrial atmosphere. Therefore in response to a number of unofficial strikes and 
defeats, against a background of employer organisation and national lock-outs the 
new moderate leadership of the Trades Union Congress (TUC) shifted the official 
union strategy from offensive action to reasoned argument in defence of pay and 
conditions. This strategy continued, and from the 1940s, whether it was a 
Conservative, Labour or even a Coalition government, they all worked together with 
trade unions until the late 1960s when governments began to impose collective 
agreements on the unions in answer to economic problems such as the rise in foreign 
competition. Therefore, it was economic problems for the capitalist class that caused 
this shift in cooperation as their profit levels were being challenged and were now 
upsetting the balance that they had created. Again, as Laybourn notes, and has been 
suggested elsewhere in this chapter, the increased number of strikes in this period: 
 
promoted the idea that Britain was strike-prone, but strikes generally formed a  
small proportion of the days lost at work and may deflect attention from other  
factors which might be more appropriate as explanations of Britain’s relative  
industrial decline.88 
 
From the 1970s onwards the trade union movement were forced into a defensive 
position although some analysts have spoken of the power that the trade unions had 
that ‘brought down the Heath government’ and ultimately led to the ‘winter of 
discontent’ in 1979. However, being on strike is a sign of weakness, not power. If the 
trade union members had power they would have been able to improve occupational 
health as well as other conditions and there would have been no need to battle with 
the variety of governmental, medical, and other institutional bodies to achieve what 
little they did. To suggest that the trade unions could have done more is to suggest 
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that pluralism is what it says it is, an equal distribution of political power. Where in 
their history have the trade unions had equality in accessing the policy process? 
Whilst political and ideological competition does exist, this competition is unequal. 
The politics and values that uphold the capitalist system have an overwhelming 
advantage over ideas and values that challenge it within a system that operates 
behind the illusion of free speech, open competition and political pluralism.89 
The worker’s health plays little or no part in most of the literature on the 
chemical industry although the accounts that are available remain useful in providing 
information on the technological and scientific advances that have been made 
throughout the period in question. This information can be used to analyse what 
production methods and chemical substances were being introduced as well as 
providing information on the mechanisation of processes that took the worker away 
from direct contact with hazardous and toxic substances. For example, Haber’s two 
volumes contain useful chapters on comparative international working conditions 
although most of the remaining content relates specifically to the scientific, 
technological, economic, and environmental factors that played their part in the 
industry’s growth.90 Hardie and Pratt’s extensively researched History of the Modern 
British Chemical Industry provides the reader with a cornucopia of information with 
regard to the development of the industry although these writers fail to provide one 
single account of the conditions of work experienced by the chemical labour force.91 
In reviewing Hardie and Pratt’s work, Musson accurately describes this type of 
analysis as a ‘techno-historical study.’92 Reader’s history of Imperial Chemical 
Industries traces the development of the largest chemical concern in Britain. Having 
had access to ICI records this volume provides an exhaustive account of business 
transactions and the development of plant and processes yet it fails to deliver any 
substantial information about occupational health and safety issues. Indeed, although 
it is made clear that the book only covers the period up to 1952 the health dangers 
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that had been identified with the dyestuffs and rubber sectors are strangely absent 
from Reader’s detailed account.93 Fox, a former ICI chemist, provides an extensively 
researched analysis of the development of the dyestuffs sector and yet provides only 
limited information on the working conditions in this part of the industry. Unlike 
Reader however, Fox does include some basic information about the ‘discovery’ that 
bladder cancer was linked with the manufacture of dyestuffs.94 This deadly danger 
will be dealt with in detail in Chapter Three of the thesis. William’s account, The 
Chemical Industry, essentially deals with the organisational development that took 
place across the British industry whilst Miall’s study, The History of the British 
Chemical Industry, makes but a few (and outdated) points about the health of the 
workforce who toiled to produce TNT, a matter dealt with above. Harrison’s Not 
Only the Dangerous Trades is helpful in understanding the gender inequalities that 
existed within occupational health and safety. Whilst it is true that Harrison’s work 
explores the relationship between women’s work and health between the 1880s and 
1914, and therefore puts it outside the period under examination, it remains a 
persuasive account of factory legislation that proved to be a poor and weak strategy 
in preventing damage to the health of women exposed to dangerous substances such 
as lead and phosphorus. For Harrison, failures existed within the legislative measures 
in that the elimination of recognised dangerous substances was rejected in favour of 
their regulation.95  The relevance this study has is that a similar pattern of regulation 
continued into the twentieth century. Aspects of regulation such as protective wear 
for workers and fines for employers remained respectively inadequate and cheap. In 
any event, legislation and regulation addressed only a few of the problems within a 
limited number of occupations leaving many areas of paid labour outside of the legal 
or state systems.  
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Chapter Two 
Assessing the Damage I: Fatigue and Trauma 
 
Oh, it improved as the years went on but the things that improved a 
lot were the minor things. The major things…if it cost the company a 
lot of money, there was very little change, they weren’t interested, 
they just ignored our comments on likes of noise and ambient 
temperature and stuff like that…they weren’t bothered.1 
 
Introduction and Context 
Male labour power was the principal choice for British chemical employers 
throughout the period under examination although, as was the case in other parts of 
British industry, many women were employed during both world wars (1914-18 and 
1939-45). The chemical plants in which they worked ranged in size and complexity 
and between 1914 and 1974 many changes took place in the way that the chemical 
plants were designed, in the type of process technology that was used, and the 
number and variety of chemicals that were produced. This dynamism was not evident 
at the beginning of the period under examination when only eleven per cent of global 
chemical output was British whilst German manufacturers accounted for more than 
twice that level at twenty-four per cent (USA levels were thirty-four per cent).2 
Unlike their European counterparts the British chemical masters concentrated on 
producing a narrow range of products and by 1915 it was clear to the government 
that the industry would be unable to meet the material demands of the First World 
War. Indeed, the realisation of just how limited a range was on offer forced the 
government to intervene during the early years of the war and ensure that new 
chemical plants were built and essential processes developed. In a History of the 
Modern British Chemical Industry Hardie and Pratt have argued that the government 
intervention proved to be the catalyst that helped transform the industry.3 In the 
aftermath of war competition with both the American and German chemical giants 
resulted in the rationalisation of large sections of the British chemical industry and 
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this process was evidenced most graphically in 1926 by the formation of the largest 
chemical company in Britain, Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI). 
From the mid 1920s a larger range and quantity of products came to be 
manufactured by firms such as ICI, Albright and Wilson, Courtaulds etc. and the 
overall expansion of the chemical manufacturing sector led to more workers 
becoming employed within the industry. Indeed, the Chemical Workers’ Union noted 
that whilst other sections of British industry had been ‘plagued by unemployment’ 
between the years 1925 to 1935 the chemical sector had increased its employees by 
25,000.4 Many of those workers would witness the changes that occurred in the use 
of process technology and scale of production although the modernisation of the 
industry was neither wholesale nor smooth. For example, Reader notes that even by 
the early 1940s the conditions of work in the newly built government chemical 
factories highlighted to the directorate of ICI just how little regard they had given to 
their own workers welfare in their more established plants.5 According to Waldron, 
the situation for those working in the older plants were exacerbated by wartime 
working conditions with long hours being worked in poorly lit, badly ventilated and 
badly maintained plant.6 Inevitably, under such circumstances, increased numbers of 
workers contracted industrial diseases and this was especially so amongst those in 
the munitions sector.  
The post-war era witnessed more changes in the way that chemical plants 
were designed and constructed although it was not until the 1960s that one industrial 
medical officer could comment on the fact that chemical engineers were now being 
consulted at the design stage and that consequently ‘methods of reducing the 
frequency of operations that involved risk’ were being considered.7 Yet, it remained 
the case that the chemical process itself was the main determining factor in the 
choice of materials and design of the plant. For example, Brian Watson, a former ICI 
manager, recalled visiting one ammonia soda process site in the 1970s where wood 
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and copper were used as construction materials because, ‘the environment was so 
corrosive that they couldn’t make the plant out of steel girders.’8 Regardless, the 
process man was still expected to toil within this corrosive environment and as one 
worker recalled ‘its not just the fumes, you can get burns you see, terrible burns from 
ammonia and ammonia nitrate.’9  
Huge capital investment was made in the research and development of 
complex new products and it became increasingly essential that any new plant be 
built to more exacting specifications. Many large-scale building programmes were 
embarked upon during the 1960s such as those in the north east of England where 
ICI built new plants at Billingham and Wilton. These formed the largest 
petrochemicals and general chemicals complex outside of the United States of 
America whilst the polythene plants were the largest in Europe and the third largest 
in the world. Interestingly, a study of the ICI Billingham plant noted that between 
1946 and 1959 the ‘output doubled in value but the labour force was reduced from 
15,000 to 14,800 during the same period.’10 The use of automated process 
technology was responsible for this trend, a trend that was accompanied by large 
capital investments. Between 1958 and 1970 the annual capital expenditure in the 
British chemical industry rose by 70 per cent in real terms.11 As noted above, 
although some of the labour intensive methods were being replaced this investment 
in the industry initially led to higher numbers being employed with the total numbers 
employed rising from 444,000 in 1958 to 462,000 by 1970. Investment in the new 
processes and products also meant that over the same period the net output per 
person employed rose from £1,656 to £4,184.12 By 1972, the chemical industry was 
able to reduce the numbers employed to 439,000 whilst at the same time the net 
output per person employed continued to rise, reaching a total £5,251.13 
With advances being made in the fields of science and technology a much 
larger range of products came to be manufactured and these found ready markets in 
                                                 
8 Interview D. Walker with B.J. Watson, 08 October 2005, p.10 
9 Interview D. Walker with D. May, 06 September 2005, Tape 1, p.11 
10 J.W. House, Recent Economic Growth in North-East England, The Role of Four National Growth 
Industries, Chemicals, Electrical Goods and Machinery, Vehicles, Paper and Board, Department of 
Geography, Research Series No.4 (University of Newcastle Upon Tyne 1964), pp.34-35 
11 W. Grant, W. Paterson, and C. Whitson, Government and the Chemical Industry, A Comparative 
Study of Britain and West Germany, Clarendon Press, (Oxford 1988), p.40 
12 Annual Abstract of Statistics, Number 111, 1974, p.164 
13 Annual Abstract of Statistics, Number 111, 1974, p.164 
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other industries. For example, synthetic dyestuffs and chemical fertilisers were 
produced in large quantities from the 1920s, synthetic resins and plastics from the 
1930s and 1940s and, having barely existed at all before 1945, the petro-chemical 
industry would become a very large sector of the industry in the post war period. 
Changes in the type of chemicals being produced necessitated the use of the new 
process technology and some chemicals would be produced on a continuous basis 
within a totally enclosed system. These processes were primarily introduced to meet 
the needs of production but enclosed process systems and automated handling would 
remove some of the more obvious risks associated with the industry. Nonetheless, 
new chemicals and processes brought with them new risks and dangers. From the 
1930s some of the dangers were being strongly suspected by chemical process 
workers and occupational health experts but these suspicions did not impede 
production. Only from the late 1940s and early 1950s, in response to the data 
presented in a series of official epidemiological studies would safety procedures for 
certain processes become strengthened and the production of clearly defined 
substances be banned altogether. Nonetheless, by the 1970s the former ICI director 
of research calculated that ‘only 6000 of the 30,000 chemicals in regular use in 
British industry have been tested for their ability to cause cancer’ and that 1000 of 
the 6000 tested were proven to be able to cause cancer.14 By the end of the twentieth 
century around 100,000 chemical substances were registered in the USA for 
commercial use and each year that total increased by 800 to 1,000. This occurred 
‘with no, or only minimal testing’ and there was ‘little or no basic toxicity 
information in the public record for 75 per cent of the 3,000 chemical substances 
produced in the highest volume in the United States.’15   
In A History of Work in Britain McIvor has argued that there were three main 
ways in which work could directly affects a worker’s health. Long hours and the 
pace of work could induce fatigue, workers could be injured or killed by industrial 
accidents, and working in close proximity to substances could lead to poisoning and 
occupational disease.16 Within the majority of chemical works in Britain in 1914, 
                                                 
14 D. Eva, and R. Oswald, Health and Safety at Work, Pan, (London 1981), p.114 
15 C.F. Cranor, ‘How Should Society Approach the Real and Potential Risks Posed by New 
Technologies?’ pp.3-9 in Plant Physiology (133) September 2003 
http://www.plantphysiol.org/cgi/content/full/133/1/3 
16 A.J McIvor, A History of Work in Britain, 1880-1950, Palgrave, (Hampshire 2001), p.113 
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long hours of work were common, the provision of suitable washing and sanitary 
facilities was the exception, the supply of protective wear was patchy, and food was 
usually consumed where the work was done leaving open the possibility that workers 
might ingest toxic substances.17 Moreover, much of the chemical production in 
Britain was generated within a crude and chaotic working environment. For example, 
Russell notes that in 1915 one manufacturer instructed his employees to sit on top of 
safety valves in order to maintain a high pressure in process vessels.18 This insight 
might have a darkly comic value to it and perhaps be dismissed as a ‘thing of the 
past’ yet Brian Watson recalled that in the 1970s: 
 
There was a process, I think it was a titanium process somewhere over 
Billingham way, where the process was dissolving the vessels in 
which it took place or at least dissolving the lids of the vessels away. 
And there were people who wore asbestos suits who walked on the 
top of these hot retorts welding up gaps in the lids as they appeared 
and it struck me as being a particularly dangerous job.19 
 
Again, at the beginning of the period under examination, most chemical workers 
came into close contact with the materials they produced and much of the work was 
labour intensive. For example, commenting on the alkali trade Campbell noted that 
the men were ‘mixing, heating, dissolving and crystallising’ and in carrying out these 
‘arduous’ tasks were ‘exposed to great heat and acid fumes.’20 Doug May, a former 
chemical process worker, worked in the ammonia nitrate fertiliser section of an ICI 
works in Avonmouth, Bristol. Various chemicals were used depending on the 
specific type of fertiliser required and these would include ammonia, nitric acid, 
phosphoric acid, sulphuric acid, potash and limestone. Discussing the job, Doug May 
recalled that in 1969: 
                                                 
17 D. Walker, An Inconvenience of the Trade, Occupational Health and Safety in the British Chemical 
Industry, 1870-1914, M.Phil Dissertation, University of Strathclyde, 2003. Unpublished 
18 C.A. Russell, (ed) Chemistry, Society and Environment, A New History of the British Chemical 
Industry, Royal Society of Chemistry, (Cambridge 2000), p.236 
19 Interview: D. Walker with B. J. Watson, 08 October 2005, p.11 
20 W.A. Campbell, ‘The Alkali Industry’ pp.75-106 in C.A. Russell, (ed) Chemistry, Society and 
Environment, A New History of the British Chemical Industry, Royal Society of Chemistry, 
(Cambridge 2000), p.84 
 50
 All of these things were produced on the site but actually came 
together in my plant which was the granulation plant and that was 
where they were all mixed up together in various…in what we called 
NPK [N=Nitrogen, P=Phosphorus and K= Potassium]. If you had a 
high ammonium nitrate content fertiliser with low other ones they 
used to produce different problems on the plant. Sometimes things 
would clog up, other times you would get particularly dusty 
conditions, if you were producing high ammonium nitrate ones you 
would get white dust flowing around all over the place. It was a hard 
plant, it was a physical plant, it was the sort of plant where you could 
work your guts out and, blow me, five minutes later the whole damn 
plant was in a mess again and you had to start all over again…It was 
physically demanding.21    
 
As the above testimony has indicated, the idea that the chemical industry evolved 
from being a mainly dangerous and labour intensive business into a fully safe and 
automated one can be misleading. Drawing on a variety of source material this 
chapter will examine what impact the changing workplace had on the health of those 
who sold their labour power within the British chemical industry during the sixty-
year period that began in 1914. The framework for this chapter will draw on the first 
two of the areas identified by McIvor above and will be presented in two parts.  
                                                 
21 Interview: D. Walker with Doug May, 06 September 2005, Tape 1, p.7 
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Part One: Hours and Pace of Work 
 The firm of Brunner Mond was an early pioneer amongst chemical employers 
in reducing working hours. This was evidenced by their decision to introduce a three-
shift system in place of the normal two-shift system from as early as 1889. By doing 
so, shift hours were reduced from 12 to 8 per day and a 56-hour working week was 
created. To achieve this the firm employed a third shift of men and to help finance 
this change Brunner Mond reduced the existing men’s pay by 10 per cent per shift to 
cover some of the additional costs.22 Brunner Mond provided an explanation to the 
Chemical Works Inquiry of 1893 as to why shorter working hours were conducive 
within their business. Firstly, they claimed that sickness levels had been lowered and 
secondly that when combined with increased productivity the wages paid per ton of 
alkali were no different than they had been four years previously. Brunner Mond thus 
assured the Committee that all of this had been made possible due to ‘improvements 
in the apparatus used [the Solvay system in place of the LeBlanc system] …and 
partly to the increased efficiency of the men due to their better health and spirits.’23 
The implementation of shorter working hours at Brunner Mond was accompanied by 
the introduction of holidays with pay, share-ownership schemes, company housing, 
and recreation clubs, all of which formed part of the welfarist programme that 
Brunner Mond would import into ICI in 1926. As will be discussed in Chapter Four, 
in return for this welfarist package both the management of Brunner Mond and ICI 
expected, and generally got, loyalty to the firm rather than to a trade union. Indeed, 
both Fitzgerald and Melling have argued persuasively elsewhere that welfarist 
schemes were generally designed as part of a wider strategy that aimed to instil a 
sense of loyalty to the firm thereby diluting and confusing any potential unified 
labour disquiet over the conditions of work.24 
During the late 1890s and early 1900s some other chemical employers 
followed the Brunner Mond lead on hours and shifts such as at Castner-Kellner, 
                                                 
22 The 50th Anniversary, Brunner Mond & Co, 1873-1923, Bemrose & Sons, (Derby 1923), p.69 
23 Report on the Conditions of Labour in Chemical Works, The Dangers to Life and Health of the 
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Chance Brothers, Gaskell Deacons, Peter Spence, and Crosfield’s, but these firms 
were exceptions rather than the rule. For most workers the conditions at the 
beginning of the twentieth century worsened as the pace of shovelling and the 
strength of the chemicals increased directly as a result of the intense competition that 
the industry experienced from the USA and Europe.25 Haber has also noted that in 
the period following the Great War most shiftmen who toiled in British chemical 
works continued to work twelve-hour shifts although these hours were reduced by 
the mid to late 1920s so that a typical working week for shiftmen consisted of 7 
shifts of 8 hours each.26 The hours worked in ICI remained at the Brunner Mond 
level until 1935 when they were reduced to 48 hours and two years later the Factory 
Act of 1937 made legal the 48-hour working week and limited the amount of 
overtime to be worked to a maximum of 6 hours. This was a relatively short-lived 
gain and as demand increased during the war years from 1940 onwards the 
contractual hours were raised to 56 hours. Indeed, McIvor has noted that across 
British industry in this period there was a ‘repeat of the 1915 scenario’ whereby 
work was speeded up and the hours of work were lengthened up to 70 or 75 per 
week.27 Indeed, the records of the TGWU show that in the chemical sector in 1944 
the wages were ‘too low’ and that ‘a man could not live on his earnings unless he 
worked for 12 hours a day.’28 Following the war ICI reduced the contractual hours to 
48 and by 1948 had reduced this further to 44 hours per week.29 The level of hours 
remained at this level until 1960 when they were lowered to 42 hours and in 1965 
they were reduced still further to 40 hours where they remained at that level up to 
and beyond 1974.30  
The trend towards the introduction of the shorter working week may be 
viewed as a positive one for the health of the worker. Less time spent in the 
workplace facilitated recovery time for the workers as well as reducing the amount of 
                                                 
25 A.P. Laurie, ‘The Chemical Trades’, pp.568-598 in Dr T. Oliver (ed) Dangerous Trades, John 
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time they were exposed to potential hazards. Whilst these could all be positive 
aspects of a shorter working week Kinnersley has argued that as the working week 
was reduced many employers introduced methods to intensify production levels. 
Certainly, across British industry as a whole, productivity levels did increase by 20 
per cent between 1957 and 1968 and from 1960 more than a third of British workers 
regularly worked eight hours of overtime each week.31 From Table 1 it can be seen 
that production in the chemical sector overtook the production of all other 
manufacturing in Britain from the 1960s. As has been touched upon above an 
investment in technology helped to increase production levels but many chemical 
firms also increased their productivity by harnessing the available labour power to 
this technology so that little or no interruption of production would occur. The use of 
shift systems was also an essential element in this process whilst overtime and wage 
incentive schemes were widely utilised.    
 
Table 1: Growth of the British chemical industry, 1913-1968 
                                     (Production in 1958 = 100) 
Year Chemical and 
allied trades 
All manufacturing 
industry 
1913 23 37 
1920 26 38 
1929 29 46 
1937 38 62 
1950 69 82 
1960 123 115 
1961 125 115 
1962 129 115 
1963 139 120 
1964 152 129 
1965 159 134 
1966 165 136 
1967 171 134 
1968 185 143 
 
Source: G.C. Allen, British Industries and Their Organization, Fifth Edition, Longman, 
(London 1970), p.219 
                                                 
31 P. Kinnersley, The Hazards of Work, Pluto Press, (London 1974), p.19 
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 By the 1970s more than a third of all industrial workers employed across 
British industry worked shifts. Throughout the period 1914 to 1974 shift work, 
especially rotating shifts, was a common feature for those selling their labour power 
in the chemical industry, a method of working often associated with health problems. 
For example, dietary and sleep patterns were disrupted causing digestive problems, 
increased fatigue, and increased stress levels. By the early 1970s one physiological 
research study revealed that those who endured rotating shift patterns were more 
prone to physical, mental and social problems.32 Navarro has also argued that shift 
work ‘in addition to physical and psychological wear, destroys all possibilities for the 
workers to enjoy normal daily life relations.’33 Having started work with ICI in 1964 
one former shift worker recalled that he had actually liked shift work and especially 
when each shift consisted of twelve hours because, ‘the working week was 
condensed, that’s whit I liked aboot it, but you could have twelve hard hours, twelve 
hard hours, o’er four days, it was a hard week.’34 Nonetheless, demonstrating that his 
liking for shiftwork was atypical the same respondent also revealed that ‘at that time 
there was about twenty [others] started but after two years there was three [because 
they] jist didnae like it, didnae like shift work.’35 That is, eight-five per cent of the 
men who started shift work at that plant subsequently resigned within a period of two 
years for no reason other than the fact that shift work was an essential part of the job. 
This decision was taken in spite of the fact that for an unskilled or semi-skilled 
worker ‘the money at that time was probably the best in the area.’36 As will be 
argued below, very few workers liked shift work but the money and security offered 
by a large firm such as ICI could act as a magnet especially to those young unskilled 
or semi-skilled men who were starting to have families. 
Reasons that explain why shift work was not liked are revealed in an 
examination of a chemical labour force employed in a large Teeside chemical works. 
The study, conducted in the early 1970s by Nichols and Beynon, found that many of 
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35 Interview: D. Walker with KG, November 2005, p.6 
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the process workers viewed shift work as having a detrimental effect on their social 
and physical wellbeing. For example, on returning from a night shift many men 
became irritable when they were forced to deal with the noise levels of traffic or 
other family members and neighbours who were going about their ‘normal’ daily 
routines. Echoing Navarro’s assertion above, it was also found that the men had 
trouble arranging to meet others for a social occasion as ‘free times’ would have to 
be calculated well in advance and take account of the rotating shift pattern. The 
continental shift system was especially disliked and one of the respondents outlined 
how it affected his diet and sleep pattern:   
 
This Continental (6am-2pm, 2pm-10pm and 10pm-6am) really messes 
my system about: on the day shift I’ll eat like a pig, y’know about five 
meals a day like. I have a breakfast before I go to work, then I have a 
big breakfast at work and then I have a few pints before my dinner, 
then tea, a few pints and chips for supper. Now on ‘two to tens’ I just 
sleep. I have a big meal before I go to work and some supper but 
mostly I just sleep. But on nights. Jesus Christ! On nights I don’t sleep 
or eat. Then it’s days off to recover and back eating like a pig again.37  
 
Looking back at his career in ICI Peter Dodds recalled the rotating shift pattern that 
he worked throughout the 1960s and 1970s and commented on how this had affected 
his daily life.  
 
Yeah, well if I was the early shift I was home at three o’clock but you 
felt tired. If you were on back shift the kids were at school and you 
were there in bed and on night shift, your first night shift was okay 
because ye saw the kids and that before they went to school, yer 
second night shift ye were in bed when they went tae school and ye 
saw them when they came home but ye were shattered…I thought the 
continental shifts were horrific, absolutely horrific.38 
                                                 
37 T. Nichols, and H. Beynon, Living With Capitalism, Class Relations and The Modern Factory, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, (London 1977), p.25 
38 Interview: D. Walker with Peter Dodds, November 2005, p.26 
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 Whilst the shift system interfered with the social pattern of his and his family’s daily 
life, Peter Dodds had resigned himself to the fact that accepting shiftwork was the 
price that had to be paid in the labour market for gaining improved job security.  
 
I was just married and I wanted the security. The ICI gave you a 
pension and I thought this was terrific because at the buses you got 
nothing. So I went there for security at the time. I’d never worked 
inside a factory in my life before and I thought when I first started, 
‘och, I’ll never stick this’ and as I say I was there for thirty-five years. 
I basically went there for the pension. When I first started I actually 
dropped fifteen pounds a week which was a lot of money in these 
days. I went from twenty-five pound a week tae ten pound so I didn’t 
go there for money. Eventually that came after about six months, I got 
the same rate, but the thing I went there for was security for ma wife 
and kids.39 
 
The production of alkali dominated the early years of the industry, a process 
that was both labour intensive and required men to attend to the process round the 
clock (paternalistic legislation prohibited night work for women and juveniles and so 
excluded them from the shift jobs available in the chemical works).40 Physical 
exhaustion was therefore experienced not only by the long hours of work they were 
expected to undertake but also by the heat and the heavy nature of the work. For 
example, Campbell notes that large wrought iron tools measuring 12 to 15 feet long 
had to be manipulated into place using hooks and chains. Whilst being exposed to 
acids and fumes throughout their shift the men would use these large and heavy tools 
to stir batches for production.41 The same heavy manual labour was required for 
black ash production, a process that was also undertaken on a piecework basis. Both 
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jobs required the worker to use his own judgement to determine when the mixture 
was ready. With the wage being determined by the quantity produced an additional 
level of pressure was laid on the shoulders of the chemical process worker to get this 
judgement right. The heat associated with many of the tasks also drained the men of 
energy. Wohl notes in Endangered Lives that temperatures of 130ºF were 
experienced by Victorian bleach makers but by the 1950s temperatures in the 
workplace had risen dramatically, such as in the manufacture of carbide, where 
electric furnaces reached temperatures of 4000ºC.42 One former ICI process worker 
noted that in his work area during the 1970s, ‘it was a hundred plus Fahrenheit, that’s 
draining during a twelve hour shift, it’s no(t) very healthy.’43 Working in this heat he 
had been issued with nylon overalls for protection but according to this respondent, 
‘it was just a normal nylon and it did melt if ye touched the stenter oven door.’44 
Asked if a heat protection suit or overall was available the respondent claimed that, 
‘there was one heat protection suit which was one size fits all and it was stinking, it 
was never cleaned, so are you going tae put that on?’45 
 Few historical records of the chemical industry contain the workers voice but 
one government inquiry undertaken in the last decade of the nineteenth century 
provides evidence of the arduous nature of the work. Although this documentary 
evidence is taken from the 1890s the content remains relevant to the period under 
investigation as little or no change in this process took place up to the First World 
War. On being questioned by the Royal Commission about his working day one 
black ash worker described his working conditions at Bramwell and Sons’ Chemical 
Works. From this evidence it can be seen that long hours of heavy manual labour 
were undertaken in great heat. Thus: 
 
I have to strip to my singlet. Having raised the furnace door I have to 
buckle to with a slicer, a large heavy iron bar fourteen feet long, 
weighing over half a hundredweight, it’s as much as I can lift with 
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both hands. With this bar I have to shift the material from one over to 
another. The ball includes 3 cwt [hundredweight] of salt cake, 1½ cwt 
of slack, 2¼ cwt. of stone, and 3cwt of mud lime. That is the lightest 
scale but we are generally on what is known as double muck and that 
brings in as much as 16 cwt of lime. While at it I am working as hard 
as a man can work for the full twelve hours. We have no fixed meal 
hours. I have sometimes to take my meals by instalments sometimes 
rising from them four or five times. There is no time allowed for 
meals. We must make it out as best we can.46 
 
Long hours of heavy manual work remained a common feature for most people 
employed in 1914 and the Health of Munitions Workers Committee (HMWC) noted 
that this was due mainly to the view held by most employers that long hours of work 
produced larger outputs. Nonetheless, recognising that neither the health of the 
worker nor industrial efficiency were benefiting from long hours of work the HMWC 
recommended in 1916 that the average working day should not exceed 13 or 14 
hours and that regular breaks should be incorporated into the working day. By the 
end of the war the HMWC acknowledged that their earlier recommendations on 
working hours were ‘too long’ and they therefore proposed that the hours could be 
reduced further ‘without loss of output.’47 In their final report, published in 1918, the 
HMWC reported that the reason why so many accidents had occurred in the 
workplace could be explained by the speed of working and worker fatigue and that 
this was exacerbated by poor diet, inadequate illumination, lack of ventilation and a 
lack of safety provision.48  
Long hours of work and shift patterns could have a negative effect on the 
well being of a worker and this could be exacerbated by methods of work designed to 
maximise production levels and profits. By 1911, American firms such as DuPont 
had taken an early lead in forming Labour Efficiency Departments but the workforce 
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in Britain were generally managed on an informal basis with managerial prerogatives 
being maintained. Haber has noted that amongst the British chemical employers 
managerial attitudes were mostly ‘autocratic, harked back to Smilesian precepts of 
self-help, and occasionally were sympathetically paternalistic.’49 Nonetheless, a 
range of strategies including piecework, close supervision, and the speeding-up of 
the process were all utilised across British industry. Most incentive payment 
schemes, such as piecework, were designed to give the impression that a ‘fair 
system’ was in operation with the financial rewards being directly related to output. 
However, as Parker et al have argued, all such schemes involved some form of 
‘subjective estimating’ and from a health point of view could also lead to increased 
worker anxiety associated with the ‘instability of earnings’ and a fear that the rate 
would be cut if the bonus earnings reached too high a level.50 According to Cronin 
and Littler approximately 250 British firms had implemented the Bedaux ‘scientific 
management’ system by 1939. This neo-Taylorist system introduced incentive 
payment schemes in conjunction with time and motion studies that were aimed not 
only at increasing production but also exerting more managerial control over the 
labour process.51 From amongst the 250 firms that adopted the Bedaux system 11 per 
cent were in the chemical sector with ICI being the best known amongst them. With 
the chemical process itself often dictating the speed of production limited 
opportunities were available to chemical employers to intensify workloads. 
Nonetheless, the Bedaux system was implemented to measure, control and intensify 
workloads in the filling, packing and storing of the finished chemical products. 
According to Gill et al the Bedaux system was introduced to ICI employees in 1935 
and at a point when pay structures were changing from one that had been negotiated 
at district levels to one of a single, uniform company rate paid throughout all ICI 
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plants.52 Maintaining the managerial prerogative, the scheme was overseen by the 
ICI Central Labour Department who appointed an assessor at each site who in turn 
evaluated the work and awarded points under specific headings according to their 
own personal judgement.53 
By 1945, the secretary of the Chemical Workers Union (CWU) commented 
that between the wars ‘the hours of labour were dangerously long for such an 
unhealthy industry’ and that ‘rationalisation and the Bedaux system were used to 
press workers to utmost limits of physical endurance.’54 Zelma Logue worked in the 
ICI Ardeer munitions plant during the war and remembered working under the 
Bedaux system. She recalled, ‘they gave you a quota and anything you done over 
that you got a percentage but we never had a great wage.’55 The low bonus 
experienced by this worker was perhaps a result of the way in which the workload 
had been assessed and how the points for tasks were allotted. The system could be 
manipulated in the firms favour and this is made clear in the testimony provided by 
former Wolsey workers. For example, at Wolsey the time and motion men had 
picked younger and fitter workers to do the jobs that were to be measured for the 
scheme. By doing so the higher bonus levels became virtually unattainable and for 
some the bonus was ridiculously low. One former Wolsey worker recalled her 
experience of this wage system thus:  
 
It floored everybody, I mean it... they just didn't know what to do, you 
know, to try and better themselves, I mean after all you could only, 
you could only keep working. They hadn't done enough research, they 
didn't realise the implications of what it could do to a human being. 
One girl can adapt, another girl can't. I saw them go hysterical, I saw 
them cry, I saw one girl faint. And I don't think that any system 
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should be allowed to do that to a person, I think it should have been 
gone into a lot more before it was introduced.56 
 
Isabella Henderson worked at the ICI munition plant in Ardeer and also disliked the 
Bedaux system commenting that ‘nobody liked it ken, it really was a horrible thing.’ 
Isabella recalled that in other sections of the workplace a piecework system was in 
use and this delivered a better return for effort as ‘you made your own wages…the 
more cartridges you made the more money you got.’57 The influence of the Bedaux 
scientific management system continued at ICI and in 1951 payment by results 
systems linked to work study continued to be implemented.58 Indeed, by 1965, when 
discussing the British chemical industry Manning claimed that incentive schemes 
based on work study were ‘fairly common’ and that these were often coupled with 
‘plant efficiencies and other factors to provide an overall incentive to greater output, 
better quality and greater efficiency.’59 Increased outputs were of course also 
achieved by improved methods of manufacture but only where ‘higher effort’ was 
measured did incentive bonus schemes reward the workers.60   
Having examined the methods used in a large chemical fertiliser plant during 
the early 1970s Nichols and Armstrong noted the pressure on the operatives to 
manhandle the sacks of product and to keep pace with the speed of the feeders and 
conveyors. These men were ‘cheaper than a completely automated system’ and 
seventy-five per cent of them were engaged in ‘unremitting physical work of an 
unskilled kind.’61 Nichols and Armstrong also noted that these men now worked 
within a newly designed and ‘elaborate productivity deal’ that removed the former 
complicated bonus systems. Within the new system of work the employees were 
encouraged to become more ‘involved’ in their work, to ‘self actualise’ and to see 
that their own and the Company’s needs were interdependent. The new productivity 
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deal, it was claimed, would provide ‘more chemicals, more wages and more profit – 
for everyone.’62  With the bonus rates removed and a structure of guaranteed fixed 
wage rates put in their place the non-negotiable wage took no cognisance of 
increased workloads. Exposing the workforce to a series of training films, talks about 
wastage, the costs of production etc, the new productivity targets were then identified 
by plant managers and the team of workers were encouraged to meet them. As 
Nichols and Armstrong have noted, ‘the period which followed the introduction of 
the Agreement saw an increasing pressure for production being placed upon fewer 
and fewer men.’63  One former ICI worker recalled his experiences of a similar 
system of working that had been introduced at his plant thus: 
 
Aboot yins [once] a month we were subjected to a brain washing 
session. They ca’d [called] it a communication session and it was 
supposed to be a two way thing…you know…coming and going frae 
baith sides. Our concerns were put forward and allegedly forwarded 
tae the management. All the times that I was at these meetings I’ve 
never known anybody tae get a response back frae any of our queries. 
All they were interested in doing was telling us facts or whit they 
wanted tae dae and whit they were going tae be dae’n [doing] they 
didnae give a toss aboot whit we were wantin’ whether it wis 
safety…anything, they jist didnae care but this was supposed tae be a 
communication a two way communication…a complete waste o’ 
time… propaganda that’s a’ it was, but again, it looked good when 
they said there was communications.64 
 
Within such a system this ICI employee had no feeling of being ‘involved’ or of 
being ‘self-actualised’ as he toiled each week within his 12 hour rotating shift pattern 
amidst the excessively high noise levels that were slowly impairing his senses.     
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It has been explained above that long hours of work were a common feature 
during the early years of the industry however this was not a universal trend. For 
some, working long hours would have been impossible due to the very nature of the 
atmosphere in which they toiled. Two notable examples of the type of work that fell 
into this category were bleaching powder packing and lime dressing. Those 
employed on this work did so for shorter hours than any other job in the chemical 
industry because of the heavily polluted conditions that existed in the ‘chamber’ 
where they worked.65 Prior to starting their work the ‘packers’ and ‘dressers’ first 
had to wrap numerous layers of cloth around their mouths, a protective barrier 
sometimes referred to as a ‘muzzle.’ From an inquiry of 1892 one worker stated that   
 
 
Illustration 2: Bleaching powder packers wearing muzzles, c.1917. 
Source: http://www.northwichuk.com/pics/albums/oldnorthwich/thumb_1917_bleach_packers.jpg 
 
 
it was vitally important to breathe through the mouthpiece of the muzzle and the 
consequences if this was not done. Thus: 
 
                                                 
65 A typical chamber was made from lead and was usually 30 to 50 feet long, by 20 to 30 feet wide 
and about 5 to 6 feet high.  
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If they inhale through their nostrils at all it has a very bad effect, they 
become gassed and sometimes they have to lie up for two or three 
days. The sensation they complain of is in the throat - a choking 
sensation as if they were asphyxiated.66  
 
Moreover, breathing through such a large improvised respirator was physically 
demanding with the exertion required for breathing being intensified once the actual 
work started. This was physical work with the lime dresser wheeling in barrows of 
lime into the chamber and then spreading the lime using a large rake. The doors of 
the chamber were then closed and chlorine gas would be piped into the chamber 
through the roof. About halfway through the process the lime dressers would have to 
re-enter the chamber and rake the lime once again to ensure that the gas was 
saturating all of the lime. Once the process had been completed, barrels were rolled 
into the chamber and the bleaching powder was then shovelled into the containers. 
Neither of these types of workers could withstand the physical strain of breathing 
through the respirators nor raking or shovelling for more than an hour at a time. 
Working in such conditions a working day of five or six hours was considered to be a 
‘big day.’67 
The government enquiry of 1893 noted that both these types of workers 
quickly became exhausted and that this was noticeable by their ‘red and puffed state’ 
as well as by their ‘profuse perspiration.’68 The picture overleaf shows that packing 
bleaching powder into large barrels continued as a job at the ICI Castner Kellner 
Works in Runcorn through to the late 1940s. From the photograph it can be seen that 
the packer was now able to utilise machinery for a part of this task. This machine 
was used to deliver a standard measure of powder to the barrel. The ‘barrel filler,’ as 
it was known, was positioned directly below the various openings in the ceiling. This 
allowed the bleaching powder to be shovelled from the floor above (where the 
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process had taken place) via a chute and into the open barrel. The introduction of this 
equipment would not have reduced the physical nature of the job or the dust levels  
 
 
Illustration 3: ICI Castner Kellner bleaching powder packing, Runcorn, 1946/1947 
Source: www.catalyst.org.uk/visit/visibase.htm 
 
but was used to help meet the requirement for accuracy of weight in packing. Once 
filled, the barrel had to be manually manoeuvred into position for storage and 
shipment. The large wooden mallet in his hand would have been used to hammer the 
lid of the barrel into position. What is also remarkable about this picture is that it 
shows that from the 1890s to the 1940s the packer had remained reliant on a cloth 
‘muzzle’ to protect his respiratory system. As can be seen in the photograph overleaf, 
by the 1960s, a small gauze mask had replaced the muzzle and the operator was now 
equipped with a pair of lightweight goggles. As before, breathing in through the 
exposed nostrils had to be avoided. However, the requirement for heavy labour had 
been reduced with the powder now being delivered to the metal barrel by the pull of 
a lever. A canvas cloth was attached to the feeder nozzle and this fitted over the top 
of the container thereby reducing the dust levels. Nonetheless, as can be seen from 
the photograph below, despite the improvements that had been implemented, dust 
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continued to be transmitted into the air and accumulations of this are clearly visible 
around a wide part of the work area. 
 
 
Illustration 4: Filling bleaching powder containers, Castner Kellner Works, 
Runcorn, 1960 
    Source: Catalyst Museum, Widnes, Cheshire 
 
Heavy loading and unloading of raw ores and finished chemical materials 
were part and parcel of the daily toil for many chemical workers throughout the 
period under examination. The shovel was used extensively for filling barrels and 
sacks. These containers, once filled, were then manually heaved into storage areas 
ready for dispatch. Large bottles or ‘carboys’ filled with corrosive liquids were also 
manhandled throughout the workplace and these were both heavy to lift and liable to 
spillage or breakage. Usually stored within a metal cage and using straw as 
cushioning, some of the glass carboys contained up to 10 gallons of liquid and 
required two labourers to lift them. One former worker at Holliday Dyes and 
Chemicals Works in Huddersfield recalled that: 
 
I was helping to lift a carboy of nitric acid up the stairs to 59 & 60 
pans when the carboy broke and splashed down my trousers, a quick 
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dash to the nearest tap and a drenching with water saved me from 
serious injury.69  
 
In 1960, the Chief Inspector of Factories noted that in some of the new chemical 
plants corrosive liquids were now being pumped and piped from delivery to storage 
or to use and that this system had reduced the necessity for repeated hazardous 
operations that involved the handling of carboys and drums.70 However, the use of 
this safer system was slow to reach the factory floors of British 
 industry and the CIF could only comment that ‘the system of lifting carboys by a 
pulley block to the reaction vessel is still prevalent…it cannot be emphasised too 
strongly that this is a most dangerous practice.’71 Discussing the reluctance of 
industry to modernise Dintenfass has argued in the Decline of Industrial Britain that 
by comparing productivity growth figures for Britain with other industrial economies 
it suggests that the chemical industry along with coal, construction, and the electrical 
goods industry were ‘all part of a larger pattern of technological backwardness and 
not isolated exceptions to a more progressive tendency.’72 Pagnamenta and Overy 
have claimed that in 1914 the chemical industry remained “unsophisticated” with 
wooden poles being used to stir vats and with chemicals being decanted 
haphazardly.73 A few employers did invest in new technologies but they remained 
few in number and by 1920 The Chemical News could only report on experiments 
that were being conducted with labour saving devices that could potentially be 
installed in chemical works.74  
Technological advances such as conveyor belt machinery were developed 
primarily to increase production levels although indirectly they may have delivered 
some improvement in the working conditions by reducing the loads that had to be 
manually transported. Areas considered appropriate for mechanisation in the 
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chemical industry in the 1920s were the pneumatic conveying of coal and granular 
substances as well as the automation of machines that handled liquids.75 However, as 
with any transmission equipment a potential threat to the worker existed if it was not 
properly maintained or guarded. Warnings about this specific danger had repeatedly 
been made by the Chief Inspectors of Factories and despite successive claims that 
this issue was being addressed the CIF still felt it necessary to reiterate the warnings 
in 1925 when they stated that ‘the harmless looking rotating shaft, once it gets a grip 
of a worker’s clothing can speedily cause death or grave mutilation.’76 Therefore, 
although the introduction of conveyors and automated equipment would relieve the 
strain associated with moving heavy loads of ore and coal this type of equipment, if 
improperly installed and maintained, had its own potential health and safety dangers.  
Haber has argued that by the 1920s ‘the shovel was on the way out’ although 
this general statement could not be applied across the whole of the industry.77  One 
process operator recalled that even in the 1970s he continued to use  a shovel:  
 
We started using limestone as a filler within fertiliser. I didn’t like 
using the stuff I think it was bloody awful. It’s very heavy. I mean, if 
you have a shovel full of limestone it’s like lifting up a block of 
concrete and it was introduced into the system instead of using 
sulphuric acid because it was cheaper.78 
   
Indeed, adopting technical or mechanical labour saving devices seems to have 
occurred more readily in Germany and the USA than in British chemical concerns 
where conveyors were not installed widely until well after the First World War. In 
the smaller batch system of production Richard Fitzpatrick, a chromate process 
worker, recalled that from the early to mid 1940s the raw materials that he required 
were brought to his workplace on wheelbarrows. Thus: 
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I was wheeling a one wheel big barra (barrow) that maybe held aboot 
four hundred weight o’ dross (coal) and I had to feed the furnaces 
(with a shovel) plus a had about a hundredweight bag of soda I had to 
put at certain furnaces.79 
 
The chromate manufacturing industry was a more labour than capital 
intensive one but by the early 1950s the large-scale manufacture of soda ash did 
utilise mechanical packing equipment. That is, the finished product was delivered to 
the sack by mechanical means, usually by conveyor. Thereafter the sacks were 
manually handled with men loading the sacks onto wagons or barges for storage and 
transportation. The volume of labour required to handle the output can be gauged 
from a 1948 ICI magazine that claimed that 85 per cent of the Winnington and 
Wallerscote exported products were transported by barges and other small craft to 
the main ports at Merseyside for shipping.80 This meant that many thousands of 
sacks had to be manipulated onto these craft and that much of this heavy manual 
labour was undertaken in an atmosphere thick with dust. One ICI report from 
 1954 stated that despite the existence of the ventilation system in the plant ‘dust is 
inevitably produced at the packing points’ where up to 23,000 bags were handled 
daily.81 Five years later in 1959 ICI could still report on the physical demands being 
made on the packers and loaders and that the dust exposure was ‘both heavy and 
prolonged.’82 The British Economic Development Committee viewed high levels of 
manual labour as being inefficient and in the 1960s noted that the scale of 
operations in American chemical firms allowed them to utilise the latest bulk 
handling techniques, including automatic bagging and loading facilities.83 By 
comparison, the wife of a former ICI soda ash worker recalled the heavy manual 
labour that her husband did in a Cheshire chemical plant during the 1960s:  
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It was very hard work ‘cos they [sacks] used to come down a chute 
and of course, taking them off the machines they used to rub all their 
wrists and all their wrists would be bleeding.84 
 
According to Hilda Langley her husband had to stop this particular job after he 
sustained an occupational injury. This testimony indicates that there were high 
physical demands being made on those employed to load sacks of finished product. 
Ten years later Nichols and Beynon found much the same situation at a large 
fertiliser plant where it was observed that hundredweight bags of fertiliser were 
delivered by conveyor to the men at the ‘band end’ where they ‘thudded’ into the 
shoulders of the loaders. Having caught the bags, they turned and dropped a bag into 
a lorry every six seconds.85 When loading bags onto railway wagons the area for 
loading was restricted and would only allow room for one man. Taking it in turns the 
men caught the hundredweight bags and dropped them into position every three 
seconds, ‘warm bags that burn your shoulder; leaving it red raw.’86  Hilda Langley 
recalled the work her husband had to do and the speed that the bags were delivered to 
him, something that ultimately damaged his body.  
 
They came down the chute…they come at such a speed …down the 
chutes like … and he used to have to load them into boats. He was 
one of the loaders that used to load the barges and he hurt his back 
with the loading a boat so he had to go on light work duty then, he 
was on a green card, he hurt his back.87 
 
As a ‘green card’ holder Mr Langley was now officially designated as a disabled 
worker. He retained his job at ICI but his status as a seller of labour power had now 
been altered and as a ‘disabled’ worker was now liable to be discriminated against. 
To reduce the levels of discrimination against disabled workers the government set 
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employment quotas for employers under the rules of the Disabled Persons 
(Employment) Act 1944 and 1958. If a ‘green card’ holder was employed they would 
be counted against the quota set for that firm. Although this legislation was well 
intentioned one former chemical worker recalled his ICI medical examination in 
1964 and how he was pressured to help meet the firms ‘disabled’ quota: 
 
Aye, it was a bit of a joke. I mean they wanted me to go in as disabled 
because I’d had a broken leg in a motorbike accident and I said ‘no, 
I’m no going disabled’ cos they were obviously trying to make their 
figures look good…they’ve got to employ so many disabled guys and 
I said ‘no’ I says ‘if I dinnae stick this job’ I says ‘I can get a disabled 
sticker easy’ I says ‘but I canane get rid o’ it easy’ I says ‘so I’m no 
willing tae go’ and he said ‘well’ the usual ICI tactic ‘we might no be 
able to employ you’ I said ‘well, that’s up tae you but I’m no going 
disabled.’88 
 
ICI were in need of shift workers at this factory during the mid 1960s and the man 
secured the job without succumbing to the threat that he would only be employed if 
he agreed to be a green card holder. 
Film archive of sodium cyanide production in the 1930s shows a workshop 
with rows of pots emitting explosions followed by sheets of flame. The men in this 
ICI film wear (pristine) heavy aprons, hoods, gloves, and goggles, in order to carry 
out their workload, much of which is manual in nature. Using large metal tools they 
tighten or loosen nuts and levers, they push large containers and bogies alongside the 
process, and empty the sodium bricks from their moulds before piling them onto the 
passing trolley. The narrator of the ICI film intones ‘heavy clothing was needed to 
protect them from caustic splashes and the great heat generated in the cells.’89 As the 
men finish their shift they remove their heavy protective clothing wiping away the 
sweat that has gathered beneath the thick layers. The narrator informs the viewer that 
this plant is closing and a new one will open at Billingham which is ‘modern, better 
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equipped, and more efficient’ and will produce one and a half times the amount of 
sodium under better conditions. He adds ‘not all of the men will be going.’90 
 The reduction in the number of men required for each process was being 
matched by investments in new technology and new processes. This trend of 
replacing men with technology continued and by the mid 1960s technical 
‘innovations’ were changing the demands made on the labour force. One example of 
this is seen in the change that occurred in a process man’s job where he was expected 
to provide manual labour looking after one reactor. Following the installation of the 
new technology it meant that he had to attend to five reactors.91 This would indicate 
that the introduction of this particular piece of technology had been introduced to 
boost productivity and profit levels. With more reactors to look after the process 
operator now had to rely on the equipment to perform satisfactorily. Brian Watson, a 
former manager at ICI, commented on the tendency to move from a manual 
workforce to a less manual one where possible. Thus: 
 
The explosives industry in particular tended to be heavily manual 
because mechanisation tends to mean friction and you want to keep 
friction to a minimum in anything involving explosives so there 
tended to be a lot of manual involvement in the explosives industry.92 
 
One respondent who had worked at an explosives factory recalled the heavy manual 
workload during the war, a job that led to her wrists being strapped for about six or 
eight weeks due to strain. For the reasons stated above by Brian Watson, the manner 
in which the work was carried out changed very little with the passage of years.  
 
You had to put the gun cotton from the steaming house into this 
pumper which …it was like a huge bath it wasn’t a bath but it looked 
like that. One (worker) was at one end and you were at this end or 
whatever and you had sticks with flat pieces on it that you had to keep 
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pushing the popper, pushing the gun cotton and if it wasn’t running 
smoothly you had difficulty in getting it away again, very much so. It 
had to run smoothly.93 
 
The manufacturing of less volatile products allowed for the introduction of 
mechanisation and automation and Mr Watson discussed some of the reasons as to 
why these would have been implemented. 
 
It tended to move from manual to less manual. Various pressures on 
that, safety for one thing, the less extent to which people are exposed 
to chemicals the safer they are likely to be and it’s cheaper to buy 
electricity than it is to buy labour. So you want to keep your manning 
to a minimum and automate as much as you can.94 
 
The above testimony indicates that many variables were in play when 
determining which methods were best suited for the needs of production but 
protecting the process and reducing costs would have been paramount considerations 
for any capitalist firm. In the above statement the safety of the operatives also 
appears to feature in the consideration process. Indeed, within the Sociology of 
Industrial Injury Nichols has identified this feature of capitalist production and has 
argued that improving safety standards can be conducive with profit accumulation 
when, for example, it reduces the threat of explosions or other disruptions to 
production.95  The drive to increase production could also bring changes to the 
design of manufacturing equipment and inadvertently minimise or eliminate 
dangerous procedures. For example, one former shift supervisor recalled that for 
years men were regularly injured by the knives that they used to cut the plastic film 
they produced. This hazard was ultimately removed but only because ‘the units got 
bigger and bigger’ and the film became ‘too wide to cut manually so they had tae 
design a machine tae cut it.’96 Therefore, whilst the introduction of new process 
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technology and improved plant design could reduce the numbers of operatives being 
injured the motivation behind some of these improvements was to enhance 
production and profit levels rather than to save or protect lives per se. As will be 
discussed below, even where injury or death was shown to be occurring as a direct 
result of exposure to certain processes a positive preventative response was not 
always forthcoming from the industry.  
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Part Two: Accidents 
  In 1918, the HMWC noted that ‘only accidents of a certain degree of 
severity’ were notifiable to the Chief Inspector of Factories and that ‘vast numbers’ 
of accidents remained unaccounted for.97 Consequently, the 150,000 accidents 
reported annually during this period are merely an indication of how dangerous the 
workplace was for those who left their home each day in order to earn a living.98 
Over the following decades various legislative measures were introduced aimed at 
reducing the numbers of workers who fell victim to an occupational injury, disease, 
or premature death. Nonetheless, by 1972 the levels of death and injury caused by 
accidents at work remained under serious discussion and following a two-year 
investigation a Royal Commission, led by the former Chairman of the Coal Board, 
Lord Robens, stated that:  
 
Every year something like 1,000 people are killed at their work in this 
country. Every year about half a million suffer injuries in varying 
degrees of severity. 23 million working days are lost annually on 
account of industrial injury and disease.99 
 
These statistics refer to British industry as whole and it is therefore important to 
analyse the record of health and safety within the chemical industry to see what sort 
of levels of injury and death were found in this sector. Statistics by themselves have 
a tendency to dehumanise occupational accidents and perhaps at the outset of this 
section a detailed example of one fatal accident may bring such incidents into sharper 
focus. This particular accident occurred in the mid 1960s within a modern ICI 
fertiliser plant in Bristol. Doug May, a sub-contracted maintenance fitter at the time, 
recalled what happened: 
 
                                                 
97 Health of Munitions Workers Committee, Final Report, Industrial Health and Efficiency, PP 1918, 
(Cd. 9065), p.65 
98 Health of Munitions Workers Committee, Final Report, Industrial Health and Efficiency, PP 1918, 
(Cd. 9065), p.65 
99 T. Nichols, and P. Armstrong, Safety or Profit: Industrial Accidents and the Conventional Wisdom, 
Falling Wall Press, (Bristol 1973), p.1 
 76
There was a Polish worker who was actually working on the top of 
one of the elevators. I mean the elevators are huge, huge elevators, 
they run …they ran in those days from the bottom of the plant up two 
or three floors to the top. He was actually working on the top of the 
elevator and he was repairing some of the linkage on the top of the 
product screen elevator and he had actually put his head, or his body, 
inside the top of the elevator to see where the chain was actually on 
the cog and unbeknown to him the chain was actually balanced on one 
of the teeth and he put his head in there, put a light on …(sighs). As 
you can well imagine the chain actually clicked down into its position 
and his head happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. 
They dragged him out of the elevator, the whole of the top of his head 
was split open according to the senior operator at the time who told 
me…you could actually see his brain, where his …obviously the 
weight of the chain just smashed down onto his skull and just cracked 
(snapping of fingers) it like an egg. Terrible, terrible thing to happen 
but that was … that was obviously something that was avoidable but 
he should never have put his body or his head in there anyway but I 
mean people do…people just do something on the spur of the moment 
and that was enough, you know. Unfortunately the poor fellow died 
and that was that.100 
 
It is interesting to note that the respondent, a fellow worker, is blaming the ‘poor 
fellow’ himself for this accident because ‘on the spur of the moment’ he had placed 
his own body in this potentially dangerous situation. However, with no guarding or 
warning system to prevent him from doing this it is possible to argue that this is 
exactly what he had been expected to do in order to repair the machine. Following 
this ‘accident’ Doug May noted that the firm installed guarding at the top of the 
elevator and that: 
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You could clean things, you could clean the top of an elevator after 
that but you could not actually get into the chain system. They pushed 
a series of chutes in there I remember and also grills and gratings so it 
was not possible to happen again. So they did learn their lesson from 
it but I mean…at what a cost.101  
 
No longer would anyone be able to spontaneously put their head or body in this part 
of the machinery but it took a human life to achieve this level of safety. Whether this 
was technically an accident is highly debatable. For decades the Factory Inspectorate 
had been vociferous on the need for guarding on machinery. At the design stage it 
would not have been difficult to predict that this elevator, which included major 
moving parts, would require regular maintenance. Therefore, hindsight was not 
required to determine that such a piece of equipment would have needed guarding to 
ensure its safe operation. The remedial work carried out after the ‘accident’ had no 
disproportionate financial costs nor did it pose any technical difficulties. If this had 
been done earlier then the tragedy that took place could have been averted. 
Moreover, sub-contracted maintenance fitters were increasingly used by the industry 
but by definition were not chemical sector employees.102 They were therefore not 
included in the fatal accident statistics for the chemical industry. 
Situated on the Lancashire coast, the Fleetwood Ammonia Soda Works 
witnessed 251 accidents between the years 1918 to 1920.103 The accident records for 
the years 1920 to 1924 were missing from the archive but in the same works between 
January 1924 and August 1927 a further 504 accidents occurred.104 Therefore, within 
a single chemical plant over a period of seven years there had been a total of 755 
accidents. This equates to an average of one reported accident every three days. The 
official government statistics also reveal that between 1914 and 1924 around 845 
chemical workers were killed in industrial accidents across the entire British 
chemical industry.105 Another way of looking at this is that for the first ten years of 
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the period under examination one chemical worker lost his life every fourth day and 
consequently a significant other lost their husband, their father, their brother, their 
son, or indeed, a wage earner.  
Some of the injuries sustained in the chemical industry were not specifically 
process related and included those where workers had fallen through poorly 
maintained roofing or weak scaffolding. Some workers were electrocuted where 
cranes or heavy lifting gear had struck overhead cables. Railways and boats 
transported bulk ores and chemicals to and from the chemical plants and as a result 
some workers were crushed to death or run over by railway wagons whilst others 
drowned after falling between boats and the dockside as they loaded barges. Other 
reported accidents were process related and had similar outcomes to accidents 
recorded in other industries. These included injuries to the eyes, head, and back, 
septic wounds, loss of limbs, burns to either the face, arms, hands or feet, fractures 
and crushed limbs.  
The discovery of a neglected archival source belonging to the United Alkali 
Company (UAC) provides a unique opportunity to see just how some of the injuries 
came to be sustained within this large chemical undertaking. The UAC was one of 
the four largest chemical manufacturers in Britain prior to it becoming part of ICI in 
1926. What the archives of this firm show are that between October 1914 and June 
1928, around 7,254 of its workers sustained an occupational injury and that 67 of 
their workers died. This represents an average of 544 serious accidents and 5 deaths 
per year.106 The total workforce is not known and therefore the percentage being 
injured or killed is also unknown. Nonetheless, a selection of cases are cited in order 
to provide an overview of the type of injuries sustained as well as providing, where 
possible, the reasons that were given for them happening. They include brief 
accounts of each reported incident from the 39 works that were operated and owned 
by the UAC.107 Due to constraints of space only a limited number of reports will be 
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referred to but what is suggested by the content of these reports is that a poor 
standard of maintenance and preventative safety provision was responsible for the 
frequency and repetitive nature of many of the accidents. The books were compiled 
as a reference for insurance and court cases and this becomes clearer when in 1924 a 
new column was added headed ‘name and address of any person other than the 
Company on whom there may be a legal liability?’108 
Many of the reported cases contain handwritten footnotes such as ‘settled in 
County Court’ with various sums of money being identified for legal costs. Most of 
the victims received reduced wages whilst recovering from their injuries although 
this was not an automatic or universal provision. The decision to pay reduced wages 
was based on the employee making a claim and having this claim approved by his 
manager at the relevant UAC plant. Many of the accident reports state that ‘no claim 
was made’ but for those claiming successfully the UAC appear to have thought that 
half the normal weekly wage was sufficient to keep the worker and any dependants 
alive. Compensation for fatalities was dealt with on a case-by-case basis. Some cases 
were settled in the County Courts, some were settled on a paternalistic basis and 
some were completely ignored. The examples set out below demonstrate the glaring 
social inequalities and reveal how much the employer felt a human life was worth. 
Each quote is taken directly from the accident reports and therefore it is the 
manager of each chemical works that is describing what happened. Although all of 
the reported cases provide short descriptions of each accident many of the reports 
also contained the footnote ‘no claim made’ and ‘did not return to work.’ On some 
occasions it can be seen that very similar accidents are recorded and therefore it must 
be assumed that few, if any, steps were taken following an accident to prevent it 
happening again. This of course calls into question the extent to which many of these 
incidents were in fact accidents. Fatalities were dealt with as court cases or, if no 
claim was made, simply logged. The 67 fatalities are those that happened as a result 
of accidents and therefore do not include those who died from the effects of long-
term exposure to toxic fumes, gases and dusts. On the matter of gases the Chief 
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Inspector of Factories himself admitted in 1937 that the system used for reporting 
cases of gassing was inadequate and therefore ‘no true picture’ could be furnished.109 
In May 1915, Joseph Lagan, a 28 year-old furnace worker employed at the 
UAC Tennant’s Works was killed. He had been employed for 4 weeks when 
according to the report ‘he stumbled against the guard of No.2 pot which gave way 
and he fell into the pot which contained hot hyposulphite liquor. He died 
immediately on 7 May 1915 from scalded body, legs and arms.’ The sum of 
£253.15.9 was ‘paid into court on 9/6/1915 to settle.’110 Guarding or fencing around 
the pots, or rather the lack of them was apparent again that year when Thomas Jones, 
a 19 year-old labourer, died at the Pilkington-Sullivan Works. Employed for just nine 
weeks he ‘evidently walked into a pot containing about fifteen inches of hot 
sulphur.’111 This case was also ‘settled’ but for the much lesser sum of £15.19.2. 
Neither of the reports provided any concrete reason as to why someone would be 
able walk into a pot of hot sulphur or why the guards would have broken or given 
way so easily. The Chemical Works Inquiry of 1893 offers some explanation. 
Having received evidence of the lack of guarding around pots and inefficient lighting 
the Chemical Works Inquiry recommended that areas around the rims of pots be kept 
clear, that ‘secure’ fencing be erected, and that all dangerous places be well lit.112 
The 1893 legislation was in force and unaltered in 1915 and as the guarding had 
given way in the first case and had not been erected at all in the second this strongly 
suggests that the UAC had failed to comply with the legislation. Further, a lack of 
sufficient lighting is evidenced in the report of a man who had rushed to sound the 
alarm following an escape of gas at the UAC Allhusen Works. The man had fallen 
and ‘lacerated his leg and was off work for just under six weeks’. Why this man had 
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fallen was that he couldn’t see where he was going because ‘it was dark at the 
time.’113 How this man actually felt as he fled an escape of gas in the dark was not 
recorded but the testimony provided by one former chemical worker gives some 
insight into the feelings of panic and fear that were experienced when fleeing an 
escape of dangerous chemicals more than 50 years later. Thus, according to Doug 
May: 
 
I was showing another operator how to vent a system, a liquefied 
ammonia system, a cooling system, and unbeknown to me one of the 
valves had been passing and liquefied ammonia had got into a 
hundred foot stack which was used for venting-off. I didn’t realise 
that there was pressure in the system and the pressure blew up, blew 
up the vent, which normally would have been safe if it had just been 
pressure… and there was this eight-foot of liquefied ammonia which 
vented over me and my colleague. He ran one way…fortunately he 
stayed in the open air (but) he did suffer some burns to his chest and 
his shoulders. I actually ran the other way, ran along a road into an 
electricians shop, slammed the door behind me and at that stage I 
started venting off like nobody’s business because I was covered in 
white em … you know white liquefied …and eh… I couldn’t breathe, 
couldn’t even get out the room because the door had jammed and that 
frightened me to death because I was quickly loosing common sense. 
I saw a dartboard which had been grouted into a wall and I just put my 
foot up against the wall and my hands on the dartboard and I 
wrenched it out of the wall and smashed it through a window which 
was about head height, a small window, and dived straight through the 
window after it, cutting my arm and my leg. I managed somehow or 
other to hurl myself out the window and I’m not kidding you would 
do things like that …if you can’t breathe you would do daft things and 
eh …I ran up the road, well it seemed like a run, probably a stumble I 
would imagine, and went into the front of the plant and it was a big 
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plant. Managed to get to the control area telling everybody to shut the 
systems down because I thought there had been a major fume release 
and I was grabbed by two or three of my colleagues who stripped all 
of the clothes off of me and it was then that I noticed that everybody 
was not gasping for air like myself. One of my colleagues Dennis 
Armitage put a ten minute breather set on me and within seconds I 
was okay because there was air coming into me but they got me off to 
a hospital and my colleague as well and I think really if I hadn’t got 
out of that room I don’t know if I would be here today to be honest. It 
was that dangerous, it was awful stuff, terrible. But that’s liquefied 
ammonia…it’s terrible stuff, it really is awful when it vents-off, it just 
grabs your lungs and you can’t breathe…it really is horrible stuff you 
know…I shit myself to be perfectly honest and I didn’t realise I had, 
not until I got to the hospital and sat there in my overalls and I thought 
‘my goodness me.’ 114  
 
In this account Doug May reveals the panic, the anxiety, and the fear that 
accompanied his desperate attempts to avoid what he thought were his last moments 
of life. This incident took place in daylight hours but if the attempt to flee the release 
of ammonia had occurred in the dark he may not have survived. Doug May was 
lucky to avoid serious injury and this is evident from a report conducted in 1973 that 
examined the long-term health effects amongst seven workers who were exposed to 
separate accidental escapes of ammonia. Showing a remarkable similarity with the 
type of accident experienced by Doug May all of the workers involved sustained 
burns to the eyes, throat and mouth. In addition all of them suffered respiratory 
damage for several years with ‘persistent abnormalities’ being experienced 
thereafter. One of the workers died following the extensive damage to his respiratory 
system.115   
With the rush to produce armaments from 1915 the numbers of employees in 
the chemical industry doubled with the labouring power of women also being 
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utilised. Output of high explosives increased from one ton per day to six hundred 
tons a day and at the end of the war 600,000 tons of high explosives had been 
produced.116 The UAC Pilkington-Sulliven Works in Widnes was part of this effort 
and accidents here reveal the lack of preventative care afforded to the women who 
toiled here. Having been employed for six months, 28 year-old Ellen Connor had her 
hand crushed when ‘the rag she was using as protection caught on the rim of a drum 
of sulphide sodium.’117 The implication being made here was that this was her own 
fault when in fact it clearly indicates that proper safety gloves had not been issued by 
the employer for this task. Ellen Webster, a 24 year-old with only four weeks 
experience did not return to the works after her feet had been badly burned with 
nitric acid that had spilled from a carboy. Her 22 year-old colleague May Smith, who 
had just one months experience suffered a similar fate although this woman did 
return to the works after sixteen weeks of convalescence on half pay.118 Catherine 
Fox and Anne Cosgrove, both 19 year-olds with six months experience were injured. 
Fox was ‘gassed whilst plugging shells’ and Cosgrove was burned by nitric acid 
‘whilst unloading carboys.’119 Neither made a claim. Eleanor Morley and Florence 
James were both employed at the Allhusen Works as shell fillers in 1917. Eleanor 
had had four months experience at her job but ‘whilst filling shells some liquor got 
into her rubber gloves and burnt her hands.’ She was absent for two weeks and 
received half pay. Florence suffered from a similar accident but made no claim and 
did not return to the works.120 Whilst burning the fingers may not appear at the outset 
to be too debilitating there is another case that highlights the potential dangers. A 
male shell-filling colleague also burnt his fingers but continued working. It was 
reported that ‘his fingers got gradually worse and although under medical 
supervision his fingers were amputated on November 1st 1916.’ He did not return to 
the Allhusen Works and he made no claim on the firm.121  
Annie Hamilton, a 25 year-old labourer worked at the Mort Liddell Works in 
Widnes for five months when she received burns to her legs and feet. This happened 
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after ‘passing through the finishing shed when the No.12 caustic pot foamed over 
and she walked through the hot liquor on the floor.’122 She returned to her work after 
three months of half pay. The accidents books contain many reports of accidents that 
were caused by splashes or spillages of caustic but these reports do not relay the 
impact that the injuries had on the worker or his dependents. Hilda Langley recalled 
her father talking about his experience in the caustic works during the late 1940s: 
 
There was one man, I remember me Dad telling me once, that he fell 
and when he fell he landed with his arm in the caustic and they pulled 
him straight out but it had burnt his arm straight off it were that 
bad.123 
 
Hilda’s brother-in-law recalled this incident vividly. 
 
I can remember the accident, he had a bungalow built at Sandiway 
and I was electrician and we wired the bungalow and I can remember 
him being there with his arm and I asked him what happened and he 
said, he told me himself that he slipped on the gantry thing that he 
walked across and his arm went through the thing and when he pulled 
it out it had gone.124 
 
Was this accident the fault of the worker? From the evidence it can be seen that the 
guarding did not prevent the worker’s limb from entering a highly dangerous 
container. Obviously a finer mesh would have prevented this happening and 
therefore this was not really an accident at all but a foreseeable incident caused by 
the fitting of a poorly designed and inefficient guarding system. The flooring around 
the vat may also have been uneven or manufactured from unsuitable materials to 
cause the man to slip. Nonetheless, from the records it can be seen that being 
splashed by caustic was a much more common occurrence than falling into a 
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container of caustic. Gladys Rogerson recalled her own father being brought home 
after being badly splashed by caustic in the 1940s: 
 
I remember him coming home, well, being brought home in the 
ambulance when he’d had nasty burns through the caustic. His legs 
were badly marked down the front and his arms…well at the time it 
was, it was horrendous to me as a child because to see somebody with 
their skin burnt off their legs and their arms …it was a horrible 
sight.125 
 
Following this accident Gladys remembered her mother stating to her father ‘I 
suppose this will be the death of you one day.’ Gladys recalled her reaction to this 
adult discussion: 
 
I used to think to myself ‘Oh, heck, I don’t think me Dad will get 
killed working there’, but you don’t know (emphasis) what happens in 
these situations. Being a small child you weren’t really …I don’t think 
the imagination was fired like it is today with the television, to see 
things is common place…these horrendous things that go on…but you 
couldn’t visualise it in my day.126 
 
In effect, this child had been left with the fear of the unknown and as her father went 
to work each day she was left thinking that he might not return. Gladys’s husband 
Derek visited the plant as a maintenance worker and noted that condensation water 
sometimes dropped into the caustic vats and that this caused caustic splashes to 
occur. As the working environment around caustic production was very hot the men 
wore little underneath their cotton overalls and therefore the splashes ‘went through 
their overalls and onto their skin.’ Gladys Rogerson recalled the damage done to her 
father: 
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The front of both legs were very badly burnt and his arms… from his 
elbows down, they were just like white lines down where the caustic 
had burnt him… it heals but it leaves the white, a white scarring you 
never seem to see the pink of the flesh, you know.127  
 
Asked if any friends or neighbours had been injured Hilda Langley recalled that: 
 
A lot of it was eyes, ‘cos they got caustic in their eyes, they used to 
flush them out with water and run ‘em straight to the surgery that was 
the most injuries they got I think really wasn’t it? It was from the 
caustic to their eyes.128 
 
At the Muspratt Works in Widnes, Patrick Simmott, a 37 year-old man with 
seven years experience, was killed in April 1917. The circumstances surrounding his 
death were that ‘after a revolving furnace had drawn a charge of black ash he was 
found burnt to death in one of the black ash bogie wagons into which the charge had 
been drawn.’129 As was often the case, no claim was made. The fact that no claim 
was made could be explained by an absence of relatives or dependents or perhaps 
because the living relatives and dependents had no idea that it was possible to make a 
claim or indeed had no funds to pursue one. Workmen’s compensation legislation 
had been originally enacted in 1897 but even after being strengthened in 1906 the 
burden of claiming lay with the workers or their dependents. Where they were well 
organised trade unions helped to pursue accident claims across British industries. 
However, as will be discussed in Chapter Five, trade unions were poorly organised in 
the chemical industry and only began to realise their potential membership after the 
1939-45 war. With little protection on offer the accidents books are filled with many 
cases of a similar nature and reveal a gloomy and tragic list of human suffering. 
What is also striking is that in some of the cases the men being asked to undertake 
the work were quite old when injured. For example, in 1924 Bernard Johnston was 
employed as a foreman bricklayer in the St.Rollox Chemical Works in Glasgow. 
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Supervising the cleaning of a private drain on the Caledonian Railway line he was 
struck by a ‘light engine’ and suffered a ‘fractured elbow, scalp wound and 
shock.’130  This man was 73 years old and had an average wage of 102/6d per week. 
He died as a result of his injuries and his widow was granted a one-off payment of 
£10 by the firm as well as an allowance of 10/- per week. The year before that death 
a 74 year old was reported to have ‘strained [his] abdominal muscles’ as he 
attempted to separate carboy baskets. The man, Henry Collins, had already worked 
for 62 years of his life and it must be assumed that his accident caused more damage 
than was known at the time. He died four weeks later. No claim was made and no 
costs were made for his funeral or other expenses.131  
The first book of the UAC accident books had a total of 368 recorded 
accidents whilst the next eleven books had room to record 626 accidents each.  
 
Table 2: Reported accidents, United Alkali Company Ltd, 1914-1928   
Period covered by book Total 
number 
of months 
Total 
number of 
accidents  
Average number 
of accidents per 
month 
Fatalities 
October 1914 - July 1915 10 368 36.8 6 
July 1915 - March 1916 9 626 69.5 6 
March 1916 - January 1917  11 626 56.9 6 
January 1917 - August 1917 8 626 78.2 8 
May 1918 - March 1919 11 626 56.9 7 
March 1919 - December 1919 10 626 62.6 3 
December 1919-October 1920 11 626 56.9 4 
October 1920 - August 1922 23 626 27.2 7 
August 1922 - February 1924 19 626 32.9 5 
February 1924 - April 1925 14 626 44.7 4 
May 1925 - February 1927 22 626 28.4 5 
February 1927 - June 1928 16 626 39.1 6 
Total  7254  67 
 
Source: DIC/UA8/5/11-22. Accident Books of United Alkali Company Limited 1914-1928 
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Therefore, the rate at which these books could be filled provides a rough indication 
of the overall rate that accidents were occurring. The Allhusen, and 
Pilkington/Sullivan works feature prominently in the accident books and although  
the actual number of employees for each works is not known their prominence may 
have something to do with them being the largest works with the highest number of 
employees. Both works were involved in munitions manufacturing and in this 
particular area of manufacture the pressure to increase productivity was intense. As 
can be seen from the table, between January and August of 1917 the average number 
of accidents per month had more than doubled since July 1915. It should be noted 
that the period August 1917 to May 1918, a period of nine months, is missing 
completely from the records and it can only be assumed that many accidents would 
have occurred during this period as this was the height of wartime production. 
Accident rates decline slightly after this period but a steady number of accidents 
continued to be recorded through to October 1920 before slowing down. The 
economic boom years and high levels of productivity during the wartime and 
immediate post war era may account for the relatively high rate of accidents 
experienced during those periods. However, although the average amount of 
accidents per month were never as high as those experienced at the height of war it 
can be seen that by 1928 the average number of accidents being reported was higher 
than had been recorded in July 1915. From this evidence it would appear that few if 
any steps had been taken in the intervening years to seriously address the causes of 
accidents in this firm. 
An increased awareness of the causes and consequences of industrial 
accidents led to factory legislation and some improvements in health and safety 
statistics. At first glance, the official data appears not to show any dramatic changes 
in the actual numbers of accidents or fatalities.  As can be seen in the tables below, 
between 1924 and 1974, a total of 2,017 chemical workers were officially reported as 
having been killed in industrial accidents and between 1959 and 1974 more than 
130,000 workers who sold their labour power within the industry were injured in 
accidents.132 One important point that has to be applied when viewing the fatality 
figures is that over the period 1924 to 1974 the total numbers employed in the  
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 Table 3: Fatal industrial accidents in the British chemical industry, 1924-1974 
1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 
66 56 39 56 69 59 78 54 36 49 52 53 52 
1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 
38 43 N R N R 89 86 58 65 44 34 40 41 43 
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 
34 40 27 42 45 51 26 34 35 38 48 37 26 
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 Total 
36 23 25 41 31 31 30 19 22 14 19 46 2,017 
 
Sources: Chief Inspector of Factories Reports, Annual Abstract of Statistics No.88 1938-
1950, p.48 and Annual Abstract of Statistics No.96, 1959, p.45   
 
NR denotes that in these years figures were not recorded 
    
industry increased substantially. Therefore, by factoring that variable into the 
equation it is logical to assume that the chances of being killed in an industrial 
accident within the British chemical industry had decreased over this period. As will 
be discussed below this apparent record of improvement in the rates may not be 
wholly accurate. The data for non-fatal accidents is also unclear. As can be seen in 
Table 4 the years 1963 through to 1969 witnessed a year on year increase in the 
number of reported non-fatal accidents. This increased accident level was mirrored 
over the same period across the whole of British industry. Subjecting the industry- 
 
Table 4 Non-fatal accidents in the chemical industries sector, 1959-1974  
1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 
10,036  9,909  9,947 
 
9,542 
 
8,074  9,943  10,465  10,907  
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
11,377  11,534  12,214 
 
10,232  9,330  9,169  9,994  9,825  
 
Source: Chief Inspector of Factories Reports   
 
wide accident data to quantitative analysis it has been asserted that neither the 
unemployment nor engagement rates were significant variables but that the high 
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levels of overtime being worked during ‘a continuing upswing in the business cycle’ 
offered one explanation for this increase.133 Were high levels of overtime worked in 
the chemical sector during this period and would this explain the increased accident 
rate?  
One government inquiry of 1969 stated that productivity in ICI had been 
increasing at a rate of 10 per cent annually and that this would have been ‘impossible 
without a direct contribution from the workers.’134 Did this contribution include 
overtime? Peter Dodds, a former ICI process worker in Scotland recalled 
 that during the 1960s: 
 
There was a lot of overtime, well everybody did it at that time…ye 
had yer mortgage, ye had yer family growing up so you wanted as 
much money as you could so ye’d maybe do an extra shift or an extra 
two shifts on yer day and a half off so ye were working fourteen days 
on a trot and ye were absolutely shattered.135 
 
With a workforce that was ‘shattered’ accidents were bound to happen but Peter 
recalled that in the 1960s ‘the money was rolling in’ and ICI were less concerned 
about accident levels at that stage. It was only when international competition 
became intense and profits dropped that more strenuous efforts were made to reduce 
accident levels and their associated costs. Thus, according to Peter Dodds: 
 
I think people weren’t so aware that accidents cost money and that 
that affected the business. They [ICI] were concerned that you as a 
person got a cut but that was as far as it went I think. They didn’t 
think ‘how can we stop the accident happening where as that changed 
later on in years.136  
 
                                                 
133 P.B. Beaumont, Safety at Work and the Unions, Croom Helm, (London 1983), pp.20-21 
134 Pay of General Workers and Craftsmen in Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. PP 1969 (Cmnd 3941) 
HMSO London, p.9 
135 Interview: D. Walker with Peter Dodds, 25 November, 2005, p.25 
136 Interview: D. Walker with Peter Dodds, 25 November, 2005, p.13 
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Based in Cheshire, Hilda Langley, the wife of a former ICI soda ash process worker 
recalled that during the 1960s her late husband worked more than his contractual 
hours and she stated that: 
 
It was hard work, very hard work. He used to do a lot (emphasis) of 
overtime because the more overtime he did the more money they got 
in their pension fund … and with being late going to ICI he wanted to 
get as much in his pension fund as he could.137  
 
In communities where chemical work was the main option for those selling their 
labour power the conditions of work were known and talked about beyond the 
factory walls. In 1964 Ron Angel, a local songwriter in the chemical area of 
Middlesborough, wrote the words for the ‘Chemical Worker’s Song’ or, as it is 
became known, ‘The ICI Song’: 
 
Go, boy, go 
They time your every breath 
Every day you're in this place 
You're two days nearer death 
But you go  
 
A process man am I, I'm telling you no lie 
I work and breathe among the fumes that trail across the sky 
There's thunder all around me, poison in the air 
A lousy smell that smacks of hell, dust all in my hair  
 
I've worked among the spinners, breathed in the oily smoke 
Shovelled at the gypsum that nigh on makes you choke 
I've stood knee-deep in cyanide, got sick with the caustic burn 
Been working rough, seen enough to make your stomach turn  
 
There's overtime and bonus, opportunities galore 
Young men like the money, they all come back for more 
But soon you're knocking on, looking older than you should 
Every bob made on this job is earned with sweat and blood. 138 
 
The song relays a negative message about the working conditions that existed in the 
chemical industry and the fact that overtime is actually cited in the final verse 
                                                 
137 Interview: D. Walker with H. Langley, 21 March 2005, p.3 
138 www.mysongbook.de/msb/songs/c/chemical.html 
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indicates that this had been a regular feature during the mid 1960s. Taking the above 
evidence together it is possible to argue that working overtime was a regular 
experience for those employed in the industry during the 1960s and that this could 
explain the year on year increase in the accident rates for the chemical sector during 
that period. Table 5 is interesting in that it shows a decline in the number of reported 
accidents in the late 1960s compared to the early to mid 1970s but that the rate of 
accidents had actually increased slightly over the same period.   
 
Table 5: Incidence of accidents per thousand employees, 1967-1974 
 
Year Reported 
Accidents 
Incidence 
per 1000 
employees
1967 11,377 31.6 
1968 11,534 33.3 
1970 10,232 35.6 
1971 9,330 33.4 
1972 9,169 34.3 
1973 9,994 35.8 
1974 9,825 34.6 
 
Source: Annual Reports of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops  
(Incidence rates prior to 1967 were not found). 
 
In respect of the risk of bodily damage caused by accidents Table 6 shows 
that by the mid 1970s most of the old staple industries in Britain retained their 
unenviable position of having a higher incidence of accidents than the chemical 
sector. In other words, according to the official data, there was less chance of having 
an accident in the chemical industry than in the coal, metal manufacturing, or 
shipbuilding industries. This positive view should be tempered by three facts. Firstly,  
official figures rely on accidents being reported. This would include those where a 
worker had died at their place of work or had been injured and then went on to 
receive treatment for that industrial injury. Crucially, those not included are the many 
workers who would later suffer from a disabling or lethal illness due to ‘accidental’ 
exposures to toxic substances. The total numbers affected in this manner are self 
evidently unknown as they were not included in the accident or fatality data 
associated with the chemical industry.  
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Table 6: Inter-industry variation in accident rates reported under the provisions of  
  the Factories Act at the SIC Order Level for Britain, 1972-74 (Average) 
    (Incidence rate per 100,000 at risk of total reported accidents) 
 
Coal and Petroleum 7290 
Metal Manufacture 7270 
Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering 6850 
Mechanical Engineering 4020 
Chemicals and allied industries 3730 
Textiles 2920 
Electrical Engineering 2400 
 
Source: P.B. Beaumont, Safety at Work and the Unions, Croom Helm, (London 1983), p.22 
 
This, as Sellers has noted, is the ‘epistemological dilemma’ in that ‘connections 
between workplace causes and their bodily effects often remained frustratingly 
obscure, remote, and difficult to establish.’139 Some measurement was made of 
poisoning by recording some of those affected by the limited number of ‘recognised’ 
occupational diseases. However, as will be discussed in detail below all that can be 
stated is that many thousands of chemical workers would have died or would have 
become incapacitated by industry related diseases many years before the diseases 
became recognised, many from diseases that were never recognised, and many who 
left the industry and whose illness was never attributed to the chemical industry at 
all. Secondly, chemical firms had been concerned throughout their history by adverse 
public opinion, usually associated with pollution and environmental damage. In 
response, the industry sought to give the impression of being safe and this included 
artificially lowering the numbers of employees recorded as being absent from work 
from accidents. The issue of accidents not being reported was one raised by the 
TGWU in the mid 1950s, as they were concerned that if this was not done at the time 
of the accident then claims for injury benefit may not be met at a later date if the 
symptoms persisted.140 The TGWU then made a request to ICI that all works 
                                                 
139 C.C. Sellers, Hazards of the Job, From Industrial Disease to Environmental Health Science, 
University of North Carolina Press, (London 1997), p.4 
140 MSS.126/TG/449/E (Minutes & Reports of the Chemical and Allied Trades National Committee of 
the Transport & General Workers Union), MIN 406, October 1956 
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accidents should be notified to the shop steward immediately but this was refused 
and ICI claimed that the methods they used for notifying accidents were 
‘satisfactory.’141 Nonetheless, there is evidence that some chemical manufacturers 
deliberately massaged accident data by paying workers to attend the workplace even 
although they were not fit enough to carry out the work for which they were 
employed. For example, Davidson notes that in various American chemical plants 
trade unions and attorneys, such as Ralph Nader, produced evidence to show that 
firms would transport injured workers into the plant so as to show that they had no 
lost time and therefore had a good safety record.142 This practice was not exclusive 
to the USA. One respondent who had worked with ICI in Britain revealed that it was 
also operated at his and other ICI plants throughout the United Kingdom. Thus: 
 
If someone got hurt in ICI and it was say a broken bone or severe 
bruising they were practically carried oot back tae work on a stretcher 
‘cos they didnae want their lost time accident figures tae go up. This 
happened in a’ the plants I was ever involved wi, anybody that got 
hurt at a’ wi an accident wis…they were threatened tae get their arse 
back tae work and they were picked up wi’ taxis and God knows what 
a’ just tae get them in so it widnae gang doon against (be set against) 
the record.143 
 
Thirdly, in 1973 the National Economic Development Council claimed that both the 
French and Dutch chemical industry had fewer accidents than the British industry. 
The German industry did have a higher number than the British but their figures 
included accidents that occurred on journeys to and from work and minor accidents 
of a nature not recorded in Britain. The German figures were further skewed because 
they employed many workers in the industry who were of a lower health standard 
due to the labour shortages and it was also reported that safety requirements had been 
difficult to communicate to the many immigrant workers who had little knowledge of 
                                                 
141 MSS.126/TG/449/E (Minutes & Reports of the Chemical and Allied Trades National Committee of 
the Transport & General Workers Union), MIN479, July 1957 
142 R. Davidson, Peril on the Job, A Study of Hazards in the Chemical Industries, Public Affairs Press, 
(Washington 1970), pp.151-171 
143 Interview: David Walker with KG, 25 November 2005, p.35 
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the language.144 Taking all of the above issues into consideration the claim that the 
British chemical industry was a less dangerous place to work in than say shipbuilding 
or metal manufacture seems less robust.  
There was one danger associated with the chemical industry, which, unlike 
most of the others, did receive wide public interest. This was the danger of explosion. 
McIvor has argued that in the coal mining industry attention concentrated on 
explosions rather than the weekly death toll, as these were dramatic incidents that 
had an immediate adverse impact on the surrounding social and economic 
community.145 A similar pattern evolved for the chemical industry. In 1913, it was 
reported that an explosion at the Nobel Explosives Works at Ardeer on the Ayrshire 
coast of Scotland had killed seven men with nine others being seriously injured.146 
Eleven months later another explosion at the same works killed eight workers and 
injured one.147 Nobel’s responded with the observation that, “human imperfection 
can never be entirely eliminated.”148 It is not clear by this if Nobel’s were admitting 
that they too were imperfect but it is more likely that the blame was being directed at 
the worker. Why this might be is explained by Dwyer who has argued that: 
 
From the moment the human factor is considered to be the cause of 
accidents, everything the worker does and omits to do can be blamed. 
In this way a definition can be arrived at in which nearly all accidents 
are attributed to the worker.149  
 
By 1915, another six workers had lost their lives at Ardeer in two separate 
explosions.150 In 1917, a huge explosion occurred at the Brunner Mond Silvertown 
TNT plant in London killing 73 people, seriously injuring 400 others, and destroying 
                                                 
144 National Economic Development Office, Chemicals Manpower in Europe, Report of a 
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Work in Britain, 1880-1950, Palgrave, (Hampshire 2001), p.138 
146 The Times, March 11, 1913, p.6 
147 The Times, May 29, 1914, p.18 
148 The Times, May 29, 1914, p.18 
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900 homes in the immediate vicinity.151  The cause of the accident was investigated 
and a report published in 1917 (the public were not allowed to see this report until 
the 1950s). The investigation into this explosion would not have been undertaken 
simply because of the numbers of workers that had been killed or injured, after all, 
British workers had been dying from occupational accidents at a rate of at least two 
every hour for many decades prior to 1917.152 The more likely scenario was that this 
had been undertaken in response to the destruction of lives and property of those who 
were not directly employed in the chemical industry. This was a highly public 
incident and one of the major criticisms made in the inquiry was that the Silvertown 
plant had been positioned in a built-up urban conurbation.  
An explosion placed a fear in those living in close proximity to a chemical 
works and who, through the media, generally sought assurances from the firms that 
their families and property would be protected from future explosions. For the 
owners of the production process an explosion represented the destruction of a large 
capital investment and one that had to be repaired or replaced. Therefore, a positive 
consequence for the survivors of an explosion was that employers tended to take 
relatively swift preventative action to protect their investments, even when the 
precise cause of the explosion was unknown. For example, in 1930 at a chemical 
plant in Scotland the exact cause of the ignition causing the explosion could not be 
ascertained yet the firm immediately fitted ‘explosion panels’ and ‘hanging screens’ 
to reduce the risk of explosion and fire.153 In the same year following an explosion at 
a synthetic chemical plant in Middlesborough ‘the plant was re-designed with the 
elimination of all tanks and gas spaces so reducing further risk of explosion to a 
minimum.’154 A leak of rainwater entering a sodium storage tank resulted in a 
chemical reaction and explosion. Following this accident the tanks were placed under 
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weather proof cover and large explosion vents of sheet rubber were fitted.155 Whilst 
these responses were laudable a swift preventative response to risk was less 
forthcoming where the assessed risk did not pose a threat to a large capital 
investment. Evidence of this can be seen in the multitude of Factory Inspector’s 
reports that had to repeatedly make the same points over many years about ensuring 
that guards were fitted to machinery or that dust extraction and ventilation systems 
be maintained and operated efficiently.  
Despite the efforts taken to prevent them happening explosions continued to 
occur and between 1936 and 1958, across British industry as a whole, 587 people 
were killed in industrial explosions.156 In the post-war era the chemical industry 
itself experienced various explosions but one, more than any other, stood out.  In 
June 1974, an explosion occurred at the Royal Dutch Shell Nypro (UK) plant in 
Flixborough, North Lincolnshire. This single explosion killed 28 chemical workers 
and injured 36 others.  A further 53 people were reported as casualties and hundreds 
of people not associated with the plant suffered minor injuries. Around 1,821 homes 
and 167 shops in the area sustained some damage. Noting the damage the Chief 
Inspector of Factories commented on the fact that the Flixborough ‘disaster’ had no 
parallel in the UK chemical industry since 1945.157 The Chief Inspector could only 
have been referring to the size of the explosion and the widespread injury and 
damage caused, because the total death toll at Flixborough differed only marginally 
from that which was posted every single year for the chemical industry between 1924 
and 1974.158  
As with previous explosions elsewhere in the industry the deaths of the 
operatives and the total destruction of the operating records meant that the cause of 
the accident was not immediately known. How the public viewed this most visible of 
death tolls can be seen in the words of one contemporary BBC team that visited the 
site: 
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Just a few miles from here in the Yorkshire coalfields they’ve grown 
used to the idea of death and disaster as the price men have to pay for 
coal. Even the fish that comes into Hull, across the Humber, over 
there, is bought at the cost of the trawlers that never return. Now 
Flixborough has joined this unhappy band of communities that pay for 
other people’s progress with human life.159 
 
The reporter turned to look at the sheets of flame and the enormous clouds of thick 
black smoke that spewed from the tangled wreckage of the Nypro pant.  He indicated 
towards the scene of devastation and stated slowly and deliberately, ‘this is the price 
of nylon.’  
A government inquiry team were quickly established who discovered that in 
March 1974 a crack had been found in one of the reactors and that this had resulted 
in a leak of cyclohexane, a highly flammable substance used as an intermediate in the 
production of nylon. At that juncture the company had shut down the plant for 
investigation and a decision was taken to remove the faulty reactor and install a 
bypass assembly to connect the other reactors ‘so that the plant could continue 
production.’160 Kletz has argued that at this point: 
 
There was no professional mechanical engineer on site at the time as 
the works engineer had left and his replacement had not arrived. The 
men who were asked to design and install the temporary pipe had 
great practical experience and drive; they had the plant back on line in 
a few days. However, they did not realize that designing large pipes 
(20 inch bore) to operate at high temperatures (150°C) and pressure 
(10 bar) was a job for experts. Their only drawing was a full-size 
sketch in chalk on the workshop floor; the only support was 
scaffolding on which the pipe rested.161 
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Unsurprisingly the disaster inquiry discovered that this course of action had been 
seriously flawed and that the modification to the plant had been installed ‘without a 
full assessment of the potential consequences. Only limited calculations were 
undertaken on the integrity of the bypass line.’162 Therefore, senior management at 
this plant had sanctioned the remedial work and thereby had effectively prioritised 
the restoration of production capacity and profits over the health and safety of the 
operatives. Brian Watson, a former ICI plant manager, recalled the accident and 
commented that: 
 
That was a piece of impromptu design that went wrong. I suppose 
under the Health and Safety at Work Act it would not have been a 
safe system of work. It went to not being a safe place of work or a 
safe method of work and the whole thing had not been thought 
through properly.163 
 
The administration block was completely destroyed in the explosion and it was only 
because the accident occurred at the weekend that the lives of the 50 women who 
worked there were spared. Of the workers killed, 18 had been working in the control 
room when the explosion blasted through the glass windows. The inquiry 
commented that more attention should have been paid to the safety of the workers 
and that the control room should have been designed with the potential for explosion 
in mind. As described above, explosions had been associated with the industry 
throughout its entire history and it is therefore remarkable that by the 1970s the firm 
needed any reminding of this risk and to include its potential in the plan for the 
building. Moreover, the manufacture of nylon specifically included the use of highly 
flammable substances and again should have heightened any risk awareness at the 
design, planning, building or building approval stages. No record could be found to 
explain why Royal Dutch Shell Nypro had sanctioned the design of the control room 
without taking the possibility of explosion into account.   
 
                                                 
162 Health and Safety Executive, ‘Flixborough (Nypro) Explosion 1st June 1974’ 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/sragtech/caseflixboroug74.htm 
163 Interview D. Walker with B.J. Watson, 08 October 2005, p.8 
 100
Conclusion 
Following the analysis of the hours and pace of work it has been argued that 
despite the reductions in hours made by a few welfarist employers most workers in 
the first two decades of the twentieth century experienced a long arduous day within 
the haphazardly constructed chemical works of Britain. A typical working week 
lasted around 60 to 70 hours with many workers having to undertake their duties on a 
rotating shift pattern of work. Such long hours of work were filled by bouts of 
intense and heavy labouring and this was made worse by the fact that much of the 
work was carried out within a hot, dusty, and fume filled atmosphere. None of these 
working conditions were conducive for the health of the worker. Indeed, physical 
exhaustion resulting from the long hours of intensive work was just one of the issues 
identified by the HMWC during World War One as having a detrimental impact on 
productivity. In response, recommendations were made by this government 
appointed body (and their successors) to reduce the hours and pace of work. From 
the mid 1920s the contractual hours of work began to be reduced and although the 
period 1939 to 1945 saw them increase once again the trend thereafter meant that by 
1974 they had been lowered to an average of around 40 hours per week. Although 
much of the work remained heavy and dangerous the lowering of the contractual 
hours meant that workers now had the potential to enjoy longer periods of ‘free’ time 
in which to physically and mentally recover from the strains of their work. This, 
combined with a wider introduction of holidays with pay from the mid 1940s meant 
that less time was spent in the workplace and along with the reduced hours of work 
the chances of coming into contact with toxic substances or of being burned, scalded, 
gassed, or blown to pieces were reduced.  
However, over the same period in which the working week was gradually 
being reduced the chemical industry expanded both its range and level of production. 
To some extent increased productivity was achieved by the use of improved 
scientific and technological developments but what is evident is that three other 
factors involving the chemical workforce helped achieve this objective. First, the 
workforce had to respond to the labour process that had been altered and linked to a 
variety of wage payment schemes. Second, the workforce remained harnessed to the 
production process by means of the rotating shift system of work. Third, although 
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ostensibly a voluntary scheme, many workers were drawn into a regular pattern of 
working overtime. What has been argued is that all of these methods of work had an 
adverse impact on the social, physical, and mental well being of many chemical 
workers. For example, someone on a rotating shift pattern could never have benefited 
from reduced working hours in the same the way that someone on constant day shift 
would. Whilst some of the health issues associated with working shifts or keeping 
pace with wage payment schemes are subjective in nature it has been argued that a 
direct correlation does exist between the increased amount of overtime being worked 
during the 1960s and the increased accident rates recorded over the same period. 
Based on the evidence presented it is at least possible to argue that the full benefits 
that should have been delivered by reducing the contractual hours of work were 
diluted by the demands made by the chemical industry for increased productivity and 
the consequent methods of work that were deployed to achieve this. 
Official data reveals that between 1914 and 1974 thousands of chemical 
workers lost their lives and that many hundreds of thousands were injured. This toll 
was generated entirely as a result of accidents in the workplace. Evidence taken from 
the accident books of the UAC, the Factory Inspectors reports, and from oral 
testimony all demonstrate that a certain amount of knowledge did exist with regard to 
the causes of many of these accidents. Nonetheless, many types of accidents reported 
at the beginning of the period continued to be reported decades later. Therefore, the 
overwhelming evidence is that many of the reported ‘accidents’ were foreseeable and 
therefore potentially avoidable if the knowledge of the causes had been acted upon 
much sooner. For example, proper guarding, overalls, gloves, goggles, respirators, 
and regular maintenance would all have helped reduce the frequency and number of 
accidents that occurred. In this respect it has been found that the chemical industry 
was no different from many other areas of British industry where tens of thousands 
of workers were killed or injured in accidents that were easy to predict and 
technically preventable.   
The large increases in the numbers employed across the chemical industry do 
not appear to be matched by large increases in the numbers of reported accidents and 
therefore it appears that the chemical industry had a comparatively good safety 
record. Undoubtedly, the introduction of new process technology and enclosed 
 102
 103
systems of production would to some extent have reduced the need for workers to 
physically manipulate heavy loads around open vats of boiling liquid and this would 
have helped reduce the numbers of accidents. Improved plant design, better lighting 
and company supplies of protective clothing would also have made a positive impact 
on accident rates. Greater steps were also taken to protect the plant from explosion or 
fire risk and this too would have resulted in a safer working environment for the 
operatives. However, notwithstanding such efforts to improve the health and safety 
aspects of the working environment this research has raised some doubt about the 
validity of the accident data for the chemical industry.  
As with all statistical evidence if it is to show a true picture then the data that 
is entered has to be accurate. However, the underreporting of occupational accidents 
has historically been shown to be a likely occurrence. Whilst this is true for all 
sectors of British industry the chemical industry had its own some specific features 
that led to the underreporting of accidents. Missing data for war years is a relatively 
common feature across British industry and this is seen in the UAC archive. This 
archive has also shown that for an accident to be recorded the works manager had to 
write a report and that this was done for compensation insurance purposes. However, 
it has been demonstrated that many of these reports simply stated that the victim ‘did 
not return to the works’ or that ‘no claim was made.’ It is therefore highly unlikely 
that any of these accidents would have officially appeared in any government 
statistics. Moreover, a comparatively low level of trade union representation existed 
throughout the period in question and therefore fewer workers than in other 
industries, such as coal mining or shipbuilding, would have received support in 
reporting an accident or in pursuing a claim for compensation. Further, in 
circumstances where little worker unity existed injured workers would have been 
cautious of claiming against the firm and this too would have kept the accident 
figures artificially low. Any of the many sub-contracted workers who were injured or 
killed would not have been set against the chemical industry data and evidence has 
also been presented to show that the industry took steps to present an impression of 
being a safe employer by ‘transporting’ injured employees into the workplace and 
thereby creating low and false accidents records. 
 
Chapter Three 
Assessing the Damage II: Poisoning and Occupational Diseases 
 
Despite the 200 years that have passed since observing the first 
occupational cancer [scrotal skin cancer in chimney sweeps}, a 
positive, definite association between industrial exposure and the 
occurrence of cancer in humans has only been established for 26 
chemicals (or industrial processes).1 
 
Watterson has argued that unlike infectious diseases that float between social 
boundaries posing a threat to all social classes, occupational diseases are specifically 
related to those who are exposed to the materials and processes at the point of 
production. Historically therefore occupational diseases have overwhelmingly 
impacted on the lower socio-economic groups and perhaps this explains why 
occupational diseases, which are rarely contagious, have been given less importance 
and are often left unchecked for centuries.2 Occupational diseases are also sometimes 
difficult to recognise due to the fact that the symptoms experienced by the worker 
may be common to other non-occupational diseases such as coughs, fatigue, loss of 
appetite, indigestion or, simply, pain. Further, many years can elapse between 
exposure to a substance and an occupational disease developing. Indeed, a process 
may have been worked for a number of years and may have ceased altogether many 
years before any of the workers develop an illness. The delay between exposure and 
disease is known as the latency period and diseases contracted over long periods of 
time are known as chronic diseases. This differs from an acute reaction whereby the 
symptoms and the reactions occur within very short periods of time. British chemical 
workers experienced both chronic and acute occupational diseases and the cause and 
effect of these will be discussed below.  
At the beginning of the twentieth century the atmosphere that existed within 
many of Britain’s chemical works was described as, ‘one of unpleasant fumes and 
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stinks, either acrid, stifling or nauseating.’3 Whilst this may not have been an 
especially conducive environment in which to work it was the toxic properties of the 
chemicals rather than their smell that posed a health risk to the workers. By the early 
1900s some established chemicals had been recognised as posing a danger to the 
health of chemical workers but it was untypical to see risk awareness accompanying 
the production of a new substance. For example, the fumes of aniline, carbon 
bisulphide, nitric acid or benzene had a negative impact on the health of chemical 
workers but these effects were not officially discussed in 1913 the reason being that 
none of these ‘new’ products had been included in the official definitions of a gas.4 
Therefore, although workers exposed to the fumes of aniline suffered from 
headaches, fatigue, dizziness, respiratory damage and heart failure no official efforts 
were being made to halt this. Carbon bisulphide fumes were killing some and 
damaging others with liver, kidney or central nervous system damage being the most 
common symptoms. Benzene would be later identified as a carcinogenic substance 
but even short-term exposure to the fumes caused nausea, vomiting, narcosis, a 
reduction in blood pressure, dermatitis, skin and respiratory damage whilst exposure 
to the fumes of nitric acid could result in serious respiratory damage or even death.5  
Although chemical process workers were faced with a variety of potentially 
health damaging substances Russell has noted that up to 1914 protective clothing and 
equipment was ‘rarely provided’ leaving most workers little option but to improvise 
their own protection from the processes and products.6 Depending on the work being 
undertaken strips of muslin cloth (the muzzle) would be wrapped around the 
worker’s mouth to prevent fumes or dust being inhaled, paper was stuffed in and 
around shoes or clogs to guard against spillages and old sacking material was used as 
temporary overalls or wrapped around the hands as a form of glove. Unsurprisingly, 
only limited success was achieved by these improvised means. Filters placed over the 
mouth for example may have stopped larger particles of dust but they were less 
efficient in preventing tiny particles of dust or fumes and gases from entering the 
                                                 
3 M.R. Fox, Dye-Makers of Great Britain, A History of Chemists, Companies, Products and Changes, 
1856-1976, Imperial Chemical Industries PLC, (Manchester 1987), p.40 
4 Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops, PP1914, Cd. 7491, p.141 
5 Physical and Theoretical Chemistry Laboratory, Oxford University, www. physchem.ox.ac.uk/msds/ 
6 C.A. Russell, ‘The Organic Chemicals Industry to the First World War’, pp.197-238 in C.A. Russell, 
(ed) Chemistry, Society and Environment, A New History of the British Chemical Industry, Royal 
Society of Chemistry, (Cambridge 2000), p.236 
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body. Indeed, when the German army first used chlorine and phosgene gas as 
weapons of war in 1915 no respirator existed in Britain to provide protection from 
their effects.7 Self evidently therefore no process worker associated with the 
manufacture of these gases would have had protection. With little or no attention 
being paid towards the workers health the men had no alternative in responding to 
leaks of poisonous gas other than by ‘stuffing a wet handkerchief in their mouths, 
clenching their teeth on it, and shutting off the valves.’8 With an abundant supply of 
available labour scant regard was paid to developing a suitable and efficient 
respirator. In fact, it was not until gassing incidents on the Western Front began to 
threaten British military plans that experiments to find an effective respirator were 
begun.9 Therefore, it was the need to keep soldiers alive and fighting in the trenches 
that brought about the development of the military respirator and from this emerged 
the industrial respirator. 
On the eve of the Second World War the Senior Medical Inspector could still 
report on the high number of occupational gassing incidents that were occurring. 
This he hoped, would be corrected by the ‘international situation’ a matter that would 
make the workers more ‘gas minded’ and ‘respirator minded.’10 Indeed, despite the 
presence of potentially dangerous dusts, gases, and fumes in the workplace there is 
evidence to suggest that some workers so exposed did not always wear respirators or 
masks. Various reasons can be cited to explain why this was so such as the fact that a 
daily exposure to the fumes could render the operator oblivious to the smell. For 
example, on being questioned if there were any noticeable fumes within his plant 
Peter Dodds stated that there was a slight smell at first but that this had soon 
disappeared. His wife immediately interrupted the interview to contradict this 
statement recalling that, ‘the smell never disappeared…every time you [Mr Dodds] 
came home from work I could smell the plastics…it seemed to cling to your hair and 
your skin.’ Mr Dodds recalled ‘it was the fumes of the polymer…after two or three 
weeks you couldn’t smell it.’11 Derek Rogerson recalled visiting a chemical plant to 
                                                 
7 N.T. Freeman, Protective Clothing and Devices, United Trade Press, (London 1962), p.50 
8 N.T. Freeman, Protective Clothing and Devices, United Trade Press, (London 1962), p.50 
9 Ibid, p.50 
10 Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops for the Year 1938, PP 1939 
(Cmd.6081) HMSO London, p.62 
11 Interview: D. Walker with P. Dodds, 25 November, 2005, p.5 
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do some maintenance work and where the men joked about the fumes to which they 
were exposed: 
 
This stuff used to come off this pipe, used to come through it like, 
God, you know, the tears would be running down your face you know 
and the blokes used to say to me (laughs) ‘Oh you’ll never have a cold 
while your working here mate.’12  
 
There was also the possibility that the conditions of work made wearing protection 
extremely uncomfortable or that the respirators that were available were of such a 
poor design and quality they were ignored.13 For example, one former chromate 
process worker could still recall that in the period 1939 to 1945 he and his colleagues 
all wore ‘muzzles’ made from muslin cloth to protect themselves from the fumes and 
dusts in their factory.14 This muzzle was not worn in place of a properly fitted 
respirator it was because this cheap material was what the firm had supplied. As will 
be discussed below this level of protection was hopelessly inefficient and 
occupational respiratory damage, including chronic bronchitis and lung cancer, 
would be experienced by many of these chromate workers. However, where the 
danger posed by the fumes was immediate a different response was needed. Doug 
May recalled: 
 
You could go up on the saturator section, what we called the saturator 
section, and sometimes up there you would get a whiff of ammonia, it 
might be a small leak or something of that nature, and by golly you 
know, you’d get the hell out of there quickly, you’d grab a mouthful 
of air (inhales deeply) and that would do you ‘cos you were on the 
run, you know. Get the hell out of this, you know, or in the end, you 
would…I would always take a breather set with me if I was working 
in a certain area, I would carry a ten-minute breather set with me just 
                                                 
12 Interview D. Walker with D. Rogerson, 21 March 2005, p.23 
13 Similar problems with badly designed respirators were encountered in the asbestos industry. See G. 
Tweedale, Magic Mineral to Killer Dust, Turner & Newall and the Asbestos Hazard, Oxford 
University Press, (Oxford 2003), p.28 
14 Interview: D. Walker with R. Fitzpatrick, 13 August 2004, p.2 
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in case. Because if you’re caught in it you’ll never forget it, you got to 
get out quick.15 
  
 At an ICI soda ash plant in 1953 it was found that the workers were being 
‘constantly exposed to a heavy concentration of ash dust’ and that following initial 
bouts of uncontrollable sneezing and nasal irritation many workers suffered from 
perforation and loss of the nasal septum.16 It was acknowledged by the ICI research  
 
 
Illustration 5: Packing soda ash, 1953. 
Source: R. McL. Archibald, ‘Perforation of the Nasal Septum Due to Soda Ash’ pp.31-37 in British 
Journal of Industrial Medicine, (11) 1954, p.33 
 
team that the septum had both a physiological and anatomical importance and that 
changes to the structure could be harmful.17 An efficient, well-fitted, and 
comfortable mask would have reduced this risk but the report stated that packing 
soda ash was ‘a hot job’ and that the packers ‘did not like protective masks or mutton 
                                                 
15 Interview D. Walker with D. May, 06 September 2005, p.12 
16 R.McL Archibald, ‘Perforation of the Nasal Septum Due to Soda Ash’ pp.31-37 in British Journal 
of Industrial Medicine, (11) 1954, pp.33-34 
17 R.McL Archibald, ‘Perforation of the Nasal Septum Due to Soda Ash’ pp.31-37 in British Journal 
of Industrial Medicine, (11) 1954, p37 
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cloth.’ The report had noted that the temperature of the ash at the packing point 
varied from 120º to 130º F.18 ICI decided not to share their research findings with the 
workers nor did they think it appropriate to carry out pre and post employment 
examinations. The reason given for this decision was that it was thought that it might 
lead to ‘neurosis’ amongst the workforce.19 The recommendations made in the report 
did not call 
 for the design and provision of a more suitable mask but instead set the long-term 
goal of reducing or eliminating dust levels. Whilst this aim was admirable it was not 
met. Six years after the initial research had been conducted a second survey in 1959 
revealed that dust exposure at the ICI soda ash plant was ‘both heavy and 
prolong
                                                
ed.’20 
Meeting the material needs of the First World War created excessively high 
demands on British chemical workers. Concerned about flagging output, some 
government officials began to speculate in 1915 that if health and safety measures 
were improved this might also improve industrial efficiency and therefore 
productivity would increase. As has been stated above, the group charged with 
turning this logic into practicality was the Health of Munitions Workers Committee 
(HMWC). By 1916, the HMWC had noted that ‘the manufacture and manipulation 
of toxic chemical substances…have brought many special dangers to the lives and 
health of munitions workers.’21 Of the many dangers identified, attention was 
brought to those engaged with tetrachlorethane, trinitrotoluene, and other nitro or 
amido derivatives of benzine which were resulting in cases of toxic jaundice and 
which were now to be notified to the Chief Inspector of Factories.22 The manufacture 
of nitric acid, a toxin associated with the manufacture of explosives, could also be a 
risky occupation and as the demand for explosives increased then so too did the risks 
of exposure to nitrous fumes. For those unfortunate enough to be working in areas 
where, as the HMWC described it, ‘accidental escapes of nitrous fumes’ occurred, 
 
18 R.McL Archibald, ‘Perforation of the Nasal Septum Due to Soda Ash’ pp.31-37 in British Journal 
of Industrial Medicine, (11) 1954, p32 
19 R.McL Archibald, ‘Perforation of the Nasal Septum Due to Soda Ash’ pp.31-37 in British Journal 
of Industrial Medicine, (11) 1954, p37 
20 C.P. Chivers, ‘Respiratory Function and Disease Among Workers in Alkaline Dusts’ pp.51-60 in 
British Journal of Industrial Medicine, (16) 1959, p.52 
21 ‘Special Industrial Diseases’ Health of Munitions Workers Committee, Final Report, Industrial 
Health and Efficiency, PP 1918, (Cd. 9065), p.75 
22 Ibid, p.75 
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the initial symptoms experienced by the workers were an irritation to the eyes and a 
bad cough.23 As these were of a relatively minor nature many workers simply carried 
on working and therefore the exposure continued. Indeed, having a cough was 
virtually ubiquitous in working class communities. However, with a higher level of 
exposure the worker was likely to collapse, usually within a period of up to three 
hours. An increased discharge of mucus would then occur along with bouts of 
vomiting and thereafter congestion of the respiratory system rapidly developed. 
Within 30 hours the victim would be dead having remained conscious ‘until near the 
end.’ In response to the increasing numbers of cases of poisoning by nitrous fumes 
the HMWC recommended that ‘emergency helmets’ with a supply of ‘fresh air’ 
should be placed near the workplace and that notices should be posted in factories 
warning workers not to remain in an area where an accidental escape had taken 
place.24
                                                
 
It is difficult to measure the success of this prevention policy as the only way 
to do so is to analyse the numbers of officially reported cases of gassing. Nitrous 
fume poisoning figures for 1915 and 1916 are unavailable but for the years 1914, 
1917, 1918 and 1919 the figures show that 9(2), 62(5), 27(7) and 5(2) workers were 
gassed or killed.25 Given the fact that tens of thousands of workers were employed in 
the munitions sector this shows that a surprisingly low percentage suffered from this 
particular form of poisoning and that the numbers suffering decreased substantially 
by the end of the war period. Clearly a lower demand for munitions offers one 
logical explanation for the reduced figures in 1919. However, doubt must exist over 
the accuracy of this data. Indeed, Ineson and Thom have demonstrated that despite 
clear evidence of toxic poisoning amongst female munitions workers statistical data 
was manipulated and falsified in relation to the numbers of women suffering so that 
the war effort would not be hampered.26 Moreover, other reasons exist that question 
 
23 Ibid , p.82 
24 Health of Munitions Workers Committee, Final Report, Industrial Health and Efficiency, PP 1918, 
(Cd. 9065), pp.82-83 
25 E. Crooks, The Factory Inspectors, A Legacy of Industrial Revolution, Tempus, (Gloucestershire 
2005), p.178  (Figures in brackets denote fatalities).  
26 A. Ineson, and D. Thom, ‘T.N.T. Poisoning and the Employment of Women Workers in the First 
World War,’ pp.89-107 in P. Weindling (ed) The Social History of Occupational Health, Croom 
Helm, (Kent 1985), p.89   
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the veracity of the data, for example, discussing the 905 reported cases of gassing 
that had : 
e after-affects are such as to 
keep the workman away from work for three days the Department 
 many of the workers who were absent for more than three days were 
simply
                                                
 occurred between 1932 and 1937 the Chief Inspector of Factories noted
 
The [above] table gives no true picture of the actual number of cases 
of workmen affected by gas either slightly or even to the extent of 
being rendered unconscious. Unless th
does not necessarily hear of the case.27 
 
Yet, where workers had been absent for more than three days this would not 
necessarily mean that they would be included in the tables for the Department’s 
attention. For example, at the United Alkali Company (UAC), a large supplier of 
munitions,
 logged in the company’s accident book as ‘gassed’ and ‘did not return to 
works.’28 
The UAC accidents books again provide some insight into the conditions of 
work, specifically in relation to those exposed to gases and fumes. In 1917 two UAC 
employees at the Pilkington-Sullivan Works in Widnes, Thomas Daniels and Ralph 
Phillips, were both ‘gassed by fumes’ that had escaped from a ‘damaged earthenware 
pipe.’29 Daniels returned to the works some three weeks later but Phillips did not and 
no claim against the firm was made. The report did not state which type of gas had 
escaped. A similar vagueness surrounded the chemical involved in an incident a few 
months later when a 37 year-old labourer died ‘due to the absorption of some toxic 
substance.’30 The most probable reason that explains why the causative agents in 
these and other cases remained undefined is that in most chemical works different 
substances were produced under the one roof. Without a proper investigation it 
would have been difficult to determine which specific toxic substance delivered the 
final blow. Finding the precise substance may only have been required if a court case 
 
27 Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops for the Year 1937, PP 1938 
(Cmd.5802) HMSO London, p.59 
28  DIC/UA8/5/11-22. Accident Books of United Alkali Company Limited 1914-1928 
29 DIC/UA8/5/13. Accident Book of United Alkali Company Limited, March 1916- January 1917 
30 DIC/UA8/5/14. Accident Book of United Alkali Company Limited, January 1917- August 1917 
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was to 
level of 25/- per week. This situation 
continu
be held or insurance monies paid out but where neither the workers nor their 
families made a claim there was no need to determine the precise substance involved.  
Over a period of a few weeks in 1918 five workers were ‘gassed’ in separate 
incidents at the Allhusen Works in Gateshead. The first incident happened on the 14th 
May and the fifth on the 4th June. The four men and one woman were all described as 
having suffered from ‘inhalation of gas in the atmosphere of the building.’31 
Following their exposure the true consequences for the health of these workers can 
only be surmised, as once again the gas itself was not specified and none of the 
victims made a claim. It is not known whether a loss of health or fright kept these 
workers away all that is known is that none of the five victims who had been gassed 
returned to the Allhusen Works. Again, the true damage done to the health of a 49 
year-old pyrite breaker (a task reserved for those who were no longer fit enough to 
do other work) is also unspecified after he had ‘inhaled gas that was floating 
about.’32 The man never made a claim or returned to the works. A clue to one type of 
gas inhaled by the Allhusen workers can be found in the case of a 72 year-old 
labourer named William Irwin, who had worked in the Allhusen Works for 14 years. 
In the accident report for this man it is stated that he ‘inhaled chlorine gas whilst 
sweeping up the gangway at the mechanical Saltcake Furnace. The gas escaped 
through pipes that had been cracked by frost.’33 Inhaling chlorine gas causes 
coughing, nausea, vomiting, headache, dizziness and difficulties in breathing. It can 
also result in pulmonary oedema (a build-up of fluid in the lungs). As yet another 
victim of poor plant maintenance Irwin’s earnings dropped substantially from his 
usual 65/- per week to a compensatory 
ed for a period of twenty-eight weeks until the Company granted him an 
unspecified pension due to his ‘old age.’34  
At the Widnes Works ten men were gassed in March 1921with four of the ten 
dying immediately. The four men killed were aged between 19 and 27 years old and 
had an average of ten weeks experience in the works. Their cases were settled in the 
County Court for the sum of £300 each whilst the other six victims, who had all been 
                                                 
31 DIC/UA8/5/15. Accident Book of United Alkali Company Limited, May 1918- March 1919 
32 DIC/UA8/5/16. Accident Book of United Alkali Company Limited, March 1919-December 1919 
 Alkali Company Limited, May 1918-March 1919 33 DIC/UA8/5/15. Accident Book of United
34 The amount of pension was unspecified. 
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involved in the attempted rescue effort for the deceased men made no claim on the 
UAC and never returned to the works.35 In 1927, Patrick Mulroy, a 38 year old man 
with five months experience in the Pilkington-Sulliven Works, died from ‘congestion 
of the lungs’ after being exposed to an escape of phosgene gas from ‘a leaky joint in 
the exit main.’36 Phosgene gas was the nerve gas used in the trenches during World 
War One and even slight gassing could cause a dry burning throat, numbness, 
vomiting, chest pain, shortness of breath and a cough with phlegm. Patrick Mulroy 
had obviously been exposed to a large dose and the result was almost immediate. The 
gas would have dissolved in the fluid of his lung tissue and caused severe burns. 
Large quantities of the tissue fluid would then flood the lungs and pulmonary 
oedema would result. The notes attached to this case demonstrate the iniquity of the 
society in which people lived and worked. Mr Mulroy had gone to work that day to 
earn his living and had been killed simply because the UAC had failed to properly 
maintain the equipment that it used to transport known lethal substances. The UAC 
paid Mr Mulroy’s widow the sum of £10, a sum that equated to just less than three 
weeks of her former husbands wages.37 The legal secretary for UAC received the 
um of £15.12.0 in respect of the work he had undertaken for the court. Commenting 
on the 
 
d, in the early 
nineteen twenties, that only some 48 per cent of premiums were being 
                                                
s
financial priorities of compensation schemes Bartrip noted that in 1912: 
Insurance companies were responsible for some 33 per cent of 
workmen’s compensation payments, [yet] only 63 per cent of 
premium income was going towards benefits, the rest was financing 
commissions, management expenses and profit. Moreover, of the 63 
per cent an undisclosed amount consisted of legal and medical 
expenses. The Holman Gregory Committee foun
paid in benefit while profits exceeded 20 per cent.38  
 
 
35 DIC/UA8/5/18. Accident Book of United Alkali Company Limited, October 1920-August 1922 
36 DIC/UA8/5/22. Accident Book of United Alkali Company Limited, February 1927-June 1928 
37 The accident report states that the average weekly wage for Mr Mulroy was £3.10.6   
38 P. Bartrip, ‘The Rise and Decline of Workmen’s Compensation’ pp.157-179 in P. Weindling, (ed) 
The Social History of Occupational Health, Croom Helm, (London 1985), p.171 
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As was discussed above, some ‘new’ gases were not officially acknowledged 
in 1913 although this did not prevent them from being manufactured or used. Indeed, 
it was not until 1924 that poisoning by carbon bisulphide or aniline became notifiable 
industrial diseases whilst chronic benzene poisoning had to wait until 1936 to 
achieve the same status.39 Despite the statistical unreliability for data on cases of 
gassing it would seem that gassing remained a serious health risk to the workforce in 
chemical works up to the middle of the twentieth century. For example, between 
1939 and 1947 there were a total of 4,386 reported cases of occupational gassings 
with 222 workers losing their lives.40 Waldron has noted that conditions of work 
during the Second World War were ‘arduous’ and the need to meet blackout 
regulations led to a reduction in ventilation systems leading to ‘a greater exposure 
than normal to some toxic substances.’41 He further argued that there was ‘a very 
considerable rise in the number of gassings’ and that many of these were the result of 
xposure to carbon monoxide or nitrous fumes. Although the numbers of gassing 
 
s can be seen in Table 6 below. 
ate (1 ll gassing accid orte  Fa spe
8
e
accidents increased it was also significant that the rate of gassing accidents increased
a
 
Table 7: R 05) of a ents rep d to the ctory In ctorate, 
                   193
 
-1944 
Year 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 
Men only 5.25 4.72 14.92 19.70 19.50 17.684 11.84 
Men & Women 3.40 3.06 9.32 11.92 11.15 9.93 6.70 
 
fumes was again associated with the manufacture of munitions and in the period 
Source: H.A. Waldron, ‘Occupational Health During the Second World War: Hope Deferred 
or Hope Abandoned?’ pp.197-212 in Medical History, (41) 1997, p.204 
 
Just as had been the case during the First World War, the inhalation of nitrous 
                                                 
39 Statutory Rule and Order 1924/1505. Association of British Chemical Manufacturers, Safety Rules 
for Use in Chemical Works, Part II, Detailed Instructions, (London, 1952), p.189 and Annual Report 
n, p.54 
SO 
pp.197-212 in Medical History, (41) 1997, p.202 
of the Chief Inspector of Factories on Industrial Health for the Year 1960, PP 1961 (Cmnd. 1478) 
HMSO, Londo
40 Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories for the Year 1947, PP 1949 (Cmd.7621) HM
London, p.66 
41 H.A. Waldron, ‘Occupational Health During the Second World War: Hope Deferred or Hope 
Abandoned?’ 
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1939 to 1945 there were 892 victims of nitrous fume poisoning with 10 men dying.42 
The evidence indicates that little had been learned since 1915 with more workers 
falling victim to this form of poisoning during the Second World War than during the 
First. Nonetheless, the Chemical Trade Journal and Chemical Engineer had little 
hesitation in announcing a ‘striking reduction’ in the numbers of nitrous fume 
victims during the years 1947 to 1950 when only 31 cases and one fatality 
occurred.43 Again, a decrease in the demand for munitions is the most likely reason 
to explain this as no mention is made of any specific preventative measures having 
been implemented. Importantly however, reductions in the total number of 
occupational gassings began to be witnessed during the 1950s although 2,373 
workers were still gassed and 285 of these died.44 By the mid 1960s the numbers 
being gassed fell sharply and there were approximately 100 gassing cases and 4 
fatalities reported each year in the latter half of the decade.45 One reason that 
explains this improvement was that by the 1960s chemical engineers were being 
consulted at the process design stage and that the new chemical plants being 
constructed were having protective features built into their design.46 One 
contemporary writer on occupational health issues commented on this changed 
approach and noted that, ‘this is yielding good results because much attention has 
been g
ption of the essential conditions required for 
e manufacture of a new product (Melinex) at an ICI plant in Dumfries in 1960. 
Thus, a
           
iven to methods of reducing the frequency of operations that involve risk to 
the workers.’47 
The manufacture of some new products could also bring about improved 
conditions of work but these conditions were necessary to ensure uninterrupted 
production and were not implemented for the health of the worker per se. One 
example of this can be seen in the descri
th
ccording to one ICI publication: 
                                      
oks, The Factory Inspectors, A Legacy of Industrial Revolution, Tempus, (Gloucestersh42 E. Cro ire 
2005), p.178 
43 Chemical Trade Journal and Chemical Engineer, January 13, 1950, p.112. 
44 Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories on Industrial Health for the Year 1959, PP 1960 
(Cmnd. 1137) HMSO, London, p.46 
45 Annual Reports of H.M. Chief Inspector of Factories for the Years 1965 to 1968, (Cmnd. 2724), 
(Cmnd. 3080) (Cmnd. 3358) (Cmnd. 3745) (Cmnd. 4146) 
46 Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories for the Year 1960, PP 1961 (Cmnd. 1479) 
HMSO, London, p.53 
47 E.E. Lieber, Occupational Health, Guide to Safeguards Against Employee Sickness and Accident, 
Business Publications, (London 1964), p.45 
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 high standards of 
cleanliness now essential, in demonstrating the meticulous care 
id 1970s. Following repeated and failed 
quests to ICI for a copy of the results of this research (the ICI manager claimed the 
results urvey 
team th
 
                                                
The clean air condition necessary for efficient and continuous 
production was a new phenomenon for employees. Considerable 
effort was devoted to training, for example, in explaining the purpose 
of each item of equipment, in emphasising the very 
needed to set controls and dies, and in cleaning and polishing so that 
no possible contamination would enter the film.48    
 
Therefore, in 1960, working in clean air was to become a new experience for the 
workers at this plant. This was enhanced by a range of other measures all 
implemented simply to ensure that ‘efficient and continuous production’ occurred. 
However, some of methods used to ensure that efficient and continuous production 
was achieved were less conducive to the physical wellbeing of the operators. To 
achieve a ‘clean air condition’ the building had no windows and was therefore 
artificially lit throughout. The process itself was a continuous one and required shift 
workers to attend to the product amidst very high noise levels. One of the former 
workers at this plant discussed his participation in a health survey that had been 
undertaken over a period of weeks in the m
re
had been lost) the operator finally managed to obtain a copy from the s
emselves. He stated: 
What the survey showed was that all the senses were being adversely 
affected due to the conditions and all their [ICI] operators with longer 
service were affected the worse. Basically, what was happening is at 
the start of our shift cycle and at the end of our shift cycle your 
hearing, your eyesight, and your reaction time was slower but on your 
days off they all picked up again and at the start of the next shift cycle 
you were practically where you were at the start of the first shift 
cycle. But, as you were getting older and your length of service was 
 
48 W.R. Irving, Drungans Means Business, A Short History of the ICI Site at Drungans from 1939-
1986, Imperial Chemical Industries P.L.C. (Dumfries 1987), pp.17-18   
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getting longer it was taking you longer to recover and your senses was 
going and it’s worse…it was a lot worse than other people. But I 
mean we were a helluva noisy area, you were in an area where it was 
all fluorescent lighting there was no…it was all artificial lighting there 
was no natural light at all and they [the survey team] said that was one 
of the worst things about the whole place…was the lighting was 
affecting the eyesight and the noise was affecting the hearing. 
But…ICI promised to do something about it but…even the new plants 
hat some work had been undertaken to establish a safe working 
environment. However Markowitz and Rosner have argued persuasively that the 
establis  was 
flawed
                                                
that were designed, the likes of Melinex Two [started 1966] and 
Melinex Five [started 1985] after that had no windows.49 
     
As the decades passed reductions in gassing incidents demonstrated that more 
effort was now being made to improve the working conditions. This trend was allied 
to the changed social and political atmosphere that had begun during the Second 
World War and which helped strengthen trade unions and brought the Labour Party 
into a position of influence within government. Johnston and McIvor have also 
argued that more employers and managers came to realise that by positively 
addressing health and safety issues productivity and company loyalty could be 
enhanced.50 Within this new era the ICI Industrial Hygiene Research Laboratories set 
to work and by 1955 they had identified maximum allowable concentrations for 151 
toxic dusts, fumes and metals.51 By 1960, there were more than 250 threshold limit 
values (TLVs) listed for gases, vapours, toxic dust, fumes and mists.52 At one level 
this signalled t
hment of a threshold limit value system in the US chemical industry
 in that: 
 
 
49 Interview: D. Walker with KG, 25 November 2005, p.11 
50 R. Johnston, and A. McIvor, Lethal Work, A History of the Asbestos Tragedy in Scotland, Tuckwell 
Press, (East Lothian 2000), p.55 
51 M.W. Goldblatt, ‘Research in Industrial Health in the Chemical Industry’ pp.1-20 in British Journal 
of Industrial Medicine, (12) 1955, p.1 
52 N.T. Freeman, Protective Clothing and Devices, United Trade Press, (London 1962), pp183-187 
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The industry knew that threshold limit values (TLVs) were a 
benchmark of what was achievable, although not necessarily what 
was safe. Still the [chemical] industry continued to rely on standards 
 best injurious 
nd, at worst, lethal. Yet, in 1954 an optimistic outlook for the occupational health of 
chemic nual 
confere
 
The leading chemical manufacturers are constantly testing the 
ortant to the employers that the 
chemic
                                                
for which there was often inadequate information and that today look 
arbitrary.53 
 
Tweedale echoes such a view and has shown that the former head of the Medical 
Research Council’s Pneumoconiosis Unit considered TLVs to be little better than 
‘informed guesswork rather than scientific fact.’54 As will be shown, this indeed was 
the case and both the British and American chemical industries exposed their 
workforces to threshold limit values that were latterly found to be at
a
al workers was presented when a Times article reported on the an
nce of the Sanitary Inspectors’ Association. The article stated: 
carcinogenic properties of new substances so that in future there is 
much less chance of repeating the tragic story of the last 30 years.55  
 
As was being acknowledged here, there had indeed been a tragic story. However, 
reducing the risks did not mean eliminating them and just as had occurred in the 
earlier period many of the ‘new’ chemicals that went into full production had yet to 
be fully analysed over the long term. Having invested heavily in the research and 
development of new chemicals employers had to ensure that the production of these 
would not be interrupted. It was therefore imp
al workforce believed that steps had been taken to protect their health. As will 
be shown below this sometimes meant that chemical firms were economical with the 
truth when it came to identifying health hazards.   
 
53 G. Markowitz, and D. Rosner, Deceit and Denial: The Deadly Politics of Industrial Pollution, 
University of California Press, (California 2003), pp.171-172  
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By definition, ‘accidental’ escapes of gas could never be eradicated yet, for 
example, no study was ever undertaken to determine the effects of repeated low-level 
exposures to the fumes of nitric acid, despite its continued use. By 1973, one source 
suggested that chronic bronchitis would be the most likely outcome.56 From as early 
as 1907 the Departmental Committee Report on Compensation for Industrial 
Diseases had argued that bronchitis could not be included as an industrial disease as 
they could not distinguish between bronchitis of an industrial origin and bronchitis 
caused by some other means. This decision was reached despite their lack of doubt 
that bronchitis was often caused by the ‘inhalation of fumes of chlorine or other 
irritating gases.’57 Indeed, one part of a wider research project has shown that 
between 1949 and 1967 Glasgow chromate workers suffered from a ‘significant 
excess mortality’ from bronchitis.58 These deaths would not have been reported as 
occupational deaths and therefore would not have shown in government statistics as 
an increased mortality in the chromate manufacturing industry. Indeed, the 
uncertainty of what specific health damage was being visited upon chemical workers 
renders much of the associated health damage invisible. For example, methanol had 
been used in industrial processes since the nineteenth century and from that time had 
been identified as a dangerous substance. Nonetheless, even by the early 1950s the 
chemical industry remained unsure as to how much of this substance workers could 
be exposed to before the accumulation would constitute a toxic hazard.59  In the 
meantime, amidst such levels of indifference and ignorance, chemical workers were 
expected to carry on working. 
As indicated above, with the development of the industry in the twentieth 
century many thousands of  ‘new’ chemicals came to be manufactured. In 1934 the 
Chief Inspector of Factories noted that whilst it was important to remain vigilant with 
regard to known industrial diseases ‘particular attention must be directed to new 
forms of poisoning occasioned by the use of chemicals, many of them complex in 
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character, the effects of which on the human subject little is known.’60 The fact that 
so little was known did not deter manufacturers from pushing ahead in their pursuit 
of profits and it was left to others to play ‘catch-up’ and find out what they could 
about the substances being handled. In many cases, knowledge of the potential 
dangers was only gained through first-hand experience. For example, Oliver, a 
pioneer of occupational health, noted in 1935 that the workers he interviewed 
reported ‘again and again’ that they had been exposed to dangerous substances but 
only discovered that this was the case long after the event.61 Two years later, 
Mackenzie, the founder of the Industrial Health Education Council (later the 
Industrial Health Education Society) wrote of the technological and scientific 
advancements being made in industry and expressed similar concerns to those 
reported by Oliver. Mackenzie was perturbed by the fact that industry was making 
rapid but unchecked advances leaving the unsuspecting process workers to act as 
human 
 and that tens, perhaps hundreds, of 
workers will suffer and many even die before effective preventive 
guinea pigs. As Mackenzie stated: 
 
Almost every advance in industrial method means the birth of some 
new baffling health problem
measures can be evolved.62  
 
Twenty years later, in 1956, Meiklejohn, a specialist in occupational health, 
noted the large increase in the number of organic compounds being manufactured 
and how interest in these had focussed on their commercial value ‘rather than in their 
toxic effects on the workman.’63 Nonetheless, by the middle of the twentieth century, 
thanks to the efforts of a variety of groups and individuals, a list of substances had 
been identified as being of danger to workers and the resultant illness defined as an 
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occupational disease. This meant that the victims could potentially receive some 
financial compensation and that certain preventative measures may have been put in 
place to reduce or prevent exposure. In other words, the use or manufacture of 
known harmful chemical substances was to be regulated, not banned. At this juncture 
the list of occupational diseases associated with the industry included poisoning by 
lead, manganese, phosphorus, arsenic, mercury, carbon bisulphide, benzene, 
dinitrophenol, tetrachlorethane, tricresyl phosate, triphenyl phosate, diethylene 
dioxide, methyl bromide, chlorinated naphthalene, nickel carbonyl, nitrous fumes, 
beryllium, and chrome ulceration.64 Perhaps the most insidious of all occupational 
diseases were those that had long latency periods and often resulted in death. Only a 
few such occupational diseases have ever been officially connected to the industry 
nd granted ‘prescribed’ status. A specific examination will now be made of three 
auses and effects of exposure to chromates 
(metals
y identified as an 
occupational hazard from as early as 1893 when a government inquiry reported on 
the dan ns in 
1952 th
s relatively 
heavy and contamination, particularly of minor cuts and abrasions, 
a
areas of the industry to examine the c
), dyestuffs (organics), and vinyl chloride monomer (plastics).  
 
Chrome Ulceration and Lung Cancer 
Originally used in the dye, tanning and pigment industries during the early 
nineteenth century chromates have also been used in the manufacture of ceramics, 
paints, pharmaceuticals, explosives, wood preservatives, as well as for use in 
chromium plating. Chrome ulceration had been officiall
gers to the health of chemical workers.65 Discussing chrome ulceratio
e Chief Inspector of Factories could still comment that: 
 
The work in the bichromate manufacturing industry i
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may occur from dust or liquid. In consequence the sites affected are 
more varied, and multiple ulcers occur more frequently.66 
 
What this report did not comment on was that the cause of much of this physical 
damage was due to the fact that the chromate plants in Britain were old, dusty, and 
prone to leakage. Richard Fitzpatrick was employed at his local chromate 
manufacturing plant near Glasgow between 1939 and 1945, a place that his father 
had worked in for many years. Mr Fitzpatrick recalled, ‘what a knew was just my 
father c  to be 
honest  dirty 
work th 1940s 
thus: 
d a big thingmy (indicates a lever) and he shifted them 
himself. While he was emptying these wagons…obviously all the 
of the 
                                                
oming home and…I really didnae think it was a place to be working in
with ye but ah had to finish up going there.’67 He recalled the heavy and
at a Polish colleague had to undertake on a daily basis during the mid 
 
He was in there at half-past-four and five o’clock in the morning and 
finished up about twelve or one. He had a certain amount of wagons 
to empty and he never called on the pug (small train) to shift the 
wagons. He ha
pipes round about there was always a leak somewhere…and he was 
always stripped and I think that wi’ him sweating it (chromic acid) 
went on tae his back…he had quite a lot of liquor and chrome holes 
on his back.68 
 
This man would have been supplied with an overall and obviously the heavy nature 
work had led him to remove this. Wearing the overall would perhaps have 
provided a limited amount of protection but exposed to regular leaks of chromic acid 
a cotton overall would provide little resistance. A more successful preventative 
measure would have been to secure the leaks through proper and regular 
maintenance but this was obviously not a feature of that workplace. 
 
66 Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories for the Year 1952, PP 1954 (Cmd.9154) HMSO 
, p.2 
itzpatrick, 13 August 2004, p.7 
London, p.165 
67 Interview: D. Walker with Richard Fitzpatrick, 13 August 2004
68 Interview D. Walker with R. F
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Chrome ulcers were slow to heal and could penetrate to the bone and lead to 
the loss of fingernails or deformity of the joints of the fingers. Other damage being 
done to the chromate workers included the ulceration, perforation, or destruction of 
the lining membrane of the nostrils with the clouds of chrome dust also being 
suspected from an early stage of being responsible for causing damage to the 
respiratory system.69 Despite the introduction of the Special Rules and Regulations 
 
 
Illustration 6: Chrome ulcer caused by handling sodium bichromate 
Source: D. Hunter, The Diseases of Occupations, Sixth Edition, Hodder and Stoughton, (London 1980), p.436 
 
introduced by the government in 1893 there is clear evidence, as will be discussed 
below, that these were not fully complied with and workers within the chromate-
manufacturing sector continued to lose their septum and suffer from chrome 
ulcerations right through to the 1970s.70 Indeed, not all chromate workers were 
exposed to toxic dangers within the confines of the factory walls. Some raked the 
toxic waste on the dumping grounds and suffered terribly from chrome ulcers, 
dermatitis and the loss of the nasal septum. One former worker’s wife claimed that, 
‘his ears wept and stuck to the pillow; his eyelids would stick together; his toes and 
                                                 
69 Chemical Works Inquiry, p.7 
70 D. Walker, ‘Working in it, through it, and among it all day’ Chrome Dust at J&J White of 
abour History Journal, Volume 40, 2005, pp.56-57 Rutherglen, 1893-1967’ pp.50-69 in Scottish L
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feet were badly affected with ulcers, leading to amputation of his feet and he 
eventually lost both legs.’71 Indeed, this woman suffered from dermatitis herself 
caused by handling her husband’s chromate impregnated clothing prior to washing 
them. O
 symptom of working with chromates was chrome 
ulcerat
                                                
ne maintenance worker reported that having been employed at the Glasgow 
works from 1964 to 1966 his nasal septum had been destroyed within the first year.72 
Another, who drove the dumper trucks full of chemical waste, claimed that the waste 
blew into his face but ‘we were given a wee gauze and cotton wool mask that was no 
good at all.’73 
The loss of the nasal septum as a direct result of occupation had been 
recognised for centuries but this affliction was accompanied by little, if any, pain and 
therefore had been largely ignored by most. Described in the 1950s as a 
‘symptomless condition’ by someone whose nasal septum was clearly intact the 
unsociable consequences of loss could nevertheless be experienced by the victims.74 
According to Hunter the inconvenience experienced by those who suffered from the 
loss of septum was that mucus plugs tended to form in the nasal passages.75 Richard 
Fitzpatrick recalled that his father was always clearing his nose and, having followed 
his father into the local chromate manufacturing plant near Glasgow, Mr Fitzpatrick 
admitted that he too had lost the septum and that he was ‘always blowing and 
picking.’76 Whilst this socially unacceptable practice may have been annoying the 
painful and more noticeable
ion. By 1920 this had become a notifiable industrial disease and from that year 
onwards official figures became available to show the number of victims suffering 
from this occupational disease. However, as will be demonstrated below, this data is 
unreliable and fails to provide a true picture of the numbers of workers who suffered 
from this industrial disease.  
In the late 1920s and 1930s an increase occurred in the amount of consumer 
goods receiving chrome plating. By the mid 1930s the Factory Inspectorate chose 
this reason to explain why there had been an increase in chrome ulceration cases in 
 
91, p.5 
ournal 
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71 The Rutherglen Reformer, July 26, 1991, p.5 
72 News of the World, September 3, 2000, p.8 
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the chrome plating industry.77 It follows that an increased demand for chrome plating 
had to be accompanied by an increased demand for chromates as without them no 
plating could be achieved. As can be seen in Table 7, apart from minor blips in 1929 
and 1938 the increased demand does not appear to have led to any great surge in the 
numbers of reported cases of chrome ulceration. What is striking about these figures 
is that up to the late 1940s the men employed in the main chromate manufacturing 
plants in Britain worked on a ‘high-lime’ process using hand-fired furnaces and 
ccording to specialists who have studied the process technology this would have 
, a catalyst 
or chrome ulceration 
l i t m 4 e r s  f
ree ma work nd t eafte houl ecli  so  extent.  
a
 nufacturing sector, 1928 to 1938 and 1946 to 1956 
a
resulted in the men being exposed to ‘especially high’ levels of toxic dust
or chrome ulcers.78 Given that this was the case the figures ff
shou d be h gh up o the id 19 0s wh n rota y kiln  were inally 
79
installed in all 
th chro te s a her r s d d ne to me
 
Table 8: 
        
Number of reported cases of chro
      ma
me ulceration in the chrom te  
 
1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 TOTAL
3 15 47  13 6 2 2 2 1 Nil 1 2 
  
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 TOTAL
5 11 43 28 36 80 87 65 103 104 92 654 
 
Source: Annual Reports of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops 
 
Yet, as can be seen this is clearly not the case and remarkably a higher number of 
cases begin to appear in the mid 1940s onwards with a total of 654 cases of chrome 
ulceration being recorded between 1946 and 1956. This is approximately 14 times 
the number of chrome ulcerations that had been recorded between 1928 and 1938. 
The numbers employed in chromate manufacturing remained relatively static
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throughout the periods in question and therefore this variable cannot account for the 
larger number of victims in the mid 1950s.80 Improved reporting by an increased 
number of factory inspectors could provide one plausible explanation for the higher 
figures as could the introduction of the Industrial Injures Act in 1948 as this had 
made it easier to claim compensation. As has been already commented upon, the 
1920s and 1930s witnessed an increased demand for chrome plated goods and 
therefore the Depression era does not provide a satisfactory explanation for the lower 
figures recorded during that period.  
Three other sources provide evidence to indicate that the figures for chrome 
ulceration are unreliable. First, a former employee at the Rutherglen works claimed 
that between 1939 and 1945 ‘chrome holes were pretty common’ that ‘dust was 
always flying about’ and that there was no ventilation system.81 This testimony is 
verified by the second source, an environmental survey undertaken by the Medical 
Research Council in 1951. Therein it was reported that ‘perforation of the nasal 
septum was common’ and that the concentration of chromium in the dust-laden 
atmosphere was 327 to 550 times higher than the maximum allowable 
concentration.82 This information immediately raises doubts about the government 
data for chrome ulcerations. If such high dust levels existed in the 1950s then how 
could the numbers for chrome ulceration be so low during the 1930s when the old 
manufacturing process was still in use? Third, in 1960 the Chief Inspector of 
Factories on Industrial Health reported on the unusually high number of cases of 
chrome ulceration that had occurred in 1959. The reason offered for this was that 
some old plant buildings had been demolished and this had disturbed ‘deposits of 
waste material’ that were in the roof areas. In total, 167 workers were affected by the 
‘chrome bearing dust’ that had accumulated in the rafters of the buildings and which 
had clearly not been dealt with earlier by the extraction or ventilation systems.83 In 
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the same report it was also stated that at a ‘modern and well equipped’ chromate 
manufacturers there had only been 14 cases of chrome ulceration.84 Incredibly 
therefore, in this one modern and well-equipped chromate plant in 1959 there had 
been more cases of chrome ulceration than there had been in all three British plants 
put together in 1929. From the evidence above it is possible to argue that the entire 
data for chrome ulceration is unreliable and therefore provides no true insight into 
the extent of suffering that must have been endured by the chromate workforce. 
Indeed, the medical evidence and worker’s testimony from 1900, together with the 
oral testimony and atmospheric and technological evidence for the 1940s and 50s 
strongly suggests that chrome ulceration could have been running at epidemic 
proport
cancer could be an occupational hazard associated with chromate 
manufa
than expected.87 Indeed, according to Gross and Kölsch, the German health 
ions amongst the chromate workforce until at least the 1960s when the new 
plant, improved ventilation, and enclosed handling systems were finally 
operational.85 As will be discussed below, why these improvements were carried out 
in the late 1950s is not explained by the continued existence of chrome ulcerations 
but by the response to the fact that lung cancer had been linked to chromate 
manufacturing.  
The Glasgow Medical Journal of 1890 reported that nasal cancer had been 
found in a 47 year-old chromate worker from Glasgow.86 No follow up study was 
undertaken at this juncture and it was not until 1922 that the possibility was even 
considered when Thomas Legge observed 175 cases of nasal perforation but failed to 
find any cancers. It would take another 26 years before the British would consider 
the possibility that 
cturing. Meanwhile, German researchers published their first results in the 
1930s followed by the United States in the 1940s with both sets of data indicating 
that the incidence of lung cancer among chromate workers was significantly higher 
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authorities had officially recognised that lung cancer was a possible occupational 
disease by 1936.88 
Up to 1948 the British had conducted no research in this area and had no 
reliable mortality data to work with. With the re-invigorated trade union and labour 
movement urging and gaining reform in the post war era the state appointed Medical 
Research Council (MRC) were instructed to investigate this possibility. The MRC 
study involved just over 700 workers from three chromate-manufacturing factories in 
Britain with all of the workers being interviewed and x-rayed.89 After 8 years of 
research the MRC were finally able to report that 12 men from their cohort had died 
from lung cancer. According to the researchers Bidstrup and Case, this demonstrated 
‘a statistically significant increase of deaths found over deaths expected from this 
cause’ and that ‘an excessive mortality from carcinoma of the lung’ had to be 
admitted.90 They estimated a latency period of 18 years but as the researchers had 
                                                                                                                                         
not been asked to determine the carcinogenic occupational factor then they could not 
state what precisely was causing this to happen. One earlier investigation of the 
working environment had suggested that it was reasonable to suggest that ‘the most 
dangerous points in the manufacture’ were where the highest levels of insoluble and 
soluble chromium compounds were found.91  
 Having received the results of the research in 1956 the employers responded 
by introducing a series of major plant and process changes designed to reduce the 
risk. As discussed above, rotary kilns had replaced hand-fired furnaces during the 
early 1940s at the Bolton and Glasgow works whilst Eaglescliffe had used these 
since 1928. Although this early improvement resulted in a more efficient output its 
significance to the health of workers was that they would have been exposed to lower 
levels of dusts containing sodium chromate and soluble calcium chromate. The 
consequences of the delay in introducing these to the largest factory in Glasgow are 
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self evident. Other improvements introduced from the mid 1950s included changes in 
the way that the raw materials, residues, and finished products were prepared and 
handled
Industrial Injuries Advisory Council would recommend that lung cancer be 
prescribed as an occupational disease but only for those handling or being exposed to 
 with these being largely dealt with on a mechanised basis. Improved kiln gas 
entry flues and improved ventilation systems were also introduced along with 
enclosed handling systems.92 Annual x-rays were provided for all of the workers 
from 1955 onwards and all new recruits were given pre-employment medical 
examinations.93 
Of the original cohort of 723 men who were medically examined in 1948, 
217 sought other employment and were never traced, 57 retired because of ill health 
or age, and 59 men died. It is at least possible to argue that a percentage of the 217 
men who could not be traced may have died from occupational lung cancer although 
their deaths would ever have been attributed to the chromate manufacturing 
industry.94 What is known is that of the 59 men who died the cause of death in 12 
cases was due to carcinoma of the lung. In 1956 Bidstrup and Case stated that the 
ratio between mortality found from carcinoma of the lung in their sample of workers 
and that expected was 360 per cent and that ‘by the time all of the men at risk have 
lived their life span it will probably be found that the factor is very much higher.’95 
Indeed, in 1981 a follow-up study of the men employed between 1948 and 1977 
found that there was a twofold excess of lung cancer deaths at the Eaglescliffe plant 
and a nearly threefold excess at the Rutherglen plant and that 116 deaths from cancer 
of the lung had occurred.96 This study also reported an increased risk of cancer of the 
nose and nasal sinuses with 2 deaths recorded. It was not until 1986 that the 
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the dust of zinc chromate, calcium chromate or strontium chromate.97 By 1991, an 
updated report showed that 218 chromate workers had died from cancer of the lung 
and that 4 workers had died with nasal cancer.98 In a postscript to the 1991 follow-up 
ses of lung cancer had occurred and that 
dine, 
naphth
study it was further stated that seven new ca
two of the men had since died.99  
 
The Dyestuffs Sector and Bladder Cancer  
 A German surgeon named Rhen first reported occupational bladder cancer 
amongst men in the dyestuffs sector in 1895 although at this stage he thought that 
aniline was responsible. By 1912, following a trip he had made to Germany, the 
existence of this disease was relayed to Britain by Thomas Legge, the then Senior 
Medical Inspector of Factories. Undoubtedly the war would have distracted attention 
from this matter but according to Goldblatt, by 1920, British manufacturers were 
aware that the German dyestuffs industry had been ‘preoccupied on the bladder 
tumour problem.’100 Nonetheless, it was not until 1926 that the first cases of bladder 
tumour were officially reported to have been found amongst British dyestuffs 
workers.101 By the early 1930s more cases of bladder cancer were being reported 
whilst some attempt was being made to identify the precise cause. For example, 
reporting on five cases of bladder cancer in chemical workers in 1931 the Factory 
Inspectorate drew up a list of the suspect chemicals used in the manufacture of 
synthetic dyes. The list included, ά-naphthylamine, β-naphthylamine, benzi
ionic acid, phenylene-diamine, toluene-diamine, nitro-naphthalene, 
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dimethylamine, toluol, toluidine and aniline.102 At this stage no one, or combination 
ncer. 
strial 
utputs that emanated from the city of Huddersfield in the north of England. In 1932 
            1922-1932       26 chemical labourers out of 37 males (70.2 per cent)103 
 
Indeed, between 1900 and 1932 the Huddersfield Royal Infirmary admitted a total of 
64 cases for bladder tumour and therefore one half of all admissions had been 
chemical labourers.104 Further analysis for the period 1928 to 1932 revealed that the 
mortality rates among chemical workers with bladder cancer in the dyestuffs sector 
was 38 times higher than for the male insured population of Huddersfield.105 
 
                                                
of any of these, were identified positively as the causative source of the ca
The manufacture of intermediate dyestuffs was just one of many indu
o
an investigation of the records held at Huddersfield Royal Infirmary revealed that 
admission for cases of papilloma and cancer of the bladder for the years 1900 to 
1932 showed the following: 
1900-1910 3 chemical labourers out of 12 males (25 per cent) 
1900-1911 3 chemical labourers out of 15 males (20 per cent) 
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 Illustration 7: Intermediates department, Huddersfield dyestuffs works, 1935 
Source: W.J. Reader, Imperial Chemical Industries, A History, Volume II, The First Quarter-Century 
1926-1952, Oxford University Press, (London 1975), p.334 
 
 
 
One reaction to these findings might have been to ban the use of the 
substances involved and find an alternative but another thirty years would pass 
before this option would even be partially considered. In the meantime the long 
drawn-out process of identifying the precise causative agent was pursued. As many 
related processes were worked alongside each other the investigators could only state 
that the causative agent or agents were likely to be found in a list that included, 
aniline , and 
dianisid der  
tumour  were 
introdu  train 
106 With these improvements in place 
, ά-naphthylamine, β-naphthylamine, benzidine, diphenylamine, toluidine
ine. Faced with the certainty that the increased numbers of cases of blad
 were a result of exposure to one or other of these substances measures
ced to reduce dust and fume levels, to improve plant hygiene, and to
workers in the proper handling of the products.
the workforce were relied upon to continue producing the intermediate dyestuffs.  
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By the mid 1930s some efforts were being made to identify papilloma 
 much earlier in the medical history by means of chemical and micros
ations of the workers’ urine. These examinations were not carried out 
of the 
bladder copic 
examin on all 
of the workforce although having found some ‘unsuspecting’ early victims the firm 
oncerned expressed their desire to carry out this procedure on all its employees 
, ‘many of the employees were 
evitably exposed for a number of years to repeated doses of potentially 
carcino tative 
policy  later. 
Thus: 
e of many precautions and improvements 
troduced in recent years, the workers do come into significant 
iltering. 
c
three or four times a year thereafter.107 The Factory Inspector welcomed this addition 
to the measures already in place because it was clear that in spite of the fact that 
protective clothing and respirators had been issued
in
genic intermediates.’108 Demonstrating how ineffective this preven
was Goldblatt could make the same observation more than ten years
It is certain that, in spit
in
contact with a great variety of compounds among which the supposed 
bladder carcinogens must be included…do what we may, there are 
operations in this industry which inevitably expose men to dust and 
sometimes fumes, for example, flaking, drying, grinding, f
Shovelling toxic products into reaction vessels is notorious as a dust 
disseminator.109 
 
Indeed, even in 1947 solidified β-naphthylamine was broken by hand and then finely 
ground on hand operated roller mills in small sheds. Noting the conditions of work 
that had prevailed in 1947 Goldblatt suggested that: 
 
It is unnecessary to emphasise the state of the atmosphere in such a 
shed in which the workman was not only enveloped in naphthylamine 
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dust, but every nook and cranny in the shed was filled with it and the 
floor was thick with it.110 
 
Having analysed the annual incidence of tumours in two dyestuffs factories Goldblatt 
discovered that between 1934 and 1947, 99 men had been found to have a bladder 
tumour and that from that total 59 of the men died. The prognosis for the long-term 
survival amongst the 40 men still alive was considered to be poor.111  
In 1947 the Dyestuffs Group of the Association of British Chemical 
Manufacturers (ABCM) decided to set up and finance a major research project on 
industrial papilloma of the bladder. According to the ABCM this research had been 
delayed due to the war. The study, undertaken by the Chester Beatty Research 
Institute, would later be acknowledged as the ‘prototype of historical cohort studies’ 
and involved the participation of twenty-one firms.112 The results of the research 
were published in 1954 and showed that contact with ά-naphthylamine, β-
naphthylamine or benzidine in either manufacture or use caused many more bladder 
tumours in workers than in those not exposed to these chemicals. Exposure periods 
of a few months were found to be sufficient to cause a tumour and working in the 
dyestuffs sector of the chemical industry increased the risk of dying from a bladder 
tumour by thirty-fold.113 Latency periods ranged from 16 years following exposure 
to β-naphthylamine and benzidine and 22 years when exposed to ά-naphthylamine. It 
was also estimated that from a group of 2,466 men ‘one in ten’ of the men who had 
been exposed to ά-naphthylamine, β-naphthylamine and benzidine had already 
developed bladder tumour, and that this was expected to reach one in five before all 
the men were dead from all causes.114 The survey showed that up until 1952 there 
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had been 455 cases of bladder tumour found in the British chemical industry and that 
‘the disorder, tumour of the bladder, must be regarded as a killing disease.’115   
These results were passed to the government prior to their publication and in 
1953 papilloma of the bladder was officially recognised as an occupational disease. 
This now meant that the workers with this disease who could prove they had been 
exposed to β-naphthylamine were able to submit a claim for compensation. They 
could also be awarded court damages if they could show that the employer knew 
about the bladder cancer risk and did not take appropriate steps to prevent this 
happening116 It was accepted that so far as β-naphthylamine was concerned ‘no plant 
could b
rking practice that the ABCM ‘hoped’ 
ould be implemented by the member firms.118 With ‘The Control of Industrial 
Bladde tative 
measur n, the 
design inate, 
all con urther 
evidenc nition 
of this f the 
renal p at this 
                                                
e economically devised which could be operated with any degree of certainty 
that tumours would not occur’ and therefore the manufacture and use of β-
naphthylamine was stopped.117 Alternatives to β-naphthylamine were introduced for 
the dyestuffs sector but no alternatives existed at that point to replace ά-
naphthylamine, benzidine, or the homologues and derivatives of benzidine, and 
therefore all of these continued to be utilised in the industry although precautions 
were intensified for their manufacture and use. These precautions were contained in a 
1957 publication that laid out the code of wo
w
r Tumours’ as its title the paper went on to list a variety of preven
es that included the provision of protective wear, medical supervisio
of new plant and to ‘reduce to the minimum, and where possible to elim
tacts between operator and carcinogens.’119 In 1958, having amassed f
e, the Industrial Injuries Advisory Council recommended that the defi
occupational disease should be extended to include ‘the epithelial lining o
elvis or of the epithelial lining of the ureter.’120 It was also decided 
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stage to extend the occupational coverage to include working with ά-naphthylamine, 
β-naphthylamine and any of their salts, diphenyl, auramine and magenta. 
Undoubtedly the voluntary measures introduced by the ABCM must have had 
some positive impact on the industry but in 1967 a study of occupational dermatitis 
carried out at the Blackley Works in Manchester revealed gaps in the attempts to 
eliminate contact between operator and the dyestuffs. These works belonged to ICI 
and produced a range of dyestuffs, dyestuff intermediates, rubber chemicals and 
other products. The description of the works, which were owned and operated by the 
largest and wealthiest chemical firm in Britain, reveal that it had not been possible to 
fully im
40 years. In 1974 it was estimated that 20 per cent of all bladder cancers in industrial 
plement the ABCM measures. Thus: 
 
The works is an old established one and the buildings and plant vary 
considerably in age; some parts date back to before the 1914-18 war, 
and others are quite new. In general, the standard of industrial hygiene 
is fair, although some of the older plants are not up to the standards 
achieved in more modern structures. Process workers may have skin 
contact with chemicals when charging materials to the reaction 
vessels or in the later stages of the processes in the course of filtration 
or drying procedures.121  
 
The report made no mention of carcinogenic materials but it did find that the 
chemical process workers had a rate of dermatitis that was six times that of those 
who had little or no chemical exposure.122 The Carcinogenic Substances Regulations 
of 1967 finally prohibited the manufacture, use, and importation of β-naphthylamine, 
benzidine, and other closely related compounds. By this time the evidence that linked 
bladder cancer with working in the dyestuffs sector had been available for more than 
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communities could be linked to occupational factors and that ‘some occupations 
which were not previously suspected’ were also subject to this hazard.123  
Whilst investigating the incidence of bladder cancer amongst dyestuffs 
worker
to Fox, a former employee of ICI Organics Division, the Board of 
ICI Dy ill be 
discuss ase at 
all and known 
to have te that 
althoug ped using Nonox S in 1949 the ‘facts’ surrounding this 
withdrawal only surfaced in parliament when cancer risks associated with the rubber 
in 1965.127   
Employed from the mid 1940s at the Dunlop plant in Birmingham two 
worker rubber 
in whic cancer 
           
s in the 1950s the research team also discovered that a high number of other 
workers were suffering from papilloma of the bladder. These workers were 
employed by Dunlop in the rubber industry and worked in a large factory in 
Birmingham where an antioxidant had been used throughout the 1930s and 1940s. 
The antioxidant, known as Nonox S, was manufactured by ICI and contained β-
naphthylamine. The discovery of the papilloma cases amongst the rubber workers 
was mentioned to the medical officer of ICI’s dyestuffs division who, due to his 
knowledge of the content of Nonox S, ‘came up with the suggestion that Nonox S 
might be the responsible agent.’124 In June 1949 Dunlop were informed of the 
potential dangers associated with Nonox S and they immediately stopped using this 
antioxidant. The following month ICI took the decision to withdraw Nonox S from 
sale. According 
estuffs Division took this decision ‘at the earliest opportunity.’125 As w
ed below whilst Fox may have believed this to be true this was not the c
 despite the apparently swift decision 183 rubber industry workers are 
 died of bladder cancer between 1945 and 1964.126 It is interesting to no
h Dunlop had stop
industry were being debated 
s who had been exposed to ‘a great deal of fume originating from hot 
h Nonox S had been incorporated’ were diagnosed as having bladder 
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in 1966  from 
the late ly for 
the two  been 
diagno als of 
liability rt by 
1971. H  (and 
Dunlop should 
have do rectly 
and fou
ad been 
drawn forcibly to the mind of ICI by the negotiations for the 
That ICI must have assumed that part of the naphthylamine impurity 
was β-naphthylamine; at all events they could and should have 
.128 Represented by their trade union, both men pursued Dunlop and ICI
 1960s in order to establish liability. This was an important case not on
 named men but also for the 450 other rubber industry workers who had
sed with bladder cancer. Following the initial and inevitable deni
 made by ICI and Dunlop the case had wound its way into the High Cou
ere conclusive evidence was presented to prove that ICI were liable
 to a lesser extent), as they had not acted as promptly as they could or 
ne. ICI in particular were identified by the judge as having acted incor
nd that: 
By the beginning of 1939 the dangers of β-naphthylamine h
undertaking to the Minister, the commissioning of the new β-
naphthylamine plant and the large number of cases of bladder cancer 
at Huddersfield.129 
 
The judge further held that: 
 
By 1942, ICI had in fact analysed Nonox S and received a report that 
it contained 1.8 per cent free naphthylamines by weight. That by 1942 
ICI had in fact decided that the free naphthylamine content of Nonox 
S was a cancer hazard to their own workmen employed in handling 
the hot finished product. They certainly had decided this by 1945. 
That ICI knew the circumstances in which Nonox S was used in the 
rubber industry, including the temperatures to which it was subjected. 
discovered that the β-naphthylamine impurity was of the order of 0.25 
per cent. That by 1943 ICI knew for certain that it was β-
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naphthylamine itself that was a carcinogen rather than some impurity 
connected with its manufacture. At all material times ICI were wholly 
unaware of any safe level of exposure to β-naphthylamine.130 
re ICI had known of the lethal capabilities of Nonox S from 1942 
and po
ide is a colourless, flammable, toxic gas, first produced 
comme
 
In reality therefo
ssibly from as early as 1940 and yet had knowingly delayed the removal of 
this deadly product for at least a further seven years and possibly nine. From this 
evidence it is also obvious that ICI had withdrawn Nonox S in 1949 as they had 
finally accepted the potentially lethal capabilities of this substance amongst the 
Dunlop rubber workers. Indeed, it was noted that there had been no indication from 
amongst ‘the voluminous papers of Dr Goldblatt or any other medical officer of the 
dyestuffs division that the risk to users of either Nonox S or other products had ever 
been considered.’131 Therefore, negligence is one factor that explains the delay 
surrounding the withdrawal of Nonox S from sale. The profit levels generated by this 
product would easily have covered the total sum of £21,000 paid in damages to both 
of the victims who took ICI to court.132 ICI appealed the original decision but on 
October 31, 1972, this appeal was lost because negligence by ICI had been proven 
beyond doubt.133 By 1973, an estimated 500 widows and former rubber workers had 
lodged claims against ICI, the largest and richest of the chemical firms that operated 
in Britain and, reputedly, one of the best.   
 
Vinyl Chloride 
Vinyl chlor
rcially in the 1920s and early 1930s in both Germany and the USA. It is used 
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most extensively as a monomer (VCM) in the manufacture of polyvinyl chloride 
(PVC). The existence of PVC was noted by the British industry in 1937 but they did 
not begin producing it themselves until the need for substitute materials arose during 
the Second World War. With full production starting in 1942 around 5,000 tons of 
PVC was being manufactured annually by 1945 with the vast majority used as cable 
insulation for wiring systems on ships and aircraft. In the post-war era new and 
varied uses were found for PVC and, alongside the growing demand for new housing 
and cheap consumer goods, production levels rose from 149 thousand tonnes per 
annum in 1963 to 400 thousand tonnes by 1973.134 Owen notes that PVC was a 
‘high-volume commodity chemical’ and that the only companies able to make money 
manufacturing PVC were ‘those who had the lowest costs, the best technology and a 
large share of the world market.’135 Thus, chemical process workers manufactured 
VCM and PVC within a relatively new and modern sector of the British chemical 
industry. As will be shown below these factors did not prevent many workers 
experiencing a variety of occupational diseases and, for some of them, the outcome 
would prove fatal.  
In 1953, with just over ten years or production already behind them, the 
plastics
now being added to the vinyl chloride in order to alter the properties of PVC.137 In 
nces 
 division of ICI published a research paper on the properties of PVC in which 
their scientists described VCM as a ‘mild narcotic.’ They issued a warning that if 
working conditions were to be ‘considered satisfactory’ concentrations of this gas 
‘were not to exceed 500 ppm’ (parts per million).136 The same threshold limit value 
(TLV) was established at the same point in time within the American plastics 
industry. A second article from the plastics division of ICI, published in 1959, 
discussed the toxic properties of the chemicals (such as lead and cadmium) that were 
concluding the 1959 review of the plastics industry Harris noted, ‘few substa
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have been subjected to such thorough investigations to ensure freedom from harm to 
those who make and use them.’138 This was a bold claim yet there is little evidence 
to show that at that stage extensive occupational health research had been undertaken 
in Britain to confirm the validity of this statement. Indeed, according to Russell the 
German industry did not use lead in the manufacture of their PVC, even during the 
war, because of their strict factory legislation on lead compounds. However, the 
British plastics industry continued to use lead in the late 1960s despite the 
availability of many alternatives.139 Moreover, according to Watterson et al the 
doubling of production levels of VCM and PVC between the 1960s and 1970s was 
not tracked in any way by activities that may have established if ‘adverse health 
effects’ were occurring amongst those who worked with VCM.140  
This lack of thorough occupational health research became evident when, just 
five years after the ICI ‘investigation’ had been conducted, it was revealed in 1964 
that a definite link had been established between exposure to VCM and a disease 
known
had actually been exposed to ‘very high concentrations’ 
                                                
 as acro-osteolysis.141 Acro-osteolysis was characterised by a deterioration of 
bone, particularly in the fingertips, with the fingers becoming slightly shortened and 
clubbed. The ‘discovery’ of this occupational disease was made in the American 
industry and according to Rosner and Markowitz, once the information had been 
passed to the heads of the US plastics industry they attempted to ‘forestall any 
disclosures.’142 Whether this deceit delayed investigations within the British industry 
it is not known, however, VCM related acro-osteolysis and Raynaud-like phenomena 
(coldness and numbness of the hands and feet) were not recognised as occupational 
hazards in Britain until 1966.143 Contrary to the assurances given by the ICI 
scientists in the late 1950s investigations into these industry-related diseases revealed 
that the chemical workforce 
 
138 Ibid, p.229 
139 C.A. Russell, (ed) Chemistry, Society and Environment, A New History of the British Chemical 
eport on a Health Survey of Ex- 
 Surrounding Exposures to Vinyl 
sis is derived from Greek. Akron means extremity, osteon means bone, and 
osner, Deceit and Denial: The Deadly Politics of Industrial Pollution, 
f/command_papers/Cm6645.pdf
Industry, Royal Society of Chemistry, (Cambridge 2000), p.250 
140 A. Watterson, S. Pickvance, M. Cairns and M.Wingfield, ‘R
Vinatex Workers in Derbyshire and Associated Health Issues
Chloride Monomer’, Chesterfield Trade Union Safety Team, Centre for Occupational and 
Environmental Health, De Montfort University, (Leicester 2000), p.2 
141 The word acro-osteoly
lysis means dissolution.  
142 G. Markowitz, and D. R
University of California Press, (California 2003), pp.173-178 
143 www.iiac.org.uk/pd , p.5 
 141
of VC
. However, research carried out amongst 162 former workers of the 
Vinatex
                                                
M.144 Indeed, the Chief Inspector of Factories noted in 1975 that acro-
osteolysis, Raynaud’s phenomenon, and scleroderma (a disease of the immune 
system that causes the skin and soft tissue to become stiff, tight and shiny) had all 
been found amongst polymerisation workers who had ‘regularly’ been exposed to 
concentrations of VCM ‘well over 1000ppm.’145 That is, many chemical workers had 
been ‘regularly’ exposed to more than twice the TLV recommended by the industry 
itself and this exposure had resulted in workers suffering from an occupational 
disease.  
Although acro-osteolysis had been identified in 1966 it was not until 1972 
that the TLV for vinyl chloride was revised downwards to 200ppm and, according to 
the Chief Inspector of Factories, ‘it was believed that this level, if properly observed, 
was adequate to control the fire, explosion and known health risks.’146 As no reasons 
had been given to show that this level would guarantee a safe working environment it 
appeared that ‘informed guesswork’ was once again being used as a means to protect 
the workforce. The shortcomings of this method would surface within two years 
when the vinyl chloride TLV was reduced yet again, this time to a quarter of its 
previous value at 50ppm. Three years after this level had been agreed the levels were 
reduced once more in 1977 to 10ppm. The reasons that explain these reductions will 
be further discussed below.  
According to Watterson et al, it was reported during the 1960s and 1970s that 
around 3 to 6 per cent of workers exposed to high VCM levels had contracted acro-
osteolysis
 VCM plant in Chesterfield, England, noted that 113 of those suffered from 
symptoms associated with Raynaud’s Phenomenon and that 41 workers, or 25 per 
cent, had symptoms of acro-osteolysis.147 Indeed, at an earlier juncture Vinatex 
themselves had settled the compensation claims of 35 workers who suffered from 
 
144 A.J. Fox, and P.F. Collier, ‘Mortality experience of workers exposed to vinyl chloride monomer in 
the manufacture of polyvinyl chloride in Great Britain’ pp.1-10 in British Journal of Industrial 
Medicine, (34) 1977, p.9 
) 
 6322) 
urrounding Exposures to Vinyl 
Occupational and 
145 Annual Report of H.M. Chief Inspector of Factories for the Year 1974, PP1975, (Cmnd. 6322
HMSO, London, p.50 
146 Annual Report of H.M. Chief Inspector of Factories for the Year 1974, PP1975, (Cmnd.
HMSO, London, p.49 
147 A. Watterson, S. Pickvance, M. Cairns and M.Wingfield, ‘Report on a Health Survey of Ex- 
Vinatex Workers in Derbyshire and Associated Health Issues S
Chloride Monomer’, Chesterfield Trade Union Safety Team, Centre for 
Environmental Health, De Montfort University, (Leicester 2000), p.6 
 142
acro-osteolysis. These Vinatex workers, like their counterparts in the USA, had all 
been instructed to enter pressure vessels (autoclaves) to clean the inner surfaces and 
in doing so had been exposed to heavy concentrations of VCM. The task itself 
involved workers lowering themselves into the pressure vessels that measured six 
feet in diameter and ten feet in height. Once inside the tank the only source of fresh 
air was a two-foot opening at the top.148 Having begun manufacture in 1969 the 
Vinatex plant in Chesterfield had around 40 of these autoclaves. Discussing the high 
level o
workers were instructed to do so (whilst being assured that all was safe) 
demonstrates that the owners and managers of the production process were either 
                 
f vapours in the tanks one former Vinatex worker, Geoffrey Larkin, noticed 
their intoxicating nature and commented that ‘you’d feel as though you’d just came 
out of the pub.’149 Another former worker, Colin Hadfield, recalled that in the early 
1970s he kept asking his employer  ‘Is there any danger?’ a question that always 
received the same reply, ‘there was none.’ Having worked for just over four years at 
the Vinatex plant Mr Hadfield contracted acro-osteolysis. This caused his fingers to 
whiten and numb, he became impotent, had pounding headaches, and was constantly 
tired.150  
Levels of VCM recorded at the Vinatex plant varied considerably with one 
report for 1970 showing a level of 200ppm whilst in 1974 a level of 3000ppm was 
reported. Indeed, the readings were so varied that one figure for 1973 showed VCM 
levels of 50,000ppm, a level 100 times higher than that which was considered to be 
safe.151 Therefore, although it had been acknowledged in the 1950s that vinyl 
chloride was a toxic substance and that it had ‘anaesthetic properties’ it remained the 
case that polymerisation workers were instructed ‘regularly’ to get inside autoclaves 
that contained excessively high concentrations of VCM.152 The fact that these 
totally incompetent or had a deep disregard for the health of their workers. 
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News of a more lethal health hazard surfaced in January 1974 when the Chief 
Inspector of Factories was informed that three American workers had died from 
angiosarcoma of the liver, a liver tumour caused by exposure to high levels of vinyl 
chloride monomer.153 All of the deceased workers had been involved in cleaning 
autocla as 19 
years. de of 
practic ppm 
(establi els 
be mon d that this information be 
ade available to the workforce.154 Following some research into the industry it was 
e former workers, David Foster, suffered from a liver 
ondition and knew of others who were seriously ill or had died. He stated: 
ves and the average period that the tumours had taken to develop w
In response, the Chief Inspector of Factories established an interim ‘co
e’ which lowered the TLV for VCM from its ‘safe’ level of 200
shed just two years earlier) to one of 50ppm. He also insisted that VCM lev
itored for each shift using computer technology an
m
found by 1975 that two British workers had died from angiosarcoma and that 32 
VCM workers worldwide had been diagnosed with this occupational cancer.155 The 
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) set up a register to collate cases of angiosarcoma 
and, through ICI initially, the British plastics industry established their own. 
Watterson et al have noted that although the industry register showed that 196 
workers had this liver cancer by 1999 the register was ‘incomplete.’156 For example, 
the industry register contained no case histories of the Vinatex plant that employed 
428 VCM workers. One of th
c
 
These people have got away with industrial murder…they’ve known 
about this bloody stuff for a long time. They fooled people into 
believing it was bloody harmless…anytime anybody had any 
suspicions or qualms, they were soon dispelled by 
management…people were afraid to speak out.’ 157 
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 Workers were afraid to speak out as they had to ensure continued employment and a 
regular income in order to provide some level of security for themselves or their 
families. Having witnessed her husband in this position the wife of a Vinatex worker 
recalled the final months of her husband’s life who was dying from angiosarcoma. 
‘He was in terrible pain those last eleven months, terrible…he couldn’t walk very far 
and his lung collapsed.’ The HSE register for angiosarcoma was brought to an end 
after 20 years despite the fact that the longest recorded latency period for 
angiosarcoma was 40 years.  
 
Conclusion 
Perhaps the most significant reason that explains the relatively low numbers 
volved in accidents in the chemical industry is that accidents were more likely to 
be ‘accidental’ escapes of toxic dusts, gases, and fumes and where the consequences 
were not always immediately apparent. Yes, exposure to a toxic substance could 
result in almost instant death but many workers would unknowingly go on to suffer 
from chronic occupational illnesses and a relatively slow demise in their health. 
Indeed, many of the substances that were in full production were not fully 
understood and the consequences of ‘accidental’ exposure would only surface 
decades later when workers suffered from bladder cancer, respiratory damage and 
other cancers. Prior to being diagnosed as suffering from an occupational disease 
many workers became unfit for heavy manual work and were discarded by the 
chemical industry, forced to find work elsewhere. In many cases no official link 
existed between the industry and those who suffered and this meant that the 
statistical data for health damage in the chemical sector became wholly unreliable. 
Even where a link between exposure and ill health was acknowledged such as with 
chrome ulceration the figures have been shown to be totally untrustworthy and for 
those suffering from more insidious diseases such as occupational cancers the 
statistical evidence is patchy, poor, and incomplete. The true levels of death and 
injury that resulted from exposure to the many known and unknown toxins that were 
manufactured in the industry will never be known and therefore the official accident 
in
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and injury data does not reflect the danger that existed for those who sold their labour 
power to the chemical industry between 1914 and 1974.  
 
Chapter Four 
The State, Factory Inspectors, and Medical Knowledge 
 
But what are five Medical Inspectors among 150,000 factories and 
130,000 workshops? They would need to be as old as Methuselah 
before they had once made the complete circuit.1 
 
Although a study commissioned by the firm, and carried out for them 
by respected academics, had found an excess of deaths over that to be 
expected, and this study had been published, the company had 
continued to exceed safe levels of the chemical carbon disulphide, and 
had reassured the workforce instead of telling them about the 
2hazard.    
3
ly relied were the state, the 
Factory
industry, state decisions were influenced to varying degrees by the economic, social, 
                                                
 
 
Where little or no protection was available from the obvious hazards that 
existed within the workplace some workers developed their own means of protection 
to help ensure that they could continue to earn a living, at least in the short term. The 
limited knowledge they possessed about the effects chemical substances could have 
on the body heightened the risk factor and in most cases the methods workers 
devised were of a simple design and generally made from poor quality materials such 
as wrapping cheap muslin cloth over the mouth to prevent the inhalation of dusts or 
gases.  To a greater extent the workers were reliant on the efforts made by others to 
a) identify and investigate potential hazards, b) draw up sets of rules and regulations 
to ameliorate or remove dangers, and c) to widen the understanding of the risks and 
enforce legislative measures. Those with the responsibility for ensuring that these 
tasks were carried out and on whom the workers large
 Inspectors, and those with medical knowledge. 
The primary role played by the state was to pass and amend the legislation 
pertaining to industry. However, as Bowden and Tweedale have noted of the cotton 
 
1 MSS.292C/140/4 (Medical Inspections, Reports and Articles of Sir Thomas Legge) TUC General 
Council, ‘Prevention as a Benefit under the National Health Insurance Act’ 24/06/1930 
2 S. Watkins, Medicine and Labour, The Politics of a Profession, Lawrence and Wishart, (London 
1987), pp.118-119  
3 See Chapter Two, p.64  
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and political considerations relevant at the time.4 Whilst considering appropriate 
areas for factory legislation account was taken of suggestions made by those with 
enough power to influence the decision makers. This would include, with varying 
degrees of success, the legal profession, social reformers, workers and their 
representatives, as well as employers and their representatives. The second agency of 
the three was the government appointed Factory Inspectors. In addition to their 
advisory role the inspectorate visited places of work to ensure that both employers 
and employees were meeting the conditions laid down in the legislation. Whilst the 
inspectorate had the power to prosecute employers for failing to comply with factory 
legislation historically, as Jones has argued, they tended to adopt a more educative 
stance.5 The third group that influenced and shaped occupational health policies were 
those who had medical knowledge. This could include doctors working at a local 
level or more generally by occupational health specialists employed by the 
government, the Trades Union Congress (TUC), or by industrialists. Each of these 
three agencies will be examined in turn to see what impact they made on the working 
conditions that existed within the British chemical industry and to then draw these 
together to analyse their importance in shaping the way that working conditions were 
scrutinised.  
 
The State 
 In 1915 the government showed no hesitation in becoming directly involved 
in the British chemical industry. It did so by taking responsibility for the 
development and supply of synthetic dyes and explosives as well as bringing help to 
the pharmaceutical and fertiliser sectors of the industry. In the aftermath of war the 
government also sent a secret mission to Germany to establish what methods the 
German manufacturers had used to produce explosives and poison gas. Of 
importance to the government was the fact that the German industry had been able to 
quickly convert their dyestuffs and pharmaceutical industries for war production. 
According to the British mission this ‘illustrated the great military value of a well-
                                                 
4 Bowden, S. and Tweedale, G. ‘Mondays Without Dread: The Trade Union Response to Byssinosis 
in the Lancashire Cotton Industry in the Twentieth Century’ pp.79-95 in Social History of Medicine, 
Volume 16, No.1, 2003, pp.85-86 
5 H. Jones, ‘An Inspector Calls: Health and Safety at Work in Inter-War Britain,’ pp.223-239 in P. 
Weindling (ed) The Social History of Occupational Health, Croom Helm, (Kent 1985), p.224 
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organised dye and fine chemical industry.’6 This report influenced the government’s 
post-war policy on the chemical industry as was evidenced by their decision taken in 
1919 to bring together two of Britain’s dyestuffs manufacturers to form the British 
Dyestuffs Corporation and by their investment of £1.5 million in this firm.7 The 
government then proceeded to protect the dyestuffs sector by introducing the 
Dyestuffs (Import Regulation) Act of 1920. This Act prohibited the import of dyes 
and pigments if they could be obtained from the British industry and was initially 
meant to last for ten years but actually remained in place until 1960.8 By helping to 
consolidate, modernise, and protect the dyestuffs sector of the chemical industry the 
government had shown just how important it thought it was to the nation.  
By contrast, protecting the workforce from the effects of chemicals provoked 
a less robust response from the government. Offering some limited protection to 
those working in the alkali, acid, and chromate sections of the industry the 
government introduced the first set of Special Rules and Regulations in 1893.9 For 
the next thirty years these rules and regulations remained largely unaltered despite 
the many changes that occurred in the range of chemicals being produced.10 Indeed, 
the 1893 rules and regulations had been framed mainly to address problems 
associated with the LeBlanc system of manufacture yet by 1914 this process was 
being replaced by the Solvay system leaving many of the rules out of date. 
Moreover, even where no change in the process or product had taken place the 
government were slow to respond to longstanding evidence of occupational disease 
in the industry. For example, in 1893 the government were informed that chrome 
ulcerations were caused by exposure to the chromate manufacturing process. They 
were reminded of this fact in the reports made by their appointed Factory Inspectors 
                                                 
6Report of the British Mission Appointed to Visit Enemy Chemical Factories in the Occupied Zone 
Engaged in the Production of Munitions of War in February 1919, PP 1921, (Cmd. 1137), p.6  
7 The two firms involved were Read, Holliday and Sons and Levensteins Limited. Following a rather 
short period as BDC they were merged into ICI in 1926 to form the Dyestuffs Division of that firm. 
8 M.R. Fox, Dye-Makers of Great Britain, A History of Chemists, Companies, Products and Changes, 
1856-1976, Imperial Chemical Industries PLC, (Manchester 1987), p.178 
9 Report on the Conditions of Labour in Chemical Works, The Dangers to Life and Health of the 
Workpeople Employed Therein and the Proposed Remedies, Chemical Works Committee of Inquiry, 
PP 1893, (C.7235) 
10 In 1908 some rules were made for the provision of welfare for those working with nitro or amino 
derivatives of benzene (dyestuff intermediates) and in 1913 for those working with chromates and 
bichromate of potassium or sodium (mordants). New products being manufactured included: organic 
solvents, various industrial gases, organic chemicals, and synthetics for which no provision had been 
made.  
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for the next 27 years before chrome ulceration finally became a notifiable industrial 
disease in 1920.11 Similarly, recognised for its deadly and chronic effects from the 
early 1890s carbon bisulphide poisoning was not recognised as a notifiable disease 
until 1924.12 A similar and sluggish government response is found in relation to 
other chemical substances through to the 1970s. Indeed, this type of response was not 
exclusive to the chemical industry with Weindling noting that it was a ‘recurrent 
feature of the history of occupational health.’13  
In 1921, the government reviewed the existing rules and regulations for the 
industry in order to take account of the developments that had taken place in the 
intervening years. Demonstrating just how limited the old rules and regulation had 
been once the Chemical Works Regulations (S.R.& O. 1922/731) were introduced 
some manufacturers were reported to have been puzzled interpreting those that 
attempted to address the liability of gas or fumes to escape.14 Taking preventative 
measures was obviously an unknown consideration for many. However, other rules 
were much easier to understand such as Regulation 4 that prohibited the use of naked 
lights where flammable gases, fumes or dusts were used. This was designed 
primarily to protect the process but by doing so it also offered some protection to the 
process worker. Regulation 7 laid down stricter procedures for ensuring that those 
entering boilers, tanks, chambers etc. were safe to do so. This may have been a well-
intended improvement to the rules but crucially no rule was created that called for a 
specific atmospheric test to be conducted prior to the men entering such vessels. 
Another fifteen years would elapse before this particular oversight was corrected 
under Section 27 of the Factories Act (1937). Indeed, although the Chemical Works 
Regulations of 1922 were more complex and did, to some extent, update the rules 
and regulations of 1893 they failed to take full account of the number of 
developments that had taken place in both the processes and type of chemicals being 
worked across the industry. For example, they offered no protection whatsoever 
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against the new synthetic solvents that were being produced.15  Moreover, unlike 
other industries that had relatively constant products or methods of manufacture, the 
chemical industry was in a constant state of evolution with new chemical substances 
being regularly developed and manufactured. Government legislators inevitably 
worked in the wake of this chemical development and their safety rules and 
regulations, if formulated at all, arrived too late for those who had been left 
vulnerable. For example, an untold number of dyestuffs workers suffered and died 
from bladder tumours even although this risk had been brought to the attention of the 
government in 1912, was known about by manufacturers from the 1920s, and 
reported by the factory inspectorate from the 1930s.16 However, due to ‘difficulties’ 
in determining an exact definition of the precise cause of the disease the legislation 
designed to prevent this deadly hazard was not rolled out until 1967 and even then 
papilloma of the bladder was not made a notifiable disease. 
Delayed since 1922, most of the measures within the Factory Act of 1937 
were applicable to factories in general. Jones has argued that this Act ‘embraced 
many more workers than previously and raised standards of safety, health and 
welfare.’17 For example, the 1937 Act brought in the 48-hour working week to all 
factories as well as restricting overtime hours to 6 per week. Facilities to be provided 
in all factories now included those for first aid, washing, cloakroom, and seating. 
Food was no longer to be consumed where the dust or fume of lead, arsenic or any 
other poisonous substance was present and where these substances were worked 
suitable rooms were to be provided for meals. Following a series of explosions in the 
chemical industry during the 1930s more stringent rules were introduced to deal with 
the threat of dust explosion.18 Again, protecting the process could lead to improved 
protection for the workers and in many cases it was this motivational factor that was 
in play. Indeed, even by the mid 1960s the Chief Inspector of Factories on Industrial 
Health could state that: 
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The total amount of any kind of dust needed to cause serious ill-health 
is not great and the dust itself is of little economic value; thus it 
confers no great commercial advantage to control it. In a pottery or a 
lead works, the amount of raw material needed to kill everyone would 
not show on the balance sheet, so that the demands for process 
cleanliness hardly ever approach the standards needed for biological 
control – except in those cases where some secondary factor such as 
damage to plant can be taken into account.19 
 
Further evidence of steps being taken primarily to protect the product or plant rather 
than the worker were found at Dunlop. Having examined the ‘showpiece’ conditions 
of work that existed in the 1940s at a Dunlop rubber factory a judge, ruling on a case 
of employer negligence, stated that, ‘Dunlop had applied their minds to the 
(carcinogenic) dust problem, not because they thought that it might be injurious to 
the work-people but because they knew that it would be injurious to the products 
manufactured.’20 With the protection of plant in mind, the 1937 Factory Act saw 
safety rules for factories being strengthened so as to deal more effectively with fire, 
including new rules that covered the provision of fire alarms. Some consideration 
was given directly to the workers safety when measures were also introduced that 
called for better means of escape for workers in the event of fire. An ongoing project 
since 1893, the rules for the guarding and fencing of fixed vessels containing 
dangerous liquids or chemical materials were also improved. Medical inspections 
were to be provided for all those engaged on dangerous processes and records kept of 
the results. McIvor has argued that this measure ‘significantly extended the 1901 Act 
and the role of preventative medicine in industry.’21 Whilst this was true it was also 
the case that this and other measures within the Factory Acts had only incrementally 
improved the conditions of work and that these continued to offer only limited levels 
of protection to chemical workers. Indeed, the rules and regulations that had been 
                                                 
19 Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories on Industrial Health for the Year 1966, PP 1967 
(Cmnd. 3359) HMSO, London, p.74 
20 Wright v. Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd. And Another, Cassidy v. Same, April 20, 1971, QB, pp.311-332 in 
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History, (31) 1987, p.177 
 151
drawn up in 1922 for the chemical industry remained in place in 1937, and beyond.  
The lack of safety and welfare provision would be highlighted during the Second 
World War when, just as had occurred in the First World War, it became apparent 
that in order to sustain or increase productivity more care had to be delivered to the 
workforce. Consequently, medical and welfare services were introduced for all 
personnel who were engaged within state owned factories that repaired or 
manufactured munitions of war.22     
In 1945, the Chemical Workers’ Union argued that due to the vast numbers of 
new products that had entered the industry the Chemical Works Regulations of 1922 
were ‘entirely out of date’ and ‘redundant.’23 The resolution also noted that ‘the 
danger is emphasised when it is realised that twenty years ago the number of solvents 
known and made in Great Britain was less than twenty, but in 1935 there were over 
300.’24 The Association of Scientific Workers agreed and further noted that, ‘certain 
materials have come into widespread use in the plastics industry which involves the 
manufacture of 15 or 16 different classes of compounds.’25 Despite bringing this to 
the government’s attention the Chemical Works Regulations were not reviewed at 
this stage with chemical workers having to rely on the piecemeal legislative 
improvements contained in the general clauses of the Factory Acts. One consequence 
of such a policy has been identified by Harremoës et al who have argued that the 
legislative handling of asbestos led to a situation whereby, ‘with each successive 
incremental improvement in conditions, the persistent risks associated with the new 
conditions would then in turn take further decades to become evident.’26 As has been 
demonstrated in Chapter Three this interpretation fits with the manner in which the 
problems associated with the chromate and dyestuffs sectors were dealt with.  
In the immediate post-war period the Labour government commissioned 
several reports to address occupational health and safety issues. One of these 
attempted to review the policies used for scheduling occupational diseases, 
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something that had been ongoing since 1906. Thus, in 1948, the Departmental 
Committee on Industrial Diseases decided that rather than amend the former tests 
used to decide the eligibility of an industrial disease they would ‘start afresh’ and 
examine independently what criteria was appropriate in prescribing diseases under 
the National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act of 1946.27 The National Insurance 
(Industrial Injuries) Act of 1946 came into effect in 1948 replacing the Workmen’s 
Compensation Act on 1897. Under the old law a worker had to claim against the 
employer and prove how much the injury had caused loss to their earning capacity. 
Under the Act of 1946 the claim was made against the Department of Health and 
Social Security with the amount of benefit awarded based on an independent medical 
assessment. In 1974, twenty-five years after the Act had been introduced, one trade 
union commented that ‘in practice it [the Act of 1946] has proved to be a substantial 
improvement over the Workmen’s Compensation Scheme which preceded it, and 
large numbers of working people have benefited from its provisions.’28 Such 
comments tend to strengthen Jones argument that the original Workmen’s 
Compensation Act and similar measures were designed to fend off trade union and 
labour unrest.29 Certainly, the Act of 1946 had the effect of dangling the carrot of a 
successful compensation claim a little lower. In the immediate post-war era amidst 
‘an upsurge of popular radicalism’ this measure may have helped to defuse any 
potential worker unrest over the fact that working for a living could lead to death or 
injury.30  
The Factory Act of 1948 contained more general updates and provisions to 
industry as a whole although some were specific to chemical works. As mentioned 
above, the rules and regulations were strengthened where dangerous fumes were 
liable to be present in tanks, vessels, etc. This was an attempt to reduce the number 
of workers being killed trying to save colleagues that had collapsed when cleaning 
out residues in tanks and where fumes had built up. Factory Inspectors were also now 
able to take away samples of any substances that they suspected might cause injury 
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to workers and to have them analysed. Yet again, the rules covering the risks of 
explosion and fire were tightened and although such regulations were designed to 
protect the plant they also had a beneficial effect on the health and safety standards 
for those employed in chemical plants. Nichols notes that whilst the prioritisation of 
profit over health would normally prevail within the capitalist system this does not 
negate the possibility that under certain circumstances improving the health and 
safety of the workers could coincide with an increase in profits. For example: 
 
Where there is threat of major explosions or of other major disruption 
to production, as well as life and limb, this is clear enough. Where 
injury is so frequent that production is severely interrupted the linkage 
is again clear enough. Where injuries threaten to become an effective 
organising issue there may also be an incentive for employers to 
improve health and safety…or…if they are effectively threatened with 
state regulation.31    
 
Without doubt, the various pieces of legislation that had been enacted over 
many years had culminated in a bewildering mass of sections, sub-sections, and 
amendments. Some occupational diseases were prescribed, some were notifiable, and 
some were dealt with by statutory regulation (requiring employers to take 
precautionary measures). Some factory legislation was undermined by legal 
decisions and years could pass before it was reframed to take account of such 
decisions.32 Against this backdrop, the chemical industry continued to increase the 
number of processes it used and types of chemicals produced. In 1965 the TUC 
stated that they had ‘repeatedly expressed concern’ that there was insufficient 
safeguards in place to protect workers from exposure to dangerous chemicals.33 
Obviously demonstrating a certain level of mistrust the TUC also called for 
government-sponsored research ‘independent of private industry’ to identify 
hazardous substances and they demanded statutory safeguards, including 
notifications under the Factories Act, for any substances that were found to pose 
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health risks.34 These demands helped elicit from the government some draft 
legislation on the use of toxic substances used in the manufacture of dyestuffs. 
Legislation was consequently passed entitled the Carcinogenic Substances 
Regulations (1967). This legislation prohibited the manufacture, use, and importation 
of β-naphthylamine, benzidine, and other closely related compounds. At this point in 
time the evidence that had linked bladder cancer with these substances had been 
discussed at state level for 40 years.35 Also in 1967 the TUC demanded that the 
Minister of Labour introduce compulsory notification to the factory inspectorate 
when new chemical processes were introduced. This was refused by the Minister 
who stated that, ‘because of the close watch kept on developments…and because of 
the co-operative attitude of industry it had generally been found that possible hazards 
had been less than expected.’36 This response may have arisen out of the ‘close 
relationship’ that had been forged between the industry and government whereby, as 
Grant et al have noted, there was a ‘predisposition to accept that the industry could 
be trusted.’37 However, given the chemical industries attitude to bladder cancer this 
was a remarkable response. It also appeared to be ignoring the fact that just three 
years earlier the first victims suffering with acro-osteolysis had been reported despite 
the workers having been given assurances by the VCM industry in the mid 1950s 
that exposure to the process posed little threat to health. Indeed, although the industry 
made some effort to identify occupational health hazards a much more resolute effort 
had been made on the commercial side and by the early 1970s around 3,000 new 
chemicals were being introduced each year within the organic, inorganic and plastics 
branches of the chemical industry.38 Whilst these levels of innovation reflected the 
scientific and economic dynamism associated with the industry they also 
demonstrated the magnitude of the problem that faced those who suspected that some 
of these ‘new’ substances posed a problem for the health of chemical process 
workers. 
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In the early 1970s it was claimed that the legislation that existed to deal with 
industrial hazards was ‘somewhat disorganised’ and was really a ‘reflection of the 
history of industrialisation, rather than a rational attempt to protect the worker from 
the risks of his (sic) occupation.’39 In an attempt to scrutinise the existing legislation 
and propose a more modern and efficient way to deal with the protection of the 
worker the government established a Committee (under the leadership of Lord 
Robens) to investigate. Taking evidence from a variety of sources the Committee’s 
recommendations were subsequently published in 1972 entitled ‘Safety and Health at 
Work’ although were more frequently referred to as the Robens Report. The report 
argued that health hazards connected with new chemical processes were to be 
identified before plant construction began and that any medical and safety advice 
was to be ‘fed in at the design stage.’40 This idea had surfaced some time before but 
it was an important idea, especially in a continuously evolving industry such as 
chemicals. Here was a process that would help identify the hazards so that they could 
be avoided rather than taking retrospective steps to control them. Discussing the 
Robens Report the government noted that one of the main recommendations 
involved ‘moving away from the statutory approach towards effective self regulation 
by employers and work-people jointly, with much greater emphasis on agreed 
voluntary standards and codes of practice.’41 Gill et al noted that the Report actually 
identified the difficulties in legislating for an industry that experienced large amounts 
of technological change but went on to criticise the Report for embracing the idea 
that an ‘identity of interest’ existed between the employer and the employee in 
relation to safety and health problems. According to Gill et al this ‘identity of 
interest’ was a myth as ‘health and safety considerations were too often sacrificed to 
the demands of production and costs.’42 The evidence presented in Chapters Two 
and Three of this thesis largely confirms this view.   
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The subsequent legislation that emerged from the findings of the Robens 
Report was the Health and Safety at Work Act (1974). This placed a duty on 
employers to consult safety representatives and to allow safety committees to be 
established. Working within an environment of ‘shared responsibility’ the provisions 
of the Act did not deal with particular hazards but dealt with all problems of health, 
safety, and welfare at work. One former ICI worker recalled the period when the 
Health and Safety at Work Act was introduced at his plant thus: 
 
We started getting meetings about health and safety and some of the 
ICI propaganda was that a lot of the Robens recommendations had 
been taken from ICI procedures. Now, we didnae have procedures 
(laughs) so how could they have done that? So when they were saying 
this I just laughed and said ‘look, this is bullshit’. How can the 
executive (Health and Safety Executive) take recommendations off 
our procedures when we didnae have procedures at that time? Slogans 
was whit they had…after 1974 ‘SAFETY RANKS EQUAL WITH 
OUR PRODUCTION’ now that was a joke, that was an absolute joke. 
We certainly never had evidence of that.43 
 
This cynical view was echoed in a series of interviews conducted amongst chemical 
workers by Nichols and Armstrong wherein it was noted that, ‘when you’re over 
there in the office it’s ‘Safety before Production’ but when you’re down here it’s 
‘Production before Safety.’44 
Despite many years of campaigning by trade unions and occupational health 
specialists the state did not establish an occupational health service when they 
created the National Health Service (NHS) in 1946. Johnston and McIvor have 
argued that this had the effect of ‘marginalising’ occupational health issues.45 
Certainly, it was noted by the TUC in 1953 that only 2 per cent of factories had 
‘definite arrangements for medical services other than statutory examinations of 
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young persons and that only 1 per cent provided a service amounting to a general 
medical supervision.’46 However, trade unions and others, such as the British 
Medical Association (BMA), continued to argue that the division of functions 
between the various Ministries responsible for occupational health was ‘most 
unsatisfactory’ and that a single Department should be created.47 Whilst the TUC 
argued that the most appropriate body to operate an occupational health service was 
the Ministry of Labour the BMA argued that the Ministry of Health was more 
appropriate.48 The TUC continued to press for this provision and in 1968 again 
gained support from their annual conference to fight for the establishment of an 
occupational health service despite the persistent presence of the ‘the clammy hand 
of the Treasury.’49 By the early 1970s copious amounts of evidence were presented 
to the Robens Committee on issues of occupational health and safety and claims 
were made for a more specialist occupational health provision to be provided. 
Nonetheless, although decades of campaigning had taken place a specific 
occupational health service was not created by statute in 1974. It was argued that ‘no 
country could afford ‘double banking in medicine with a workplace health service 
superimposed upon a home and family health service’ but emphasised the 
importance of these two to form close operational linkages.50 Nichols and Armstrong 
have argued the Robens Report and its recommendations ‘was largely written by 
administrators’ who failed to fully understand that ‘since safety is a question of 
putting people before production, the people who do the producing must have the 
power to ensure that their safety is put first.51 The failure of the state to establish an 
occupational health service meant that many workers continued to be denied proper 
occupational health provision. Pickvance has noted for example that much of the 
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provision was ‘employer led’ and concentrated its efforts on ‘pre-employment 
screening and fitness for work’ rather than ‘planned prevention.’52   
 
The Factory Inspectorate 
Established in 1833 with just four inspectors to cover the whole of Britain the 
Factory Inspectorate grew in number so that by 1914 it had increased to 206. Despite 
this increase in recruitment the inspectorate remained understaffed with a 
responsibility to inspect around 60,000 factories and somewhere between 100,000 to 
200,000 workshops. In 1911, Arthur Henderson commented upon this deficiency in 
Parliament stating that visits by the Factory Inspector ‘were like those of angels, 
occurrences which happen very seldom.’53 Indeed, analysing the effectiveness of this 
branch of the Home Office Bartrip and Fenn assert that up to 1914 low levels of 
staffing had prevailed, that the lack of staff had impacted badly on their ability to 
inspect and report and, having only minimal fine levels at their disposal, the 
inspectors had been unable to penalise law-breaking employers effectively.54 
Wrigley has also shown that with a ratio of inspectorate to workplace of 1:1332 even 
the most basic standards of industrial welfare were unable to be enforced.55 McIvor 
has also argued that the limited industrial legislation that had been enacted up to 
1914 was ‘uneven, full of loopholes, and difficult to police and enforce.’56 Shortages 
of staff inevitably left gaps in inspection and this was exacerbated by an increase in 
production during the war. Members of the TUC continued to raise concerns on this 
issue both during and after the war but with only marginal effect.57 Indeed, even by 
1947 the Association of Scientific Workers could still argue that there were 
insufficient numbers inspecting workplaces and that of those employed there was a 
shortage of specialist skills.58 Some increases were made in the numbers of 
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inspectors employed and by 1971 there were just over one thousand inspectors 
operating across Britain. Nonetheless, these inspectors were now responsible for over 
one million establishments. Working with this ratio of inspector to place of work the 
average rate of inspection was once every four years rather than annually as 
recommended by the International Labour Organisation.59 Under such circumstances 
the Robens Committee recommended, not that there should be a massive recruitment 
of inspectorate, but that ‘the resources of the inspectorate must be used selectively.’60   
As noted above the low levels of inspection failed to impress trade unions and 
their view of the inspectorate was further diminished by the fact that on most 
occasions the inspectors gave notice to the employer of an impending visit. This 
practice was heavily criticised by trade unionists and in 1929 the TUC argued 
vociferously that the Factory Inspectorate should ‘not make arrangements with 
employers prior to visits.’61 The most obvious reason for objecting to this practice 
was that experience had shown that where notice was given the employers took 
temporary remedial action so as to give the impression that they were complying 
with factory legislation. As far as the trade unions were concerned giving notice to 
the employer meant that the inspectorate were siding with the employers. Despite 
repeated calls by the unions for the inspectorate to halt this practice the evidence 
shows that it did sometimes occur. One former ICI worker recalled that even in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s he was frustrated at not being able to identify safety 
hazards because the inspectorate would notify the employer of their intended visit to 
the plant. The immediate consequence of giving advance notice of a visit was that,  
‘[ICI] always cleaned the place up and certain bits o’ the process were shut doon’ so 
that ‘a’ their flaws could be hidden.’62 This former chemical worker assessed that 
both economic and political considerations were active agents in shaping the 
behaviour and decisions of the inspectorate. Thus: 
 
They [ICI] were always warned. Why did they [Factory Inspectors] no 
just arrive? It was the same when the insurance assessors came ‘roun 
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it was always bullshitted up for them but they should just arrive wi’ 
nae notification. Why warn them? Again it’s going back tae politics 
isn’t it? If the Factory Inspector went in there and seen the way that 
plant was run they would have shut it doon. We couldnae do the 
process if everything had tae be done safely it would be 
impossible…there’s the jobs gone. ‘Oh a health and safety man has 
shut ye doon, a Factory Inspector, it’s the government, no us. That’s 
no suitin’ anybody is it?63  
 
In addition, the understaffed inspectorate adopted a ‘deliberate policy preference for 
persuasion rather than prosecution,’ a policy that did not always generate positive 
responses from employers who, under the logic of capitalism, sought to profit 
maximise by keeping production costs down.64 Nonetheless, it has been suggested 
that the reason why this particular policy was preferred by the inspectorate was 
because there were insufficient inspectors to deal with the heavy workload and also 
that the legal regulations were ‘rather unclear.’65 Both the understaffing levels and 
the ‘softly-softly’ approach of the inspectorate have been examined and criticised by 
Tweedale and Johnston and McIvor who have all argued persuasively that these 
factors offered inadequate protection to those who toiled in the asbestos industry.66  
It will be argued here that a similar situation existed for those within the chemical 
industry.  
As noted above the Factory Inspectorate had helped to update the rules and 
regulations for the chemical industry in 1922 and thereafter found themselves having 
to explain to employers the meanings behind some of the new rules. By 1929, the 
Association of British Chemical Manufacturers (ABCM) had established their own 
means to educate employers when the first edition of their ‘Model Rules’ were 
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published for ABCM members.67 Notwithstanding this effort, John C. Bridge, Chief 
Medical Inspector of Factories, could still write in 1932 of the ‘anxiety’ that existed 
amongst those being exposed to the new complex chemical substances that had been 
brought into use stating that ‘new industries have brought their problems.’68 Of 
course, the chemical industry was not strictly a new industry but during and after the 
First World War it had been transformed and thereafter would continuously renew 
itself in terms of the process technology it used and in the substances that it 
produced. The Chief Inspector of Factories noted the changes that had been taking 
place across the industry and wrote in 1933 that:  
 
It is inevitable that particular attention must be directed to new forms 
of poisoning occasioned by the use of chemicals, many of them 
complex in character, the effects of which on the human subject little 
is known.69 
 
The comment above demonstrates that the chemical industry had not only devised 
and manufactured a variety of toxic substances but that they had been able to do so 
without anyone monitoring what the full effects these might have on the human 
body. The Inspectorate appeared to be powerless in this regard but in 1933 they did 
recommend that each new organic compound should be ‘physiologically tested 
before it was placed on the market for general use.’70  With little government support 
being offered to undertake the testing the Chief Inspector had to rely on ICI, the 
principal manufacturer of many of the these substances, to conduct the tests. The 
Inspectorate stated that they found this level of safeguard to be ‘satisfactory.’71 At 
this juncture the Inspectorate may have simply believed that some form of testing 
was better than none and that ICI would withdraw any suspect substance found. 
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However, as has been shown in Chapter Two, ICI’s delayed withdrawal of Nonox S 
would show that a self-regulating system could be less than satisfactory.72  
 Following the introduction of the Factory Act of 1937 the CIF noted that 
there was a ‘general willingness’ amongst the employers to make sure that the new 
legislation was complied with.73 By contrast, a more pessimistic view was expressed 
about the willingness of the employees to comply with the improved provisions for 
eye protection because ‘workers for one reason or another will not wear goggles.’74 
The implication behind these statements was that the employers were doing all that 
they could to make sure the workers were safe from harm but that it was the workers’ 
own fault that eye injuries were occurring. However, oral testimony covering the 
period from that late 1930s to the early 1970s reveals some reasons why this may not 
have been as straightforward as was being implied. One woman who worked in dusty 
conditions in a chemical plant during World War Two recalled that whilst she had 
been given an overall and cap neither goggles nor a mask were issued for her 
protection.75 Another witness recalled that her husband had been exposed to high 
levels of soda ash dust throughout the 1960s and that ‘they were given gloves and 
goggles and things but it didn’t always work.’76 Where the potential danger was most 
obvious there appeared to be more compliance with the wearing of goggles and other 
protective wear. Asked about accidents at his chemical plant in the 1960s one former 
ICI manager recalled ‘not with acid, people knew to wear gloves and goggles.’77 The 
British Occupational Hygiene Society noted the same effect within the atomic energy 
industry in the mid 1950s whereby ‘employees were well aware of the danger of 
their working conditions and cooperated fully in the precautions advised.’78 
Similarly, the Nuffield Department of Industrial Health wrote in 1973 that, ‘in the 
chemical industry it so frequently happens that the more dangerous a substance is to 
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handle, the safer it is in fact handled.’79 However, where workers were ignorant of 
potential dangers the heat of the plant, the design of the protective wear, and the 
pressure of work, could all lead to workers refusing to wear safety equipment. Peter 
Dodds was responsible for the safety of his shift at an ICI plant but recalled that 
many men didn’t always wear the equipment ‘because it was uncomfortable, it made 
their hands sweaty, the face visors would get condensation in them and a’ the rest, 
they didnae want it, they just didnae want to wear it because it was cumbersome.’80 
Therefore, a combination of the employers’ failure to provide protective wear, the 
poor design and manufacture of some equipment, and a lack of awareness of the 
dangers provide some reasons to explain why workers may not have always worn 
safety equipment.   
It has been argued that the attitude shown by the Factory Inspectorate towards 
the manufacturer was not always forthright enough and that the advice they proffered 
was more often than not, ‘quietly tendered.’81 One example that shows how 
ineffectual this policy was can be seen in the way that dust in the chromate- 
manufacturing sector was dealt with. In 1960 it was reported by the CIF that there 
had been a ‘marked increase’ in the number of cases of chrome ulceration within one 
of the chromate-manufacturing plants.82 On investigation, the CIF noted that this 
increase was attributable to a programme of work that had involved the demolition of 
buildings. It was explained that the demolition had ‘disturbed old standing deposits 
of waste material, particularly in roof structures’…and was made worse when ‘the 
most heavily contaminated parts of the factory were demolished.’83 This would 
strongly indicate that chrome dust levels, described by Legge from 1900 as a ‘source 
par excellence for chrome holes,’ had not been dealt with as ‘efficiently’ as the 
inspectorate had for decades been suggesting they had been nor as the rules and 
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regulations had demanded.84 Bartrip has argued that employers accepted the 
introduction of special rules ‘without demur’ but self evidently they would have done 
so when there was so little pressure to fully implement them.85 Indeed, it is possible 
to argue that the only reason the increased incidence had been reported was that the 
victims (sub-contracted demolition men) were new to this sort of workplace and 
therefore not inured to the conditions. Despite legislation having been in place since 
1893 to deal with dust levels chromate manufacturers had come to accept chrome 
ulceration and loss of the nasal septum as part and parcel of the job. For example, 
Richard Fitzpatrick, a chromate worker at Whites between 1939 and 1945 provided 
oral testimony that he, his brother, and his father had all lost their nasal septum and 
that chrome holes ‘were pretty common.’86 This former worker also testified that in 
the crystal house ‘there was always dust flying about’ whilst the furnace area had 
‘nae windows’ and ‘nae ventilation system’ and was ‘always dusty and stoorie.’87 
Richard Fitzpatrick’s memories of the ‘stoorie’ atmosphere are confirmed by the 
results of an environmental study of the chromate industry conducted by the Medical 
Research Council in 1951. Therein, it was noted that ‘perforation of the nasal septum 
appeared to be common’ with the concentration of chromium in the dust laden 
atmosphere being 327 to 550 times higher (3.27 mg./cu.m. and 5.5 m.g./cu.m) than 
the maximum allowable concentration (0.1 mg./cu.m.).88 It should be emphasised 
that this scientific evidence was produced nearly twenty years after the Factory 
Inspectorate had claimed that levels of chrome ulceration had been reduced. Given 
the fact that only three chromate-manufacturing plants were in operation throughout 
the period in question, that specific rules had been put in place from 1893 that 
identified dust as the cause of the disease, this should have been one of the easier 
areas of the chemical industry for the Factory Inspectorate to police. Yet, the 
evidence indicates that the level of inspection at this plant must have been cursory at 
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best and non-existent at worst. Certainly in his seven years of working in chromate 
manufacturing Mr Fitzpatrick was never aware of having met or seen a Factory 
Inspector.89 The evidence of persistent chrome ulceration and loss of septum in this 
industry points to the fact that the Factory Inspector’s repeated encouragement to the 
manufacturers to improve ventilation and extraction systems was not a successful 
strategy. 
Explosions had been associated with industry for many years but it was not 
until 1944 that a Senior Chemical Inspector was appointed to the Engineering Branch 
of the Factory Inspectorate to address this problem more specifically. In 1958 a 
separate Chemical Branch of the Inspectorate was created that had twenty-six 
Chemical Inspectors and eight Senior Scientific Assistants whose roles were to 
advise on the risks associated with fire and explosion and to investigate and measure 
contaminants that were likely to be toxic or injurious in the working environment.90 
It should be emphasised that despite their title these inspectors advised on health and 
safety issues in various types of factories and were not specifically appointed to 
oversee chemical works. Despite the introduction of safety legislation designed to 
protect chemical plant and the fact that a specific Inspectorate existed to advise on 
this issue the Chief Inspector of Factories noted in 1968 that there had been sixteen 
‘serious explosions’ in chemical plants over the previous five years.91 This poor 
safety record should have perhaps alerted the industry and the inspectorate once 
again to this particular threat and highlighted the need for the risk of explosion to be 
considered at the design, building, planning, and approval stages. Six years later, on 
the first day of June 1974, an explosion occurred at a chemical plant near 
Flixborough. The blast instantly killed 28 people, seriously injured 36 and caused 
minor injuries to hundreds of others. Nearly two thousand homes and shops were 
damaged in the surrounding area.92 Within two hours of this explosion the local 
Factory Inspectors had arrived at the scene and later that evening inspectorate staff 
from London Headquarters hurried to the site. The following day the management of 
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the firm were interviewed and eye witness accounts were recorded. By the 27th June 
the Secretary of State for Employment had ordered a formal investigation into this 
‘accident’ and as was noted by the Chief Inspector of Factories ‘where necessary 
inspectors and others worked round the clock for seven days a week.’93 The Chief 
Inspector of Factories noted in his report of 1975 that ‘the Flixborough explosion 
was a catastrophe to all who suffered from it directly or indirectly’ before adding, 
quite remarkably, that: 
 
Although the Chief Inspector at the time had given previous warning 
of the possibility of such a disaster, the fact of its occurrence may in 
time be seen to have altered very significantly the work of the 
Inspectorate and greatly extended its role in the prior assessment of 
major hazards. Certainly, it has already influenced the priorities and 
efforts of the Health and Safety Commission.94 
 
In other words, warnings had been given and these chemical workers need not have 
died. This was in fact an avoidable ‘catastrophe.’ Moreover, demonstrating the lack 
of regulation in this industry the Court of Inquiry that had been established in the 
wake of the explosion found that pressure systems in the chemical industry were not 
subject to the same statutory inspection as in factories. Recommendations were duly 
made for the Acts to be amended and as Crooks notes ‘these recommendations were 
endorsing the application of the statutory requirements of the old Factories Act upon 
an industry that had avoided this type of prescriptive legislation.’95  
 
Medical Knowledge 
The government appointed the Health of Munitions Workers’ Committee 
(HMWC) in September 1915 to conduct a variety of investigations designed to 
address issues of industrial health, efficiency, fatigue and medicine. Having 
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undertaken various pieces of original research the work of the HMWC was described 
by the Senior Medical Inspector of Factories as ‘a crucial phase in the evolution of 
industrial medicine’96 Whilst this may true it was also true that the primary objective 
of the HMWC in introducing rest pauses, shorter hours, improved ventilation, etc, 
was to improve the working conditions of the (mainly female) munitions workers. At 
that stage little or no attention was paid to other occupations where poverty and ill 
health continued to be found amongst the male industrial workers of Britain. Indeed, 
demonstrating just how little care was shown to those who had to earn a living 
Stevenson notes that in some industrial areas between 1917 and 1918 as much as 70 
per cent of men were classed as ‘unfit for overseas duties’ at a time when Britain was 
desperate for troops.97  
McIvor has identified that members of the HMWC campaigned to extend 
their research work beyond the war period and this campaign bore fruit when in 1917 
the Industrial Health Research Board (IHRB) was established. Again, McIvor, 
analysing the impact that the IHRB had on the workplace has argued that although 
some of the ‘crucial tenets of IHRB ideology’ reached ‘enlightened industry leaders’ 
it remained the case that the work of the HMWC and the IHRB ‘was rarely realised 
in inter-war workshop practice.’98 It would appear then that employers had 
enthusiastically cherry-picked the research of the HMWC during a period of full 
employment but this enthusiasm had waned during the inter-war period when most 
employers could fill the gaps left by those killed, injured, or worn-out, from the 
plentiful supply of cheap, willing, and unemployed labour.99 In 1939, Haldane also 
noted that employers frequently ignored industrial diseases. To correct this situation 
he suggested rather than gently persuading employers to take an interest in medical 
research their prompt attention would be gained if only they were made to pay more 
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frequently for the health damage that they caused by their negligence.100 Waldron 
has also argued that so far as industrial medical services were concerned, a similar 
pattern to that found in the First War emerges in the Second World War with state 
and employer enthusiasm for these services blossoming during the war but fading 
once again with the coming of peace.101    
In was during the inter-war years, in 1925, that the Industrial Health 
Education Society (IHES) was formed with the aim of raising awareness of 
occupational health issues amongst a wider audience. This organisation received 
some financial support from the TUC and between 1925 to the late 1930s the number 
of talks arranged by the IHES rose from 150 per year to just under 400 per year with 
the audiences consisting ‘mainly, but not exclusively of male trade unionists.’102 
Having examined this organisation Watterson concluded that although they did have 
some successes amongst trade unionists, ‘the Society did not succeed in involving 
employers in its work to any great extent.’103 In other words, it was mostly those 
who were vulnerable that were interested and mostly those who had made them 
vulnerable that were not. Indeed, in 1935, ten years after it had been founded, Lord 
Horder, President of the IHES, could still state in The Times that the programme of 
work that they had delivered was, ‘I fear, but little known.’104 Interestingly, amongst 
the employers who had taken an early and active interest in the work of the IHES 
was Lord Melchett, otherwise known as Sir Alfred Mond, the first Chairman of ICI. 
Mond’s interest may have been driven by a desire to ensure that his workforce was 
kept abreast of occupational health issues or perhaps it was done to create a positive 
public profile for ICI. After all, Mond’s former company, Brunner Mond, had led the 
way within the chemical industry on the lowering of working hours and introducing 
the three-shift, in place of the long and arduous two shift, system.105 The welfarist 
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and labour policies that had been established by Brunner Mond were largely 
imported into ICI and by 1929 the Works Council system was introduced to act as a 
forum that would allow workers some say in work-related matters.106 Wages, hours 
and the conditions of work, were not to be discussed in these Works Councils or, as 
Reader caustically notes, ‘any subject but the really important ones.’107 Effectively, 
this decision removed a real opportunity for ICI workers to discuss occupational 
health issues with their colleagues and plant managers in relation to the conditions of 
work they each experienced.108 It is at least possible therefore to argue that privately 
Mond may not have actually wanted his workers to be fully au fait with occupational 
health education as implementing preventative measures may have led to increased 
production costs. However, being involved with IHES did demonstrate publicly to 
the government, the workforce, the trade unions, and any potential recruit, that ICI 
was an employer that cared about occupational health. 
This is not to argue that ICI made no efforts to research occupational health 
problems but these were now to be identified, examined, and discussed by the 
scientific researchers who were funded by ICI whilst the ‘unscientific’ voice of the 
ICI worker had been effectively muzzled. As has been argued by Navarro and 
discussed in Chapter One, the ownership of medical knowledge is important to those 
who control and own the means of production.109 From 1930, the ICI Dyestuffs 
Group Medical Service was given responsibility for all aspects of safety, health 
hazards, and occupational illnesses within the Group. By 1934, a medical officer had 
been appointed at the Huddersfield plant with part-time or consultative officers also 
working in other factories belonging to the dyestuffs division. In 1935, Dr M.W. 
Goldblatt was engaged by ICI as Group Medical Officer with the remits of ‘overall 
co-ordination of medical services and of initiation of research on toxicity or other 
medical aspects relating to the Group’s products and processing.’110 Looking back at 
his appointment in the 1930s Goldblatt recalled in 1955 that this was important as he 
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had actually been put in charge of ‘the first industrial hygiene laboratories 
established by industry in Britain’ and that this was ‘tangible proof of the awakened 
realisation among industrialists that industrial health is not a question of policy, but 
of science, of conscience, and of civility.’111 Industrial health research may have 
been all of these to the newly ‘awakened’ industrialist but, as will be discussed 
below, it remained the case that the health of the worker was ultimately determined 
by economics. 
In 1956, discussing ‘the great difficulties’ that manufacturers faced when 
discovering that their product was lethal to the men manufacturing it, Goldblatt 
claimed that halting production would be, ‘too facile and would, if applied, rebound 
more severely on the worker than on his employer.’112 Instead, and in line with the 
thinking of most industrialists Goldblatt recommended that production should 
continue until ‘alternatives should be found to hazardous processes.’113 Goldblatt 
knew that one method for the early detection of bladder cancer amongst dyestuffs 
workers was routine urine examinations but that these had not been conducted in the 
1930s.114 He also knew by the late 1950s that cystoscopic examination (explained 
below) was the best method available to control the bladder cancer hazard but that 
this was not being done in Britain because it was thought that this would have a 
detrimental impact on production or, as Goldblatt put it himself, ‘it would mean 
either mass evacuation of parts of the industry or a demand from all exposed men for 
a transfer to other work.’115 It was explained that although some routine cystoscopy 
was performed on dyestuffs workers in France, Italy, Switzerland, and America the 
British workers attitude to this operation was ‘far from favourable.’116 In the 1970s, a 
judge, in a case brought against ICI, commented on the use of cystoscopy and reveals 
why this might have been so: 
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Since the plaintiff had to endure, and I use the word deliberately, 
some 13 further cystoscopies, it is necessary to consider what this 
means. The operation involves passing a cystoscope through the 
urethra and into the bladder. This instrument is in the nature of a 
telescope, but in addition, it can be used to remove small tumours and 
for carrying out diathermy or cauterising processes. It is inserted 
under anaesthetic, but after it has been removed, the patient suffers 
very considerable discomfort for a period of some two to seven days, 
during which micturition [urination] is very painful.117 
 
From 1933, the ICI research department knew that bladder cancer ‘was one of the 
most serious occupational diseases ever encountered’ and later admitted in a court of 
law that ‘the disease is horrible, the prognosis is shocking; and one cannot 
overemphasise the sufferings of the men who contract it.’118 Nonetheless, although 
Goldblatt was responsible for several published articles on bladder cancer this 
leading occupational health research scientist employed by the largest chemical 
manufacturer in Britain was not prepared to argue that the production process be 
stopped. Instead he noted that, ‘the burden of study at present is to devise methods of 
manufacture and design of plant which will eliminate the hazard.’119 Indeed, despite 
Goldblatt’s claim that industrial health was not a matter of policy the fact that a lethal 
process could remain in place in order that it meet the needs of production indicates a 
contrary position. As noted in Chapter Three, following a long campaign and delayed 
research, the carcinogenic substances involved in the dyestuffs process were finally 
banned in 1967.  
Whilst Goldblatt may have been correct in claiming that the ICI Industrial 
Hygiene Research Laboratories were the first of their kind they were not the only 
such industrial research group. Tweedale has noted that the asbestos industry funded 
the establishment of the Asbestosis Research Council (ARC) in 1957. This asbestosis 
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research organisation sought to enhance the public image of two asbestos 
manufacturers and as Tweedale notes ‘the ARC performed a public-relations 
function and provided a measure of political and legal protection.120  A similar 
pattern can be seen in the chemical industry. As noted above, by publishing regularly 
in the British Journal of Industrial Medicine the ICI industrial health research 
laboratories reinforced their position to others that the health and welfare of ICI 
workers was an important issue and that it was being addressed. The occupational 
health science that was owned by ICI was also used in the early 1950s during a legal 
case to rebut claims made by an ICI personnel manager that insufficient effort had 
been made to protect workers from ά-naphthylamine.121 In the 1970s, ICI again cited 
the work of their industrial hygiene unit to defend their position in court proceedings 
regarding the culpability of ICI in the sale and use of Nonox S.122  
Whilst some criticism has been made of the ICI Laboratories they did expend 
effort and resources researching a variety of substances that the company 
manufactured as well as investigating the working conditions that existed. In fact, 
many of the research results were published in the British Journal of Industrial 
Medicine, a journal that Goldblatt had been involved with since 1942.123 His own, as 
well as his colleagues input would have undoubtedly highlighted to the regulators 
and fellow scientists that ICI addressed the issue of employee health and safety 
seriously. Many improvements to processes and products were recommended in 
these research papers and once implemented these would have led to a more 
                                                 
120 G. Tweedale, Magic Mineral to Killer Dust, Turner & Newall and the Asbestos Hazard, Oxford 
University Press, (Oxford 2003), p.175 
121 The Times, ‘Law Report, May 2, High Court of Justice, Trumper v. Imperial Chemical Industries 
Limited’, May 3, 1952, p.3 
122 Wright v. Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd. And Another, Cassidy v. Same, April 20, 1971, QB, pp.311-332 
in Knights Industrial Reports, Volume XI, October 1971- March 1972, Charles Knight & Co, (London 
1972) and, Wright v. Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd. And Another, Cassidy v. Same, October 31, 1972, Court 
of Appeal pp.255-274 in Knights Industrial Reports, Volume XIII, October 1972- March 1973, 
Charles Knight & Co, (London 1973) 
123 Goldblatt sat on the editorial board. ‘British Journal of Industrial Medicine, The First 25 Years’, 
pp.1-3 in British Journal of Industrial Medicine, (25), 1968, p.1 Examples of ICI published research 
results include, M.W. Goldblatt, ‘Vesical Tumours Induced by Chemical Compounds’ pp.65-81 in 
British Journal of Industrial Medicine, (6) 1949, A.L. Walpole, M.H.C. Williams, and D.C. Roberts, 
‘Tumours of the Urinary Bladder in Dogs after Ingestion of 4-Aminodiphenyl’ pp.105-109 in British 
Journal of Industrial Medicine, (11) 1954, C.P. Chivers, ‘Respiratory Function and Disease Among 
Workers in Alkaline Dusts’ pp.51-60 in British Journal of Industrial Medicine, (16) 1959, G.T. 
Bowra, D.P. Duffield, A.J. Osborn, and I.F.H. Purchase, ‘Premalignant and Neoplastic Skin Lesions 
Associated with Occupational Exposure to ‘Tarry’ Byproducts During Manufacture of 4,4’-Bibyridyl’ 
pp.76-81 in British Journal of Industrial Medicine, (39) 1982  
 173
conducive and healthy environment being created for the chemical worker.124 
Nonetheless, having paid for it, the results of any medical research belonged to the 
company and the dissemination of the findings was therefore under the company’s 
control. Indeed, this very issue is commented on by the judge in the Nonox S case 
who stated that: 
 
It is as well to state plainly that a company’s responsibility for the 
proper discharge of all its duties lies squarely on the executive of that 
company, the board or its committees…it is not correct in law to 
attribute to a medical officer such as Dr Goldblatt sole responsibility 
for all aspects of health problems in industry. He was not a member of 
the board or of any executive committee though he was called to 
advise.125 
 
Therefore, whilst the medical research information was owned by the company 
chemical workers could remain ignorant of how the substances they worked with 
were actually affecting their health. For example, the Research Department of the 
Alkali Division of ICI conducted a test in 1953 to assess the health effects of soda 
ash packing. In this area of work the men were ‘constantly exposed to a heavy 
concentration of ash dust’ some of which they inhaled.126 The researcher found that 
one consequence was that the nasal septum of workers was being perforated but he 
decided not to share this knowledge with those exposed to the risk because:  
 
A nasal examination of all applicants for employment and subsequent 
periodical examinations in our works would probably lead to an 
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undesirable focussing of attention on the nose and a consequent 
possible production of neurosis.127 
 
In this particular case the health damage being done was not life threatening. 
However, if more people had known of the physical damage associated with the 
production process this may have led to difficulties in recruiting workers and an 
‘undesirable focussing’ of managerial attention on why it was that production was 
being affected. The ‘scientific’ explanation that sharing this knowledge could lead to 
neurosis amongst the workforce tended to emphasise to the readership of the British 
Journal of Industrial Medicine that the ICI occupational health researcher really had 
the interests of the worker’s health uppermost in his mind. After all, the researcher 
had also stated that the loss of the nasal septum was a ‘symptomless condition.’128 
The other health effects caused by the inhalation of soda ash were not published until 
1959 when much of the blame for the reduced respiratory performance amongst the 
workers was placed on their smoking habits.129  
In 1930 the government contributed £250,000 for the building and equipping 
of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. Sir Thomas Legge, a 
prominent industrial hygiene expert noted the list of proposed lecturers forwarded by 
the Minister of Health and then drafted a letter claiming that ‘there is no name among 
them of any medical man who would be likely to insist on the claims of industrial 
medicine and surgery.’130 The following year at a meeting of the TUC General 
Council Legge further claimed that ‘no medical school gave any instruction to 
students on industrial medicine’ and that ‘attempts to give lectures on industrial 
diseases to medical students had always been thwarted.’131 The lack of academic 
interest and financial support in the field of industrial health research was not unique 
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to the 1930s. In the 1950s the Medical Inspector of Factories could report that ‘a 
considerable improvement in notification is needed from the medical profession and 
from employers’ to assess the levels of industrial disease and thereby take steps to 
control them.132 Also in 1955, after ten years in operation, the Nuffield Foundation 
could report that the study of industrial health was ‘among the less successful of its 
ventures.’133  Demonstrating that the industry suffered from wilful deafness even by 
1973 the Nuffield Department of Industrial Health felt it necessary to continue to 
lobby for health hazards to be identified in new chemical processes before plant 
construction began and to ensure that both medical and safety advice was 
incorporated into the design.134 That the Nuffield should still be promoting this 
preferred method in the 1970s indicates that the Association of British Chemical 
Manufacturers (ABCM) ‘Safety Rules’ were more impressive on paper than in 
reality as in 1951 they had stated under rule 1-16 that: 
 
Before commencing any large-scale experimental work or any new 
manufacture, the employer shall take steps to ascertain definitely all 
the hazards involved both from the actual operations and the chemical 
reactions. The properties of the raw materials used, the final products 
made, and any by-products arising during manufacture shall be 
carefully studied and provision made for dealing with any hazards 
including effects on workers which may arise during manufacture. 
The design of the building and plant shall be based on the information 
thus obtained.135 
 
According to Raffle, the applied research method most commonly used for 
investigating occupational health has been the epidemiological survey.136 Bohme et 
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al have argued that the chemical industry ‘in particular’ stressed the use of this 
research method claiming that ‘animal models, molecular understanding, and 
pathologic data cannot establish cause-effect relationships.’137 Indeed, the use of this 
long term research method was pioneered in Britain by Case et al to establish the 
causes of bladder cancer in dyestuffs manufacture and then by Bidstrup and Case 
when examining the causes of lung cancer in chromate manufacturing.138 The 
original research conducted by Case et al was financed by the ABCM who stated in 
1953 that this research was based ‘on a study of all the death certificates of males in 
England and Wales between 1920 and 1950 where tumour of the bladder was 
mentioned.’139 In other words, and notwithstanding the value of the results drawn for 
such studies, this form of research was heavily reliant on having dead workers to 
count. Drawing on a wide variety of evidence it has been argued by Bohme et al that 
the chemical industry’s preference for this methodology is that human 
epidemiological data are difficult to acquire, the surveys are time-and-resource-
consuming and inevitably delays ensue with regard to regulatory decision making.140  
This will be explored further in Chapter Six where the chemical employers will be 
examined to assess their responses to occupational injuries and deaths. 
 
Conclusion 
 Three agencies were identified who had the potential to offer chemical 
workers a better level of protection from occupational hazards than they could 
themselves. It has been argued that the state was relatively ineffectual in offering a 
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protective matrix to address the many hazards that existed within this industry. It is 
however the quality rather than the quantity that left so many workers exposed to 
risk. The first rules and regulations had been introduced in 1893 and were easily 
outdated by the time the second set was enacted in 1922. A further forty-five years 
would pass before the Carcinogenic Substances Regulations were introduced to deal 
with specific industrial carcinogens that had been first identified in the 1920s. To 
some extent these legislative measures were enhanced by the general rules and 
regulations contained within the Factory Acts and by the recognition of occupational 
diseases such as chrome ulceration (1920) and poisoning by carbon bisulphide 
(1924). However, what has been argued here is that many of the general legislative 
measures were designed to prevent the most obvious hazards such as fire and 
explosion and therefore, whilst ultimately providing a level of protection to the 
workforce, they had not been introduced for that purpose per se but to protect 
investment and profit. 
The slow state response to occupational health and safety issues contrasts 
dramatically with the dynamic development of the British chemical industry and 
what has been argued is that at no point did the state ever catch up with the pace of 
chemical development. Consequently, what might be termed ‘a gap of neglect’ 
opened up between the first acknowledgements that a health problem existed and 
legislation being passed to address the causes. Tweedale, and Johnston and McIvor 
have found a remarkably similar situation with respect to the asbestos industry. The 
state must be criticised for accepting the industry’s ‘co-operative attitude’ in 
identifying possible deadly substances whilst virtually ignoring the toll of death and 
suffering that had mounted for more than forty years.  
It has been argued that the work of the Factory Inspectorate was far from 
exemplary although to some extent their work was seriously impeded by the constant 
lack of funding and personnel that plagued this organisation from its inception. It has 
also been suggested that the legislation they were charged with policing was not 
always clear. This left areas of doubt that could be exploited by the legal profession 
who represented employers threatened with court proceedings for failing to adhere to 
the rules and regulations. This resulted in the inspectorate adopting a position that 
sought to encourage rather than force employers to comply with the legislation. The 
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chromate-manufacturing sector was used as an exemplar to show how this ‘softly-
softly’ policy was virtually useless in preventing chrome ulcerations and the loss of 
nasal septum and these must have been running at epidemic proportions from the 
1920s through to the late 1950s. Perhaps the inspectorate’s approach was simply a 
pragmatic response to the lack of interest shown towards occupational health and 
safety issues by the state and in general. Nevertheless, suspicion that the inspectorate 
worked on behalf of the employer’s interests rather than the workers is seen in their 
practice of giving warning to employers that an inspection was imminent. The 
frustration amongst those workers who wished to have faults and hazards witnessed 
by the inspectorate has been outlined and it has also been argued that this practice 
tended to alienate large sections of the trade union movement.  
The final area to be examined was concerned with medical research. 
Beginning with the wartime work of the HMWC it was shown that this was primarily 
designed to increase production and that whilst this was required during a period of 
full employment the enthusiasm of the state and employers for this type of research 
waned with the return of mass unemployment in the inter-war period. Indeed, 
McIvor’s analysis has argued persuasively that employers largely ignored the work 
of the IHRB whilst Watterson has shown that a very similar situation prevailed in 
relation to the educative work of the IHES. Some doubt exists as to the motivation 
that led the head of ICI to become involved with the IHES although it has been 
suggested that he did this to enhance the caring image that was created around ICI 
that helped to diffuse concerns about the safety of the industry.  
From the 1930s ICI added to their vision of being a safe employer by setting 
up and paying for a research laboratory that was staffed with ICI scientists. This 
group conducted various occupational health research projects and published their 
results in reputable journals. There is evidence that their work did deliver some 
improvements to the working environment, however, what is argued here is that this 
was acceptable to the employer so long as it was affordable and did not interfere with 
production. It has also been argued that research paid for by the company was owned 
by the company and consequently it was they who controlled the results. What has 
been shown here is that on occasion information concerning the welfare of the 
workers was withheld as was the case of those working amongst the hazardous dusts 
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of soda ash. The medical research was also used by ICI to defend its position in legal 
cases that sought to show that the firm did not take sufficient precautions to protect 
its employees or customers. The use of the epidemiological method has also been 
criticised. This methodology was first used in 1947 by a chemical industry 
commissioned research project on industrial papilloma of the bladder with the results 
being published seven years later. It has become the most commonly used 
methodology in the industry but has drawn criticism from Bohme et al who see its 
use as a delaying tactic within a wider strategy that seeks to ‘manufacture doubt’ 
about the dangerous processes and products associated with the chemical industry.  
 
Chapter Five 
Trade Unions and Occupational Health  
 
The employers have now agreed that the question of safety in the 
chemical industry is something that concerns both the trade union side 
and the employers’ side of the JIC (Joint Industrial Council). In order 
that this matter can be fully discussed it has been agreed that an 
appropriate item be placed on the agenda of the next JIC meeting.1 
 
 
Introduction 
As this chapter is concerned with the trade union movement it is perhaps 
appropriate to begin by defining them. Trade unions are fundamentally composed of 
individuals who have little option but to sell their ability to work in the labour market. 
Once a buyer of this ability is found a wage is paid for so long as the employer is 
willing to do so. As individuals, waged labour has little effective leverage in the 
relationship with the buyer of their abilities. Most labour historians would agree that 
those who sold their ability to work came to realise that they had a common interest 
and learned that if they organised they could exert more influence collectively than 
they could as individuals. As a result of becoming organised in trade unions 
concessions could sometimes be won from the employer including improved wages, 
shorter hours, or by gaining some improvements in the working conditions. However, 
these concessions were not won in a uniform pattern and as McIvor has argued, the 
growth of trade unionism and strike propensity was uneven with gains sometimes 
later lost.2 
Amongst those joining a trade union there are some that voluntarily participate 
by attending branch meetings whilst some even allow themselves to become elected 
by their peers to representative positions at a local, regional, or national level. 
However, most members of trade unions do not participate in the day-to-day running 
of ‘their union.’ Indeed, in 1950, a survey of the Transport and General Workers 
Union (TGWU) found that although branch meetings were held on a regular basis the 
meetings were only attended by a minority of the membership due to ‘timidity 
resulting from inadequate education, the inconvenience of time and place of meetings, 
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time-consuming household duties, alternative sources of leisure and finally, in a few 
cases, dissatisfaction with the actual operation of the branch.’3 Therefore, being a 
member of a trade union did not mean becoming a member of an army or of a 
business. Members could, and did, absent themselves whenever they did not wish to 
participate in the trade union. Choosing to participate in a trade union would perhaps 
have come about for pragmatic reasons such as noted above. That is, having realised 
their relatively weak position to those who owned and controlled the means of 
production they banded together and collectively challenged this power on occasion 
to win some limited concessions. Nonetheless, according to Poole, many reasons exist 
that explain participation in a trade union and he asserts that there are ‘five clusters of 
attitudes’ which members judge to be legitimate forms of union activity. These can be 
seen to be ‘ideological, revolutionary, conservative, instrumental, or political in 
nature’ with all being consistent with a desire to enhance their position in decision 
making at a workplace level.4   
Within the history of the labour movement there has been a very limited 
examination of the role played by the trade unions in the chemical industry. In his 
study examining the period 1900 to 1930, Haber offered one explanation for the gaps 
in archival material relating to chemical workers by claiming that the government 
concentrated their efforts on industries where trade unions had become increasingly 
active such as in coal mining, textiles and engineering. The chemical industry was 
considered to be one of the ‘less organised trades’ and therefore many changes within 
the industry tended to ‘escape notice.’5 Factors such as unemployment, the business 
cycle, changes in the composition of the workforce, legislation, etc. may all have 
played some part in contributing to this position. However, one theme affecting 
recruitment that emerges consistently from the literature is the employers’ attitude 
towards trade unions. In some firms the tactic deployed to prevent recruitment was 
straightforward. One former worker recalled that his manager ‘refused to have a union 
in the place at all and he threatened that he’d sack the first man that started one.’6 
However, a more subtle approach was adopted by those chemical employers who 
                                                 
3 J. Goldstein, The Government of British Trade Unions, A Study of Apathy and the Democratic 
Process in the Transport and General Workers Union, George Allen, (London 1952) 
4 M. Poole, Workers’ Participation in Industry, Routledge, (London 1978), pp.87-88 
5 L.F. Haber, The Chemical Industry, 1900-1930, International Growth and Technological Change, 
Oxford University Press, (Oxford 1971), p.387 
6 P. Pagnamenta and R. Overy, All Our Working Lives, British Broadcasting Corporation, (London 
1984), p.17 
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came to dominate the industry and who designed and implemented a variety of 
welfarist strategies that sought to neutralise trade unionism within their businesses. 
Nonetheless, what will be demonstrated in this chapter is that although a low density 
of trade unionism persisted within the chemical industry, chemical trade unionists 
were able to make some impact on issues of occupational health by utilising the 
strength of their union organisations that recruited and operated largely outside of the 
industry.  
Many accidents occurred in the chemical industry but the task facing the trade 
unions in attempting to improve the working conditions was not just to deal with the 
obvious but also to deal with the sometimes obscure, complicated, and insidious 
presence of industrial diseases. These diseases were most often accompanied by long 
latency periods of up to 20 years and consequently posed no immediate threat in the 
consciousness of many workers. That is, although chemical trade unionists suspected 
that death and sickness was occurring as a result of exposure to fumes, gases and 
dusts, these lacked the dramatic immediacy of seeing someone being severely scalded 
by caustic or having their arm removed by ore crushing machinery.7 Such events 
could be officially recorded and the statistics collated. For trade unionists that then 
wished to campaign on such unambiguous health and safety issues the problem of 
convincing others to join them was less arduous. However, the worker’s response to 
industrial disease was less immediate and as Meiklejohn noted in 1950: 
 
If diagnosis does not automatically involve certification and 
compulsory suspension, advice to the workman to find a safe job out of 
the dust is summarily dismissed. In our highly industrialized modern 
state, economic employment and family considerations supersede 
slight deviations from full health …the pay packet recognizes no 
danger, piece work and output bonus admit no hindrance, and health 
seldom becomes a reality until lost beyond recovery. 8 
 
Convincing the government to schedule industrial diseases so that damaged 
workers might receive compensation by right rather than litigation was no simple task 
                                                 
7 Several such incidents appear in the Accident Books of United Alkali Company Limited, 1914-1928, 
DIC/UA8/5/11- 22 
8 A. Meiklejohn, ‘Doctor and Workman’ pp.105-115 in British Journal of Industrial Medicine, (7) 
1950, p.109 
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and often failed. However, recognising unofficially that some workers were dying as a 
result of exposure to their profit making processes some large chemical employers 
who came to dominate the industry introduced their own compensation schemes. Was 
this altruism? Whilst firms such as Bruner Mond and ICI proclaimed to have a long 
history of ‘sympathetic and progressive’ policies it will be argued here that these 
employers may have had less than altruistic reasons for introducing such schemes.9 
Trade unions had a moral responsibility to mitigate the physical damage that was 
visited upon their membership and they had been drawn into the bureaucratic web of 
compensation schemes since the 1880s and 1890s. From a workers perspective it was 
the trade unions that were delivering compensation to victims and in return trade 
unions gained gratitude and sometimes more members. However, where 
compensation was not available workers could become aggrieved and industrial 
relations could worsen. By providing their own compensation schemes chemical 
employers not only controlled the system but also drew kudos away from trade unions 
and towards themselves. This type of strategy is made abundantly clear by the chief 
executive of ICI Central Labour Department who stated in 1928 that: 
 
The value to the company of benefits, privileges and concessions 
depends on the workers recognising them as voluntary acts by the 
company and not as a product of negotiations with the trade unions.10 
 
The managed response to industrial injury and disease through employer led 
compensation schemes and other benefits removed the need in the minds of many 
chemical workers to join trade unions. Compensation schemes also worked for 
employers because a) they had a set economic value on human life, b) some claims 
could fail whilst others were never made c) payment of a claim was full and final and 
d) compensation acted as a palliative to many workers and trade unions allowing the 
capital intensive processes to carry on largely uninterrupted.  
Industrial diseases emerged from within a chemical industry that rapidly 
expanded both its range of products and methods of production from 1914 onwards. 
This would create a bewildering array of complex and toxic chemical substances that 
                                                 
9 Alkali News, 75th Anniversary Edition, 1873-1948, February 1949 (Northwich), pp.10-11 
10 C. Gill, R. Morris, and J. Eaton, Industrial Relations in the Chemical Industry, Saxon House, (Hants. 
1978), p.87 
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required the trade union movement to conduct increasingly difficult investigations in 
their attempt to have some of these officially recognised as occupational hazards. 
Inevitably time lags existed between the first suspected identification of ill health or 
death and official recognition of such by the employers, the state, and the medical and 
legal establishments. The existence of delays was not created by trade unions and they 
had limited resources or power to circumvent the socially constructed requirement for 
irrefutability. Nonetheless, because delays did exist between the original identification 
of a health problem and positive preventative action being implemented this has led 
some to criticise the trade unions for not doing enough. It will be argued that this 
criticism has arisen because trade unions have mistakenly been perceived of as having 
an equal and powerful place alongside those who were responsible for the 
implementation of preventative measures to deal with occupational hazards.  
To begin this investigation there will be a brief analysis of where things stood 
at the beginning of the period; the industry as it was during the First World War. By 
using this as an introduction to some of the themes this will be linked to an 
engagement with the historiography of occupational health and it will be argued that 
much of the criticisms made of trade unions are overstated. Indeed, this study will add 
to the body of evidence that has challenged the revisionist position on trade unions 
and occupational health. In order to establish some context for this examination the 
size and density of the trade unions will be examined and this will include a 
comparative element to show where the chemical trade unions stood in relation to 
other trade unions that were also affected by occupational health hazards. This 
analysis of membership and density will chronologically follow the economic and 
political events that impacted on the development of trade unionism and will include 
an analysis of the employers’ attitudes to trade unions within the industry. Thereafter, 
drawing on a variety of primary source documents, predominantly those belonging to 
the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) and the Trades Union Congress 
(TUC), this analysis will chart the progress of the trade union movement within the 
British chemical industry to see what impact they had on many of the occupational 
health issues that they faced between 1914 and 1974.    
 
The material needs of the First World War highlighted just how old fashioned 
the chemical industry had been with the majority of manufacturers being described as, 
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‘Victorian in their ideas and equipment.’11 Within such a backward environment 
increasing demands for munitions brought increased risks of occupational health and 
these risks were now shared between the tens of thousands of men and women newly 
recruited to the workplace. Ineson and Thom have highlighted the dangers to the 
health of the women that arose from their exposure to TNT whilst more recent 
evidence has identified the dangers that were associated with the development and 
production of poison gas, undertaken regardless of the death, or disablement to 
chemists and workers.12 Whilst the manufacture of poison gas at Porton Down was 
highly secretive and many of the human guinea pigs were ‘volunteers’ this was 
ostensibly not the case with the manufacture of TNT. By 1915, in response to 
information of ill health and sickness emerging from the industry, many refused to 
accept work that involved TNT whilst others who were already doing so absented 
themselves. Faced with declining production levels the Health of Munition Workers 
Committee (HMWC) were appointed in 1915 and within a year had listed the 
consequences to the workers health if exposed to the vapours and dusts of various 
chemical compounds used in the manufacture of munitions and war related 
products.13 In 1916, the Miners’ Federation, the Cotton Spinners’ Association and the 
Dock and Riverside Workers’ Union called for the Workmen’s Compensation Act to 
be amended so that ‘all diseases which may be contracted by munitions workers 
owing to the handling of TNT or other chemicals be scheduled as industrial 
diseases.’14 However, the ability of the trade unions to help many victims of TNT 
poisoning was circumscribed. Although the HMWC had identified many causes and 
symptoms of TNT poisoning some of this medical and scientific work was suppressed 
or used unethically to hide the true levels of disease whilst some was distorted to 
pacify the workers who agitated against TNT work.15  
                                                 
11 S. Miall, A History of the British Chemical Industry, Ernest Benn, (London 1931), p.37 
12 A. Ineson and D. Thom, ‘T.N.T Poisoning and the Employment of Women Workers in the First 
World War’, pp.89-107 in P. Weindling (ed) The Social History of Occupational Health, Croom Helm, 
(London 1985) and J. Parker, The Killing Factory, The Top Secret World of Germ and Chemical 
Warfare, Smith Gryphon, (London 1996), p.24 and p.210. Secret reports withheld until 1981 revealed 
that at Porton Down in 1917-18 ‘workmen were used extensively for experimental work.’   
13 Health of Munition Workers Committee, Memorandum No.7, Industrial Fatigue and Its Causes, PP 
1916, (Cd. 8213), p.2 and Health of Munition Workers Committee, Memorandum No.8, Special 
Industrial Diseases, PP 1916, (Cd. 8214) The list included drowsiness, headaches, loss of appetite, 
eczema, cyanosis, shortness of breath, severe coughing, vomiting, anaemia, pains in the limbs, staining 
of the worker’s skin and hair, jaundice, liver destruction and even death 
14 Trades Union Congress Report, 1916, ‘Amendment of Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ p.321 
15 A. Ineson and D. Thom, ‘T.N.T Poisoning and the Employment of Women Workers in the First 
World War’, pp.104-105 
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What is important to the study of occupational health is that the HMWC had 
shown that it was possible within a very short period of time to conduct research and 
identify a number of dangerous methods and materials that existed within the 
workplace. Moreover, the work of the HMWC had only gained significance as ill 
health and death interfered with the output of munitions for the war effort. As for the 
health of workers not involved with munitions the HMWC stated, ‘no useful purpose 
would be served by dealing with those of less immediate importance.’16 From 
amongst the ‘less important’ one official estimate has calculated that 21, 942 of them 
died as a result of occupational injuries between 1915 and 1919.17 Perhaps at a time 
when a much greater crop of deaths and injuries was being recorded on the fields of 
France the HMWC statement and actions were understandable. As the findings of the 
HMWC were being published in a variety of journals it is interesting to note what the 
chemical industry thought about them. In the industry’s main publication, the 
Chemical News, the following statement informs us that: 
 
Many of those problems under consideration, whether concerning the 
employment of men, women, or children, have only recently been 
grappled with, and it is amazing that such a stage of industrial progress 
should have been reached without any serious attempt to solve them. 
Had the attempt been made earlier much of the bitter heritage of labour 
unrest which has descended to us might have been spared. We can only 
hope that, with the new insight which the war has brought us, better 
understanding may prevail, and the welfare of the industrial 
population, upon which the prosperity of the Empire depends, be 
safeguarded to the utmost of our power.18 
 
Here was a vision of an ignorant past and an enlightened future. Yet, what was indeed 
‘amazing’ was that none of this ‘new insight’ had been intrinsically missing in the 
period preceding the war. Years before the above statement was made, occupational 
health experts, medical experts, factory inspectors, as well as trade unions had all 
identified occupational health problems within the chemical industry specifically and 
                                                 
16 Ibid, p.3 
17 Figures quoted in A.J. McIvor, A History of Work in Britain, 1880-1950, Palgrave, (Hampshire 
2001), p.132 
18 Chemical News, March 23, 1917, p.142 
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within industry generally.19 Offering solutions to deal with these problems they had 
claimed that many deaths and injuries were preventable. As a result of war and the 
desire to win it this ‘new insight’ had been immediately called upon but clearly there 
must have been some form of external economic or political factors preventing it from 
being used much earlier, and latterly more fully.20  
Although in 1917 the Chemical News had predicted progress, Beaumont 
claims that forty years later trade union representatives still had no right to inspect the 
statutory safety and health records at the workplace, had no legal right to liase with a 
visiting factory inspector or to see the report and had no legal right to information 
either from the employer or inspectorate about the hazards to which any of the 
members might be exposed to at work.21 Eva and Oswald have further argued that the 
persistence and failure of the voluntary approach to safety committees, the 
weaknesses in the law and the failure to properly fund or staff the factory inspectorate 
were all subsequently identified by the trade unions who in turn pressured the Labour 
Party for reform.22 Fifty-six years after the ending of the First World War the Labour 
Party introduced the Health and Safety at Work Act (1974) something that Nichols 
has identified as leading to ‘a heightening of safety-consciousness.’23   
Some of the barriers to occupational health reform have been briefly touched 
upon but amongst historians of occupational health some have posited that the trade 
unions also impeded progress. These historians have claimed that trade unions could 
have done more, that they prioritised wages over health issues and that they used their 
resources to win compensation payments rather than campaigning more effectively 
for preventative measures.24 Whilst acknowledging the contribution that these 
                                                 
19 For a brief history of industrial medicine and the experts who worked in this field see A. Meiklejohn, 
‘Sixty Years of Industrial Medicine in Great Britain’, pp.155-165 in British Journal of Industrial 
Medicine, (13) 1956. For an extensive overview of many of the health problems associated with work 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries see T. Oliver (ed) Dangerous Trades, The 
Historical, Social and Legal Aspects of Industrial Occupations as Affecting Health by a Number of 
Experts, John Murray, (London 1902). For the chemical industry see A. P. Laurie, ‘The Chemical 
Trades’ pp.568-598 in T. Oliver (ed) Dangerous Trades, (London 1902). Also Report on the 
Conditions of Labour in Chemical Works, The Dangers to Life and Health of the Workpeople 
Employed Therein and the Proposed Remedies, Chemical Works Committee of Enquiry, PP 1893, 
(C.7235) The Chemical and Copper Workers’ Union gave evidence to this Committee on the unhealthy 
and dangerous conditions in the workplace. 
20 J.D. Bernal, The Social Function of Science, Routledge, (London 1944), p.172 
21 P.B. Beaumont, Safety at Work and the Unions, Croom Helm, (London 1983), p.71 
22 D. Eva, and R. Oswald, Health and Safety at Work, Pan, (London 1981), p.37 
23 T. Nichols, The Sociology of Industrial Injury, Mansell, (London 1997), p.140 
24 P. Weindling, (ed) The Social History of Occupational Health, Croom Helm, (London 1985), P.W. J. 
Bartrip, The Home Office and the Dangerous Trades, Regulating Occupational Disease in Victorian 
and Edwardian Britain, Rodopi, (Amsterdam 2002) 
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historians have made to the study of occupational health and safety their conclusions 
are not without criticism and thus an alternative point of view has emerged. Although 
remaining partially critical of the trade unions these historical studies tend to 
emphasise the employers prioritisation of profit over health as well as serious state 
neglect. For example, Tweedale and Johnston and McIvor place much of the blame 
for the toll of disease and death amongst asbestos workers at the door of the 
employers and the regulators.25 Similarly, Markowitz and Rosner’s recent research 
has argued that American chemical workers were unnecessarily exposed to disease 
and death when the vinyl industry responded to occupational health problems by:  
 
Hiding information, controlling research, continuing to market their 
products as safe when they were known to be dangerous, enlisting 
industry-wide groups to participate in denying that there was a 
problem, and attempting to influence the political process in order to 
avoid regulation.26 
  
The British firm of Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) were also cited in this study as 
having colluded with these US manufacturers during the early 1970s.27 
The work of Tweedale and Johnston and McIvor amongst others has revealed 
persuasive evidence to show that those who wielded the true economic, social and 
political power could have done much more to emphasise, encourage, legislate and 
implement occupational health reform. By delaying or limiting research the actions 
and attitudes of the powerful impacted adversely on the ability of the trade unions to 
campaign effectively. This was exacerbated by the fact that some essential 
information that would have been vital for campaigns on occupational health was 
withheld entirely. The problem then faced by the trade unions was that although they 
may have been able to call upon work-related experience as evidence of occupational 
health problems this was not enough to counter the opposing views forwarded by 
many legal, medical, employer or government establishments. The evidence shows 
that many trade unionists suspected for years that certain processes were damaging 
                                                 
25 R. Johnston and A. McIvor, Lethal Work, A History of the Asbestos Tragedy in Scotland, Tuckwell 
Press, East Linton 2000 and G. Tweedale, Magic Mineral to Killer Dust, Turner & Newall and the 
Asbestos Hazard, Oxford University Press, (Oxford 2003) 
26 G. Markowitz and D. Rosner, Deceit and Denial, The Deadly Politics of Industrial Pollution, 
University of California Press, (California 2003), p.300 
27 Ibid, p.182, 189 and 213  
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but found it impossible to prove this without having access to ‘the facts.’28 As 
Watterson has argued there is a general presumption in Britain against the idea that 
work and occupational illness go hand in hand unless ‘an extensive body of research 
data is provided and a very high level of proof of causality established.’29  
The processes that would begin to deliver this research took many years to 
become established but in the intervening years compensation legislation was used 
not only as a cheap option by the state and employers to address occupational health 
problems but also to concentrate the minds of those concerned on the value of money 
rather than life. Compensation became the immediate viable option for trade unions 
and they had a responsibility to the victims to pursue claims. However, in doing so 
they were also drawn into a bureaucratic process that was not of their making. The 
compensation process was loaded against unions although in the absence of any other 
available option it may not have appeared that way at the time. The clarity that shows 
how heavily weighted the system was is contained in a series of studies of 
occupational health and safety that have revealed many cases of weak regulation, 
under-funded and under-staffed inspection, ineffective medical monitoring, corporate 
or state deception, and the placing of profit maximisation ahead of safety.30 
Those who criticise the trade union movement have tended to adopt a 
pluralist perspective when doing so. One weak point of this perspective is that it 
fails to sufficiently demonstrate in what way the trade unions had equal access to 
information and power with which they could have done more to launch 
                                                 
28 TUC Report, 1945, p.297. Motion forwarded by the Chemical Workers’ Union and supported by the 
Association of Scientific Workers identifying the inadequacies of the Chemical Works Regulations, 
1922 and the lack of specialist knowledge to help identify the health risks associated with new plastic 
compounds and solvents.  
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Policy, 1833-1897, Clarendon Press, (Oxford 1983), N. Daykin, & L. Doyal, (eds) Health and Work, 
Critical Perspectives, MacMillan, (Hampshire 1999) D. Eva, and R. Oswald, Health and Safety at 
Work, Pan, (London 1981) W. Graebner, ‘Hegemony Through Science: Information Engineering and 
Lead Toxicology, 1925-1965’ pp.140-159 in D. Rosner and G. Markowitz (eds) Dying For Work: 
Workers’ Safety and Health in Twentieth-Century America, Indiana University Press, (Indianapolis 
1989) B. Harrison, Not Only the Dangerous Trades, Women’s Work and Health in Britain, 1880-1914, 
Taylor and Francis, (London 1996) A. Ineson, and D. Thom, ‘T.N.T. Poisoning and the Employment of 
Women Workers in the First World War,’ pp.89-107 in P. Weindling (ed) The Social History of 
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(Oxford 2003) C. Woolfson, J. Foster, and M. Beck, Paying for the Piper, Capital and Labour in 
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preventative campaigns. If they did have equal social, economic and political power 
then why did the trade unions perversely chose not to use it to prevent damage and 
death amongst their members? A more self-evident explanation is that no such 
equality existed. This is precisely what Melling has found when examining trade 
union responses to occupational risk between the 1890s and 1940s. Thus, for 
Melling: 
 
The responsibility for the levels of industrial illness and injury lay 
primarily not with the union but rather with more powerful players in a 
context where market conditions and institutional rules defined the 
capacities of the different actors. The capacity of the unions and their 
members to secure safe working or to press for better compensation 
depended on circumstances over which they possessed limited 
control.31 
 
Hyman echoes such a view noting that the power of organised labour never managed 
to exceed that of capital and the support it receives from the state and other dominant 
sections of society.32 According to Tweedale, trade unions who represented members 
in the asbestos industry played only a ‘limited role’ in matters of health and safety but 
this was mainly due to the decision of Turner & Newall to exclude them from 
decision making, by their lack of access to medical knowledge, by a dearth of funding 
and by low levels of trade union membership.33  
It is at least possible to argue that the problems of accessing information 
within the chemical sector was more difficult to establish than in any other industrial 
sector. Within the chemical industry the numbers of chemicals handled not only 
increased in number but also became increasingly complex in their formulation and 
were manufactured using a variety of newly developed technical and scientific 
processes. The pace of change far outstripped legislation and examination. This 
becomes evident when it is seen that in 1925 less than 20 solvents were manufactured 
but only ten years later there were over 300 and yet the Chemical Works Regulations 
                                                 
31 J. Melling, ‘The Risks of Working and the Risks of Not Working: Trade Unions, Employers and 
Responses to the Risk of Occupational Illness in British Industry, c.1890-1940s’ pp.14 –34 in ESRC 
Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation, Discussion Paper No.12, December 2003, p.16 
32 R. Hyman, Industrial Relations, A Marxist Introduction, MacMillan, (London 1978), p.23 
33 G. Tweedale, Magic Mineral to Killer Dust, Turner & Newall and the Asbestos Hazard, Oxford 
University Press, (Oxford 2003), p.288 
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of 1922 covered all of these solvents.34 It has been estimated that by the late 1970s the 
international chemical industry produced 500 new chemicals and marketed over 
120,000 new synthetic compounds annually.35 Due to the high capital costs incurred 
on research and development, information on the chemical compounds and processes 
was guarded with only certain engineers, scientists, or chemists being in full 
possession of the knowledge.36 The importance of the secrecy attached to the job was 
expressly referred to in the contract of employment.37 Given that this secrecy existed 
in connection with the products and processes this would inevitably make it more 
difficult for trade unions or any other external party to establish just how safe or 
unsafe they were. As previously stated, the task faced by the trade unions was to 
provide conclusive proof of the existence of an occupational risk in order to have the 
process banned, safeguarded against or have those suffering from an illness or injury 
compensated. For those who may have suffered or witnessed others suffering from 
industrial diseases it was not enough to simply suspect that the process or material 
handled was the cause. Diseases such as cancer could be occupational, non-
occupational or a combination of both.  
The trade unions were under a moral obligation to mitigate the worst effects 
on the existing victims and pursuing compensation claims was one way of doing this. 
It was also argued by the trade unions that compensation law financially penalised the 
employer and that by winning more cases for the workers the employer would then be 
forced to save capital by implementing preventative measures. Whilst being perfectly 
logical at the time the decision to pursue compensation on this basis was perhaps 
naive and failed to take into full account the basic economic calculations that some 
employers chose to make. That is, by conducting (generally secretive) cost-benefit 
analyses some found that it was cheaper to pay compensation than to pay for more 
expensive preventative measures. Thus, the trade union belief in human morality was 
                                                 
34 TUC Report, 1945, p.296.  
35 C. Gill, R. Morris, and J. Eaton, Industrial Relations in the Chemical Industry, Saxon House, (Hants. 
1978), p.219  
36 In the post-war period research and development expenditure by the chemical industry exceeded that 
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Organization, Fifth Edition, Longman, (London 1970), p.212 
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overridden by the desire for capital accumulation. Prominent amongst those adopting 
this form of economic thinking into their business strategies have been the oil, 
asbestos, car, and chemical industries.38  
 
Trade Union Recruitment and Retention 
Trade unionism within the chemical industry has its origins in the last decade 
of the nineteenth century and campaigns by the Chemical and Copper Workers’ 
Union contributed to the establishment of safety rules and regulations for the 
relatively simple pre-war chemical processes.39 However, the pace of change and 
complexity within the industry would leave in its wake those who were concerned to 
monitor health and safety issues. This was the case whether it was to establish 
compensation payments or to have more stringent preventative measures put in place. 
Amongst the less prominent unions that recruited in the chemical industry were the 
Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW), the Union of Shop, 
Distributive and Allied Workers (USDAW) and the Union of Construction and Allied 
Trades and Technicians (UCATT). The prominent trade unions in the chemical sector 
from the early 1920s were the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) and 
the National Union of General and Municipal Workers (NUGMW) both of whose 
main interests and membership lay outside the chemical industry. Total trade union 
membership figures for 1914 to 1974 are available for the ‘chemical and allied 
industries’ sector but it is almost impossible to identify an accurate pattern for each 
separate union as they themselves kept no such specific records. The data that is 
available shows that in 1954 the TGWU represented 40,095 members across the 
industry rising to 48,528 by 1956.40 This membership increased marginally and in 
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1960 stood at 52,000.41 Without revealing his source Verma estimated that in 1963 
the TGWU had 60,000 members whilst the GMWU had slightly less than this 
figure.42 Of the other unions in 1963 USDAW claimed to have 15,000 members 
whilst the AUEW and other small craft unions had 24,000. UCATT had a relatively 
small membership of 3,000.43 The sluggish increases in membership experienced by 
the TGWU continued to be the norm and by 1966 they noted that they had 61,004 
members within the chemical industry.44 
In competition for members with the TGWU and NUGMW was the National 
Union of Drug and Chemical Workers (NUDCW). This union emerged in 1912 and 
by 1919 had 5,000 members but the economic depression saw its membership halved 
by 1922.45 Lerner provides a short history of this union noting the ‘poaching’ claims 
that surrounded its disaffiliation from the TUC in 1924.46 Renaming itself the 
Chemical Workers’ Union in 1936 the CWU was readmitted to the TUC in 1943 with 
a membership of 22,000. The CWU, a union born within the industry, continued to 
maintain a presence but argued that trade unionism in the chemical industry should be 
industry based and not general.47 Following years of campaigning, often in 
competition with the TGWU, the CWU decided in 1971 to amalgamate with the 
TGWU who as a result gained an estimated 7,000 former CWU members.48 
 A gender breakdown of union membership has not been fully established for 
the chemical industry and only Drake provides figures, which show that in 1914 there 
were 325 female trade union members and that by 1918 there were 3,000.49 Although 
non-quantifiable what is known is that many thousands of women entered the industry 
                                                 
41 Minutes and Reports of TGWU Chemical & Allied Trades National Committee, GEC Report, 
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42 C.Gill, R. Morris and J.Eaton, Industrial Relations in the Chemical Industry, Saxon House, (Hants 
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43 Ibid, p.123 
44 Minutes and Reports of TGWU Chemical & Allied Trades National Committee, September 1966, 
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46 Ibid 
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48 C.Gill, R. Morris and J.Eaton, Industrial Relations in the Chemical Industry, Saxon House, (Hants 
1978), p.147 
49 B. Drake, Women in Trade Unions, Virago, (London 1984) 
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during both world wars and exited it thereafter. For example, the presence of women 
is noticeable in the accident books of the United Alkali Company up to 1918 but 
thereafter the number of recorded accidents involving female workers is very much 
reduced.50 This firm embraced 38 factories and employed hundreds of munitions 
workers between the years 1914 to 1928 and it is not implausible to conclude that this 
reduction was due to the dismissal of the female employees. A similar pattern is seen 
for the period 1939 to 1945. One former chemical worker testified that during World 
War Two many women were employed at his chemical plant in Glasgow but ‘once 
the war finished the women were all disappeared’ except for those few who were 
retained to work in the canteen serving food.51 What is known and quantifiable is that 
for those women who did continue to work in the industry their position was marked 
by receiving the poorest pay with 51.5 per cent of the female manual workers in 1981 
earning under £80 whilst only 3 per cent of the male manual workers fell into the 
same category.52  
In order to appreciate the position of trade union membership within the 
chemical sector it is perhaps appropriate to see where they stood in comparison to 
other unions over the period 1914 to 1974. Thus, Table 9 compares the densities and 
membership of the coal mining, cotton and chemical trade unions for the period 1914-
74. The choice of coal and cotton has been made on the basis that these industries 
were large and were also involved in occupational health and safety issues. The data 
below reflects fluctuations in membership and density and Bain has suggested six 
main areas that impact on the growth and stability of trade unions. These are, the 
vagaries of the economic system, the recognition and acceptance of trade unionism by 
the state and the employer, the structure of the industry itself, personal and job-related 
characteristics, the composition of potential union membership, and union 
leadership.53 Where possible, it will be shown to what extent these factors played a 
part in shaping trade unionism within the industry. 
 
                                                 
50 United Alkali Company Limited, ‘Accident Books, 1914-1928’ DIC/UA8/5/11-16 
51 Interview D. Walker with Mr Richard Fitzpatrick, 26 August 2004, SOHC 
52 C. Pond, ‘Wages Councils, the Unorganised, and the Low Paid’, pp.179-208 in G.S. Bain (ed) 
Industrial Relations in Britain, Basil Blackwell, (Oxford 1983), pp.188-189 
53 G.S. Bain and R. Price, ‘Union Growth: Dimensions, Determinants, and Density’ pp.3-33 in G.S. 
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Table 9: British trade union densities for cotton, coal and chemicals, 1914-1974.  
   The figures in brackets signify trade union membership 
 
Year Chemicals & Allied 
Industries 
Cotton Coal Average for UK 
c.1914 11.0 (18,700) 49.1 (382,200) 74.1 (867,300) 23.0 (4,145,000) 
c.1920 23.6 (76,800) 78.5 (527,700) 92.4 (1,199,300) 45.2 (8,348,000) 
c.1933 10.5 (26,600) 51.4 (324,600) 52.4 (570,600) 22.6 (4,392,000) 
c.1948 35.3 (141,500) 78.3 (274,300) 86.4 (691,400) 45.2 (9,363,000) 
c.1968 39.4 (186,900) 81.0 (146,300) 89.9 (398,900) 44.0 (10,200,000) 
c.1974 48.4 (233,600) 101*(149,200) 96.1 (301,900) 50.4 (11,764,000) 
       
Source: G.S. Bain & R. Price, Profiles of Union Growth, Basil Blackwell, (Oxford 1980), pp.37-38 
* This figure is accounted for by the inclusion of active retired members.  
 
It can be seen that in all three sectors trade union membership and density increased 
in the period 1914-1920. The largest increases of all three belong to the ‘chemical and 
allied industries’ where union density doubled and membership quadrupled. One 
specific reason for this was the physical expansion made by the chemical industry to 
meet the demands of war and the increased supply of workers that were needed to 
meet this demand. The increases seen in all three during this period can also be 
accounted for by the government and employer acceptance of trade unionism and the 
existence of tight labour markets. Indeed, where employers attempted to hinder union 
recruitment the Ministry of Munitions intervened to rectify the position and 
consequently munitions workers ‘flocked into the unions.’54 To achieve acceptance 
by the government and employers the trade unions agreed to the conditions of the 
Munitions of War Act that banned strikes, made the restriction of output an offence, 
and put some safety regulations into abeyance. Following the membership advances 
made by the trade unions the 1920s were to become a pivotal moment for trade 
unionism but again this was especially so for the chemical sector and therefore this 
requires a more detailed and lengthy explanation.  
Staving off the earlier economic slump that had begun in 1922 Reader notes 
that the depression of 1929 turned expansion within the chemical industry into 
                                                 
54 H.A. Clegg, General Union in a Changing Society, A Short History of the National Union of General 
and Municipal Workers, 1889-1964, Basil Blackwell, (Oxford 1964), p.65 
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‘standstill or contraction.’55 Whilst this point is valid in economic terms it should also 
be noted that the decline in union density and membership can also be accounted for 
by the chemical employers’ attitude to trade unionism and particularly within Imperial 
Chemical Industries (ICI). This firm was an amalgamation of the four largest 
chemical firms in Britain and was formed shortly after the miners’ strike and General 
Strike of 1926.56 Both of these strikes ended in defeat for the trade unions but despite 
their victory employers remained concerned with the persistent and public evidence of 
conflict between labour and capital as well as the loss of around 162 million working 
(potentially profit maximising) days arising from these strikes.57 Three important 
issues arose as a result of these strikes. Firstly, in 1927 the Conservative government 
passed the Trade Disputes and Trade Union Act. This Act did not seek to ban trade 
unions but was designed to control and restrict them. Secondly, some trade union 
leaders and prominent employers became receptive to the idea that cooperative and 
consultative industrial relations were the way forward within capitalism. This idea 
briefly flickered into life in the Mond-Turner talks of January 1928. Thirdly, the state 
and leading employers realised that broadcasting and publishing were a ‘potent form 
of propaganda.’58 Sir Alfred Mond and his son Henry were in charge of all labour 
issues at ICI and were determined at the outset that the 33,000 employees should be 
loyal to the company and not to the trade unions. Although most chemical workers 
were deemed ‘semi’ or ‘unskilled’ their daily tasks revolved around an increasingly 
capital-intensive process technology and this meant that their co-operation was very 
important to the employer. To this end, ICI introduced a loyalty strategy- the profit-
sharing scheme – as one vital component within their range of welfarist policies. 
Similar schemes were introduced elsewhere in the industry including at Brunner 
Mond and in 1922 at Joseph Crossfield & Sons. At Crossfield a co-partnership 
scheme was introduced alongside other paternalist benefits such as, insurance 
schemes covering sickness, unemployment, and death, all of which were designed to 
induce company loyalty.59 Crossfield were also strongly anti-union with the leaders 
                                                 
55 W.J. Reader, Imperial Chemical Industries, A History, Volume II, The First Quarter-Century 1926-
1952, Oxford University Press, (London 1975), p.116 
56 The four firms involved were Brunner Mond & Company Ltd, Nobel Industries Ltd, the United 
Alkali Company Limited and The British Dyestuffs Corporation Limited. 
57 W.J. Reader, Imperial Chemical Industries, A History, Volume II, The First Quarter-Century 1926-
1952, Oxford University Press, (London 1975), p.58 
58 M. Morris, The General Strike, Penguin, (Middlesex 1976), p.251.   
59 A.E. Musson, Enterprise in Soap and Chemicals, Joseph Crossfield & Sons Limited, 1815-1965, 
Manchester University Press, (Manchester 1965), p.317  
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often referred to as ‘communists’ whilst in the company magazine, The Crossfield 
Flag, they emphasised ‘hard work, enthusiasm and loyalty’ in opposition to the 
unions ‘ca-canny.’60 In examining such ideas Fenelon argued in 1939 that by 
increasing the mutuality of interest and focussing interest on the accumulation of 
capital its purpose was to ‘bridge the gap between labour and capital.’61  
Alfred Mond, a right wing Victorian paternalist, firmly believed that the 
workers’ self-interest would cement labour to the company’s interest and, echoing the 
sentiments of the anti-trade union Economic League, Mond announced that ‘the best 
answer to socialism is to make every man a capitalist.’62 Industrial relations strategies 
within ICI were thus designed in such a way that any benefits that might be gained 
from employment had to be seen to have been gained from ICI and not the trade 
unions. In January 1928 the ICI magazine produced the illustration overleaf which 
was used to depict the ICI labour policy. Spike was a well-known cartoonist at the 
time and this may have been part of a deliberate campaign to make the message more 
digestible to the workers. Propaganda was used in Mond’s anti-trade union policy and 
the heavily subsidised ICI magazine was one vehicle that was used to deliver the anti-
trade union message. As a channel of communication this monthly magazine 
contained sixty-four pages of illustrations and news dealing with ‘all matters of 
interest to the workers.’63 In its first year of publication the magazine cost 4p per copy 
to produce, retailed for less than 1p and 400,000 copies were bought by the 47,000 
strong workforce.64 With a content designed to create a feeling of ‘harmonious 
industrial co-operation’ the magazine was circulated widely amongst the ICI 
employees and presumably their families.65  
 
 
                                                 
60 Ibid, p.318 
61 K.G. Fenelon, Management and Labour, Methuen & Co, (London 1939), p.259 
62 W.J. Reader, Imperial Chemical Industries, A History, Volume II, The First Quarter-Century 1926-
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63 Ibid, p.62 
64 Ibid, p.57 and p.62 
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    Illustration 8: The Bridge, by Spike, 1928 
                Source: W.J. Reader, Imperial Chemical Industries, (London 1975), p.46 
 
The illustration is very similar to those that were used in children’s books to 
depict the Prince who, after an arduous journey, finds the castle where the Sleeping 
Beauty lies waiting for his embrace. The Sleeping Beauty is a simple tale of love at 
first sight, has clear definitions of good and evil, and concludes with a happy ending. 
Text was inserted by Spike to provide clear signposting to the viewer. Labour (the 
Prince) is seen emerging from the dark and densely entangling mass (strikes, lock-
outs, poor industrial relations) and, in contrast to what is being left behind, sees the 
castle (ICI) standing in bright sunlight, uncluttered. The bridge of the ‘new labour 
programme’ has been lowered indicating that labour can safely avoid the troubled 
waters of the ‘out of date methods.’ The portcullis has been lifted and the door of the 
protective castle has been left open for labour to enter. The sturdy and protective 
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walls of the castle are constructed and reinforced with a selection of ICI’s welfarist 
measures that included, profit sharing schemes, improved status schemes, works 
councils and increased security.66 On entering this castle labour will see that the 
keystone of co-operation is situated firmly between management and the employees 
signifying that co-operation is vital to both as without it the secure castle will be in 
danger of collapsing. Once inside the castle labour will fall in love with and embrace 
the Sleeping Beauty (capitalism) and both labour and capitalism can live happily ever 
after. No evidence exists to precisely reflect what the ICI workers thought of this 
illustration and its message at the time but by adopting a strategy of benign 
paternalism ICI had narrowed the potential areas for negotiation and the already 
weakened trade unions began to be construed as oppositional. Between 1927 and 
1950 trade union membership in ICI plummeted from approximately 60 per cent to 
around 20 per cent of the workforce despite a general increase in trade union 
membership in other firms from 1935 and into the war years.67  
The rearmament programmes and the material demands of the Second World 
War revived the economy and as before with war, the government again intervened in 
industry and embraced trade unions in an effort to avoid disruptions to production. 
The low levels of density within the chemical sector can be seen and an explanation 
has been offered above as to why this was the case. From 1948, the increases in 
membership and density were facilitated by the changed political scene as well as by 
the increased numbers who were now needed to fill the jobs in the expanded chemical 
industry. These workers were now helping to produce a much wider range of products 
that included synthetic resins, dyestuffs and detergents, as well as chemical 
fertilisers.68 Whilst membership continued to increase in the chemical and allied 
sector the density remained stubbornly low in comparison to the other industries. 
Indeed, slow progress marked the entire period with the density in the chemical sector 
always remaining below 50 per cent. That is, actual trade union membership in the 
chemical industry was always less than half of the potential membership for every 
year of the sixty years between 1914 and 1974. Taking into consideration the other 
variables that existed it is at least possible to argue that the anti-union strategies of the 
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chemical employers had influenced the pattern of trade union recruitment at least up 
to the late 1940s. Chemicals were never nationalised and therefore comparing the 
density of the chemical sector with the UK average would be misleading. 
Nonetheless, increased government intervention in industrial relations from 1945 may 
well account for the improvements to chemical union density seen by the 1960s and 
1970s.  
 
The Trade Union Response to Occupational Health 
At the beginning of this chapter a brief overview of the period 1914 to 1918 
was provided. It was seen that although trade unions had called for industrial diseases 
to be scheduled the state and employers had sought to evade their full responsibility 
for the health of the workers. Apart from this episode no other issues on occupational 
health could be found in the archives for these years in relation to chemicals and trade 
unions. One possible reason for this was that it was during the war that the industry 
expanded and most of those joining trade unions had no experience of this sector. 
More telling perhaps is that much of the industrial diseases associated with the 
industry had long latency periods and were yet to be brought to the fore. Welfarist 
employers in the meantime dealt with the many accidents (burns, scalds, eye damage, 
crushed limbs, etc) by paying reduced wages to the survivors and making one-off 
payments to widows. This system was operated at the United Alkali Company (UAC), 
a firm composed of 34 firms with the combined will to address labour issues at a 
variety of levels. Within the UAC there was 7,254 recorded accidents and 67 fatalities 
between the years 1914 to 1928.69 Many of these victims received some form of 
monetary compensation although this was mostly at the behest of the firm who 
controlled the scheme. The lack of consistency can be seen in the following two 
examples that both occurred early in 1919 at the same factory. The first case involved 
a 72 year-old labourer with 14 years experience who ‘accidentally’ inhaled chlorine 
gas after it had escaped from a fractured pipe. Unable to carry on working he received 
a third of his pay for 28 weeks until the employer ‘granted pension due to old age.’70 
There is no mention in any of the accident books of ‘failure to properly maintain plant 
equipment.’ The second case involved a 49 year-old man with 12 years experience 
who ‘inhaled gas that was floating about.’ No claim was made, the man did not return 
                                                 
69 ‘Accidents Books’ of United Alkali Company Limited, DIC/UA8/5/11-22 
70 Details of an accident at Allhusen Works, 12/2/1919, DIC/UA8/15 
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to the works and no compensation was paid out.71 With very limited trade union 
penetration it was mostly individuals that could appeal for reduced wages after being 
injured in the employ of the United Alkali Company. 
It was previously suggested that the welfarist employers’ approach to 
industrial relations won over the hearts and minds of many workers. In 1923, the firm 
of Brunner Mond published a book to celebrate their fiftieth anniversary and this 
contained the description of a presentation of an illuminated address made in 1920 to 
the directors of the firm. Although apologies were given for their non-attendance the 
following individuals were willing to go along with the sentiments contained in the 
address, J. Fitton, Amalgamated Engineering Union; G.H. Posties, Weaver 
Watermen’s Association; and the Rt. Hon. J.R. Clynes MP, National Union of 
General Workers.72 In 1923, the AEU members presented their own illuminated 
address to the directors of Brunner Mond. This address complimented the employer 
on the ‘cordial relationships’ that existed between the firm and its employees.73 Not 
all workers shared this point of view and at Castner Kellner Alkali (a part of Brunner 
Mond) one manager reported that some ‘fiery characters’ had said ‘things would not 
be right with the workers until they had a forceful leader like Lenin.’74 However, 
there is no evidence of any revolution or even of industrial disputes at this time. 
Indeed, the UAC stated that their operations for war purposes had been on a ‘gigantic 
scale’ but that they had experienced ‘an absence of anything approaching labour 
troubles.’75 Demonstrating the weakness of the trade union movement within the 
chemical sector this statement was made at a time when strikes had doubled in 
intensity in other sections of British industry.76 Indeed, at the end of the First World 
War the UAC were cited by a government report as a model to others on how to 
conduct harmonious industrial relations.77  
                                                
In an effort to update the 1893 rules and regulations the government did 
introduce the Chemical Works Regulations of 1922. These were framed just at the 
point when the chemical industry was undergoing massive developments and 
 
71 Details of an accident at Allhusen Works, 18/3/1919, DIC/UA8/15 
72 The 50th Anniversary, BM&Co, 1873-1923. The book forms a part of a private collection of a former 
chemical worker.  
73 Archives and records collected for the 50th Anniversary history of Brunner Mond, DIC/BM14/13  
74 Internal Report dated 25 February 1922, DIC/BM20/102  
75 The Times, ‘United Alkali Company (Limited), War Work,’ April 20, 1917, p.13 
76 A.J. McIvor, A History of Work in Britain, 1880-1950, Palgrave, (Hampshire 2001), p.160 
77 P. Pagnamenta, and R. Overy, All Our Working Lives, British Broadcasting Corporation, (London 
1984), p.155 
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therefore they were drawn up before any of the new materials and processes could be 
included. As has been shown, the trade unions were in no position to make any claims 
about these materials and how they may have affected the workers health and this 
position would continue for some time. In 1928 the TUC noted the work being 
undertaken by the Industrial Health Education Society and chose to support this 
organisation by making a financial contribution. Founded in 1925, the IHES provided 
a series of ‘health talks’ to industrial and other workers across Britain with the 
purpose of imparting knowledge on how best to mitigate health risks at work. This 
organisation delivered 3,500 such talks in a ten-year period.78 The TUC could only 
hope that by supporting such an organisation the information supplied by the IHES 
would help to expand the knowledge of occupational health amongst trade union 
members.79 By 1928, some knowledge had reached the Workers’ Union who began to 
raise the issue of the health problems being caused by the ‘large amount of chemicals’ 
used in the ‘new’ artificial silk industry.80 This union called upon the TUC to pursue 
the government for the establishment of a Committee that would investigate the 
‘causes of disabilities to the workers in such factories with a view to the prevention of 
the same or failing such prevention to ensure that the workers concerned should be 
fully covered by the Workmen’s Compensation Acts.’81 The following year the 
weakened TUC could only report that the government had no intention of opening an 
inquiry, that the industry would not be scheduled, and that to deal with the problems 
raised the Chief Inspector of Factories would meet with the employers.82 
Commenting on the weakness of the trade unions in 1929 ICI stated that the union 
presence was small and useful enough for indicating issues of concern to the firm but 
not large or powerful enough to do anything about them.83  
                                                
In 1931, the British Medical Association proposed a series of changes to the 
general medical services being provided. In response to the proposals the TUC 
General Council recommended the need for more specific treatment being made 
available to workers so that a proper diagnosis and treatment programme could be 
followed. Bevin, the leader of the TGWU and member of the General Council stated, 
 
78 The Times, 1935, p.10 
79 TUC Report, 1928, p.187  
80 TUC Report, 1928, p.375  
81 TUC Report, 1928, p.374 
82 TUC Report, 1929, p.127 
83 W.J. Reader, Imperial Chemical Industries, A History, Volume II, The First Quarter-Century 1926-
1952, Oxford University Press, (London 1975), p.66 
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‘If any alterations were to be made in the existing medical services the trade union 
movement would stress the preventative point of view rather than the curative.’84 Sir 
Thomas Legge, appointed in 1930 by the TUC as Medical Consultant and Advisor to 
the Social Insurance Department, supported the General Council’s position and 
complained that his attempts to give lectures to medical students on industrial 
medicine had always been ‘thwarted.’85 By this Legge meant that his fellow medical 
professionals had not supported this specific teaching. The previous year Legge had 
suggested that the General Council of the TUC write to the Minister of Health to 
support his desire to be added to the list of appointees for the new London School of 
Hygiene as ‘none of those being appointed were likely to insist on the claims of 
industrial medicine and surgery.’86 Given the position of the trade unions at the time 
most of these points were met with a concerned indifference. This confirms McIvor’s 
view that ‘the TUC was denied access to the corridors of political power throughout 
the inter-war years. Pro-labour legislation capable of reforming exploitative working 
conditions was difficult to attain.’87 Nonetheless, the weak position of the trade 
unions did not prevent them from at least attempting to keep the issues on the agenda. 
By 1938 they had again raised concerns about the lack of research being undertaken 
that could have provided the necessary proof required to establish cases of industrial 
disease.88 Bladder tumours were one of those diseases identified and the Factory 
Inspectorate and the trade unions had initially raised these in the mid 1930s. Indeed, 
the Factory Inspectorate had recorded the presence of many bladder tumours and in 
1933 had reported 28 deaths caused by this disease.89 As will be discussed below this 
particular disease would continue to be researched for many years to establish 
whether or not it was an industrial disease. Whilst that process was ongoing efforts to 
limit exposure and to have it officially prescribed as an industrial disease (thereby 
allowing workers to be compensated by right and without litigation) were made by the 
trade unions. 
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It wasn’t the absence of trade union will or effort that was preventing research 
from being undertaken but a lack of resources on their own part as well as in other 
quarters. This can be seen when in 1939 the Industrial Solvents Committee of the 
Medical Research Council (MRC) met to discuss the lack of facilities, personnel and 
funding to deal with the issue of toxic poisoning associated with solvents. In a private 
letter from Dr Morgan of the MRC to Mr Smyth at the Social Insurance section of the 
TUC it was stated that: 
 
It is tremendously important that the work in industrial solvents and 
scientific investigation of the toxic and harmful properties of these 
substances should be investigated and known; and the TUC Social 
Insurance Department should be ready at any time to press the 
government the necessity for a continuance and development of this 
work.90 
 
A second point was raised in this letter concerning a representative of the employers’ 
group, the Association of British Chemical Manufacturers (ABCM), who had 
attended the meeting. According to Morgan this representative had asked the MRC 
Committee if it would pay for the investigations of any chemical substance if 
requested by chemical firms. In response to this question the Committee had stated 
that ‘this could not be done’ as, a) it might be objected to on principle, b) it might 
mean delay and postponement of the work already in hand and c) applications might 
be so numerous that the Committee’s pathologist would be unable to undertake any 
other work.91 The questioning by the ABCM representative is very interesting and 
could be interpreted as an attempt to ascertain more fully what the MRC Committee’s 
position was with regard to resources. Whilst the question may have been asked 
innocently or even out of concern Morgan saw it as important enough to write to 
Smyth about it at the TUC. Clearly, once the MRC situation had been relayed to the 
chemical employers via the ABCM it would become common knowledge amongst 
employers that the MRC were unable to fully investigate their industry. There is no 
record of the ABCM offering to foot the bill for this research once they knew that the 
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MRC resources were not available but perhaps minds were elsewhere as yet another 
war loomed.  
With war, the government once again sought trade union support and 
compliance. In 1940, the leader of the TGWU was asked by Attlee, the leader of the 
Labour Party, if he was prepared to become Minister of Labour within a coalition 
government. Bevin responded by stating that ‘if the Ministry of Labour remains as it 
is now, purely a glorified conciliation board with the register for national service, 
unemployment and public assistance, it will be a waste of time.’92 It did not remain so 
and one of the first things that Bevin did on his appointment was to transfer the 
administration of factory legislation and the Factory Inspectorate to his ministry.93 As 
a member of the War Cabinet and Minister of Labour, Bevin increased the number of 
doctors in industry from 80 to more than 1,000 and nurses to 7,800.94 These efforts, 
whilst laudable, did not by themselves resolve the many problems faced by the 
workers. Accidents, both fatal and non-fatal increased with most found in the 
munitions sectors of industry. The incidence of industrial disease amongst aniline 
workers rose from 10 in 1937 peaking at 249 by 1941 whilst the total numbers gassed 
by carbon monoxide and nitrous fumes rose from 196 peaking at 782 in the same 
period.95 Nevertheless, the wartime improvements that were introduced to 
government factories across Britain set a higher standard than had gone before and 
there had been an increased interest shown in occupational health issues. Attending a 
conference on industrial health in 1943 Bevin stated that: 
 
The great strides in production which we have achieved in this struggle 
would never have been possible without all the efforts to improve 
safety, health and hygiene in the past year … what we have done 
during the war must be consolidated and developed after the war.96 
 
                                                 
92 M. Stephens, Ernest Bevin, Unskilled Labourer and World Statesman, TGWU Publication, (London 
1981), p.90 
93 H.A. Waldron, ‘Occupational Health During the Second World War: Hope Deferred or Hope 
Abandoned?’ pp.197-212 in Medical History, (41) 1997, p.206, footnote (33)  
94 M. Stephens, Ernest Bevin, Unskilled Labourer and World Statesman, TGWU Publication, (London 
1981), p.102 
95 H.A. Waldron, ‘Occupational Health During the Second World War: Hope Deferred or Hope 
Abandoned?’ pp.197-212 in Medical History, (41) 1997, pp.203-204 
96 Ibid, p.206 
 206
Many trade unions grew in strength during the war and as can be seen from Table 9 
between 1933 and 1948 trade union membership in the chemical sector more than 
tripled. This was clearly a pivotal period although following this surge a density of 
35.3 per cent was still 10 per cent lower than the average membership across the 
United Kingdom. In other words it was still the case that almost two out of every 
three chemical workers were not in a trade union. Gill et al have also noted that by the 
late 1940s the majority of those that had joined were craftsmen in the North West 
area.97  
Wartime memories provided by a member of the NUGMW can perhaps help 
shed some light on how a chemical worker viewed occupational health at the time. 
This man was employed between 1939 and 1945 in a chromate processing plant near 
Glasgow, an industry that was known to have carried health risks since the late 1890s. 
The man’s father and brother had lost the septum of their noses due to the corrosive 
nature of the chrome dust and this would also happen to him. Asked if his union did 
anything about health and safety he replied, 
 
I don’t think so, no. I don’t think they were up tae that as regards 
health and safety but their mainstay wis getting you a bit a pay, getting 
ye a rise and such like. 
 
This worker testified that within the works, ‘there was always dust flying about’ and it 
had ‘nae windows’ and ‘nae ventilation system’ and was ‘always dusty and stoorie.’ 
Asked if the union had raised any issues about the prevalence of chrome ulcerations 
he replied:  
 
Well there was nothing they could do, you know whit a mean, it was 
up to yerself, if ye were a bit careless or …different if there was a leak 
somewhere and wisnae getting repaired, but there was always leaks all 
round the place ye know, high strength stuff. 
 
The former worker was then asked if he had ever known of anyone called an 
Industrial Medical Officer? His response was ‘No’ Had he ever heard of workmen’s 
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compensation whilst working there? Again, he responded, ‘No’ Had he ever seen a 
factory inspector? Once more his response was in the negative, ‘No’ Had he ever seen 
warning notices on the walls about the dangers of chrome? ‘No’ Had any of the 
managers warned him about any dangers when he had first started? ‘No, yer in here 
tae work – that’s it’98 This wartime memory clearly reveals a lack of awareness of 
what should have been happening in the workplace and perhaps blame could be aimed 
at the local trade union representative for not ensuring that this information had been 
relayed to the members. Nonetheless, the proper maintenance of plant was detailed in 
the Factory Acts (1937) and the warning posters of the dangers associated with the 
process were supposed to be placed by the employer in a prominent position for all 
their workers to read.99 Not to do so was also a breach of the rules and regulations 
introduced in 1922. Crucial for the health of the worker, information on the poster 
included advice on how to reduce the risk of damage to the septum or contracting 
chrome ulcers. This legislation however was of no use if it was not being 
implemented. 
Chrome ulceration had been a notifiable industrial disease since 1922 and the 
factory inspectorate had emphasised the need to reduce dust levels years before this 
legislation was introduced and for many years thereafter. Whilst the employer had a 
legal responsibility to know the rules and regulations there was little evidence in this 
case to show that this was happening. Conversely, prior to, and during most of the 
war, chemical trade union membership remained relatively low and unable to take a 
proactive stance on issues of occupational health. An ignorance of the dangers 
associated with the materials was one reason but perhaps this arose out of the lack of 
published materials dealing with occupational health risks. Bernal, writing in 1944, 
noted that the much of the research of the Industrial Health Research Board was not 
even read far less implemented because the IHRB was ‘precluded from popularising 
its findings by risk of becoming involved in controversy to an extent which might 
impair its neutral and detached position.’100 Despite this, some knowledge of 
occupational health was able to filter through and this was aided by the publication of 
the British Journal of Industrial Medicine that began its life in 1943. By the end of the 
war an improved awareness on occupational health issues had begun to take shape 
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and the trade union movement would respond with a heightened interest to the 
dangers associated with chrome and other chemicals from the late 1940s.   
V.L. Allen has shown that in response to the ongoing recruitment of the CWU, 
the TGWU decided to establish a chemical section within their union. In 1943 it was 
stated by the TGWU that this was being done to give the chemical workers’ 
membership  ‘a sense of being a national entity within the union.’101 Thus, in 1944 the 
TGWU Chemical Section of the National Group Committee came into being. At the 
inaugural meeting of this committee on 11 July the matter of industrial disease was 
discussed at length. The National Officer, H.R. Nichols, outlined the problem that 
chemical workers faced in relation to diseases that they had experienced but which 
had not been scheduled under the Workman’s Compensation Acts. The discussion 
then considered a financial compensation arrangement that had been made with the 
chemical employers through the Home Office. This arrangement ensured that those 
workers affected by industrial disease ‘were dealt with not less favourably than they 
would have been under the Acts.’102 It was noted that there were no reported 
problems with the firms paying the agreed amounts and that any application made for 
scheduling might have an adverse effect on this arrangement. The Committee were 
clearly unsure of their position at this stage and on 4 August a letter was sent to the 
area secretaries, trade group secretaries and all officers concerned informing them of 
the discussion and adding that: 
 
The Committee decided that it was preferable to examine ways and 
means of minimizing incidence of the disease by way of ascertaining 
whether improvements in plant, design and operation could be 
introduced. If you have any cases which have arisen in your area where 
chemical workers suspected of suffering from an industrial disease not 
scheduled have been refused compensation, will you please let me 
have particulars together with any special observations you may be 
able to make in connection with the improvement of general working 
conditions.103 
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 Having recognised the enormous difficulties in having occupational diseases 
scheduled the TGWU had pragmatically accepted that some form of compensation 
should be paid. However, it is clear from the above statement that with this payment 
in place the TGWU’s preference was to seek out ways of preventing industrial 
diseases occurring. Another chemical union at this time was also strongly of the 
opinion that the prevention of poisoning and disease was an urgent issue. In 1945, the 
Assistant General Secretary of the CWU called for the industry to be cleaned up and 
to emphasise his point he citied 441 cases of chrome ulceration, 580 of 
epitheliomatous ulceration, 165 of aniline poisoning, the high levels of gassing and 
23,724 cases of dermatitis that had all been reported between 1943 and 1945. 
According to the CWU cleaning up the industry was ‘more important than wages.’104 
Also in 1945 the National Secretary of the TGWU chemical committee was 
seeking further information about the areas where bladder tumours were occurring so 
that some idea could be obtained of the incidence as well as the treatment being 
offered.105 In April of that year he reported that correspondence had been entered into 
between the TUC and the Home Office with the Home Office identifying ‘difficulties 
connected with the scheduling of this disease.’106 These difficulties remained and at 
this stage the TGWU appear to have taken the view that until the disease could be 
scheduled the arrangements with the employer should be kept in place. There was no 
mention in the TGWU minutes about any consideration being given for the 
withdrawal of their members from this area of dangerous work. Indeed, concern to 
maintain the compensation arrangements with the employer was embedded and in 
1948 one delegate to the chemical group pointed out a ‘mistake’ that had been made 
in the minutes of the TGWU engineering group. The engineering group had written in 
their minutes that ‘it was deemed advisable that papilloma be placed on the list of 
scheduled diseases’ whilst the concerned chemical delegate pointed out that this 
should have read ‘inadvisable’ so that the arrangements with the employer would 
remain intact.107  
                                                 
104 B. Edwards, Chemicals, Servant or Master? Life or Death? National Labour Press, (London 1945), 
p.28 
105 Minutes and Reports of TGWU, MIN 63, January 1945, MSS.126/TG/449/E 
106 Minutes and Reports of TGWU, MIN 106, April 1945, MSS.126/TG/449/E 
107 Minutes and Reports of TGWU, MIN 405, April 1948, MSS.126/TG/449/E 
 210
It should be noted however that having this compensation in place did not 
preclude further attempts by the TGWU to have the risks associated with the work 
identified and employers were now at last making efforts to reduce the incidence of 
exposure. Indeed, both the ABCM and the Association of Chemical and Allied 
Employers (AC&AE) jointly appointed a health and safety officer in 1951.108 
Following some negotiation with the employers one delegate reported that he had 
managed to obtain ‘substantial improvements’ in the conditions attached to the 
manufacture of benzidene and informed the TGWU Committee that a new plant was 
to be built that would ‘eliminate the dangers’ inherent with the manufacture of this 
substance.109 To what extent the employers were simply appeasing the trade unions 
cannot be stated with any surety but writing in the British Journal of Industrial 
Medicine in 1949 Goldblatt discussed the precautions that had been introduced to 
chemical works. Noting the improvements Goldblatt emphasised that it remained the 
case that the workers came into ‘significant contact with a great variety of compounds 
among which the supposed bladder carcinogens must be included.’110 The tumours 
found, were, he thought, the result of exposure to aniline, ά-naphthylamine and β-
naphthylamines and benzidene. It should be noted that although Goldblatt had 
produced a scientific report on the incidence of tumours the language he chose to use 
in connection with his findings were hedged with a certain amount of uncertainty. 
This uncertainty was confirmed when the TGWU Committee agreed that the National 
Officer should write to the Legal Department of the TGWU to find out what progress 
was being made on papilloma of the bladder in relation to the National Health 
Insurance Act.111 The Legal Department duly replied in January 1950 stating that: 
 
With reference to getting this disease prescribed, this does not appear 
to be possible at the present time owing to the difficulties of diagnosis 
and relating the disease to the employment. I am however pleased to 
tell you that some important research work is going on under the 
auspices of the MRC the expense of which, I understand, is being 
borne by the employers in the industry. This work is on an extensive 
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footing and it may be some time before there are any results but I will 
communicate with you as soon as I learn anything as to progress.112 
 
Whilst the MRC research was ongoing the TGWU raised an appeal under the 
National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act 1946, at a tribunal in Huddersfield in 
1950 in an attempt to advance the case for papilloma of the bladder to be recognised 
as an industrial disease. This shows that the concerns voiced by the delegate in 1948 
not to have the disease scheduled was no longer the official position. The case 
concerned a chemical worker who had worked with β-naphthylamine for a 
considerable time period when in July 1949 he became incapable to work. The 
tribunal Commissioner stated that the real question at issue was: 
 
Whether the claimant had been in an occupation involving the handling 
of or exposure to the fumes of or vapour containing a nitro-or-amido-
derivative of benzene or of a homologue of benzene. More narrowly 
stated, the case turned upon the question of whether beta 
naphthylamine was an amido-derivative of benzene or of a homologue 
of benzene.113 
 
A very detailed and complex chemical explanation then followed on the properties of 
the chemicals in question and whether beta-naphthylamine was an amino-derivative 
of benzene or of a homologue of benzene. The Commissioner stated ‘The claimants 
case fails, in my opinion, because beta-naphthylamine is neither an amino-derivative 
of benzene nor a homologue of benzene’ adding ‘I think that I should be legislating 
rather than interpreting existing legislation if I assumed to attribute to the word 
homologue some unrecognised meaning which I made bold to define.’114 The appeal 
was dismissed. 
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Although defeated, correspondence was entered into between the TUC and the 
TGWU on the issue of the precise wording and scientific terms that would have to be 
used in future cases.115 Letters were then sent to the appropriate trade union sections 
informing them of the decision and the reasons for dismissal. In April 1951 the 
Huddersfield and District Associated Trades and Industrial Council wrote to the 
General Secretary of the TUC to thank the TUC for the information on the case and to 
express their appreciation for the efforts being made, including the representations 
that had resulted in the MRC scientific research. The Huddersfield District were 
however ‘perturbed’ at the high rate of the disease and wanted to know, a) were the 
British Empire Cancer Committee doing any research, b) had meetings taken place 
with the Chief Inspector of Factories, c) was there any action being taken by the 
Ministry of National Insurance.116  In reply the TUC stated that representations had 
been made to the Ministries concerned for the disease to be prescribed but that this 
request had been denied because the research being conducted by the Chester Beattie 
Cancer Research Institute was not yet complete. It was further noted that the British 
Empire Cancer group were not researching this disease but that the Chief Inspector of 
Factories had been informed of the unions position and that the inspectorate 
themselves had repeatedly noted the presence of the disease since 1931.117 
Whilst it is clear that many interested parties knew there was a health problem 
it had been impossible to speed up the research results that were a necessary 
requirement of both legal and medical institutions to officially confirm this. Much of 
the delay it should be noted was due to the epidemiological methods that were a 
necessary part of this work. However, in 1951 the Legal Officer of the TGWU wrote 
to inform the Committee that the research, although ongoing, was now nearing 
completion and that the TUC would continue to press for the disease to be 
prescribed.118 The following year the Ministry of National Insurance wrote to the 
TUC about the delay having received a reply to their enquiries about this from the 
ABCM. The ABCM letter was marked ‘CONFIDENTIAL’ and the TUC were asked 
by the Ministry to treat it as such. The ABCM outlined their position with regards to 
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the implementation of their compensation scheme shortly before the war. This, they 
stated, had been implemented due to the difficulties encountered in ‘devising 
satisfactory definitions under which the disease could be defined.’119 It was further 
explained that the necessary research to discover the causes of the disease had been 
postponed due to the war but that a five-year scheme, financed by the industry, had 
been instigated in 1948. It finally stated: 
 
The draft report of the survey has only recently become available and 
is now awaiting consideration and discussion by the joint body of 
subscribers. It is the intention of the industry that the report should be 
made available to your Ministry once they are satisfied with the 
findings.120 
 
The TUC was not a subscriber and was therefore unable to hear what issues needed to 
be discussed in order to express a satisfaction about the findings. It is also evident that 
the chemical trade unions were not party to these discussions at all leaving only those 
who would never be exposed to the risks coldly discussing this issue. Having received 
their reply the TGWU delegates expressed some satisfaction that the process was 
nearing an end and had earlier suggested that one consequence of the trade union 
persistence on this issue had been that ‘greater improvements had been made in the 
methods of preventing this disease than ever before’ and that at one workplace 
techniques had been developed that might even eliminate the disease.121  
Such acclaim was not wholesale and some criticised the approach taken by the 
TUC and TGWU. Several pieces of correspondence provide evidence that also 
include criticism of the employers’ attitude to the loss and damage to life. Frustrated 
by the lack of any signs of progress the CWU wrote to the TUC in May 1951 seeking 
any material that the TUC might have in their possession to help the CWU with a fatal 
accident case they were hoping to contest in the courts. The CWU noted that: 
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ICI together with a number of chemical establishments are admittedly 
fully aware of the dangers of papilloma arising from particular work 
and whilst they have explored every known possibility of preventing 
the contraction of this disease the answer has not yet been found. Our 
point in this case will be that knowing of this danger the employers are 
gambling with the men’s health and lives to carry on their manufacture 
when in our view they should cease manufacture entirely unless they 
can guarantee reasonable safety.122 
 
In February 1952 the General Secretary of the NUGMW wrote to the General 
Secretary at the TUC about the papilloma compensation scheme in operation at ICI. 
Requesting that the industrial disease be recognised as such within the Industrial 
Injuries Act he noted, ‘the fact that ICI are paying this compensation means that they, 
as a private company, have recognised that certain processes cause death.’123 In 
August 1952 the TUC received a terse letter from a Mr Carter, a former union 
member and chemical worker who was aggrieved with the arrangements that had been 
made between the unions and the employers. He noted that the TUC had given ‘their 
blessing’ to this arrangement ‘no doubt due to the efforts of the TGWU’ and the 
former worker proceeded to provide details of cases where compensation had either 
not been paid or where so little had been paid as to make little difference.124 This 
former chemical worker had been employed at Clayton Aniline until 1937 but later 
discovered that a tumour had developed in his bladder. He had not suspected that his 
employment was the cause until told of this possibility by a specialist (not his union). 
He then claimed against Clayton Aniline and received £5 per week for a set period of 
time but in return had to sign a document stating that no further claim could be made 
against the firm. Mr Carter stated: 
 
Well, I want to say this, I did not pay trade union contributions all my 
life to have a trade union of the TUC assist a firm to jeopardise the 
interests of my family. … Also I should like to ask is the TUC satisfied 
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that adequate precautions are being taken now to safeguard the health 
of the workers at the Clayton Aniline? I am sure this is not the case and 
I would like to point out that even now the management of the Clayton 
Aniline hold the view that alpha naphthylamine is a safe substance. In 
answer to this I would refer you to the evidence in the recent Dr 
Trumper v ICI Case.125 
 
The legal case referred to above (Trumper v. Imperial Chemical Industries), was 
conducted in 1952. Trumper had started work with ICI in 1946 as a personnel 
manager at their Wilton Works in Middlesborough. He alleged that he had been 
victimised as he had openly expressed his concerns that the new plant design failed to 
give adequate protection to the workers from ά-naphthylamine, a suspected 
carcinogen. Trumper was warned that continued criticism would lead to his dismissal 
but he did continue to criticise and was dismissed in 1949. At the hearing it was 
alleged that ICI had sacked Trumper so as to ‘keep the danger of naphthylamine 
secret and protect the company.’126 ICI denied that this was the case citing that they, 
along with the TUC, had ‘for a long time been trying to get this particular form of 
cancer made a scheduled disease.’ This particular statement is interesting in that it can 
be seen that ICI were happy to have the firm publicly associated with the actions of 
the trade unions. Whilst ICI provided compensation voluntarily there was a cost for 
this provision. If they could succeed in helping to have the disease scheduled they 
could not only enhance their claim to be a viable replacement for trade unions but 
they could also save money. Trumper claimed that the complexity of the language 
surrounding the efforts for scheduling led to confusion about what was actually being 
discussed, namely, cancer. ICI then claimed that they paid compensation and were 
therefore not hiding the truth. Trumper responded to this by stating that he had 
opposed compensation payments as this prevented many cases from coming out into 
the open. Certainly Mr Carter’s evidence that he had to sign away any further claims 
for his industrial disease would have given weight to this view. It was even accepted 
by ICI that Dr Goldblatt had publicly protested against the fact that it was not a 
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scheduled disease and that the workers should ‘not have been left to the generosity of 
industrialists making ex gratia payments.’127 
The original letter from Mr Carter ‘criticising the special scheme’ had been 
passed to the Social Insurance Department of the TUC who in turn had copied it to the 
TGWU.128 Having received no reply Mr Carter wrote again on 2nd October wanting 
to know if any action was being considered by the TUC.129 On 3rd October this letter 
was passed on to the TGWU as well as a copy of the reply sent from the TUC to Mr 
Carter which stated: 
 
I think I should make it quite clear that both the TUC and the unions 
concerned have made repeated and vigorous representations to have 
cancer of the bladder treated as an industrial disease under the 
Industrial Injuries Act. It is important to stress this as your letter 
suggests some misunderstanding of the position. Following our 
representations, detailed medical research has been undertaken but 
there seems little likelihood of getting what we want until this is 
completed. However we have been assured that the results are likely to 
be available before long. As you no doubt know, the disease occurs 
non-industrially as well as industrially and it is therefore not possible 
to attribute every case automatically to the employment. Regarding the 
detailed cases quoted in your correspondence, the right way to get 
them investigated would be to advise the individuals concerned to 
pursue the matter through their own unions.130 
 
The TUC were clearly of the view that the position they had taken was the correct one 
and it is difficult to argue against this in light of fact that completed research was a 
necessary requirement for the scheduling of any industrial disease. The frustration of 
knowing that people were dying as a result of their work was evident and 
understandable although what the CWU, the NUGMW or even Mr Carter were not 
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prepared to fully realise or accept was that at this stage the deciding powers within the 
scientific, medical or legal establishments would not have agreed with them. This 
tends to support the views that have been expressed by Melling earlier, that is, 
institutional rules were indeed defining the circumstances over which the trade unions 
had limited control.   
In addition to the risks associated with ά-naphthylamine, β-naphthylamine and 
benzene new chemical risks appeared in 1953 in the shape of Methyl Ethyl Ketone 
(MEK) and Vinyl Chloride. These chemicals were produced on both sides of the 
Atlantic and according to Markowitz and Rosner who studied the US industry: 
 
After World War II the production of new petrochemical synthetic 
materials gave rise to a new set of concerns. Unlike lead, many of 
these chemicals and products were of unknown toxicity. When the 
chemical industry’s own research indicated the possible 
carcinogenicity of vinyl chloride, the industry embarked on a serious 
effort to mislead the public and avoid federal regulation.131 
 
The true effects of vinyl chloride would only emerge in the late 1970s but in the 
absence of knowledge in the 1950s all that the TGWU could do was collate the 
responses they received to the questionnaires they had sent out about these new 
chemicals. Having done so they passed the information to the factory inspectors and 
management of the firms. It was discovered that if barrier creams, protective clothing 
(cleaned after use) and methanol were used as protection then the risks would be 
minimised and health unaffected.132 An additional risk associated with the inhalation 
of MEK would come later but protective clothing has been worn as a sufficient barrier 
against the toxic properties of MEK since its introduction.133 Although protective 
clothing had long been understood to act as a barrier against the penetration of toxins 
to the skin it was reported by the trade unions in the late 1940s that due to a shortage 
of materials there had been difficulty in obtaining this. The matter was referred to the 
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TUC by the chemical unions who in turn raised it with the Board of Trade and after 
repeated requests protective wear was made available.134 Having access to protective 
wear did not always result in a safer working environment. Sometimes it could be 
because the protection offered was insufficient as was the case with many of the 
respirators that were issued.135 It could also be as a result of the workers themselves 
deciding not to use it and such a case was discussed in 1953. The TGWU committee 
noted that some of the workers had been reluctant to put on the protective clothing or 
masks that had been fought for and won by the unions. The heat associated with many 
of the processes could perhaps account for some workers refusing to wear these but 
perhaps machismo also played a part. Commenting on the attitude to risk perception 
one witness who on occasion was sub-contracted to work at an ICI plant remembered 
his reaction compared to those who were more habituated to chemical substances.  
 
This stuff used to come off this pipe, used to come through it like, 
God, you know, the tears would be running down your face, you know, 
and the blokes used to say to me ‘Oh you’ll never have cold while your 
working here mate.’ Terrible it was.136 
 
In response to the report made in 1953 the TGWU Committee agreed that in order to 
emphasise health and safety issues an article on the subject should be placed in ‘The 
Record’, the TGWU newspaper.137 On its own, it is unlikely that this would have 
made any immediate or significant difference but the attempt to increase awareness of 
health and safety amongst the membership had merit. Committee members were 
clearly interested in these issues and felt that it was important enough to enter into 
their minutes that the Clayton Aniline Company were to build a new ‘enclosed’ plant 
designed to eliminate contact with potentially health damaging materials.138 
The TGWU committee changed its name and status in 1954 and became a 
fully constituted trade group now called the Chemical and Allied Trades National 
Group Committee representing 40,095 members across the industry.139 However, by 
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placing this membership in context it may be helpful in understanding how relatively 
insignificant it was. In 1953, according to the ABCM, there were approximately 
160,000 employees in the chemical sector, which meant that the TGWU represented 
roughly 25 per cent of all chemical workers, other unions represented another 10 per 
cent and the remaining 65 per cent remained as non-union employees.140 Despite this 
fact the TGWU and other unions had been pressing hard on health issues and finally 
in 1954 they could announce that papilloma of the bladder was to be prescribed as an 
industrial disease. The long awaited studies undertaken by Case et al from the Chester 
Beattie Cancer Institute analysed the jobs that had been done by the bladder tumour 
victims and found that the chemical manufacturing industry accounted for most.141 
The latency periods ranged from 16 to 22 years following exposure to benzidine, ά-
naphthylamine, β-naphthylamine and that working in the dyestuffs sector of the 
chemical industry increased the risk of dying from a bladder tumour by thirty-fold.142 
It is interesting to note that Goldblatt had correctly identified the cause of this cancer 
(although he also included aniline) some 5 years earlier. Nonetheless, following the 
publication of these results in 1954 the manufacture and use of β-naphthylamine was 
stopped and precautions intensified for the manufacture of benzidine and ά-
naphthylamine.143 It was perhaps the persistence of the TGWU and the TUC to have 
this cancerous disease scheduled that led the industry to conclude in 1952 that they 
would not manufacture 4-aminodiphenyl (xenylamine) as it had been shown in tests to 
induce bladder tumours in a dog.144 What was clear was that the presence of the trade 
unions had meant that the industry had not been allowed a completely free rein over 
the production of toxic chemicals. Changes had been forced upon the industry and 
these changes applied to the products as well as how they were to be produced. In 
1957 for example, the shop steward at Clayton Aniline reported that the directorate at 
his plant had received permission to demolish all old buildings so as to make way for 
new, modern and safer plant to be installed.145 Although this was a slightly premature 
announcement (the buildings were not demolished until 1959) it does show that some 
improvements were being made within the industry that may not have been made 
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before.146 Despite these efforts occupational deaths in the dyestuffs industry 
continued and it was only in 1967 with the introduction of the Carcinogenic 
Substances Regulations that the ‘most suspect’ chemicals were finally prohibited from 
being used or manufactured.147  
                                                
Having contributed towards the banning of one cancer inducing chemical and 
having another two more intensely scrutinised (and arguably preventing one from 
ever being produced) the trade unions were now faced by new industrial hazards.  
Undaunted, the chemical manufacturers had proceeded to expand their range and in 
October 1955 it was reported that a meeting had been convened with the Medical 
Officer of the Factory Department at the Ministry of Labour to discuss industrial 
hazards associated with the plastics industry. Frustration was once again evident when 
the union delegate to this meeting reported that the risks he thought were inherent in 
the industry were ‘not dealt with by the Medical Officer.’148 The North Midlands 
Federation of Trades Councils also wrote to the TUC in March 1958 to ask if they 
could examine what effect the new manufacturing process were having on the health 
of the workers manufacturing Terylene, Nylon and other plastics.149 One month later 
the TUC replied that they had ensured that the general working conditions met the 
required standards of ventilation, temperature and cleanliness and that they were 
‘pressing for increased research into the whole question of the use of potentially 
harmful chemicals.’150 By 1959, ICI were stating of plastics such as polyvinyl 
chloride (PVC) that, ‘the polymer is inert and neither toxic effects nor dermatitis have 
been experienced.’151 However, in the mid 1960s the industry discovered that vinyl 
chloride monomer (the basis of PVC) was linked to a degenerative bone disease found 
in chemical workers and by the early 1970s it was being linked to cancer.152 As 
Markowitz and Rosner have shown, the response of the industry was to follow a path 
of ‘deceit’ leaving trade unions at that time with no possible opportunity to pursue 
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issues of occupational health. Once again working knowledge and suspicions of 
health risks had not been enough to establish a campaign and under these 
circumstances it is difficult to see how the trade unions could have done more. The 
frustration amongst those seeking information that might help identify health 
problems was compounded by the attitude shown by some employers’ towards this 
aim. One minor example of this can be seen when, in 1957, ICI turned down a simple 
trade union request for all accidents to be notified to the shop steward.153 
Both the TGWU and the NUGMW campaigned on the dangers associated 
with cadmium fumes and provided ‘detailed particulars of cases’ to the TUC who in 
turn presented evidence to the Industrial Injuries Advisory Council (IIAC).154 As a 
result of these efforts poisoning from the fumes of cadmium was added to the list of 
scheduled diseases in 1956.155 Included in the evidence was the fact that various sums 
had been won from the employers for injured members. The legal department of the 
TGWU reported that 41 cases had been dealt with and sums ranging from £1000 to 
£4,750 had been obtained.156 Whilst compensation may have helped the victims or 
dependants of victims this was a reactive response by trade unions to the poisonings 
or injuries that had already occurred. For the unions to behave in a proactive way 
there would have to be some anticipation that a process or material was dangerous and 
this had to be linked to irrefutable evidence. For example, in 1957 the TGWU were 
able to discuss the new techniques that were being introduced at the ICI explosives 
plant in Ardeer. It was an uncontested fact that explosives were dangerous and it was 
felt that the remote controlled machinery to be installed would lead to a safer working 
environment. This change in the manufacturing process was also identified as leading 
to a reduction in the numbers of staff required. Prioritising safety ahead of job 
protection the TGWU supported this change ‘as it was a desirable thing that the 
danger should be taken out of the manufacture of explosives …even though it would 
require fewer operatives.’157 In contrast to the above case, where irrefutable evidence 
existed and recommendations could be made, the Welsh nickel plants came under 
scrutiny from 1957 and where cancer was suspected as an industrial hazard. Having 
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been investigated in 1948 it was known that 47 cases of nasal cancer and 82 cases of 
lung cancer had been found amongst the workforce. All of these, except 2 of the lung 
cancer cases, had worked in the old plant that had been replaced in 1924 and the 
latency period was identified as being 23 to 25 years.158 In 1955, another report had 
made only speculative suggestions as to the cause and therefore no irrefutable 
evidence existed. It was also known that the inhalation of nickel carbonyl gas could 
result in headaches, nausea, vomiting, and difficulty in breathing.  
The TGWU Committee agreed that contact with the factory inspectorate 
should be made and that an investigation should be conducted into the safety 
precautions and manufacturing processes surrounding nickel, the aim being to 
eliminate any possible causes of work related cancers.159 The legal department then 
decided to adopt a two strand approach. The first was to pursue with a tribunal some 
cases of members who had been gassed. The second part was to write to Canada 
House to ascertain the Canadian position in relation to health and safety amongst its 
workers, Canada being the largest producer of nickel. Again no mention was made of 
withdrawing the members from the workplace something that may have concentrated 
the minds of the employer on this matter. However, this meeting went on to discuss 
the high levels of unemployment that were occurring in South Wales due to the 
closure of collieries.160 Whilst facing a possible 23 year latency period and living in 
an area of growing unemployment ‘employment and family considerations’ possibly 
superseded the far distant deviations from full health. Having spent just under two 
years investigating this issue the Committee reported in 1959 that, ‘it had not been 
possible to establish that any better practice obtained either in Canada or in this 
country.’161 Discussing the issue of the cases they had taken on behalf of the gassed 
members the legal department noted that whilst evidence existed of gassing it was 
extremely difficult to progress with this issue as the firm (Mond Nickel & Co) were 
not actually in breach of any regulations.162  
At the firm of Reckitt Coleman (Colours) fears of pneumoconiosis were raised 
by the TGWU as the dusty atmosphere had led some workers to complain of chest 
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troubles.163  The rules and regulations pertaining to chemical works stipulated that the 
manufacturers had a responsibility to ensure that this was not the case. The union 
made contact with the Factory Inspectors and the regional office were determined to 
press the issue until the dust hazard had been eliminated. To help identify potential 
cases and to move the issue forward they had a list drawn up of all those suffering ill 
health. A year later, in July 1958, they managed to get the firm to agree to pay 
‘substantial’ compensation to the dependants of any members who had died as a 
consequence of respiratory disease. More importantly they had managed to secure 
additional extractor plant to considerably reduce the dust levels that had been present 
in the atmosphere.164  It was in the late 1950s that the TUC again criticised the 
structures that were in place to deal with occupational health issues. Having pressed 
for a comprehensive occupational health service that would cover all sectors of 
industry the TUC complained that ‘the resources devoted to occupational health are 
quite insufficient and there is a serious lack of co-ordination.’165 It was suggested that 
co-ordination between the general and occupational health services could be improved 
by choosing the Factory Department to co-ordinate occupational health issues. The 
TUC expressed their disappointment with the post-war development of industrial 
health within the Factory Department but felt that with additional resources and some 
re-organisation the Factory Department would be best placed to become the 
Department of Occupational Health and Safety.166   
The dangers associated with the chromate process had been long known 
although from the 1930s and 1940s studies conducted in Germany and the USA had 
shown that there was a possible link with cancer in this industry.167 In order to see 
where the trade unions fitted in to the structures of occupational health within this 
industry the following account provides an interesting example. The MRC began a 
study of the chromate industry in 1948 having noted that there was no mortality data 
or reliable information in existence even although the process had been ongoing since 
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1820.168 Having concluded her initial three-year long examination Dr Bidstrup 
showed that there was indeed some evidence to suspect that the process of chrome 
manufacturing carried with it a risk of cancer.169 Further research was required so that 
scientific excellence could be met and in 1956 the results showed that there was 
indeed ‘an excessive mortality from carcinoma of the lung.’170 Even now this did not 
mean by medical or legal standards that chromate work caused respiratory cancer and 
so a programme of annual x-ray screening was started. On publication of the 1956 
results the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance were not prepared to schedule 
lung cancer as an industrial disease for chromate workers. 
The manufacturers responded to this news by doing what the manufacturers of 
naphthylamine and benzene had done, they introduced their own compensation 
scheme. To do so they arranged to meet the workers representatives and it was at this 
stage in 1956 that the trade unions were fully informed of the research results and of 
the fact that the firm had decided to employ Dr Bidstrup as a medical consultant to the 
company.171 By July of 1958 the legal department of the TGWU had noted that there 
was ‘an increased authority’ for believing that chromate workers were at a greater risk 
of cancer. They wrote to the TUC informing them that in order to get the required 
proof ‘research and investigation over a long period might be necessary …as we are 
up against a concealed risk.’172 The TGWU stated that they had no facilities to search 
through death certificates but that they would undertake to investigate funeral benefits 
to see if that would give them any indication of the true levels of cancer amongst the 
workers. British Chrome and Chemicals Limited wrote to the TGWU informing them 
of their scheme as well as of the appointment of Dr Bidstrup ‘to investigate all causes 
of sickness and death’ to the employees.173 According to the firm only one ex-gratia 
payment had been made and this was to the widow of a former worker who had died 
before the scheme was operational. In response to a request made by the TUC’s 
Industrial Disease Sub Committee for more information to carry the issue forward the 
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NUGMW asked their Branch Secretary at the Rutherglen Works of British Chrome 
and Chemicals to write a report. This union representative appeared to be less than 
concerned about the issues being raised and the style of his report was somewhat 
compliant. He noted that the company had been and still were spending money in an 
effort to reduce chrome dust levels and having worked there for 26 years he stated 
that the ‘improvements are apparent’ and that ‘a number of employees or their 
dependants are now in receipt of benefit … and are grateful for the amount of 
money.’174 Whilst most of what the local representative wrote was true he had been 
asked to inform the union about these matters as there continued to be a fear of 
industrial cancer. What is apparent is that little, if any, of the national led urgency 
appeared to be transferring to the local representative where the actual trade union 
members were at risk. The firm closed down its’ chromate manufacturing business in 
Glasgow nine years later leaving behind a landsite heavily contaminated with Cr(VI)- 
a known carcinogen of significant mobility. 
Local union activity was noted at the Swinton Chemical & General Branch of 
the NUGMW in 1960 when they sent a letter to their General Secretary about the 
incidence of tar cancer amongst their membership at Yorkshire Tar Distillers Ltd in 
Rotherham. The union knew that there was a long latency period for tar cancer, some 
10 to 30 years, and recognised that when the condition became apparent it was too 
late to take any action to save the life of the victim. Having battled and won from the 
employer a supply of protective clothing, clogs, gloves, goggles and barrier creams 
for those directly involved in the production process the branch remained concerned 
that not all workers were protected. The branch made ‘repeated applications’ to the 
employer to supply protective clothing to all of those who came into contact with the 
tar or derivatives but had failed to secure these.175 Having sought legal advice this 
was relayed to the branch and they were informed that their complaints could only be 
dealt with by a change in legislation. What was required was that the Factories Act 
(1937) Section 46 would have to be amended by having special regulations added or 
the alternative option was to add the tar distillation process to Regulation 25A of (SR 
&O 1922, 731) Regulations for Chemical Works. Therefore, once again, what was so 
simple for the workers to see was not so simple to have put right. The Chief Inspector 
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of Factories was contacted and he paid a visit to the factory in question. His advice 
was that the workers needed to pay closer attention to personal hygiene as, according 
to this expert, this was as important as protective clothing. The TUC duly responded 
to the NUGMW with this news noting that, ‘legislation had not been considered.’176 
The NUGMW responded to the TUC after having discussions with their National 
Industrial Officer who had added that personal hygiene was important but so was 
voluntary medical examination.177 Finally, the deputy Chief Inspector of Factories 
wrote to the Social Insurance Department at the TUC arguing that, ‘a high standard of 
personal hygiene and the wearing of suitable protective clothing both play a part in 
the prevention of skin cancer.’178 What becomes apparent when viewing this string of 
opinion is that the original issues raised by the local membership (fear of cancer and 
lack of protection offered by the employer) had been turned around and if the workers 
wanted to be protected against a known risk of cancer in the industry it was they who 
would have to take care of themselves. 
The 1960s were to witness a widening of interest in matters of health and 
safety. This began in December 1961 when the TGWU decided to launch a union 
wide industrial health and safety campaign accompanied by information leaflets.179 
This was followed in late 1962 by a meeting between the three main trade union 
representatives for the chemical industry and the Minister of Labour to consider the 
establishment of a joint standing committee for health and safety. In response to this 
suggestion from the trade unions the Minister did not feel that this was necessarily the 
right way to deal with these issues and suggested that ‘a voluntary body’ be set up in 
light of the fact that, ‘the chemical industry had quite a good record for safety and that 
the industry itself looked after this problem.’180 The minister passed on his views to 
the employers and at the beginning of 1963 the employers agreed that health and 
safety was something that concerned both the trade unions and the employers. To 
further discussion on these matters it was also agreed that the appropriate body to deal 
with the issues should be the Joint Industrial Council (JIC). The employers also 
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agreed to provide the unions with relevant documents and the TGWU representative 
noted that: 
 
It is obvious that the employers committee have given serious 
consideration to the question of safety in the industry and this now 
gives the trade union side the opportunity of raising on the JIC matters 
affecting the safety, health and welfare of our members.181  
 
This was followed a few months later by an announcement that the employers had 
agreed to the setting up of a Safety Sub-Committee and that this committee would 
consider issues pertaining to ‘the existing safety measures, the acceptance of safety 
standards, and promoting the idea of safety conditions throughout the industry.’182  
 Health and safety issues were also backed up by the TGWU’s policy of 
pursuing claims against employers who had failed to take adequate steps to implement 
preventative measures. In the early 1960s the legal department could report that the 
sum of £18,000 had been won on behalf of a chemical worker ‘the highest amount 
secured in any industrial case.’183 The following year the general secretary 
congratulated the work being done by the legal department with reference to industrial 
deafness, nitro-glycerine investigations, and the number of cases that they had 
managed to settle with respect to members within the chemical group.184 The delegate 
representing members within the Mond Nickel plant in Wales echoed this view. 
Although this was one means of attempting to get the employers to consider changing 
the processes or improve plant maintenance there remained in the minds of some 
delegates the view that more information should be gathered to better understand what 
effect the industry was having on their health. This view was contained in a branch 
resolution that was put before a meeting of the chemical group in July 1965. The 
branch wanted the research department to find out, a) how long members lived after 
they had retired at the age of 65, b) what the effect was on the health of a worker who 
was exposed to ‘crude oil smells’ and fertiliser dusts and, c) what was the effect on 
the health of a worker who was consistently breathing in copper liquor and general 
chemical smells. It was added that, over time, working amongst chemicals must affect 
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health and therefore the retiring age should be lowered from 65 to 60.185 Whilst parts 
b) and c) were referred to the research department question a) was not. The National 
Secretary had agreed that whilst it would have been desirable to know the answer to 
this question the unions research department ‘was not in a position to undertake such 
a mammoth task.’186 Whilst the task may have been large the answer would have at 
least provided the union with evidence of the hidden toll of death that was attached to 
this industry. 
 In 1967, the National Economic Development Office published a report that 
compared British and American chemical industries.187 This study had been 
undertaken primarily to discover why the US industry appeared to be more efficient 
than the British and both management and trade unionists from Britain took part.188 
Many areas were under consideration including those pertaining to health and safety. 
One major difference that was noted was how equipment that was used to produce 
chemicals was maintained and designed. In comparison to the US designs it was 
found that ‘too many British design engineers appear to forget that the plant will have 
to be maintained …so that the maintenance workers are exposed to unnecessary 
danger.’189 This evidence indicates that those who were not directly exposed to the 
dangers of the industry had not consulted with those who had to do so on a daily 
basis. Whilst trade union representatives may have been able to pursue complaints 
about inadequate design features the design of chemical plant was the preserve of 
higher ranked workers and it would have been unlikely that the union’s complaints 
would have held much sway amongst the ‘experts.’ Further, any complaint could only 
have been about something that already existed and as has been shown when this was 
the case it was much more problematic to deal with and change. The Ardeer 
modernisation programme referred to earlier was an example of how, with trade union 
involvement, health and safety aspects could be built in to the process if they had been 
consulted at the design stage.190  
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In terms of safety provision the study group found that whilst the British paid 
‘considerable attention to safety …it seemed almost nothing by comparison with the 
American efforts.’191 The TGWU delegate who accompanied this study group 
reported back to the committee and noted that, ‘the maximum attention is given to 
safety; the standard of safety equipment was very high and safety rules were generally 
strictly enforced.’192 The delegate was clearly impressed and made further comment 
on the issue of trade unionism noting that ‘there is complete plant bargaining and the 
local unions are given every facility possible.’193 It was also noted that in some of the 
plants there were three times the number of shop stewards as would have been found 
in comparable works in Britain. Given that the US chemical industry had no less of an 
interest than the British in making profits it is interesting that the US could do so more 
‘efficiently’ despite spending more time, energy and money on health and safety 
issues. However, as was the case in Britain, trade union concerns on occupational 
health and safety could be accommodated to some extent by both the employers and 
the government. Markowitz and Rosner have persuasively argued that concerns could 
be neutralised or buried by a process of ‘deceit and denial’ as indeed the US chemical 
industry were doing not long after the National Economic Development Office had 
written their report.194 However, the US industries decision to deceive and deny was 
not wholly dependent on the discovery of an occupational disease but was based on a 
fear that the American public may have linked the occupational risk with a more 
general public health risk and this would have impacted adversely on sales.195  
Where the risk was purely occupational and there was little fear that the public 
would become concerned a different, and arguably less expensive approach could be 
adopted. For example, in 1973 an ICI chemical plant was visited by a factory 
inspector. He found that, ‘men were working in dust up to 2 ft. deep … there was 
even fertiliser dust stalactites hanging from the roof …and it took a twelve-day 
shutdown to clean it up.’196 Following the discovery of this ICI dust filled plant the 
firm were taken to court in Middlesborough where they pled guilty to a breach of the 
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1961 Factories Act and were fined just £50.197 What this case illustrates is that all that 
the trade unions had fought for to ensure that the workplace was safe and healthy had 
been in place and yet it had proved to be ineffective. That is, the factory legislation 
had been in place for 12 years, the inspectorate had visited the plant, a prosecution 
was pursued, the firm were subjected to the legal system, it was proven that the 
legislation had been breached, a financial penalty was handed down. The cost to the 
firm for this breach was now known but the cost to the health of those chemical 
workers who had had to endure these appalling conditions remained unknown. At one 
level this dust-filled workplace had been a relatively simple issue for the trade unions 
to deal as the evidence of such obvious and harmful conditions were easy to gather. 
However, more complicated and insidious risks existed and by the late 1970s only 26 
chemicals or chemical processes had a definite determination of the specific chemical 
initiating the disease at a time when 500 new chemicals and over 120,000 new 
synthetic compounds were being marketed annually.198 It would therefore be fair and 
reasonable to assume, just as the TGWU Legal Department had done, that the trade 
unions had indeed been ‘up against a concealed risk.’199 
 
Conclusion 
 
Although the chemical trade unions never managed to recruit more than half 
the potential membership they did increase their foothold in this sector over the period 
1914 to 1974. Various reasons can account for the slow growth of trade unions in this 
sector but the overwhelming factor that explains the stubbornly low levels of trade 
union density before the 1940s is that the employers’ anti-union strategies were 
effective. That is, chemical workers generally came to view the employer rather than 
the trade union as the provider of benefits and it was the employer and not the trade 
union that was seen as being able to deliver compensation for ill health and injury 
when workers were affected by their employment. Despite this, trade unions did 
manage to recruit chemical workers and by responding to issues raised by these 
members they campaigned with various levels of success on a number of occupational 
                                                 
197 Ibid, p.29 
198 A.W LeServe, C. Vose, and C. Wigley. Chemicals, Work and Cancer, Workers' Educational 
Association, Nelson & Sons, (London 1980), p.43. Scrotal cancer in chimney sweeps was the first 
occupational cancer to be officially identified. 
199 TUC Files, Cancer 1956-60, British Chrome and Chemicals Ltd, Letter from Legal Department of 
TGWU to General Secretary of TUC, 20 October 1958, MSS.292/174.47/6 
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health and safety issues. Given the lack of membership before World War Two, the 
complexity of the industry, the scale of production, the growth in the number of 
chemicals being produced, and the need to irrefutably prove the precise cause of an 
occupational disease, trade unions faced a mammoth task in attempting to improve 
occupational health and safety standards in the chemical industry.  
 Although from 1914 some attempts were made to address the dangers within 
the industry the trade union movement in general was seriously weakened by the 
consequences of economic depression, the General Strike of 1926 and by the 
introduction of the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act of 1927. It is clear that the 
chemical trade unions became much more focussed and better organised from 1944 
onwards and that major health issues were pursued with more vigour and with more 
success. Union campaigns sought to minimise or eliminate some of the more insidious 
dangers associated with chemical production and the complexities involved in these 
cases have been identified. Dealing with such issues was not an easy or simple task 
and required tenacity and the use of a wide range of resources that included legal and 
medical opinion, financial and political clout, and the ability to persevere with 
campaigns over many years. Yet trade unions had access only to limited resources and 
these would never be enough to keep them abreast with the enormous growth and 
development of the chemical industry. Nonetheless, campaigns were fought and won. 
Certain dye intermediates were banned, some were only allowed to be used 
restrictively, and some never went into production at all. Undoubtedly, this was as a 
result of the trade unions efforts to have these chemical substances examined more 
thoroughly than they would have been had trade unions not existed in the industry. 
Indeed, as has been shown the agency shown by the trade unions brought many 
improvements to the chemical workplace and without these chemical workers would 
have had neither the knowledge nor the equipment to deal effectively with a host of 
hazards. 
 The general criticisms that are levelled at the trade unions have to be revised 
for the chemical sector. To argue, as some historians have done, that trade unions 
could have done more cannot be substantiated when the context in which the chemical 
trade unions operated is explained. There is also little evidence to support the view 
that trade unions prioritised wages over health. Indeed, although historians have 
offered this point as criticism what they are actually discussing is the limitations of 
power that existed within the trade union movement in relation to others. Trade 
 232
 233
unions were not the architects of the waged labour system. Whilst to the worker 
wages meant a means to life, to the employer wages were a cost that cut into profits. 
Acting as the body that owned and controlled the means of production it was 
employers who prioritised wage issues over health and consequently for the most part 
trade union preferences were shaped by this decision. It was the government and 
without doubt the chemical employers that introduced compensation schemes for 
industrial accidents, injuries and diseases. Trade unions had no such power. 
Nonetheless, trade unions did have a responsibility to the victims to pursue claims and 
they did so even although the schemes were not of their own making. Drawn into a 
bureaucratic web the trade unions were manipulated and conflict over death and 
injury became institutionalised. With the potentially lethal production continuing 
virtually unabated compensation schemes offered the employers and the state much 
more than they offered the victims of industry. To criticise the chemical trade unions 
for not doing enough is rather akin to criticising women for not getting the vote much 
sooner. Trade unions have always had limited and intermittent powers. What the 
critics have suggested trade unions should have achieved is based on an illusion of 
power, and a fallacy of pluralism. 
Chapter Six 
 
Chemical Employers and Occupational Health 
 
 
Power and authority are of course excellent things; it all depends on 
who has them in what circumstances and for which purposes.1   
 
Crimes committed by employers in factories are generally not 
detected, and when they are detected the criminals are generally not 
prosecuted and when prosecuted are not punished.2 
 
 
In 1956, in a preamble to a lengthy discussion on industrial carcinogens Dr 
Goldblatt, an occupational health scientist with ICI, wrote of the difficulties facing 
the manufacturer when it became ‘probable’ or ‘demonstrable’ that a part of the 
chemical process was having a ‘dangerous effect’ upon the workers. He noted, ‘the 
simple formula that the process or substance involved should be eliminated is too 
facile and would, if applied, rebound more severely on the worker than on his 
employer.’3 The implication being made here is quite clear. If the manufacturer were 
to be prevented from producing a substance that was almost certainly lethal then all 
of the process workers could lose their livelihood, not just those that succumbed to 
the toxins. An employer, such as ICI, would be able to absorb the immediate impact 
of such a decision but the loss of jobs and the consequential impact on families and 
local businesses would have economic, social and political consequences. The use of 
an implied threat of closure and the compliant response of the workers can be seen in 
the testimony of one former chemical process operator who explained why his fellow 
workers and the trade union failed to have improved health and safety measures fully 
implemented. 
 
I mean they knew in the mid seventies that this was affecting us…the 
unions and that knew about these surveys [showing deterioration of 
                                                 
1 T. Eagleton, The Illusions of Postmodernism, Blackwell, (Oxford 1997), p.56  
2 W.H. Thompson (Solicitor), Robens Selected Written Evidence, p.661 as cited in T. Nichols and P. 
Armstrong, Safety or Profit: Industrial Accidents and the Conventional Wisdom, Falling Wall Press, 
(Bristol 1973), p.25 
3 M.W. Goldblatt, and J. Goldblatt, ‘Industrial Carcinogenesis and Toxicology’, pp.185-562 in E.R.A. 
Merewether, (ed) Industrial Medicine and Hygiene, Volume 3, Butterworth, (London 1956), p.225 
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hearing and eyesight] and basically ICI being ICI said well ‘if we’ve 
got to do all these things [implement improvements] it’s not going to 
be viable so the plants will probably have to shut down’. And you’ve 
got young guys in there with mortgages and families…the argument 
was blown out the water. That happened so many times, so many, 
many times. It happened as a group and it happened tae individuals.4 
 
Employers regularly take decisions that are designed to make profits, gain the 
confidence of the market and shareholders, and essentially do what is ‘good for 
business.’ Many business decisions are justified by reference to ‘efficiency’ and 
include those that are designed to control the production process or to increase or 
lower the numbers employed. Costs are a paramount consideration for business as 
costs cut into profits. For example, labour costs have to be kept to a minimum and 
labour is only retained whilst it remains profitable. But costs are also incurred in 
providing safeguards against occupational accidents and diseases. Just how important 
it is for business to keep these costs low has been revealed in recent legal cases in the 
United States of America. There, previously hidden documentary evidence has 
shown that the heads of both the asbestos and plastic industries continued to expose 
their workers to levels of toxic substances whilst denying and suppressing 
information that showed these were lethal.5 Having hidden these business decisions 
from public scrutiny the employers concerned must have considered their actions to 
be, at best, inappropriate.  
Markowitz and Rosner have noted that obtaining these types of company 
records provides ‘a window into a world historians are rarely allowed to enter.’6 
Indeed, finding such a ‘window’ on that side of the Atlantic is very rare but rarer still 
on this side of the Ocean. Consequently, other evidence has to be used to show the 
full range of attitudes and strategies that were chosen by British chemical 
manufacturers in responding to the evidence that their products were damaging the 
health of their workers. As has already been demonstrated, by casting a very wide net 
                                                 
4 Interview: D. Walker with Mr KG, 25 November 2005, p.12 
5 For the US chemical industry see: G. Markowitz, and D. Rosner, Deceit and Denial: The Deadly 
Politics of Industrial Pollution, University of California Press, (California 2003), for the British 
asbestos industry see G. Tweedale, Magic Mineral to Killer Dust, Turner & Newall and the Asbestos 
Hazard, Oxford University Press, (Oxford 2003) 
6 G. Markowitz, and D. Rosner, Deceit and Denial, p.xv 
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over primary and secondary documentary evidence and combining this with oral 
testimony, a clearer picture has emerged to show what the conditions of work would 
have been like for many chemical workers and how the manufacturing processes 
could cause occupational injury and disease. Employer responses to this knowledge 
varied but were, in part, responsible for the many hundreds of deaths and injuries that 
occurred amongst the British chemical workforce.7 
In the modern chemical industry scientific research and technological 
development is time consuming, expensive, and constant.8 Once a decision has been 
reached to scale up from the laboratory to the chemical plant it is vitally important to 
the manufacturers that returns are delivered on their capital investment. This can only 
be achieved by the successful sale of the product and this requires that the product is 
manufactured without hindrance from any quarter, including the government. 
According to Grant et al the British chemical industry ‘enjoyed the confidence of the 
public authorities and was very largely left to regulate itself’…‘legislation was 
sparse.’9 For Grant et al this can be explained by reference to ‘tradition’ with neither 
British nor German states taking much interest in the production or marketing of 
chemicals.10 What Grant et al do not make clear is why this tradition came about and 
therefore reasons must be sought to explain this, at least for Britain.  
From the end of the nineteenth century the government received evidence of 
progressive and welfarist measures voluntarily introduced by some of the large 
chemical manufacturers such as Brunner Mond.11 When ICI were formed in the mid 
1920s most of the welfarist measures operated by Brunner Mond were imported into 
ICI. It has been argued in Chapter Five that the primary motivation behind the 
introduction and maintenance of these welfarist measures was to create a loyalty to 
the company rather than the unions, improve production, and minimise the risk of 
                                                 
7 See Chapters Three and Four. 
8 Between 1927 and 1952, ICI alone invested £46.8 million in research and development. Cited in 
W.J. Reader, Imperial Chemical Industries, A History, Volume II, The First Quarter-Century 1926-
1952, Oxford University Press, (London 1975), p.502  
9 W. Grant, W. Paterson, and C. Whitson, Government and the Chemical Industry, A Comparative 
Study of Britain and West Germany, Clarendon Press, (Oxford 1988), p.282 
10 Ibid, p.282 
11 Report on the Conditions of Labour in Chemical Works, The Dangers to Life and Health of the 
Workpeople Employed Therein and the Proposed Remedies, Chemical Works Committee of Inquiry, 
PP 1893, (C.7235), p.5 
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strikes.12 Huge capital investments were made in the research and development of 
processes and products and to protect these investments chemical employers became 
much more aware and willing to introduce steps that would reduce the risk of fire, 
explosion, or any disruption to production. Therefore, protecting capital investment 
could on occasion help protect the welfare of the chemical worker. Official data on 
occupational accidents and deaths also showed that by comparison with other large-
scale industries, such as coal mining and engineering, there were much fewer of 
these in the chemical industry.13 By drawing attention to these aspects of the industry 
a positive impression could be generated to show that chemical employers had 
addressed the problems associated with its inherently dangerous processes. However, 
perhaps the most important reason that explains the lack of government interference 
with this industry was that the output of industrial and consumer chemicals was vital 
for the ‘success’ of much of the rest of the manufacturing and retail trades on which 
Britain’s economy relied.14 By providing an uninterrupted flow of these materials 
throughout the period in question in an atmosphere largely bereft of labour unrest the 
industry demonstrated its importance to Britain in helping it to develop as a modern 
industrialised nation. The economic, social and political benefits of having a dynamic 
chemical industry were paramount considerations to all governments at all times 
between 1914 and 1974 and it was for this reason, above all, that the chemical 
industry was traditionally allowed to regulate itself.15 
This chapter will begin by providing an examination of the representative 
body of the industry, the Association of British Chemical Manufacturers (ABCM). 
This will show that the ABCM actively sought to enhance the chemical 
manufacturing industry’s image with respect to the government, the Factory 
                                                 
12 Chapter Five, pp.179-182 
13 Official data was skewed because although occupational diseases were prevalent in the chemical 
industry they were less obvious and therefore tended not to be reported. This is discussed more fully 
in Chapter Three. 
14 Chemicals are used in the steel and non-ferrous metals, textiles, leather, rubber, aircraft, car, 
shipbuilding, paper, and building industries. They are also essential for the production of explosives, 
fertilisers, coal tar by-products, drugs, medicines, vitamins, oil distilling, artificial silk, nylon, paints, 
varnishes, plastics, soap, perfumery, and inks.     
15 For a detailed account of the basis of the close relationship between the state and the chemical 
industry see F. Pearce, and S. Tombs, Toxic Capitalism: Corporate Crime and the Chemical Industry, 
Ashgate, (Hants 1998), pp.43-44 For an example of the relationship between ICI and government see: 
W.J. Reader, Imperial Chemical Industries, A History, Volume II, The First Quarter-Century 1926-
1952, Oxford University Press, (London 1975), p.473   
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Inspectorate, and other interested parties. Thereafter, there will be an examination of 
the responses made by both large and small chemical manufacturers to the 
knowledge that their manufacturing processes were causing cancer amongst their 
workers. It will be shown that chemical employers such as ICI, and Clayton Aniline 
Limited maintained production by paying compensation to injured workers, delaying 
the dissemination of information, and by introducing methods that were aimed at 
controlling, rather than eliminating, the carcinogenic substances. Following this there 
will be an examination of an ‘announcement’ made to a workforce in 1956 by a 
relatively small Scottish chemical manufacturer. This announcement outlined the 
formal response made by the company to the fact that its processes were causing 
lung cancer. What will be demonstrated is that this firm sought to diminish the 
significance of this lethal threat through a combination of carefully chosen language, 
a company funded compensation scheme, and a measure of deceit, all of which were 
used to maintain uninterrupted production.  
 
The Attitude of the Association of British Chemical Manufacturers 
As happened in other industries chemical employers formed an organisation 
that could be used to reduce friction between competing firms and provide a united 
front against potential adversaries.16 Formed in 1916, the Association of British 
Chemical Manufacturers (ABCM) brought together the heads of the largest chemical 
firms in Britain such as, Crosfields, Brunner Mond, Lever Brothers, Mond Nickel, 
Chance and Hunt, Castner-Kellner, Albright and Wilson, and the United Alkali 
Company. Various stated aims sought to enhance the standing of the industry 
including, ‘placing before the government and government officials the views of 
such manufacturers.’17 Indeed, according to Grant et al the ABCM were, ‘primarily 
concerned with government relations’ and, within a year of coming into existence, 
had persuaded the government that they were ‘the most representative association of 
the chemical trade.’18 In 1928 the ABCM began producing their own ‘Model Safety 
                                                 
16 For a fuller examination of how employers acted in unison see, A.J. McIvor, Organised Capital, 
Employers’ Associations and Industrial Relations in Northern England, 1880-1939, Cambridge 
University Press, (Cambridge 1996) 
17 The Times, June 23, 1916, p.5 
18 W. Grant, W. Paterson, and C. Whitson, Government and the Chemical Industry, A Comparative 
Study of Britain and West Germany, Clarendon Press, (Oxford 1988), p.23 and Ministry of 
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Rules’ and in 1930 enhanced the public image of the industry by successfully 
lobbying for the chemical industry to be added to the British Engineering Standards 
Association (BESA). This resulted in BESA being renamed as the British Standards 
Institution (BSI), an organisation that became more widely known for their safety 
‘kite-mark.’19  
The Model Safety Rules were updated in 1938 by the Works Technical 
Committee of the ABCM and thereafter dealt with by their Works Safety Committee 
in 1947 and 1950. According to the ABCM it was ‘essential’ that a safe working 
environment was maintained alongside the technical improvements that were 
introduced so that the industry could provide ‘attractive and congenial 
employment.’20 As will be discussed below and with reference to the dyestuffs sector 
this was a strikingly hypocritical statement. Obviously it was important for the 
ABCM that the appropriate body should endorse their rules and they therefore sought 
this from the Chief Inspector of Factories who, in the 1950s, stated that the ABCM 
should be ‘commended’ for their initiative.21 The ABCM publications offered a 
guide to government legislation as it applied to the industry but were also enhanced 
by safety recommendations to which employers were ‘invited’ to implement.22 These 
publications would have helped any employer who was interested in the rules and 
regulations to know how, where and why these should be put into operation. For 
example, Crooks notes that one firm that had been unaware of a particular hazard 
associated with the use of carbon bisulphide until it had been alerted by the ABCM 
model rules of 1928.23 
Apart from the legislative elements, none of what was published by the 
ABCM was enforceable by law leaving chemical employers to pick and chose from 
these entirely at their own discretion. Indeed, and as has been argued, the dearth of 
                                                                                                                                          
Reconstruction, Committee on the Chemical Trade, Report of Committee Appointed to Advise as to 
the Procedure which should be adopted for dealing with the Chemical Trade, PP1917, (Cd. 8882) p.4 
19 www.bsieducation.org/Education/about/brief-history This indicated to buyers that the goods being 
purchased were ‘up to standard.’ 
20 Association of British Chemical Manufacturers, Safety Rules for Use in Chemical Works, Part 1, 
Model Rules, 3rd Edition, (London, 1951), p.4 
21 Association of British Chemical Manufacturers, Safety Rules for Use in Chemical Works, Part II, 
Detailed Instructions, (London, 1952), ‘Foreword’, G.P. Barnett, Chief Inspector of Factories, p.iii 
22 Association of British Chemical Manufacturers, Safety Rules for Use in Chemical Works, Part 1, 
Model Rules, 3rd Edition, (London, 1951), p.4 
23 E. Crooks, The Factory Inspectors, A Legacy of Industrial Revolution, Tempus, (Gloucestershire 
2005), p.146 
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factory inspection and the paltry fine levels led some employers to deal with the 
legislative elements in this manner as well.24 Moreover, having been left largely to 
regulate the industry that they owned and controlled chemical manufacturers would 
naturally have done so whilst applying capitalist logic. That is, they would ultimately 
prioritise the financial health of the business over the physical health of the 
employees. As noted above this prioritisation could, on occasion, deliver improved 
safety standards to the workforce. However, where it was perceived that introducing 
safety measures might restrict profit maximisation then steps could be taken to avoid 
this happening.25 Indeed, cabinet documents reveal the pressure applied by ‘certain 
elements within the CBI’ (Confederation of British Industry) that sought to dilute the 
powers of the Health and Safety at Work Act (1974). This was done because these 
elements ‘were worried at the prospect of the stronger powers of the Bill being 
available to control harmful emissions from heavy industry.’26 What was meant by 
‘certain elements’ was made clear in documents of a cabinet meeting held the 
previous year where it was noted that the move to dilute the powers of the HSAWA 
had been ‘strongly urged’ by the CBI and the successors of the ABCM, the Chemical 
Industries Association (CIA).27 Capitalist logic can also be seen at work in the 
contents of a speech given to the Society of Occupational Medicine in 1980 by the 
then Chairman of the CBI Health, Safety and Welfare Committee. The speech made 
clear which needs industry leaders considered paramount: 
 
If the cost of health and safety becomes too expensive then companies 
would simply have to shut down: indeed, there is a feeling beginning 
to grow that in those industries where the risks are difficult to 
quantify, e.g. where possible or suspected carcinogens are involved, 
                                                 
24 Evidence has been provided throughout that the rules and regulations for dust extraction were 
ignored with impunity in the chromate manufacturing, dyestuffs, soda ash, and fertiliser sectors of the 
industry.    
25 D. Eva, and R. Oswald, R. Health and Safety at Work, Pan, (London 1981), pp.21-22  
26 CAB/129/176/12 Cabinet Meeting, Health and Safety at Work etc Bill, Position of the Alkali 
Inspectorate, 7 May 1974 
27 CAB/128/52/7 Cabinet Meeting, Conclusions of a meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street 
on Thursday 17 May 1973. The ABCM continued in existence until 1965 when it merged with the 
Association of Chemical and Allied Employers (AC&AE) to form the Chemical Industries 
Association (CIA) who, by 1976, represented 90 per cent of all British chemical firms. For a fuller 
account of the role played by the CIA see: C. Gill, R. Morris, and J. Eaton Industrial Relations in the 
Chemical Industry, Saxon House, (Hants. 1978), pp.3-49    
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that if standards continue to get progressively tougher a stage may be 
reached in the viability of certain processes which may lead to the 
transfer of production to countries where standards are not so high.28 
 
In other words, if British firms were made to comply with controls that had been 
designed to better protect workers from carcinogenic substances then these 
employment opportunities would be offered to those whose governments were 
weaker. Although beyond the period under examination it should be noted that 
evidence does exist to show that by the 1980s the ‘export of hazardous risks’ was 
well under way from the major industrialised capitalist countries to the developing 
nations. Pearce and Tombs have noted this trend especially in the production of bulk 
chemicals which has been shifted towards eastern Europe, the Middle East, and 
Third World countries because this production process is more environmentally 
damaging, resource intensive, and requires more unskilled or semi skilled labour than 
speciality chemicals production.29 Indeed, it was in 1980 that the Union Carbide 
plant at Bhopal began producing methyl isocyanate and only four years later that its 
lethal cloud of poison would kill an estimated 16 to 30 thousand people, injuring 
500,000 others.30   
The Response to Occupational Cancer by Large Manufacturers  
Having ‘become apparent’ in the mid 1930s that bladder tumours were an 
occupational hazard amongst dyestuffs workers the manufacturers, acting through 
the ABCM, responded in 1938 not by halting production, but by offering 
compensation payments to those diagnosed with this disease.31 This way disease and 
                                                 
28 R.H. Amis, ‘Health and Safety at Work: The Employer’s View, pp.98-102 in Journal of the Society 
of Occupational Medicine, (30), 1980, p.99  
29 F. Pearce, and S. Tombs, Toxic Capitalism: Corporate Crime and the Chemical Industry, Ashgate, 
(Hants 1998), p.44  For further discussion on this subject see also: D. Michaels, C. Barrera and M.G. 
Gachara, ‘Economic development and occupational health in Latin America: new directions for public 
health in less developed countries’ pp.536-542 in American Journal of Public Health, Volume 75, (5), 
1985 and A. Watterson, ‘Why We Still Have ‘Old’ Epidemics and ‘Endemics’ in Occupational 
Health: Policy and Practice Failures and Some Possible Solutions’, pp.107-126 in N. Daykin and L. 
Doyal (eds) Health and Work, Critical Perspectives, MacMillan, (Hampshire 1999), p.123 
30 A critical analysis of the role played by Union Carbide and the desire of developing nations for First 
World capital is provided in F. Pearce, and S. Tombs, Toxic Capitalism: Corporate Crime and the 
Chemical Industry, Ashgate, (Hants 1998), pp.194-219 
31 Wright v. Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd. And Another, Cassidy v. Same, April 20, 1971, QB, pp.311-332 in 
Knights Industrial Reports, Volume XI, October 1971- March 1972, Charles Knight & Co, (London 
1972), p.313  
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death could be calculated and dealt with not as a case of human suffering but as a 
cost. Unfortunately no ‘window’ was found to provide details of how the ABCM 
administered this scheme although it is at least possible to argue that it may not have 
been dissimilar to that found in the asbestos industry.32 The timing of the decision to 
introduce the scheme is interesting, coming as it did just as Britain was preparing for 
another war and when dyestuffs technology could be applied to explosives, war 
gases, and pharmaceuticals. Indeed as Reader notes, ‘consciousness of the wartime 
importance of the chemical industry…had influenced government policy from the 
time of the Great War onwards, particularly in relation to the dyestuffs industry.’33 
The government were aware of the fact that it was the occupation that was causing 
the deaths but they were having ‘great difficulties’ defining the cause of the disease 
and were therefore not prepared to schedule it under the Workmen’s Compensation 
Acts.34 Although relatively weak, the trade unions had been pursuing this matter but 
the employers diffused the situation by agreeing to treat the disease as if it were a 
scheduled disease. By choosing this course of action the employers were in control 
of the scheme and could therefore determine who qualified for compensation. 
Nonetheless, assurances were given by the employers that the scheme would be 
operated in a fair manner and in a letter sent to the Ministry of National Insurance the 
ABCM claimed that ‘workers suffering from papilloma of the bladder would be 
treated generously.’35 This was the theory but one former dyestuffs worker wrote in 
1952 about how the compensation agreement had actually worked ‘in practice.’36 
The former worker, Mr Carter, had been employed by Clayton Aniline Limited up 
until 1937 and sometime later had to have a growth removed from his bladder. He 
found out that some of his former work colleagues had died of bladder cancer and 
                                                 
32 For details of the employer initiated Asbestosis Fund see G. Tweedale, Magic Mineral to Killer 
Dust, Turner & Newall and the Asbestos Hazard, Oxford University Press, (Oxford 2003), pp.71-87 
33 W.J. Reader, Imperial Chemical Industries, A History, Volume II, The First Quarter-Century 1926-
1952, Oxford University Press, (London 1975), p.252 
34 Cited in Wright v. Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd. And Another, Cassidy v. Same, April 20, 1971, QB, 
pp.311-332 in Knights Industrial Reports, Volume XI, October 1971- March 1972, Charles Knight & 
Co, (London 1972), p.313. 
35 MSS.292/174.47/7 (Cancer of the Bladder), Letter from ABCM to the Ministry of National 
Insurance. The letter was copied by the Ministry of National Insurance and sent on 31 October 1952 to 
Mr Clunie (Dick) Dale, Head of the TUC Social Insurance Department. 
36 MSS.292/174.47/7 (Cancer of the Bladder) Letter from Mr F.W. Carter to the Trades Union 
Congress (TUC), August 31, 1952  
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that the Manchester based, but Swiss owned, Clayton Aniline, had treated both 
widows and workers with indifference. He noted: 
 
Mrs Woods…her husband died in 1943 of cancer of the bladder after 
many years service in the Beta-Naphtol Dept of the Clayton Aniline. 
When I saw her several months ago she had never received a penny 
from this firm. She was left with 6 young children. Mrs Young…her 
husband died of cancer of the bladder in 1948. The Clayton Aniline 
pay her £2 per week. She has eleven children, ten of these under 14 
years of age. She told me she went to the office of this firm once a 
week for her money and she was frequently insulted. Richard Walker 
contracted cancer of the bladder while in the employ of the Clayton 
Aniline. After paying the worker £4-6-0d per week for a period the 
firm offered him his job back again and stopped payment. I had a 
malignant growth removed from the bladder. After a great deal of 
effort the firm paid me £5 per week for a certain amount of weeks, 
nothing at all like the period I had lost from work due to this 
complaint. For this paltry sum I had to sign a paper stating I had no 
further claim against this firm. If I were to die tomorrow my family 
would be left with almost nothing.37 
 
There is little sign here of the manufacturers generosity, either in financial or in 
moral terms. Indeed, having unearthed the fate that had befallen others affected by 
this disease Mr Carter’s concern and anxiety are obvious in the last sentence where 
he prophetically reflects on his own, as well as his family’s future. What Mr Carter 
may not have known but the employer most certainly did was that a recurrence of 
bladder tumours years after the cessation of exposure was a known and characteristic 
feature of the disease.38 It would probably have been for this reason that the firm 
insisted on a signature debarring further claims.   
                                                 
37 MSS.292/174.47/7 (Cancer of the Bladder), Letter from Mr F.W. Carter to the Trades Union 
Congress (TUC), August 31, 1952  
38 M.W. Goldblatt, and J. Goldblatt, ‘Industrial Carcinogenesis and Toxicology’, pp.185-562 in 
Merewether, E.R.A. (ed) Industrial Medicine and Hygiene, Volume 3, Butterworth, (London 1956), 
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In the immediate post-war period the ABCM initiated and funded a study into 
the causes and incidence of bladder cancer in the dyestuffs sector. This study took 
seven years to complete with the results being published in the British Journal of 
Industrial Medicine. The study showed that one out of every ten men exposed to 
benzidine, ά-naphthylamine, or β-naphthylamine had developed a bladder tumour 
and that this was likely to increase to one in every five before all the men were 
dead.39 The use and manufacture of β-naphthylamine was stopped although it should 
be noted that an alternative had been found. The government also recognised 
papilloma of the bladder as an occupational disease amongst dyestuffs workers. The 
other named chemicals were dealt with by the ABCM who responded in 1957 by 
publishing a ‘code of working practice’ that, by title, aimed at controlling, rather than 
eradicating, occupational bladder tumours in the dyestuffs industry.40 The 
manufacture and use of dye intermediates such as ά-naphthylamine continued 
although in 1965 ICI finally took the decision to shut down one of their plants that 
manufactured ά-naphthylamine. According to Castleman this decision was taken as 
ICI had conceded that even within a well designed and operated plant they could not 
prevent their workers becoming exposed to the bladder cancer inducing chemicals.41 
However, once the ICI plant stopped production imports of ά-naphthylamine went 
up. Castleman has argued that following this the ‘immorality of the implicit double 
standard’ had to be seriously questioned and that this was done both by the original 
medical researcher who had conducted the investigation into bladder cancer in the 
dyestuffs industry and in an editorial in the Lancet.42  
In the course of the ABCM study of the dyestuffs sector Case also found that 
a disproportionate amount of bladder cancer victims belonged to the rubber industry. 
The discovery of these deaths led to ICI withdrawing Nonox S from manufacture and 
sale in 1949 although latterly a legal case would prove that this action should have 
                                                 
39 R.A.M. Case, M.E. Hosker, D.B. McDonald, and J.T. Pearson, ‘ Tumours of the Urinary Bladder in 
Workmen Engaged in the Manufacture and Use of Certain Dyestuff Intermediates in the British 
Chemical Industry, Part 1. The Role of Aniline, Benzidine, Alpha-Naphthylamine, and Beta-
Naphthylamine’ pp.75-104 in British Journal of Industrial Medicine, (11) 1954, p.95 
40 T.S. Scott, and M.H.C. Williams, ‘The Control of Industrial Bladder Tumours: A Code of Working 
Practice Recommended by the British Dyestuffs Industry for the Manufacture and Use of Products 
Causing Tumours of the Bladder’ pp.150-163 in British Journal of Industrial Medicine, (14) 1957    
41 B.I. Castleman, The Double Standards in Industrial Hazards, September 1984, Volume 5, No. 9 
http://multinationalmonitor.org/hyper/issues/1984/09/castleman.html 
42 B.I. Castleman, The Double Standards in Industrial Hazards, September 1984, Volume 5, No. 9 
http://multinationalmonitor.org/hyper/issues/1984/09/castleman.html 
 244
been taken much sooner.43 Further, in 1965, the Labour MP, Peter Shore, also 
alleged that in the late 1940s when the rubber industry workers were first identified 
by the ABCM study as being in danger part of the evidence was suppressed by the 
rubber manufacturers.44 It was noted that:  
 
The rubber industry agreed to publication but asked that certain 
amendments should be made, mainly to stress that, on becoming 
aware of the hazards, rubber manufacturers had discontinued the use 
of the carcinogenic substances, and also, in view of this 
discontinuance, to omit references to the need for further 
investigations, as likely to cause unnecessary anxiety among 
workers.45 
 
Just as the ICI researchers had failed to divulge the true extent of health damage 
being caused by soda ash dust for fear that it might make their workers ‘neurotic’ the 
rubber manufacturers wanted to hide information so that their workers wouldn’t 
become too anxious.46 To agree to a silence on the need for further investigation was 
to deny those who had been at risk the opportunity to decide themselves whether 
they wished to continue working in that occupation. Again, it appears that the 
ownership and control of scientific and medical knowledge was important to those 
who owned and controlled industry. Shore pressed the Minister of Labour and asked: 
 
Would not the Minister agree that the employers association [Rubber 
Manufacturing Employers’ Association, (RMEA)] have behaved in a 
most deplorable and irresponsible way – first in delaying the 
publication of their report and all this information when it became 
available in 1950: and then their attempts, successful it would seem, 
to suppress material parts of it before it could be published in 1955?47 
 
                                                 
43 This is in relation to the Nonox S case as discussed in Chapter Three, pp.122-125  
44 The Times, ‘Rubber Industry Hazards: Minister Orders Survey’, February 16, 1965, p.17 
45 Ibid, p.17 
46 See Chapter Four, p.156 
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Another Labour MP, Edmund Dell, remained puzzled as to why, when Nonox S had 
been withdrawn in 1949 it had taken until 1965 for ‘the facts to be properly 
publicised and action taken by the government.’48  The Minister for Labour agreed 
with these sentiments and replied that ‘perhaps other action might have been taken at 
that time’ and that ‘it is all very well to be wise after the event.’ What the Minister 
meant is not clear, as there had been no need to be ‘wise after the event.’ The 
government, ICI and Dunlop had all understood by 1949 that irrefutable evidence 
existed to show that exposure to Nonox S could result in bladder cancer and it was 
for this reason that ICI and Dunlop stopped manufacturing and using the substance. 
What Dunlop didn’t do in 1949 was to inform their workers of the risk that they had 
faced and they held that information back until the 1960s.49 Commenting on this 
decision a judge accepted that a ‘large number of men’ had left Dunlop between 
1949 and 1960 and that these men had no knowledge of the risks they had faced or of 
the need to be screened for bladder cancer.  He stated, ‘there came a time when the 
proper discharge of their duty to their servants called for certain action on the part of 
Dunlop…it did not call for action to those who were no longer their servants.’50 
According to the judge 1960 was the proper time to discharge this duty and to have 
done so before this time would have been, in his view:  
 
A panic measure, quite unjustified by the state of knowledge that 
Dunlop had in 1949/1950 and I accept that any such publicising of a 
possible risk of cancer of the bladder might easily have not been in the 
interests of their employees at that time.51 
 
Why having this knowledge would not have been in the interests of the employees 
can only be explained by the possibility that the judge, like the employers, thought it 
                                                 
48 Ibid, p.17 
49 A circular was sent out by the Rubber Manufacturers Employers’ Association in 1960 
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best that workers did not develop a neurosis or anxiety. Nonetheless, ICI, Dunlop, 
the ABCM, the RMEA and the Industrial Injuries Advisory Council all knew by the 
early 1950s that workers exposed to benzidine, ά-naphthylamine, or β-naphthylamine 
ran ‘a significantly greater risk of developing tumour of the bladder than the general 
population.’52 Once again the ‘gap of neglect’ had opened up between the time the 
manufacturer had knowledge that a lethal substance existed in the manufacture of a 
product and implementing proper steps to limit or eradicate the health risk posed to 
the worker.  
 
The Response by ICI to Angiosarcoma of the Liver 
Private correspondence dated from 1959 shows that scientists knew the 
existing threshold limit value of 500ppm was an unsafe level for workers to be 
exposed to in the VCM industry. Indeed, the industries own research had shown that 
repeated exposure to 200ppm caused liver damage in rabbits with one internal memo 
from a senior Dow chemical toxicologist stating, ‘we feel quite confident…that 
500ppm is going to produce rather appreciable injury when inhaled 7 hours a day, 
five days a week, for an extended period.’53 This information was not publicly 
disclosed and no steps were taken at that stage to reduce VCM exposure levels. 
Markowitz and Rosner, two American public health historians, have presented 
persuasive evidence to support their thesis that senior officials in both the American 
and European plastics industry knew not only that 500ppm was excessive in 1959, 
but also that angiosarcoma of the liver had been identified as an occupational risk in 
1972, two years before the chemical manufacturers were forced to reveal this 
evidence.54 
When in 1972 it was secretly revealed that American chemical workers were 
dying of angiosarcoma of the liver ICI officials have been shown to be willing 
participants in the plastic industry’s deception that followed. First, at a meeting of the 
Manufacturing Chemists’ Association (MCA) held in Washington in 1972 a 
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representative of ICI presented evidence that primary cancers of the liver and 
kidneys had been discovered in rodents exposed to half the recommended TLV of 
500ppm but went along with the decision that this information should not be revealed 
outside of the MCA.55 Second, at a meeting held in July 1973 between American 
representatives of the plastics industry and the National Institute for Occupational 
Health and Safety (NIOSH) an ICI representative, in collusion with his American 
counterparts, withheld information that cases of angiosarcoma of the liver were being 
found at half the recommended levels of exposure.56 The American plastics industry 
had deliberately delayed the dissemination of their knowledge to a wider audience 
and it was only because the deaths caused by exposure to VCM were reported in 
newspapers that the industry reluctantly revealed their own information in January 
1974. In response to this news the British chemical trade association issued a press 
release, which stated that, the American industry and the responsible government 
agency (NIOSH) had been told of the 1972 European research findings.57 Following 
a challenge by NIOSH the ICI representative had to retract his statement. He then 
claimed that why NIOSH had not been told was because they had not asked about the 
research and it was assumed therefore that they were not interested.58 
In 1974 the Chief Inspector of Factories in Britain was informed of the 
occupational deaths and stated that the American revelations had pointed to the 
‘existence of a considerable problem’ although somewhat inconsistently he also felt 
that ‘the evidence available hardly justified prohibition of the process.’59 What this 
statement essentially meant was that the costs (the existence of an occupational 
disease) were much lower than the benefits (having things made from PVC). The 
tried and tested method of dealing with such a cost-benefit analysis was to introduce 
stricter safeguards and some form of financial compensation package to help the 
victims. Therefore, as a consequence of the revelations made in January 1974 a Joint 
Working Group was established in June consisting of the Factory Inspectorate, the 
Employment Medical Advisory Service, the TUC and the CBI. It was at this meeting 
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that an interim hygiene standard was agreed and by February 1975 the Vinyl 
Chloride Code of Practice for Health Precautions was published. The provisions of 
the code meant that the British plastics industry had to revise down the recommended 
level for exposure from 200ppm to a ‘ceiling value’ of 50ppm and that over a whole 
shift the levels were not to exceed 25ppm.60 Demonstrating the guesswork involved 
in establishing TLVs the workers in the USA industry were now to be protected by 
lowering exposure levels from 500ppm to 1ppm.61 Nonetheless, whether it was in the 
USA or Britain what was clear was that it had taken the public exposure of the 
human suffering and death before the industry was made to reduce exposure levels. 
Whilst the Chief Inspector of Factories noted that the industry had made the effort to 
achieve the new lower levels he made no mention of the fact that no difficulties were 
reported in achieving the new ‘safer’ levels. 
The Chief Inspector of Factories also found space in his report to mention 
that ‘it was the industry’s misfortune rather than its fault that vinyl chloride had 
proved to be carcinogenic, a discovery made as a result of industry’s own voluntary 
research.’62 Misfortune perhaps, as little could have been done about the fact that 
VCM was a carcinogen. However, the industry was certainly at fault for failing to 
take swift preventative action once they knew that exposure to VCM could be lethal 
rather than injurious. In 1974 the Chief Inspector of Factories remained ignorant of 
the fact that the industry itself had discovered angiosarcoma of the liver in December 
1972. Indeed, the evidence that angiosarcoma of the liver had been discovered in 
1972 remained a secret beyond 1974 as seen by the fact that even in 1980 the ICI 
laboratories continued to publicly claim that angiosarcoma of the liver amongst 
VCM workers had been ‘discovered in 1974.’63 Even after it had become known that 
angiosarcoma was a threat to VCM workers the industry maintained a grip over the 
monitoring of this disease. Watterson et al note that in the early 1970s the British 
plastics industry voluntarily arranged for an angiosarcoma register to be kept and that 
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by 1999, when it was closed, they had recorded 196 cases.64 However, as the latency 
period for angiosarcoma of the liver could vary between 11 to 40 years this register 
had been prematurely brought to an end by the industry and was therefore 
‘incomplete.’  
 
The Response to Occupational Cancer by a Small Manufacturer 
In 1948, the Department for Research in Industrial Medicine, a branch of the 
Medical Research Council (MRC), noted that no mortality data or reliable 
information existed for any of the chromate-manufacturing factories in Britain.65 The 
unreliability of data for this industry has been discussed in Chapter Three but the 
under-recording of mortality data was not unique to chrome ulceration or the 
chemical industry. Tweedale, for example, argues that, ‘the Factory Inspectorate 
made no special effort to tally asbestosis deaths and only listed those cases where 
there was no doubt as to the cause of death.’66 In response to the dearth of 
information the MRC conducted a three-year investigation into the chromate-
manufacturing industry and concluded that whilst it had not been possible to 
ascertain the true levels of cancer they did think it possible that there was ‘some 
increase in the incidence of carcinoma of the lung.’67  A further study was 
commissioned and for the next five years 723 chromate-manufacturing employees 
were clinically examined and x-rayed. The results of this study were published in 
1956 and it concluded that there was ‘an excessive mortality from carcinoma of the 
lung’ and that deaths were occurring ‘disproportionately early.’68 Variables such as 
place of residence, social class and smoking habits were all taken into account but 
these did not help to explain the high incidence of lung cancer. Whilst it was 
perfectly true that smoking did cause lung cancer Bidstrup and Case claimed that 
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even if all of the chromate workers had been categorised as ‘heavy smokers’ this 
would not have satisfactorily accounted for the increase in lung cancer found 
amongst the British chromate workers.69 What the evidence showed was that 
carcinoma of the lung was an occupational hazard within the chromate-
manufacturing industry and that there was a mean latency period of 21 ± 10 years. 
Responding to this evidence on the 9th of August 1956, J & J White, a Glasgow 
based chromate-manufacturing firm, issued an announcement about the introduction 
of ‘special disablement benefits.’70 By analysing this announcement a unique insight 
is gained into how this firm dealt with the ‘news’ that its processes were slowly 
killing the workforce. 
Lung cancer could be an occupational or non-occupational disease and unless 
a precise causal factor was provided no compensation was awarded under the 
National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Acts. In the case of chromate manufacturing 
the precise causal factor of the lung cancer had not been established.71 The benefit 
scheme was therefore deemed ‘special’ in that it did offer a compensation payment to 
any employee with lung cancer ‘employed on the chrome side long enough for its 
development as a result of their employment.’72 The payment of the benefit was also 
subject to company approval. Even allowing for regional variations the 1950s were a 
period of low unemployment, something that allowed most workers a little more 
freedom in choosing where they could sell their labour power. Indeed, in this 
atmosphere many workers who considered their jobs to be dangerous or unpleasant 
could find alternatives and this left gaps in some sectors. Bashir Maan recalled that 
during this period members of his Pakistani community gained employment on the 
buses, in bakeries and in chemical works because both the buses and bakeries 
worked unsociable hours and in chemicals, ‘because they were very dangerous 
jobs.’73 Therefore, instinctively, on hearing the news of the risk of getting lung 
cancer many of Whites workers may have simply chosen to leave. However, by 
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introducing the special benefit scheme the firm introduced into the mind of the 
worker the concept of gambling for future security. 
As things stood, if a worker left the firm and then contracted lung cancer he 
would receive no compensation. If he stayed at Whites there was a statistically 
greater chance of contracting lung cancer but he would receive compensation if this 
occurred. What will be argued here is that Whites anticipated that men may have 
decided to leave the firm but to avoid this unfavourable reaction they loaded the 
announcement so as to minimise the real cancer threat and retain as many workers as 
possible. Therefore, presenting an interpretation of the study prior to its release 
Whites discussed the need for their special benefit scheme: 
 
Let me tell you why we think there is such a need. We have been 
concerned about a number of cases of lung trouble [which have 
occurred on the chrome side of the works] in our works.74 Of course 
we must not form snap judgements in such matters because one or 
two cases among relatively few people tend to give an exaggerated 
view, so an assessment over a long period is the only way to form a 
proper judgement.75 
 
It can be seen that Whites had chosen to deliberately play down the seriousness of 
the findings by carefully selecting words and phrases such as ‘one or two’ ‘few 
people’ and ‘exaggerated view.’ This has to be read as a deliberate attempt at 
diminishing the threat that was actually posed. Linking the perception of minimal 
risk to their magnanimous gesture of financial compensation it is at least possible to 
argue that Whites were trying to maintain the workers’ labour and compliance and 
thereby maintain uninterrupted production.   
The announcement continued by explaining to the workers that the initial 
short investigation had been ‘inconclusive’ and that this had necessitated the much 
longer study that was conducted by the MRC scientist, Dr Bidstrup, ‘whom most of 
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you know.’76 Dr Bidstrup would go on to accept a commission from Whites as their 
‘medical consultant.’77  Whites noted of this longer study: 
 
(The) report states that the incidence of lung cancer in our works is 
greater than the average for the male population of the country as a 
whole. The Company has decided that it is its duty to make known the 
results of this investigation. It has therefore given permission for the 
report to be published but we want you to have the facts in advance. 
Don’t let us get this out of perspective. There has been a great deal of 
publicity lately about the increase in lung cancer in the general 
population and its possible causes. Such publicity tends to get the 
matter out of proportion. Remember that, although the report shows 
that the incidence is higher than normal it is still a great deal less than 
similar hazards in other industries such as the oil, dyestuffs and tar 
industries and very much less than the incidence of other industrial 
diseases such as silicosis in coal miners and foundrymen and so forth 
and so on. So you see we have a problem, not on a large scale but one 
which must be tackled positively and decisively and not getting it out 
of proportion just as similar problems have been tackled in other 
industries. Every practicable step so far as is consistent with general 
medical knowledge has been taken and will be taken to reduce any 
risk. 78  
 
Again, Whites had provided a master class on how to use language to minimise the 
risks and to shape perceptions. By carefully constructing their announcement they 
argued that although there was a threat of lung cancer the publicity associated with 
this disease had made things sound worse than they actually were. Whites had then 
argued that there was a lower risk of getting cancer at their firm than in other 
industries. This was followed by a claim that whatever problem did exist it would 
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hardly affect anyone (not on a large scale) and that in any case at Whites everything 
would be done to minimise the risks. 
In addition to the above Whites attempted a further deception. They knew 
that some of their workforce would have heard that smoking increased their chances 
of getting lung cancer.79 It was for this reason that they talked of ‘recent publicity’ 
and the matter being ‘out of proportion.’ But Whites knew that the cancer rates 
recorded in their works were not connected to cigarette smoking or the general 
population rates. Indeed the MRC report had specifically and categorically 
demonstrated this fact unambiguously stating: 
 
The possibility that the increase found by us could be due to a non-
occupational cause such as diagnostic bias, place of residence, social 
class, or smoking habits has been examined, discussed, and discarded, 
and we therefore conclude that carcinoma of the lung must be 
considered as an occupational hazard in the chromates-producing 
industry.80 
 
Therefore, the rates of lung cancer being reported amongst the Whites workforce 
were not being distorted or exaggerated but were in fact greater than the average for 
the male population. However, by introducing to the workers the idea that reports of 
lung cancer had been exaggerated Whites hoped to give the impression that this also 
applied to the cancers being reported at Whites. A second deceit is contained in the 
passage that compares the low incidence of occupational cancer at Whites with the 
higher incidence in other industries such as oil, dyestuffs, tar, and those contracting 
silicosis in the coal industry. Bidstrup had already stated in 1948 that no mortality 
data or reliable information existed at all for the chromate-manufacturing sector prior 
to this investigation and her figures in the 1956 MRC report only covered the 
previous six years. The lung cancer risk at Whites was estimated to have a latency 
period of around 20 years. It would therefore have been impossible for Whites to 
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truthfully compare the rate of lung cancer at their workplace with any other industry. 
To have done so, and to give the impression to the workers that Whites was a safer 
working environment was to act deceitfully. 
It is interesting to note that even by 1956 Whites actually had the power to 
veto or allow publication of this Medical Research Council (MRC) report. The 
decision by Whites to publish the report may have been taken, as they claimed it was, 
through a ‘sense of duty.’ Historically, however, there is little evidence to show that 
the firm had a great sense of duty.81 What can be argued therefore is that their 
decision to publish may have been influenced by events that occurred the previous 
year. It was then that the asbestos manufacturers, Turner & Newall, attempted to 
suppress research results showing that their workers had a very high risk of 
contracting lung cancer. Tweedale notes that following this attempted suppression 
the report was ‘leaked into the national press via the annual report of the researcher’s 
medical institution,’ questions were raised in parliament, and the article was 
published in the British Journal of Industrial Medicine that year.82 Whilst admittedly 
this is conjecture it is possible that Whites had heard of this turn of events from the 
press, business associates, or from their own medical expert, Dr Bidstrup. Therefore, 
in order to avoid bad publicity they allowed the publication of the research but not 
before attempting to minimise its menace and present a compassionate and caring 
front by introducing their special disablement benefit scheme.   
Whites also reacted to the findings of the report by doing what they said they 
would do and that was to follow the pattern that had been set by ‘other industries.’ 
Following a damning report in the 1950s the dyestuffs industry began to seriously 
improve plant design to reduce the workers’ exposure to carcinogens.83 The coal and 
asbestos industries also reacted to unfavourable health reports by taking steps to 
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reduce harmful dusts within their working environments.84 Thus, between 1957 and 
1959, Whites installed new plant and a new ‘low-lime’ process. As Davies et al have 
noted: 
 
In the standard high-lime kiln process…significant amounts of slowly 
soluble calcium chromate were formed and were present in the dusts 
to which workers were exposed. Exposures would have been 
especially high at Bolton and Rutherglen [Whites].’85 
 
Having lower levels of toxic dust to contend with demonstrates why installing a low-
lime process was of benefit to those working at Whites. However, there had been no 
technological reason preventing Whites from doing this much sooner as the system 
had been available since 1928.86 However, to do so may have reduced the 10 to 15 
per cent dividend being paid to their shareholders.87 Nonetheless, the changes made 
to the plant in the late 1950s and early 1960s resulted in a reported reduction of 
chrome ulceration amongst chromate manufacturers.88 A follow-up study of 1981 
also demonstrated that the introduction of these changes had reduced the 
occupational cancer rates.89 No documents could be found to indicate how much 
money was paid out on ‘special disablement benefit’ and it is therefore impossible to 
ascertain just how much the firm thought one of their workers lives was worth. A 
largely uninterrupted production of chromates continued at Whites works until 1967, 
when for business reasons, manufacturing was moved to the north east of England.   
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Conclusion 
It has been argued that from 1914 to 1974 successive governments took a 
close interest in the development of the British chemical industry because they 
understood just how important it had become at an economic, social, and political 
level. The success of the industry was therefore measured by its ability to supply the 
necessary substances to the government and other industries and this was done 
within a largely unfettered regulatory environment. The limited, and often out-of-
date government legislation was promoted in the industry’s own model safety rules 
publication with the factory inspectorate endorsing these over a period of decades. 
This helped to provide a public perception that the chemical industry was concerned 
about the welfare of its workforce. However, it has been argued that the existence of 
model safety rules was no guarantee that their legal or voluntary aspects would have 
been implemented. Indeed, the employer’s attitude to employee health and safety is 
perhaps better measured by the fact that throughout the period the model rules were 
in print the chemical industry continued to expose thousands of workers to lethal 
compounds in the dyestuffs sector. Further, it has been argued that ‘reputable’ 
employers were complicit in the rubber industry’s decision to withhold vital 
information regarding the carcinogenic properties of Nonox S and that even up to the 
1970s were prepared to act deceitfully with regard to the carcinogenic properties of 
VCM.  
Employers did respond to the evidence of occupational deaths and injuries 
and this was witnessed in three main ways. Firstly, employers introduced some 
improvements to their processes and these were designed to have an ameliorative 
effect. This course was followed as controlling a potentially lethal but profitable 
process was preferable to having it prohibited. However, it has been shown that when 
the costs of providing proper protection grew the employers threatened to stop 
production or move it where the legislation was weaker. Second, both large and 
small chemical firms unilaterally established and administered financial 
compensation schemes. By doing this they showed that it was acceptable to kill or 
injure workers and that it was possible to put a price on this loss. Under these 
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circumstances the employers’ controlled the budgets for death and injury and these 
became negotiable costs. For example, the evidence shows that Clayton Aniline 
Company acted in a grudging, inconsistent, and indifferent manner in response to the 
human loss sustained in their production processes. Indeed, the evidence 
demonstrates that this firm made workers sign away future claims even although the 
firm would have known that bladder tumours were likely to reoccur in the victims. 
Even in smaller firms, such as at Whites, a compensation scheme was introduced in 
response to the news that their workers stood a greater risk of contracting lung 
cancer. It has been argued that this was not an altruistic measure and that the firm set 
out to deceive its workforce by minimising the risk factor that was inherent in the 
production process. This took place during a period of low unemployment and it has 
been argued that the reason the firm followed this line was in an attempt to maintain 
its workforce and therefore its production. The third response came in the form of 
epidemiological research projects. These were commissioned to discover if a risk 
actually did exist although they were not always structured to determine the precise 
causal factors. The main characteristics of these studies were that they took many 
years to complete and relied on having dead bodies to count. Yet, even after years of 
research and where substances were identified as dangerous these substances were 
not always banned. In the dyestuffs sector β-naphthylamine was banned but by the 
time research had been commissioned and conducted an alternative substance had 
been discovered. The other highly dangerous substances remained in manufacture for 
years thereafter. Only when the manufacturer conceded that it was impossible to 
manufacture them safely was the process stopped. This could perhaps be viewed as a 
highly moral act but the manufacturers decision to then have the substances imported 
tends to tarnish this. 
 
 
Chapter Seven 
 
Conclusion 
 
Social historians of occupational health have investigated a number of areas 
of British industry in recent years that have included cotton, coal and the asbestos 
industries. These have provided important in-depth analyses of the issues that lie at 
the interface between medical and labour history. Having identified a gap in the 
literature this research provides an account of occupational health and safety within 
the British chemical industry covering the period between the outbreak of World 
War One and the introduction of the Health and Safety at Work Act in 1974. 
Throughout this period the diverse output of the British chemical industry was 
important to both the government and to many areas of British industry and retail. 
Indeed, it has been argued that because of its economic, political and social 
importance the industry was allowed to develop with only limited regulation.1 Yet, 
this was an inherently dangerous industry, one that used high pressures and high 
temperatures to transform raw materials into a bewildering array of complex 
chemical substances. Danger to life arose from explosion, fire, and spillage but 
manufacturing chemicals also generated toxic fumes, gases, and dusts with exposure 
to these resulting in acute symptoms and chronic illnesses for many. Working in the 
chemical industry was a hazardous occupation although this was not always 
immediately or obviously apparent and staying alive whilst trying to earn a living 
was not always easy. Whilst this may be true for other industries what sets the 
chemical industry apart is the fact that it experienced a continuous growth not only in 
its scale of production but more importantly in the number of products that it 
manufactured. Therefore, the potential areas for injury, disease or death multiplied 
along with the development of the industry. The consequences of this were that some 
health hazards associated with established processes and products had yet to be 
officially identified and dealt with whilst at the same time new processes and 
products harbouring new dangers were already underway. The evidence has shown 
that this was an industry where death and injury amongst the workers acted as a 
                                                 
1 W. Grant, W. Paterson, and C. Whitson, Government and the Chemical Industry, A Comparative 
Study of Britain and West Germany, Clarendon Press, (Oxford 1988), p.282 
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barometer to show that processes were dangerous rather than the industry proving 
beforehand that they were safe. Therefore, the cost of the industries’ progress was 
measured by the loss of the workers’ health and life.  
This research used McIvor’s model which asserts that there are three main 
ways employment can affect health. These are the long hours and the pace of work 
which induces fatigue, exposure to the possibility of injury and death by industrial 
accidents, and contact with materials leading to poisoning and occupational disease. 
Examining each of these areas as well as the roles played by the key players this 
research was presented thematically. It has been shown that the working week was 
reduced over the sixty years under investigation from around 70 hours in 1914 to one 
of 40 hours in 1974. At one level these reductions counter the Marxist interpretation 
that capitalists sought to exploit labour power by increasing the amount of time 
worked. However, these reductions were introduced gradually, were subject to 
reversal, and were mainly the result of concessions made by employers or the state 
who came to realise that by doing so a more ‘efficient’ workforce was created. In 
theory, the reductions in hours should have allowed chemical workers more time to 
recuperate, to socialise, and to spend time with their family and friends. In practice 
however this did not fully materialise and over the same period that the hours were 
reduced the main employers, such as ICI, sought to find optimum levels of efficiency 
by implementing methods that were designed to increase productivity and profits. 
Therefore, new scientific and technological developments were introduced and by 
harnessing the workers to rotating shift patterns the manufacturers ensured 
uninterrupted flows of production. This has been associated with the idea of ‘work 
intensification.’ The shiftwork was then linked to scientific management techniques 
in the 1930s and the labour process was altered with certain tasks being subjected to 
wage payment schemes. This not only helped to reduce labour costs and extend 
managerial control over the process but it helped increase productivity. By the 1960s, 
regular amounts of overtime were being worked and a correlation was found between 
the long hours being worked and increased accident rates over the same period. 
Whilst overtime is usually considered to be voluntary the use of oral testimony 
allowed some insight into the pressures that waged labour experience and this calls 
into question just how much overtime is truly ‘voluntary.’ Therefore, many of the 
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health and welfare benefits that should have been delivered to the workers from 
having a shorter working week were partially lost as the owners of the chemical 
industry implemented changes to the labour process that sought to increase the levels 
of surplus value. 
It has been argued that the stress and strain of working long, physical, and 
unsociable hours had a damaging effect on the health of the chemical worker. Whilst 
some of the evidence for this may be considered subjective the official data 
associated with accidents is generally held to be more objective. Drawing on new 
archival evidence it has been demonstrated that thousands of UAC workers suffered 
injuries as a result of ‘accidents’ sustained in the workplace. This source not only 
allowed the data to be measured quantitatively but also as each accident report 
contained a brief description of cause then a qualitative assessment was able to be 
made. What these reports have shown is that many of the reported ‘accidents’ were 
predictable and preventable. The prediction would have been possible by the very 
frequency of some whilst the prevention could have been achieved by simple 
improvements in maintenance or an adherence to the limited legislation. This 
demonstrated that this employer had a disregard for the health and well-being of the 
employees although as other historians have identified this was really no different to 
many other areas of British industry where thousands of workers were killed or 
injured under similar circumstances. Indeed, this raises the question as to why these 
incidents are referred to as accidents at all.2 Perhaps it was the preferred choice of 
those who owned and controlled industry? By doing so they could convince those 
forced to sell their labour power that these were indeed just random or unforeseen 
events and were not in fact caused by neglect. Perhaps it is because by referring to 
the causes of death and injury as ‘accidental’ a perception could then be generated of 
worker carelessness? Indeed, McIvor in A History of Work has identified the blaming 
of the victim as something that had a ‘long tradition.’3 This meshes with the theory 
espoused by Dwyer who has claimed that as soon as the human factor is considered 
                                                 
2 This is explored in detail by R. Campbell in ‘Philosophy of the Accident’, pp.17-33 in R. Cooter and 
B. Luckin (eds) Accidents in History: Injuries, Fatalities and Social Relations, Rodopi, (Amsterdam 
1997) 
3 A.J. McIvor, A History of Work in Britain, 1880-1950, Palgrave, (Hampshire 2001), p.127 
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as a cause of an accident then nearly all accidents can be attributed to the worker.4 
The evidence that has been presented in this research shows that blaming the worker 
was not an unknown occurrence although the vast majority of the ‘accidents’ were 
not caused by random or unforeseen events and neither were they caused by worker 
negligence. Accidents generally occurred when the worker was simply involved in a 
regular and structured activity. An inadequate supply of protective wear, a lack of 
maintenance, a reluctance to fully implement rules and regulations or, as happened at 
Flixborough, a reliance on makeshift equipment offers a more plausible range of 
reasons to explain why it was that occupational ‘accidents’ continued to happen 
between 1914 and 1974.  
The numbers of chemical workers that were employed increased substantially 
yet, when compared to those in shipbuilding or engineering the official accident data 
shows that a relatively low number of them were involved in accidents. Bartrip, 
Burman, and Fenn have argued that state intervention in the form of factory 
legislation ultimately had an ameliorative effect on occupational health and safety.5 
Are the very low accident figures in the chemical industry therefore a direct 
consequence of positive preventative legislation? The simple answer to this question 
must be no. In terms of industry-specific legislation it has been demonstrated that 
this was sparse and often failed to address the dynamic changes that occurred in the 
development of process technology and manufactured products. Whilst the special 
rules and regulations were supplemented by the more general measures contained in 
the Factory Acts this cannot account for the comparatively low levels of accidents 
found in the chemical industry. Nonetheless, evidence has been found to show that 
some employers gradually improved the design of their chemical plant and installed 
modern process equipment. As this often reduced the contact that occurred between 
the product and the process worker this may have lowered accident rates. 
Undoubtedly accident levels would also have been reduced as a consequence of the 
efforts made to shield the capital-intensive process technology from leakage, fire, 
                                                 
4 T. Dwyer, Life and Death at Work, Industrial Accidents as a Case of Socially Produced Error, 
Plenum Press, (New York 1991), p.148 
5 P.W.J. Bartrip, and P.T. Fenn, ‘Factory Fatalities and Regulation in Britain, 1873-1913’ pp.60-74 in 
Explorations in Economic History, Volume 25, 1988 and P.W.J. Bartrip, and S.B. Burman, The 
Wounded Soldiers of Industry, Industrial Compensation Policy, 1833-1897, Clarendon Press, (Oxford 
1983)  
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and explosion. However, although chemical employers tended to react relatively 
swiftly in providing protection for their capital investments they were much more 
short sighted in providing a safer working environment for their workforce which 
was seen as an avoidable cost. Therefore, other reasons must be found to explain the 
relatively low accident figures that have been recorded for the chemical industry. 
New evidence drawn from the UAC accident books shows that at least until 
the mid 1920s accident claims were not always made and therefore never actually 
recorded. It is not unreasonable to suggest that this practice was mirrored across the 
industry as a whole. The deliberate and successful policies of the employers to keep 
trade union membership low also meant that fewer workers received assistance in 
making an accident or compensation claim. This situation would have prevailed until 
at least the late 1940s when the Industrial Injuries Act made it easier to make a 
compensation claim. Even when unions did increase their presence the evidence 
from the TGWU Chemical Group National Committee minute books demonstrate 
that still in the late 1950s ICI refused to share accident information with union 
representatives. Data is also missing for large periods during both world wars when 
production was at its height and when accident levels would have increased. Without 
overstating its significance there is also evidence to show that during the late 1960s 
and early 1970s injured workers were transported into chemical plants so that they 
would not appear on absence records and hence become an injury statistic. However, 
perhaps the most significant reason that helps explain the relatively low rate of 
accidents in the chemical industry is dealt with by reference to Sellers 
‘epistemological dilemma.’ That is, ‘though much of the havoc that production 
wrought on workers’ bodies was hard to miss, its less obvious manifestations often 
remained as invisible as the destruction of distant forests or prairies.’6 For an 
accident to stand any chance of being recorded there had to have been an incident 
that resulted in an operative receiving some form of injury (usually immediately) that 
required treatment and a period of absence for recovery. However, where the 
incident that occurred involved an ‘accidental’ escape of dust, fume, gas or liquid 
and where no physical consequences of this were immediately obvious then no 
accident would have been recorded. This of course did not mean that an ‘accident’ 
                                                 
6 C.C. Sellers, C.C. Hazards of the Job, From Industrial Disease to Environmental Health Science, 
University of North Carolina Press, (London 1997), p.4 
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had not occurred or that nobody had been injured. Whilst the chemical industry was 
routinely dangerous to those working within it this has not always been obvious to 
those who collated the accident data or to those who have perused it. None of this 
evidence negates the theory that legislation could have an ameliorative effect on 
occupational health and safety but what it does do is to question the extent to which 
it did this in the chemical industry. 
Evidence of the under reporting effect has also been found for mortality rates 
in the chemical industry. As noted above, one of the major health hazards associated 
with the industry was that it used and manufactured substances of varying degrees of 
toxicity. During the chemical process quantities of dust, fumes and gases were 
released into the working atmosphere. What has been shown is that many substances 
were used fully in the production process although their toxicity was never fully 
tested and decades would pass before the full consequences of this practice were 
officially recognised. For example, chromates, cadmium, vinyl chloride monomer, 
dyestuffs intermediates and antioxidants were all produced in vast quantities. Some 
efforts were made to limit exposure by adhering to the list of threshold limit values 
(TLVs) although, just as Tweedale has noted of the asbestos industry, these were 
generally determined by a less than robust methodology.7 Therefore, exposed to 
arbitrary levels of dusts, fumes or gases some workers experienced a slow decline in 
their health although they were not always considered casualties of the chemical 
industry, even in death. For example, latency periods associated with occupational 
cancers meant that many workers could have left the source of their demise to start 
work with other firms. When they eventually succumbed it was the final occupation 
that was entered on the death certificate. Indeed, long latency periods ensured that 
many of those who worked in the chromate, dyestuffs, or plastics sectors would most 
certainly have died from occupational cancers but their deaths would never have 
been attributed to the chemical industry as they had expired before their particular 
cancer was acknowledged as occupational. Contemporary private correspondence 
has also shown that some workers who became too ill to work and desperate for 
income were rendered invisible on receipt of compensation payments from the 
culpable company. Further, where a link was officially established between exposure 
                                                 
7 G. Tweedale, Magic Mineral to Killer Dust, Turner & Newall and the Asbestos Hazard, Oxford 
University Press, (Oxford 2003), p.258 
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and an occupational disease, such as chrome ulceration, the data has been shown to 
be wholly unreliable. With respect to the more insidious diseases such as 
occupational cancers the statistical evidence has been shown to be patchy, poor, and 
often incomplete. Indeed, detailed research undertaken by Markowitz and Rosner has 
shown that both US and European manufacturers successfully suppressed 
information on the lethal capabilities of VCM for decades and therefore no data 
would have been collected for angiosarcoma of the liver until the 1970s.8 Therefore, 
although many thousands of chemical workers would almost certainly have died or 
become incapacitated as a result of contracting an occupational disease the true 
levels of death and ill health will never be known. Having drawn on a variety of 
source material it is at least possible to argue that both the accident and mortality 
data that is available for the chemical industry presents a fictitious and flattering 
picture rather than a factual and perhaps damaging one. 
The state, the factory inspectorate and those with medical knowledge were all 
identified as agents who were positioned to deliver protection to chemical workers 
but it has been argued that none of them were as effective as they could, or indeed 
should have been. At a fundamental level the many workers who were killed, injured 
or poisoned throughout the period are testaments to this view. As noted above, 
criticism of the state arises from the fact that few industry-specific safety measures 
were enacted over the sixty years in question and this laggardly attitude contrasted 
dramatically with the dynamic development of the new products and processes. If 
careful research and a comprehensive review of legislation had filled the years 
between each measure then perhaps quality would have excused the lack of quantity 
but this was simply not the case. Rules and regulations drawn up in the late 
nineteenth century remained largely unaltered despite well-known process changes 
taking place and then only revised in the early 1920s at a point when the industry 
was undergoing rapid change. Looking backwards whilst the industry advanced was 
no way to provide effective protection. The evidence also shows that where proof did 
exist on occupational hazards many decades elapsed before preventative or 
compensatory measures were enacted. This has been referred to as a ‘gap of neglect’ 
and is something that Tweedale and Johnston and McIvor have also found in relation 
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to the asbestos industry.9 This research also confirms the view expressed by Grant et 
al and Pearce and Tombs that this was an industry that received little attention from 
the government unless it was to smooth its development.  
The factory inspectorate were far from successful in policing the workplace 
although much of this could be blamed on the chronic lack of resources and the 
imprecision of the legislation both of which weakened their potential. Indeed, these 
factors led the inspectorate into a policy of encouraging rather than forcing 
employers to comply with the law and it has been argued, as Johnston and McIvor 
have done, that this ‘softly-softly’ approach was never enough to combat those who 
prioritised productivity and profits over health and safety. Perhaps the inspectorate’s 
approach was a pragmatic reflection of the lack of interest shown in occupational 
health and safety issues both by the state and in general? After all, Legge had found 
it difficult to gain support for the teaching of occupational health and even in the mid 
1950s the Nuffield Foundation felt that this area of study was being largely ignored. 
However, the argument that the inspectorate could have acted more effectively if 
only they had been given more resources should not be overstated. There is evidence 
that this body were attuned to the employer’s interests and this is evidenced by their 
practice of giving warning to employers that inspections were imminent. Oral 
testimony has also been provided to show how this practice frustrated the workers 
who wished to have their working environment properly assessed and put right. It 
was also the case that by informing employers in advance of visits the inspectorate 
alienated many trade unionists who were deeply suspicious of this behaviour. 
However, factory inspector’s reports also show that they did help to identify areas 
where employers were failing to comply with the law and diligently reported on the 
need for improvement. Indeed, if they had failed to do this then they would have 
been obviously partial and unjust. However, as Thompson has argued of the legal 
system if they had failed to do this then they would ‘mask nothing, legitimate 
nothing, and contribute nothing to any class’s hegemony.’10      
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Occupational health research conducted by the HMWC during the First 
World War was primarily aimed at increasing production during a period of full 
employment. Whilst welcomed during the war by the state and employers the 
enthusiasm for this particular system of humanising the workplace soon waned 
during the inter-war period with the return of unemployment and a reserve army of 
labour. This disinterest in the workers welfare was confirmed by McIvor’s detailed 
analysis of the IHRB and Watterson’s examination of the IHES with both studies 
demonstrating the general lack of employer enthusiasm and interest in occupational 
health during this inter-war period.11 Of particular interest to this research study was 
the fact that the head of ICI became involved with the IHES although his motivation 
for doing so was unclear and therefore remains open to interpretation. What has been 
shown is that the IHES organised hundreds of educational talks and amongst those in 
attendance were many trade unionists. Indeed, the trade unions actually contributed 
funds to this organisation as a way of helping to educate their members on 
occupational health issues. However, whilst the IHES sought to expand the 
knowledge base on issues of health and safety the ICI workforce were actually 
forbidden to discuss such issues during the managed meetings they were allowed to 
attend. What has been argued therefore is that ICI may have shown an interest in this 
organisation as this helped them to placate trade union and employee concerns about 
the safety of the industry The ICI interest in the IHES was therefore cosmetic and 
really aimed at enhancing the caring image of the firm that was being nurtured.   
That ICI wanted to be seen (as well as act) as a safe employer was witnessed 
by their decision taken in the 1930s to establish their own medical research 
laboratory. In creating this ICI also claimed ownership of the medical knowledge 
associated with their processes. As Navarro has argued this provided the firm with its 
own ‘scientific knowledge’ and rendered most of the workers knowledge of the 
processes ‘unscientific.’12 Evidence of this is seen in the battleground that often 
existed when official recognition was being sought for occupational diseases and 
where the workers direct and often painful experience was put to one side whilst 
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prominence was given to the ‘scientific’ research that took many years to conclude. 
ICI research was conducted and the results published in reputable journals. This 
delivered kudos to ICI although undoubtedly some improvements were also 
delivered to the working environment. However, before changes were made to the 
processes and working environment ICI were generally concerned that these were 
both affordable and unlikely to hinder production. For example, the ICI laboratories 
were well aware from the 1930s that intermediate dyestuffs had carcinogenic 
properties and although some effort was made to reduce dust levels the firm 
prioritised the finding of replacement substances rather than stopping this deadly 
production. It was shown that this type of decision making was heavily influenced by 
economic and political considerations rather than any sense of human morality. This 
evidence meshes with that found by Tweedale, and Markowitz and Rosner who have 
uncovered evidence to show that asbestos and chemical employers continued to 
manufacture their products well beyond the period they knew them to be deadly.13 
Oral testimony has also shown that owning and controlling medical knowledge 
meant that ICI were able to withhold evidence that demonstrated their plant was 
causing deterioration in the eyesight and hearing of their workers. Again, in the 
absence of any ‘scientific’ evidence being made available to explain this 
deterioration the ‘non-scientific’ observations of the workforce were ignored. In 
parallel with the asbestos industry it was also noted that ICI medical research was 
used in court to defend the company’s actions when accused of not taking sufficient 
precautions to protect its employees or customers. The use of the epidemiological 
method has also been criticised. This methodology was first used in 1947 by an 
ABCM commissioned research project on industrial papilloma of the bladder with 
the results published seven years later. It has become the most commonly used 
methodology in the chemical industry but has drawn criticism from those who see its 
use as a delaying tactic within a wider strategy that seeks to ‘manufacture doubt’ 
about the dangerous processes and products associated with the chemical industry.14  
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ICI, the largest chemical employer, was anti-union although not 
conventionally so and instead deployed a range of subtle strategies that proved 
effective at keeping trade union membership figures low. Within this situation the 
relatively weakened trade unions had to contend with the dangers inherent in a 
complex industry that manufactured a huge range of potentially hazardous 
substances using various processes. Drawing on the evidence of the TGWU and TUC 
archives this research has argued that despite their relatively weak position the trade 
unions were able to campaign on a variety of occupational health and safety issues. 
These met with some success such as helping to deliver improved safety equipment 
and having the manufacture of some substances regulated or banned. It is a simple 
enough fact but one that is often missing when historians discuss trade unions and 
that is that trade unions are predominantly voluntary organisations. It is this group, 
the trade unions, who have been accused by some historians of not doing enough on 
occupational health issues, of prioritising wages over health and of fighting to 
safeguard jobs rather than for improved health and safety standards.15 These general 
accusations have been examined more closely by other historians who have tended to 
offer qualified criticisms of the role played by trade unions in combating 
occupational health issues in the asbestos industry.16 Further examinations have 
offered a more sympathetic understanding of the situation trade unions faced in the 
cotton and coal industries.17 However, this research has argued that to criticise the 
trade unions for not doing enough or of prioritising wages over health is to 
perpetuate the false premise that an equality of power existed between the trade 
unions, the state, and the employers. The evidence of this research shows that no 
such equality of power existed and therefore trade unions were constantly engaged in 
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campaigns to overcome the inherent inequalities of a system that forced people to 
sell their labour power in conditions that were not of their own making. Clearly trade 
unions did have intermittent periods where they could express their agency. This is 
evident in the campaigns they led for improved working conditions, for reductions in 
hours, for paid holidays, for pension entitlements and for sickness absence. It was 
also clearly evident when they were campaigning against anti-union laws, wage cuts, 
unemployment, lock-outs, the intensification of workloads, or even to be recognised 
by the employer and state as having a right to exist. Yes, trade unions did campaign 
for more wages – who else would? However, as has been argued wages were a 
means to life for trade unionists whereas to employers they were a cost and it was the 
employer and state that prioritised wages. Thereafter trade unions preferences were 
shaped by those decisions. As has already been stated, but is worth repeating, to 
criticise the trade unions for not doing enough is rather like criticising women for not 
getting the vote much sooner. This is not what historians have done but have instead 
produced analyses to show that women lived and worked in a society that 
discriminated, subordinated, and exploited them and that this explains the delays in 
women gaining equalities.  
This research has demonstrated that the British chemical industry operated in 
a relatively unfettered regulatory environment and that for decades the employers 
knowingly operated processes that exposed their workers to a variety of toxic and 
carcinogenic substances. This had the inevitable effect of causing injury and death to 
an untold number of chemical workers who were simply trying to earn a living. One 
of the main employer responses to disease or injury was to offer financial 
compensation, an act that emphasised that the values they possessed placed 
productivity and profit over life. By owning and controlling their own compensation 
schemes the employers managed to diffuse any potential antagonism, they sometimes 
avoided payment, and were also able to hide the numbers being killed or injured 
because the victim’s silence was required before the release of payment. The state 
knew from the outset why these private compensation schemes were being operated 
and having taken no action to prevent them have to be seen as willing partners. When 
eventually the scientific evidence revealed the precise deadly danger of the process 
the employer responses varied but self-regulation and the introduction of further 
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improvements to the working conditions usually followed rather than their processes 
being banned outright. When the regulations for certain processes were finally 
tightened in the 1970s employers threatened to export the risk to more compliant 
countries rather than spending money making these safer. Clearly up to that point 
paying compensation had been cost effective. What this research has demonstrated is 
that chemical employers were prepared to operate processes even when there was no 
doubt at all that the workers were being injured or killed. This requires no academic 
hindsight. In the dyestuffs industry, for example, employers had known from the late 
1920s that exposure to the process could result in bladder cancer. When the precise 
causes of the cancer were identified in the 1950s only one substance was banned and 
production continued unabated under an industry-led safety control programme that 
was shown to be less than effective. Meanwhile, a government department rather 
than the industries own scheme made the compensation payments. Chromate 
manufacturers also knew from the late nineteenth century that chrome ulcerations 
were associated with high dust levels. Nonetheless, they continued to use equipment 
that produced high dust levels through to the 1950s when plant had been available 
from the late 1920s that produced much lower levels of harmful dust. Only when 
lung cancer became associated with the process were steps taken to reduce dust 
levels alongside yet another company-led compensation scheme. What this research 
has confirmed is that the British chemical employers did not differ from their 
counterparts in other industries and that productivity and profit was always placed 
ahead of the workers health and safety.  
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